For ten years, 1971–1981, the Institute onHuman Values in Medicine (IHVM) played a keyrole in the development of Bioethics as afield. We have written this history andanalysis to bring to new generations ofBioethicists information about the developmentof their field within both the humanitiesdisciplines and the health professions. Thepioneers in medical humanities and ethics cametogether with medical professionals in thedecade of the 1960s. By the 1980s Bioethics wasa fully recognized discipline. We show the rolethat IHVM programs played in defining (...) thefield, training faculty and helping schools todevelop programs. We review the beginnings ofthe IHVM in the crucible of social andtechnological change that led to theestablishment of the IHVM's parentorganization, the Society for Health and HumanValues. We then turn to the IHVM programsthrough which Faculty members receivedfellowships to explore new crossovers betweenthe humanities and the health professions. Wehave not only described the Fellows Program asit existed in 1973–1980, but have completed asurvey of the fellows a quarter of a centuryafter they held their fellowships. We describeother IHVM programs designed to facilitate theinitiation and development of new humanitiesprograms, to explore conceptual issues betweenmedicine and five humanities fields, to conductissue driven or educational method conferencesand to advance humanities programs intograduate education through the Directors ofMedical Education. (shrink)

Written by a leading proponent of the philosophy and ethics of healthcare, this volume, filled with thought-provoking and frequently controversial ideas and arguments provides readers with a contribution to the literature on medical ethics.

Theories of health and disease which oppose evaluative and descriptive claims or opt for one or the other in defining fundamental concepts err, it is argued, due to an oversimplified conception of both the science of medicine and the art of clinical judgment. The work of Georges Canguilhem on the biological dimensions of value and subjectivity is explored. I conclude that he avoids the falsehoods of (a) neutral, pure fact-based medical science, and (b) cultural, arbitrary notions of value.

As health care embraces the tenets of evidence-based medicine it is important to ask questions about how evidence is produced and interpreted. This essay explores normative dimensions of evidence production, particularly around issues of setting the tolerable level of uncertainty of results. Four specific aspects are explored: what health care providers know about statistics, why alpha levels have been set at 0.05, the role of randomization in the generation of sufficient grounds of belief, and the role of observational studies. (...) The essay concludes with recommendations to acknowledge the value permeation of outcome measures and suggests that attention to reasoning and argument analysis can augment traditional evidence-based approaches in providing a robust critical approach to medical knowledge. (shrink)

In recent years so-called Complementary and Alternative Medicine practices have made significant political and professional advances particularly in the United Kingdom : osteopathy and chiropractic were granted statutory self-regulation in the 1990s effectively giving them more professional autonomy and independence than health care professions supplementary to medicine ; the practice of acupuncture is widespread within the National Health Service for pain control; and homoeopathy is offered to patients by a few General Practitioners alongside conventional treatments. These developments have (...) had a number of consequences: one is that both CAM and Conventional and Orthodox Medical professions have had to reappraise their professional identity. In manual therapy for example, questions have been asked about the differences between physiotherapy, osteopathy and chiropractic, and what the justification is for having separate professions. A wider question concerns the relationship between CAM and COM; are CAM distinct professions or should they, as has happened to a limited extent in the UK, be absorbed into the broader field of ‘ Medicine ’ or ‘Health Care’ as adjunctive therapies. CAM professions have also had to develop, implement and enforce codes of practice for practitioners and clarify the scope of practice within a profession. At the heart of these issues lies the need to identify and clarify professional values. A key claim of CAM professions is that their practice is distinct and the outcome of treatment at least as effective and in many cases more effective than with conventional therapies. In addition, what counts as effective outcome is often different from conventional medical understanding, involving more subtle humanitarian considerations, for example. Three values are identified as being commonly held across CAM professions. These are: offering ‘natural’ treatment; being patient rather than disease focussed; and being holistic. However, these may not be as distinctive of CAM as is claimed either because the meaning is unclear or because COM professions claim similar values. The paper argues that the values that inform ‘good practice’ and ‘effective outcome’ should be seen as distinct components of professional competence. This has implications for establishing professional identity and codes of practice. (shrink)

This article investigates five kinds of vagueness in medicine: disciplinary, ontological, conceptual, epistemic, and vagueness with respect to descriptive-prescriptive connections. First, medicine is a discipline with unclear borders, as it builds on a wide range of other disciplines and subjects. Second, medicine deals with many indistinct phenomena resulting in borderline cases. Third, medicine uses a variety of vague concepts, making it unclear which situations, conditions, and processes that fall under them. Fourth, medicine is based on (...) and produces uncertain knowledge and evidence. Fifth, vagueness emerges in medicine as a result of a wide range of fact-value-interactions. The various kinds of vagueness in medicine can explain many of the basic challenges of modern medicine, such as overdiagnosis, underdiagnosis, and medicalization. Even more, it illustrates how complex and challenging the field of medicine is, but also how important contributions from the philosophy can be for the practice of medicine. By clarifying and, where possible, reducing or limiting vagueness, philosophy can help improving care. Reducing the various types of vagueness can improve clinical decision-making, informing individuals, and health policy making. (shrink)

BackgroundValue sensitivity – the ability to recognize value-related issues when they arise in practice – is an indispensable competence for medical practitioners to enter decision-making processes related to ethical questions. However, the psychological competence of value sensitivity is seldom an explicit subject in the training of medical professionals. In this contribution, we outline the traditional concept of moral sensitivity in medicine and its revised form conceptualized as value sensitivity and we propose an instrument that measures value sensitivity.MethodsWe developed an (...) instrument for assessing the sensitivity for three value groups in a four step procedure: 1) value identification ; 2) value representation ; 3) vignette construction and quality evaluation ; and 4) instrument validation by comparing nursing professionals with hospital managers.ResultsWe find that nursing professionals recognize and ascribe importance to principle-related issues more than professionals from hospital management. The latter are more likely to recognize and ascribe importance to strategy-related issues.ConclusionsThese hypothesis-driven results demonstrate the discriminatory power of our newly developed instrument, which makes it useful not only for health care professionals in practice but for students and people working in the clinical context as well. (shrink)

Evidence-based medicine has always required integration of patient values with ‘best’ clinical evidence. It is widely recognized that scientific practices and discoveries, including those of EBM, are value-laden. But to date, the science of EBM has focused primarily on methods for reducing bias in the evidence, while the role of values in the different aspects of the EBM process has been almost completely ignored.

We generally accept that medicine’s conceptual and ethical foundations are grounded in recognition of personhood. With patients in vegetative state, however, we’ve understood that the ethical implications of phenomenal consciousness are distinct from those of personhood. This suggests a need to reconsider medicine’s foundations. What is the role for recognition of consciousness (rather than personhood) in grounding the moral value of medicine and the specific demands of clinical ethics? I suggest that, according to holism, the moral value (...) of medicine is secured when conscious states are recognized in everyday medical science. Moreover, consciousness fully motivates traditional principles of clinical ethics if we understand respect for autonomy as respect for the dominion of an experiencer in the private, inescapable realm of bodily experience. When medicine’s foundations are grounded in recognition of consciousness, we understand how patients fully command respect even when they lack capacity to exercise their bodily dominion through decision-making. (shrink)

Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in (...) this paper by a case study of the differential diagnosis between delusion and religious experience. In a traditional model of scientific medicine, such challenges would be expected to become less pressing with advances in medical science. Philosophical value theory suggests, to the contrary, that scientific progress, through opening up an ever-wider range of choices, will increasingly bring the full range and diversity of human values into play not just in psychiatry but in all areas of medicine. The future, then, for medicine, is an integrated model in which VBM and EBM are equal partners in a genuinelyhuman discipline. (shrink)

Gender-medicine has been very successful in discovering gaps in medical knowledge, disclosing biases in earlier research, and generating new results. It has superseded a more androcentric and sexist medicine. Yet, its development should not be understood in terms of a further approximation of value-freedom. Rather, it is a case of better value-laden science due to an enhanced pluralism in medicine and society. This interpretation is based on an account of the origins of gender-medicine in the feminist (...) women’s health movement and an analysis of the debate on inclusion of women in clinical trials. Consequently, the history of gender-medicine provides support for a procedural account of objectivity that stresses the importance of a diversity of perspectives. (shrink)

Transparency is a salutary value in our constitutional architecture. It has also been described as a necessary element in promoting accountability in the regulatory aspects of essential medicines. Despite its several incarnations, the Medicines and Related Substances Act (Medicines Act) retains a provision headed 'Preservation of secrecy' (section 34). This contributionseeks to evaluate section 34 in the context of transparency and ascertain whether it is in conflict with other legislation pertaining to the promotion of access to information and, in particular, (...) whether it is consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. (shrink)

In our current climate of rapid technological progress, it seems counterintuitive to think that modern science can learn anything of ethical value from the dark recesses of the nineteenth century or earlier. However, this happens to be quite true, with plenty of knowledge and wisdom to be gleaned by studying our scientific predecessors. Presently, our journals are flooded with original concepts and potential breakthroughs, a continuous stream of ideas pushing the frontiers of knowledge ever forward. Some ideas flourish while others (...) flounder; but what sets the two apart? The distinguishing feature between success and failure within this context is the ability to discern the appropriate time to accept an innovation with open arms, versus when to take a more cautious approach. And the primary arbiters for whether an idea will catch on or not are the professional audience. I illustrate this concept by comparing the initial reception of two innovative ideas from Medicine’s past: sterile technique, and prefrontal lobotomy. Sterile technique was first introduced by Dr. Ignaz Semmelweis and was initially ridiculed and rejected, with Semmelweis eventually dying in exile. Conversely, lobotomy was accepted and lauded and its inventor, Dr. Egas Moniz, won the Nobel Prize for his “discovery”. This begs the question: why was a technique with the potential to save millions of lives initially rejected, whereas paradoxically, one that compromised and sometimes destroyed lives, accepted? Here I explore and analyze the potential reasons why, suggest how we can learn from these mistakes of the past and apply new insight to some current ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

The concept of disease remains hotly contested. In light of problems with existing accounts, some theorists argue that the disease concept ought to be eliminated. We answer this skeptical challenge by reframing the discussion in terms of the role that the disease concept plays in the complex network of health-care institutions in which it is deployed. We argue that while prevailing accounts do not suffer from the particular defects that critics have identified, they do suffer from other deficits, and this (...) leads us to propose a new account that satisfies the desiderata for a concept of disease in human medicine. (shrink)

Values in dialogue offers a practical and theoretical model for ethics in care, that has grown from experience and research. The foundation of this ethical model is laid in the care relationship and in relational personalism. It consists of three pillars: values, dialogue, and attitudes. On this basis, a practical model for ethical reflection is developed. The aim is to empower professionals in their own ethical reflection and responsibility in concrete care situations. The model is applied on several (...) topics, such as collaboration between professionals, collaboration with clients and significant others, restriction of freedom and use of coercion, and exchange of information and confidentiality. 'Values in dialogue' is written for care professionals in their daily practice and in ethics commitees, but also for teachers and students in ethics courses. It focuses in particular on mental healthcare, support for people with mental disabilities, and care for elderly persons. (shrink)

My doctoral project is a study of epistemological and ethical issues in Evidence-Based Medicine, a movement in medicine which emphasizes the use of randomized controlled trials. Much of the research on EBM suggests that, for a large part of the movement's history, EBM considered expertise, mechanisms, and values to be forces contrary to its goals and has sought to remove them, both from medical research and from the clinical encounter. I argue, however, that expertise, mechanisms and (...) class='Hi'>values have important epistemological and ethical roles to play and can be incorporated into the current EBM movement. (shrink)

This critical notice argues for the existence of a new trend in bioethics, a complex and dynamic field of philosophical enquiry that goes beyond applied ethics and professional deontological codes. This trend supplements their traditionally “minimalist” ethics—and its concern with harm, rights or justice—with “inflationary” positions open to an integration of medicine with the humanities. By comparing and contrasting the views of two quite different philosophers, Diego Gracia and Alfred Tauber, and placing them within the theoretical background delineated by (...) George Khushf, I argue that the main contribution of this “inflationary bioethics” is an understanding of health and disease as intrinsically normative concepts, which in turn brings about a blurring of the distinction between facts and values. By refusing to construe the distinction as a dichotomy, a post-positivist philosophy of medicine must become more epistemological in order to help us clarify concepts in which the evaluative and the factual are impossible to separate. As a result, the “language of principles” in standard bioethics is being substituted by a more encompassing “language of values”; health and disease are increasingly understood as biopsychosocial phenomena; and the field is open to a process of moralization that challenges traditional models of patient autonomy and physician responsibility. (shrink)

Rationale, aims and objectives: Bioethics and professionalism are standard subjects in medical training programmes, and these curricula reflect particular representations of meaning and practice. It is important that these curricula cohere with the actual concerns of practicing clinicians so that students are prepared for real-world practice. We aimed to identify ethical and professional concerns that do not appear to be adequately addressed in standard curricula by comparing ethics curricula with themes that emerged from a qualitative study of medical practitioners. Method: (...) Curriculum analysis: Thirty-two prominent ethics and professionalism curricula were identified through a database search and were analysed thematically. Qualitative study: In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 medical practitioners. Participants were invited to reflect upon their perceptions of the ways in which values matter in their practices and their educational experiences. The themes emerging from the two studies were compared and contrasted. Results: While representations of meaning and value in ethics and professionalism curricula overlap with the preoccupations of practicing clinicians, there are significant aspects of ‘real-world’ clinical practice that are largely ignored. These fell into two broad domains: ‘sociological’ concerns about enculturation, bureaucracy, intra-professional relationships, and public perceptions of medicine; and epistemic concerns about making good decisions, balancing different kinds of knowledge, and practising within the bounds of professional protocols. Conclusions: Our findings support the view that philosophy and sociology should be included in medical school and specialty training curricula. Curricula should be reframed to introduce students to habits of thought that recognize the need for critical reflection on the social processes in which they are embedded, and on the philosophical assumptions that underpin their practice. (shrink)

Fulford has argued that (1) the medical concepts illness, disease and dysfunction are inescapably evaluative terms, (2) illness is conceptually prior to disease, and (3) a model conforming to (2) has greater explanatory power and practical utility than the conventional value-free medical model. This ‘reverse’ model employs Hare's distinction between description and evaluation, and the sliding relationship between descriptive and evaluative meaning. Fulford's derivative ‘Values Based Medicine’ (VBM) readjusts the imbalance between the predominance of facts over values (...) in medicine. VBM allegedly responds to the increased choices made available by, inter alia, the progress of medical science itself. VBM attributes appropriate status to evaluative meaning, where strong consensus about descriptive meaning is lacking. According to Fulford, quasi-legal bioethics, while it can be retained as a kind of deliberative framework, is outcome-based and pursues ‘the right answer’, while VBM approximates a democratic, process-oriented method for dealing with diverse values, in partnership with necessary contributions from evidence-based medicine (EBM). I support the non-cognitivist underpinnings of VBM, and its emphasis on the importance of values in medicine. But VBM overstates the complexity and diversity of values, misrepresents EBM and VBM as responses to scientific and evaluative complexity, and mistakenly depicts ‘quasi-legal bioethics’ as a space of settled descriptive meaning. Bioethical reasoning can expose strategies that attempt to reduce authentic values to scientific facts, illustrating that VBM provides no advantage over bioethics in delineating the connections between facts and values in medicine. (shrink)

In this article, I apply the concept of solidarity to collective knowledge practices in healthcare. Generally, solidarity acknowledges that people are dependent on each other in many respects, and it captures those support practices that people engage in out of concern for others in whom they recognise a relevant similarity. Drawing on the rich literature on solidarity in bioethics and beyond, this article specifically discusses the role that epistemic solidarity can play in healthcare. It thus focuses, in particular, on solidarity’s (...) relationship with justice and injustice. In this regard, it is argued (1) that justice and solidarity are two equally important and complementary values that should both be considered in healthcare practices and institutions and (2) that solidarity often arises in unjust situations and can be a means to bring about justice. I transfer these ‘general’ insights about solidarity to knowledge practices in healthcare and link them to the discussion about epistemic injustices in healthcare and how to overcome them. I argue that epistemic solidarity can play an important role in overcoming epistemic injustices as well as—and independently from its contribution to justice—in knowledge production in medicine more generally. To demonstrate how epistemic solidarity can add to our understanding of collective knowledge practices, I discuss two examples: patients sharing their medical data for research purposes and healthcare professionals’ engagement with patients to better understand their afflictions. (shrink)

Recognition of conscientious objection seems reasonable in relation to controversial and contentious issues, such as physician assisted suicide and abortion. However, physicians also advance conscience‐based objections to actions and practices that are sanctioned by established norms of medical ethics, and an account of their moral force can be more elusive in such contexts. Several possible ethical justifications for recognizing appeals to conscience in medicine are examined, and it is argued that the most promising one is respect for moral integrity. (...) It is also argued that an appeal to conscience has significant moral weight only if the core ethical values on which it is based correspond to one or more core values in medicine. Finally, several guidelines pertaining to appeals to conscience and their ethical evaluation are presented. (shrink)

This essay is an array of several taxonomies of values which bear on medicine. The first is a rather low-level list of types of values, meant to be adequate to observational data collection about human valuing. It proceeds to a discussion of levels of valuing so that senses of higher and lower values are articulated. Next, it offers a consideration of intrinsic versus extrinsic and of fundamental versus domestic (or mediating, enabling) values, along with the (...) notions of a practice and virtues. Finally it offers an analysis of clusters of value types along the lines of personal values, social values and professional values acting as interlocking force fields affecting the judgments, reactions and decisions of persons working in health care. In addition to the anticipated elucidation contained in the dialectic, two conclusions are intended: (1) the topic of values in medicine is staggeringly complex, and (2) a medical career is in the best sense a tragic fate in that a noble calling is doomed to many failures because of an inability to reconcile conflicts of values as much as because techniques cannot accomplish everything. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Précis of Microaggressions in MedicineLauren Freeman (bio) and Heather Stewart (bio)Microaggressions in Medicine demonstrates that the harms of microaggressions are anything but micro. Guided by diverse patient testimonies and case studies, the book focuses on harms experienced by patients who are marginalized on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, body size, and disability. It amplifies their voices, stories, and experiences, which have too often been excluded from (...) mainstream bioethical, medical, and popular discussions. The novel account advanced in Microaggressions in Medicine illustrates that microaggressions in medicine are not rare, but frequent in the healthcare experiences of marginalized patients. Our hope is that the book helps patients better understand and make sense of their experiences. We also hope that it helps current and future healthcare professionals recognize the serious and enduring consequences that microaggressions can have on their patients. Finally, it introduces actionable strategies for healthcare professionals to reduce microaggressions in their practices and institutions.Microaggressions in Medicine argues that healthcare professionals have a moral obligation to prevent microaggressions as much as possible. It aims to make a positive difference in the lives of marginalized patients as they interact with medical practitioners and institutions. It also aims to support healthcare professionals in modifying their practices to ensure that they are always providing high-quality, patient-centered care to all patients. Its ultimate goal is to help increase health equity.More specifically, the book has two broad goals: one theoretical, one practical. The theoretical goal is to reconceptualize how microaggressions have been understood in the literature and to develop this new account within medical contexts. The practical goal is to provide healthcare professionals with a greater understanding of the serious and enduring consequences that microaggressions can have on members of marginalized patient groups and to introduce strategies and tools to help healthcare professionals reduce microaggressions experienced [End Page 142] by patients, thereby diminishing harm caused to patients. To set the context for the critical responses to follow, we briefly summarize each chapter of the book, highlighting the main arguments and novel contributions.Microaggressions can be defined as actions, gestures, or even material environments that subtly and often unintentionally harm members of marginalized groups. They are prevalent in medicine yet often go unnoticed by those who commit them. The introduction outlines the main problem with which the book engages: that there are subtle things that healthcare professionals commonly say and do to patients that do not register as serious to them yet that often cause major harms to patients in the short and long term. To set the stage to unpack this problem, we define what microaggressions are, provide examples of microaggressions in medical contexts, outline the aims and goals of the book, and explain key concepts (e.g., intersectionality, harm, structural oppression) that are necessary for understanding and engaging with the book's arguments. The introduction makes clear how and why a discussion of microaggressions in medicine is valuable to marginalized patients who want to better understand their own experiences interacting with healthcare professionals and institutions. It also underscores the book's value for healthcare professionals who want to improve their clinical interactions with marginalized patients and strategize about how to make their practices more inclusive, welcoming, and just.Chapter 1, "Microaggressions: A Brief History," provides a history of microaggressions. The term was coined in 1970 by a Black Harvard psychologist, Chester Pierce, to describe the "subtle blows" experienced by Black people that are not major or explicit yet that cause real harm. Although little was written about microaggressions for almost four decades, microaggressions gained traction in 2007 through the work of psychologist Derald Sue and his colleagues. We discuss Sue et al.'s work on microaggressions, tracing key revisions and developments the concept has undergone in the last fifteen years. The chapter also summarizes some of the main criticisms that have been launched against microaggressions and considers responses that have been offered. This chapter provides the groundwork for chapter 2, which lays out our novel critique of the dominant understanding of microaggressions. It also motivates our reconceptualization of microaggressions that unfolds over the remainder of the book.Chapter 2, "Microaggressions Reconsidered: A Critique of the Act-Based... (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive and unique text and reference in medical ethics. By far the most inclusive set of primary documents and articles in the field ever published, it contains over 100 selections. Virtually all pieces appear in their entirety, and a significant number would be difficult to obtain elsewhere. The volume draws upon the literature of history, medicine, philosophical and religious ethics, economics, and sociology. A wide range of topics and issues are covered, such as law and (...) medicine, truth-telling by the physician, research, population policy, genetics, abortion, dying, and individual rights in medical care. The selections span the centuries, beginning with material from the works of Hippocrates, continuing through Thomas Percival, John Stuart Mill, and Claude Bernard, down to modern commentators like Henry K. Beecher, Walsh McDermott, David L. Bazelon, Paul Freund, H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, Paul Ramsey, Richard McCormick, Rashi Fein, and Bernard Barber. The text has eight major divisions, beginning with sections on the ethical dimensions of the physician-patient relationship in history; the moral bases of medical ethics; and regulation, compulsion, and protection of the consumer in clinical medicine and public health. Each of these sections includes key essays that appear for the first time. All of the book's major divisions contain primary documents: codes such as the Hippocratic Oath, Medieval Law for the Regulation of Medicine, and the first as well as the most recent code of the American Medical Association; court decisions, including those on Karen Quinlan and on abortion in the United States and West Germany; government documents such as the statement of the National Commission on the Protection of Human Subjects, the Tuskegee Syphilis Report, the British Parliamentary debate on euthanasia, and the Council of Europe on rights of the sick and dying; and various published guidelines such as the Harvard Medical School brain death criteria, the American Hospital Association on patient's rights, and Pope Pius XII on the prolongation of life. Cases that illustrate moral dilemmas are provided for discussion purposes. Each section is preceded by a succinct editor's introduction. The documents and essays are of practical value for practitioners and students in medicine, law, ethics, and counselling, and for individual patients and groups concerned with medical care. Through encompassing divergent viewpoints, the essays and primary documents were selected to encourage humane practices and deepen understanding of the multiple traditions that shaped and do shape the development of medicine. (shrink)

General practice (community) pharmacy as a healthcare profession is largely devoted to therapeutic treatment of individual patients whether in dispensing medically authorised prescriptions or by providing members of the public with over-the-counter advice and service for a variety of common ailments. Recently, community pharmacy has been identified as an untapped resource available to undertake important aspects of public health and in particular health promotion. In contrast to therapeutic treatment, public health primarily concerns the health of the entire population, rather than (...) the health of individuals (Childress et al. in J Law Med Ethics 30:170–178, 2002). Thus, an important question for the profession is whether those moral and professional values that are appropriate to the therapeutic care of individual patients are relevant and adequate to support the additional public health role. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the role of values in theory selection is an important issue within medical education. I review the underdetermination argument, which is the idea within philosophy of science that the data serving as evidence for theories are by themselves not sufficient to support a theory to the exclusion of alternatives. There are always various explanations compatible with the data, and we ultimately appeal to certain values as our grounds for choosing one theory over (...) another. I explore some of the ways contemporary feminist philosophers have chosen to grapple with the problem of underdetermination and proposed solutions to systematize how values might be incorporated into theory choice, drawing primarily from the work of Helen Longino and Elizabeth Anderson. I conclude by discussing how value‐laden inquiry should be incorporated within medical education to promote reflection towards medicine’s normative underpinnings. (shrink)

Many enhancement technologies are distributed by healthcare professionals—by physicians—who are held to the Hippocratic Oath and the goals of medicine. While the ethics of enhancement has been widely discussed with regard to the social justice, humanism, morals and normative values of these interventions, their place in medicine has not attracted a great deal of attention. This paper investigates the potential for enhancement technologies to fulfil the goals of medicine, arguing that they play a role in promoting (...) the health of individuals, and thus, an unavoidable place in medicine. It also warns of potential dangers, suggesting a set of guidelines to initiate conversations regarding the role and responsibilities of physicians practising in an era of enhancement. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophically-based, yet clinically-oriented perspective on current medical reasoning aiming at 1) identifying important forms of uncertainty permeating current clinical reasoning and practice 2) promoting the application of an abductive methodology in the health context in order to deal with those clinical uncertainties 3) bridging the gap between biomedical knowledge, clinical practice, and research and values in both clinical and philosophical literature. With a clear philosophical emphasis, the book investigates themes lying at the border between several (...) disciplines, such as medicine, nursing, logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science; but also ethics, epidemiology, and statistics. At the same time, it critically discusses and compares several professional approaches to clinical practice such as the one of medical doctors, nurses and other clinical practitioners, showing the need for developing a unified framework of reasoning, which merges methods and resources from many different clinical but also non-clinical disciplines. In particular, this book shows how to leverage nursing knowledge and practice, which has been considerably neglected so far, to further shape the interdisciplinary nature of clinical reasoning. Furthermore, a thorough philosophical investigation on the values involved in health care is provided, based on both the clinical and philosophical literature. The book concludes by proposing an integrative approach to health and disease going beyond the so-called “classical biomedical model of care”. (shrink)

The word "ethics" is often used as a synonym for morality or values or ideals. But ethics is also sometimes defined as critical reflection on moral claims and moral beliefs, which themselves pertain to ideas about right and wrong conduct, good and bad motives and intentions, and so on. The scope of ethics is therefore enormous, and the problems and dilemmas theoretically subject to ethical scrutiny are endlessly varied and fascinating. This is no less the case in medicine; (...) it often seems that a new ethical issue arises every time there is a breakthrough in medical technology that gives us powers we didn't have before. (shrink)

In this article, I defend the view that conscience exemption clauses for medical practitioners (doctors, nurses, technicians, pharmacists) should be limited by patient protection clauses. This view was also defended by Mark Wicclair, in his book on conscience exemptions in medicine (Cambridge UP, 2011). In this article, I defend Wicclair’s view by supplementing it with Hegelian ethical theory and feminist critical theory. Conscience exemptions are important to support as a matter of human rights. They support an individual’s right to (...) protect their deepest value-commitments. A true understanding of conscience is dialectical, however, and it requires patient protection clauses because they, too, protect individuals in their deepest value-commitments. In this article, I show that the defense of patient protection clauses is historically supported by the theory of “conscience [Gewissen]” developed by G.W.F. Hegel in the nineteenth century (mostly in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)). (shrink)

Does reading poetry make you a better clinician?Can euthanasia be understood in terms of the meaning of a life?What is the moral and existential significance of ...

Providing a compelling scholarly statement about the interrelation and pliability of values in the life sciences, medicine and health care, this volume aims to aid our understanding of the roles of power, knowledge production and economic action in the heavily scientised and economised areas of life science and medicine.

The DSM-IV, like its predecessors, will be a major influence on American psychiatry. As a consequence, continuing analysis of its assumptions is essential. Review of the manuals as well as conceptually-oriented literature on DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and DSM-IV reveals that the authors of these classifications have paid little attention to the explicit and implicit value commitments made by the classifications. The response to DSM criticisms and controversy has often been to incorporate more scientific diversity into the classification, instead of careful inquiry (...) and assessment of the principal values that drive the nosologic process. Implications for psychiatric science and future DSM classifications are discussed. Keywords: DSM-III, DSM-III-R, DSM-IV, Psychiatric Classification, values CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

A variety of approaches have appeared in academic literature and in design practice representing “ethics-first” methods. These approaches typically focus on clarifying the normative dimensions of design, or outlining strategies for explicitly incorporating values into design. While this body of literature has developed considerably over the last 20 years, two themes central to the endeavour of ethics and values in design (E + VID) have yet to be systematically discussed in relation to each other: (a) designer agency, and (...) (b) the strength of normative claims informing the design process. To address this gap, we undertook a structured review of leading E + VID approaches and critiques, and classified them according to their positions on normative strength, and views regarding designer agency. We identified 18 distinct approaches and 13 critiques that met the inclusion criteria for our review. Included papers were distributed across the spectrum of views regarding normative strength, and we found that no approaches and only one critique represented a view characteristic of “low” designer agency. We suggest that the absence of “low” designer agency approaches results in the neglect of crucial influences on design as targets of intervention by designers. We conclude with suggestions for future research that might illuminate strategies to achieve ethical design in information mature societies, and argue that without attending to the tensions raised by balancing normatively “strong” visions of the future with limitations imposed on designer agency in corporate-driven design settings, “meaningful” ethical design will continue to encounter challenges in practice. (shrink)

This article develops a phenomenology of suffering with an emphasis on matters relevant to medical practice and bioethics. An attempt is made to explain how suffering can involve many different things—bodily pains, inability to carry out everyday actions, and failure to realize core life values—and yet be a distinct phenomenon. Proceeding from and expanding upon analyses found in the works of Eric Cassell and Elaine Scarry, suffering is found to be a potentially alienating mood overcoming the person and engaging (...) her in a struggle to remain at home in the face of loss of meaning and purpose in life. Suffering involves painful experiences at different levels that are connected through the suffering-mood but are nevertheless distinguishable by being primarily about my embodiment, my engagements in the world together with others, and my core life values. Suffering is in essence a feeling , but as such, it has implications for and involves the person’s entire life: how she acts in the world, communicates with others, and understands and looks upon her priorities and goals in life. Suffering-moods are typically intense and painful in nature, but they may also display a rather subconscious quality in presenting things in the world and my life as a whole in an alienating way. In such situations, we are not focused directly upon the suffering-mood—as in the cases of pain and other bodily ailments—but rather, upon the things that the mood presents to us: not only our bodies, but also other things in the world that prevent us from having a good life and being the persons we want to be. Such suffering may in many cases be transformed or at least mitigated by a person’s identifying and changing her core life values and in such a manner reinterpreting her life story to become an easier and more rewarding one to live under the present circumstances. (shrink)

The importance of the collective management of immaterial resources is a key variable in the valorisation of products in a post-industrial economy. The purpose of this paper is to analyse how, in post-industrial economies, it is possible to devise alternative forms of mediation between producers and consumers, such as organic farmers' markets, to curb the appropriation of rent by transnational and/or local business elites from the value created by immaterial resources. More specifically, we analyse those aspects of the collective management (...) of ethical values that, in the case of organic farmers' markets, can be a strategic source of competitive advantage for local producers. In this paper, the Ecomercado de Granada is studied as an example of mediation between production and consumption in a post-industrial economy. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to analyse the value-ladenness of technology in the context of medicine. To address this issue several characteristics of technology are investigated: i) its interventive capacity, ii) its expansiveness and iii) its influence on the concept of disease, iv) its generalising character, v) its independence of the subjective experience of the patient. By this analysis I hope to unveil the double face of technology: Technology has a Janus-face in modern medicine, and the opposite (...) of its factual face is evaluative. (shrink)