Sports have long played an important role in society. By exploring the evolving link between sporting behaviour and the prevailing ethics of the time this comprehensive and wide-ranging study illuminates our understanding of the wider social significance of sport. The primary aim of _Sports, Virtues and Vices_ is to situate ethics at the heart of sports via ‘virtue ethical’ considerations that can be traced back to the gymnasia of ancient Greece. The central theme running through the book is that (...) sports are effectively modern morality plays: universal practices of moral education for the masses and - when coached, officiated and played properly - a valuable vehicle for ethical development. Including a wealth of contemporary sporting examples, the book explores key ethical issues such as: How the pursuit of sporting excellence can lead to harm Doping, greed and shame Biomedical technology as a challenge to the virtue of elite athletes Defining a ‘virtue ethical account’ in sport Family vices and virtues in sport Written by one of the world's foremost sports philosophers, this book powerfully unites the fields of sports ethics and medical ethics. It is essential reading for all students and scholars with an interest in the ethics and philosophy of sport. (shrink)

Positive psychology is one of the biggest growth industries in the discipline of psychology. At the present time, the subfield of 'positive education' seems poised to take the world of education and teacher training by storm. In this first book-length philosophical study of positive psychology, Professor Kristján Kristjánsson subjects positive psychology's recent inroads into virtue theory and virtue education to sustained conceptual and moral scrutiny. Professor Kristjánsson's interdisciplinary perspective constructively integrates insights, evidence and considerations from social science and philosophy in (...) a way that is easily accessible to the general reader. He offers an extended critique of positive psychology generally and 'positive education' in particular, exploring the philosophical assumptions, underpinnings and implications of these academic trends in detail. This provocative book will excite anyone interested in cutting-edge research on positive psychology and on the virtues that lie at the intersection of psychology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, education, and daily life. (shrink)

On Virtue and Vice is a treatise in ethics. It offers a systematic and historical study of the Doctrine of the Mean. The book argues for a triadic approach to ethical notions (for example, Goodness and two forms of Badness and Justice and two forms of Injustice). The approach of the book is intertwined with a critical study of the relevant thought both of Western thinkers (Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and David Hume) and also of Eastern thinkers (Confucius, Mencius (...) and Chu Hsi). A further aim of the book is to apply the Doctrine to contemporary life. (shrink)

Values, Virtues, and Vices, Italian Style is an interdisciplinary study that examines the lives and work of four historical figures: Caesar, Dante, Machiavelli, or Garibaldi, as well as Italian culture and the moral psychology of pride, arrogance, justification, excuse, repentance, and the concept of honor.

'Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences - the primary focus of most other contemporary theorists. This volume brings together a dozen essays published between 1957 and 1977, and includes two new ones as well. In the first, Foot argues explicitly for an ethic of virtue, and in the next five discusses abortion, euthanasia, free will/determination, and the ethics of (...) Hume and Nietzsche. The final eight essays chart her growing disenchantment with emotivism and prescriptivism and their account of moral arguments. All the essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue... Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle, ingenious, and some of them important.' Choice. (shrink)

The essays in this volume discuss a range of questions relating to virtue ethics - a form of moral theory that has gained considerable attention in recent years. These questions include: what traits ought to be considered virtues? What is the proper place of virtue in a complete moral theory? Is it true, as the ancients thought, that there is a 'unity of virtue', so that having one virtue entails having all the others? What is the nature of vice (...) or wickedness? Some of the essays in this volume explore the connection between virtue and flourishing or well-being, asking whether virtue is necessary or sufficient for leading a happy life. Some deal with specific virtues, such as pride or respect, or with the relationship between the virtues and emotions. Taken together, these essays offer valuable insights into the nature of virtue and its role in moral theory. (shrink)

In recent years, virtue epistemology has won the attention of a wide range of philosophers. A developed form of the position has been expounded forcefully by Ernest Sosa and represents the most plausible version of reliabilism to date. Through the person of Alvin Plantinga, virtue epistemology has taken philosophy of religion by storm, evoking objections and defenses in a wide variety of journals and volumes. Historically, virtue epistemology has its roots in the work of Thomas Reid, and the explosion of (...) Reid scholarship in the last few years is perhaps both a cause and an effect of recent interest in the position.In this paper I want to examine the virtues and vices of virtue epistemology. My conclusion will be that the position is correct, when qualified appropriately. The central claim of virtue epistemology is that, Gettier problems aside, knowledge is true belief which results from a cognitive virtue. In section one I will clarify this claim with some brief remarks about the nature of virtues in general, and cognitive virtues in particular. In section two I will consider two objections to the theory of knowledge which results. In section three of the paper I will argue that virtue epistemology can be qualified so as to avoid the objections raised in section two. Finally, I will argue that the amendments which solve the objections of section two also allow us to solve a version of the dreaded generality problem. (shrink)

_Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic_ presents a series of essays by leading ethicists and epistemologists who offer the latest thinking on the moral and intellectual virtues and vices, the structure of virtue theory, and the connections between virtue and emotion. Cuts across two fields of philosophical inquiry by featuring a dual focus on ethics and epistemology Features cutting-edge work on the moral and intellectual virtues and vices, the structure of virtue theory, and the connections between (...) virtue and emotion Presents a radical new moral theory that makes exemplars the foundation of ethics; and new theories of epistemic vices such as epistemic malevolence and epistemic self-indulgence Represents one of the few collections to address both the moral virtues and the epistemic virtues Explores a new approach in epistemology - virtue epistemology - which emphasizes the importance of intellectual character traits. (shrink)

Much of the critical praise for the film concerns the first of these aims. Bigelow’s use of at least four film crews for every scene affords the sense of being present in the situation, continuously shifting perspective, alert to possible danger. The relative anonymity of the scenery, clearly somewhere in the Middle East but not clearly anywhere in particular, fosters this uneasy sense of immersion in an unfamiliar scenario where the sources of danger are unpredictable. Protracted periods of silence, punctuated (...) by incidental sounds that often turn out to be irrelevant, increase this tension. The occasional quiet ring of tinnitus imparts a sense of the incessant nature of the soldiers’ anxiety. Much of the negative criticism of the film, on the other hand, concerns the psychology of its central characters. Some veterans of the war in Iraq have claimed that it is a wildly inaccurate portrayal of the attitudes and behaviour of professional soldiers. (shrink)

What metaethical position Kant is committed to remains a controversial issue. I discuss three recently published books in which Kant is viewed as an opponent to moral realism and located more or less in the constructivist camp. Although the motivations to classify Kant as a moral constructivist are partly understandable, I argue that constructivist interpretations of Kant’s moral philosophy cause serious theoretical difficulties and, for that reason, should be refrained from.

In this chapter, after a review of some existent empirical and philosophical literature that suggests that human beings are essentially incapable of changing their mind in response to counter-evidence, I argue that motivation makes a significant difference to individuals’ ability rationally to evaluate information. I rely on empirical work on group deliberation to argue that the motivation to learn from others, as opposed to the desire to win arguments, promotes good quality group deliberation. Finally I provide an overview of some (...) epistemic virtues and vices crucial to the politico-epistemic activities of arguing, debating, and listening to a contrary point of view. (shrink)

The chapter has three basic goals. First, it shows why the Kotarbińskian praxiology – despite its terminological connotations, which locate it close to its Misesian analogue – should be understood as an example of the analytic action theory, and not as a "science". The chapter initially gives reasons for this interpretation and outlines the virtues of the theory drawn in Kotarbiński's Treatise on A Good Job. Praxiology occurs to be an action theory that is consistently developed under the sign (...) of agential effectiveness. Second, it focuses on the problem of why praxiology has not been, so far, recognized as a serious party in the mainstream action theory. It gives two main answers which are responsible for this fact: that there were socio-cultural factors that blocked a wider reception of this book, and that the ontological background of praxiology obfuscated it to the extent that such a reception was extremely difficult. In the fourth step, it proposes a therapy that is able to revitalize praxiology and show its true potential. It occurs that praxiology needs an explicitly intentionalistic conceptual framework to show its true value. The chapter also sketches the most important domains of contemporary action-theoretical investigations in which the reinterpreted Kotarbińskian philosophy of agency can have something interesting to say. These domains are explored in the next five chapters. (shrink)

Recent findings in experimental philosophy have revealed that people attribute intentionality, belief, desire, knowledge, and blame asymmetrically to side- effects depending on whether the agent who produces the side-effect violates or adheres to a norm. Although the original (and still common) test for this effect involved a chairman helping or harming the environment, hardly any of these findings have been applied to business ethics. We review what little exploration of the implications for business ethics has been done. Then, we present (...) new experimental results that expand the attribution asymmetry to virtue and vice. We also examine whether it matters to people that an effect was produced as a primary or side- effect, as well as how consumer habits might be affected by this phenomenon. These results lead to the conclusion that it appears to be in a businessperson’s self-interest to be virtuous. (shrink)

The role intellectual virtues play in scientific inquiry has raised significant discussions in the recent literature. A number of authors have recently explored the link between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science with the aim to show whether epistemic virtues can contribute to the resolution of the problem of theory choice. This paper analyses how intellectual virtues can be beneficial for successful resolution of theory choice. We explore the role of virtues as well as vices (...) in scientific inquiry and their beneficial effects in the context of theory choice. We argue that vices can play a role in widening the set of potential candidate theories and support our claim with historical examples and normative arguments from formal social epistemology. We argue that even though virtues appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific success, they have a positive effect because they accelerate successful convergence amongst scientists in theory choice situations. (shrink)

Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2009-08-31 12:18:30.156.

This dissertation argues that a proper understanding of Aristotle's theory of the virtues and vices requires us to understand how practical science presupposes theoretical science, more particularly the science of the nature of the morally-developed person. It argues that by using the canons of the Posterior Analytics we can prove why the virtues are causally necessary for the morally-developed person. Further, by seeing the virtues and vices in the context of the Physics, we can see (...) how the development of these character traits might constitute the substrate principle which explains why different people respond to the world in the forms they do. ;Treating the virtues and vices as character traits and as the substrate principle underlying people's responses to the world points the way to treating them as the principle around which psychology, ethics and politics can all be integrated. The ethical virtues are rooted in the psychology of character while politics is a matter of organizing institutions so as to promote the development of determinate forms of character in given populations. Virtuous politics is taken to be that which organizes institutional structures and processes around the goal of human development. ;Throughout the dissertation I related Aristotelian insights to contemporary work in the realist philosophy of science, psychoanalysis, developmental psychology and Marx. ;This is a speculative work which, though inspired by Aristotle, is not presented as an exegesis of Greek texts. (shrink)

The Morality of Spin explores the ethics of political rhetoric crafted to persuade and possibly manipulate potential voters. Based on extensive insider interviews with leaders of Focus on the Family, one of the most powerful Christian right organizations in America, Nathaniel Klemp asks whether the tactic of tailoring a message to a particular audience is politically legitimate or amounts to democratic malpractice. Klemp’s nuanced assessment, highlighting both democratic vices and virtues of the political rhetoric, provides a welcome contribution (...) to recent scholarship on deliberative democracy, rhetoric, and the growing empirical literature on the American Christian right. (shrink)

Abstract: This introduction to the collection Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there (...) are two important but different concepts of virtue: virtues are qualities that attain good ends, and virtues are qualities that involve good motives. (3) Accordingly, vices are qualities that either fail to attain good ends or involve bad motives. Finally, the introduction summarizes the eleven essays in the collection, which are divided into four sections: the Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology; Virtue and Context; Virtue and Emotion; and Virtues and Vices. (shrink)

This book addresses a prominent group of virtues and vices as portrayed in popular films to further our understanding of these moral character traits. The discussions emphasize the interplay between the philosophical conception of the virtues and vices and the cinematic representations of character. Joseph H. Kupfer explores how fictional characters possessing certain moral strengths and weaknesses concretize our abstract understanding of them. Because the actions that flow from these traits occur in cinematic contexts mirroring real (...) world conditions, the narrative portrayals of these moral characteristics can further our appreciation of their import. Humility, integrity, and perseverance, for example, are depicted in Chariots of Fire, The Fabulous Baker Boys, and Billy Elliot, while the vices of envy, arrogance and vanity are captured in Amadeus, Whiplash, and Young Adult. This interdisciplinary work in philosophy and film criticism will be of great interest to scholars and students of film studies, philosophy of film, ethics, aesthetics, and popular culture. (shrink)

The Greek philosopher Aristotle argues that human beings are not born with inclinations toward either virtue or vice; rather, each person's moral character traits are cultivated through a combination of social influence and individual rational choice. Sons of Anarchy relies on our fascination with “anti‐heroes,” morally ambiguous protagonists for whom we often cheer. Aristotle stresses the importance of the right environment for becoming virtuous, especially when it comes to children. Far from being pure, the SAMCROpolis tends to nurture both (...) class='Hi'>virtues and vices in its “citizens.”. Part of the show's appeal stems from recognizing the members of SAMCRO as kindred spirits who exemplify‐albeit to dramatic extremes‐the mixture of virtue and vice found in every human being's moral character. The particular mix of virtue and vice that comprises Jax's moral character may, in the end, be exactly what SAMCRO needs at this moment in its history. (shrink)

For effective environmental protection, the necessary tools are not only the external ones in the form of commands, and legal or economic instruments. A very necessary tool for dealing with the environmental crisis can be inner work on one’s own character and personality, as well as on the social virtues and vices that determine our approach to the environment. Recently, a growing interest in environmental virtue discourse can be noticed, and this paper presents a proposal for five cardinal (...) environmental virtues, and oppositional to these, five cardinal vices. The presented virtues are care, moderation, respect, wisdom, and responsibility. On the opposite side of the barricade are the following vices: egoism, greed, arrogance, ignorance (stupidity), and apathy. (shrink)

Innovation processes are extremely complex and opaque, which makes it tough or even impossible to govern them. Innovators lack control of large parts of these developments and lack of foreknowledge about the possible consequences of emerging technologies. Because of these features some scholars have argued that innovation processes should be structurally reformed and the agent-centered model of responsibility for innovation should be dismissed altogether. In the present article it will be argued that such a structural idea of responsible research and (...) innovation presumes rational agents who can be motivated by reasons. Instead of dismissing the agent-centered approach to responsibility for innovation processes a virtue ethical approach will be developed. Virtues should be considered as the intellectual and moral dispositions presumed for good decision making. It will be shown that creativity and eagerness are creditable character traits that have a distinct positive value for managing the opaqueness of innovation processes. Such traits are mandatory for change and betterment. Furthermore, it will be argued that the notion of responsibility of innovators should not be understood merely as means for constraining them but also as a tool to perpetuate their integrity and happiness. Through discussing the captivating examples of Steve Jobs and the protagonist of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein it will be shown how to apply this virtue ethical framework for innovators in practice. (shrink)

The study of intellectual humility is still in its early stages and issues of definition and measurement are only now being explored. To inform and guide the process of defining and measuring this important intellectual virtue, we conducted a series of studies into the implicit theory – or ‘folk’ understanding – of an intellectually humble person, a wise person, and an intellectually arrogant person. In Study 1, 350 adults used a free-listing procedure to generate a list of descriptors, one for (...) each person-concept. In Study 2, 335 adults rated the previously generated descriptors by how characteristic each was of the target person-concept. In Study 3, 344 adults sorted the descriptors by similarity for each person-concept. By comparing and contrasting the three person-concepts, a complex portrait of an intellectually humble person emerges with particular epistemic, self-oriented, and other-oriented dimensions. (shrink)

This essay begins with preliminary observations about the nature of agnosticism. Based on the term’s etymology, in this essay an agnostic about some proposition (e.g., God exists) is someone who does not know whether the proposition is true. Being an agnostic about the truth of a proposition is compatible with the proposition appearing to be true or the state of affairs obtains but incompatible with an agnostic knowing its truth or that the state of affairs obtains. (Reference to propositions and (...) states of affairs is intended to be inclusive, rather than a controversial metaphysical distinction.) Based on apparent virtues and vices, reasons are offered about when agnosticism (or the profession of agnosticism) is virtuous or philosophically desirable and when either actual agnosticism or its profession seems to be a vice or undesirable. The essay concludes with challenging Anthony Kenny’s case for agnosticism about theism based on the virtue of humility. The central claims about apparent virtues and vices rest on the positive epistemic standing of appearances as defended by many so-called “common sense philosophers” Thomas Reid, Roderick Chisholm, and, more recently, Thomas Nagel’s thesis about the justified status of the appearance of values. (shrink)

Education is astonishingly simple. We have all been through it, whether as children or later in life—indeed, many of us are still going through it in some form or other; we all know what works; and we are all committed to realising its individual and social potential. Such a view of the matter might dispense with the need for philosophy of education altogether as the problems of education are seen as little more than puzzles to be solved. We know (or (...) think that we know) what we want to achieve, the challenge is how to do so most efficiently. If only the virtues of education were that perspicuous, that simple. If only the vices were so easily identified and expunged. It turns out that education is astonishingly complex. The following chapters aspire to re-introduce a certain complexity that abstains from an all-too-easy understanding. They seek not to offer solutions, but complications, disruptions and dissensions. The authors assume positions against the usual associations and evaluations regarding certain words and phrases—a revaluation that turns the virtues to vices and the vices to virtues. (shrink)

"Cornell Paperback." Includes index. Bibliography: p. 163-165.

Using biology as his paradigm of an Aristotelian/normative enterprise, Wallace maintains that a naturalistic view of human good is a plausible alternative to noncognitivist accounts. From the assumption that life is a natural phenomenon it follows that normative data are found in nature. Knowledge of these norms is central to biological inquiry. Biologists seek to know what it is for creatures of the kind they are investigating to flourish, to live well. They do this by investigating the characteristic mode of (...) life of creatures of the given kind, i.e., the mode of life which normal, nondefective creatures of the given kind live under favorable circumstances. Wallace himself points out a difficulty with the inquiry, namely that "characteristic mode of life," "nondefective creatures of a given kind," and "favorable circumstances" are interconnected notions, so that knowledge of one requires some knowledge of the others. How could the biologist exclude defective individuals from his study sample without presupposing knowledge of the very distinction between normal and defective creatures which he sets out to learn from his investigation? This question does not, however, paralyze the inquiry, Wallace maintains, since the biologist does not merely study data and generalize, but rather fits his problem "into a vast network of concepts, classifications, theory, and lore.". (shrink)

In Enneads, Plotinus outlines an ethical ideal founded on the similarity between human being and divinity, in which the values of virtue and vice have a central role. Vice is a weakness of the soul that prevents it from performing its functions, so that instead of moving to good, it turns to evil. The soul can exit this state only through virtue, which is a good by which it can dominate matter and become like the supreme God. The ascension to (...) God is achieved through several stages, represented by: the civic virtues, the purifying virtues and the contemplative virtues. (shrink)

This article analyses the conception of virtue and vice in early modern Europe. It explains that there were two movements in conceptions of virtue during this period. The first is the Cartesian tradition wherein virtue is intimately related to the control of the passions and the other is the continuation of this theme in Britain in a more aesthetic version. This article describes how the concepts of virtue and vice were softened by an awakening interest in the social emotions and (...) in the relationship between moral goodness and happiness. (shrink)

In two recent books, I have drawn on hundreds of studies in psychology in order to systematically develop and empirically support a new conception of the character traits which I claim most people possess. Here I will focus on just one underexplored area of the psychological literature – research on harmful as opposed to helpful behavior – and use it in a preliminary way to further support my positive view.

Despite tendencies to compete for a prime place in moral theory, neither virtue ethics nor the four principles approach should claim to be superior to, or logically prior to, the other. Together they provide a more adequate account of the moral life than either can offer on its own. The virtues of principlism are clarity, simplicity and (to some extent) universality. These are well illustrated by Ranaan Gillon’s masterly analysis of the cases he has provided. But the vices (...) of this approach are the converse of its virtues: neglect of emotional and personal factors, oversimplification of the issues, and excessive claims to universality. Virtue ethics offers a complementary approach, providing insights into moral character, offering a blend of reason and emotion, and paying attention to the context of decisions. The cases provided can be more adequately understood if we combine the approaches. Both should foster the virtues of humility and magnanimity. (shrink)

What sorts of epistemic virtues are required for effective mathematical practice? Should these be virtues of individual or collective agents? What sorts of corresponding epistemic vices might interfere with mathematical practice? How do these virtues and vices of mathematics relate to the virtue-theoretic terminology used by philosophers? We engage in these foundational questions, and explore how the richness of mathematical practices is enhanced by thinking in terms of virtues and vices, and how the (...) philosophical picture is challenged by the complexity of the case of mathematics. For example, within different social and interpersonal conditions, a trait often classified as a vice might be epistemically productive and vice versa. We illustrate that this occurs in mathematics by discussing Gerovitch’s historical study of the aggressive adversarialism of the Gelfand seminar in post-war Moscow. From this we conclude that virtue epistemologies of mathematics should avoid pre-emptive judgments about the sorts of epistemic character traits that ought to be promoted and criticised. (shrink)

Consequentialist theories of virtue and vice, such as the theories of Jeremy Bentham and Julia Driver, characterize virtue and vice in terms of the consequential, or instrumental, properties of these character traits. There are two problems with theories of this sort. First they imply that, under the right circumstances, paradigmatic virtues, such as benevolence, are vices and paradigmatic vices, such as maliciousness, are virtues. This is conceptually problematic. Second, they say nothing about the intrinsic nature of (...) the virtues and vices, which is less than we could hope for from a theory of virtue and vice. Thus, we have reason to reject consequentialist theories in favour of theories that characterize virtue and vice in terms of the intrinsic properties of these character traits. Aristotle and Thomas Hurka have theories this sort. (shrink)

According to one tradition, the virtues and vices should be understood in terms of their relation to value. But inside this tradition, there are three distinct proposals: virtues are intrinsically valuable; virtues are instrumentally valuable; or a hybrid proposal on which virtues are either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. In this paper, I offer an alternative proposal inside this tradition. I propose that virtues and vices should be understood in terms of the degreed properties (...) of being virtuous and being vicious, which I analyze in terms of the value and disvalue of actions and attitudes. I defend my proposal as the best inside this tradition by showing how it is immune from standard problems the other three proposals face. (shrink)

In this book Daly attempts to forge a new ethical approach to issues of social structures, an area of thought deficient in traditional Catholic ethics. Daly argues that the concept of the structures of virtue and vice provide the best ethical lens with which to scrutinize the effects of social structures on personal character and the well-being of the community. His argument relies on two premises: First, he considers the nexus between structures and individual moral agency - arguing that Catholic (...) ethics has failed to account for these realities adequately. The second premise concerns virtue theory, once again emphasizing the importance of accounting for the individual when approaching societal ethics. With the establishment of these premises, Daly furthers the book's ultimate goal: the development of ethical concepts capable of scrutinizing social structures regarding how they shape personal moral character, as well as how they causally impact the well-being of people and groups. Drawing on the works of Thomas Aquinas as well as social theories such as critical realism, Daly fills a lacuna in Catholic ethics that addresses the structure-agency problem that has plagued this field of study. (shrink)