Recent literature has examined the problem facing decision makers with bounded awareness, who may be unaware of some states of nature. A question that naturally arises here is whether a value of awareness, analogous to value of information, can be attributed to changes in awareness. In this paper, such a value is defined. It is shown that the sum VOA +\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$+$$\end{document} VOI is constant and, except for scale (...) effects, independent of the choice set. It follows that the larger is VOA, the smaller is VOI. This point is illustrated for a simple two-state case, then proved for general classes of compact convex choice sets, and for alternative interpretations of the concept of unawareness. (shrink)

The participation of vulnerable patients in clinical research poses apparent ethical dilemmas. Depending on the nature of the vulnerability, their participation may challenge the ethical principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, or justice. On the other hand, non-participation may preclude the building of a knowledge base that is a prerequisite for defining the optimal clinical management of vulnerable patients. Such clinical uncertainty may also incur substantial economic costs. We present the participation of pre-menopausal women with atrial fibrillation in trials of novel oral (...) anticoagulant drugs as a case study. Due to their non-participation in pivotal trials, it is uncertain whether for them, the risks that are associated with these drugs are outweighed by the advantages compared with conventional treatment. We addressed the question whether research of this new class of drugs in this subgroup would be appropriate from both, an ethical as well an economic perspective. We used the method of specifying norms as a wider framework to resolve the apparent ethical dilemma, while incorporating the question whether research of oral anticoagulants in premenopausal women with atrial fibrillation can be justified on economic grounds. For the latter, the results of a value-of-information analysis were used. Further clinical research on NOACs in premenopausal women with atrial fibrillation can be justified on both, ethical and economic grounds. Addressing apparent ethical dilemmas by invoking a method such as specifying norms can improve the quality of public practical reasoning. As such, the method should also prove valuable to committees that have formally been granted the authority to review trial protocols and proposals for scientific research. (shrink)

The analysis of the nexus between the value of information and risk is examined for sequential decisions with different degrees of future commitment, as e.g. environmental decisions. We find that in the linear case a riskier environment in general will increase the value of information. This result will be extended in the separable case to decreasing and increasing stochastic returns to scale. An example shows the ambiguity in the general case.

In the recent philosophical literature on inquiry, epistemologists point out that their subject has often begun at the point at which you already have your evidence and then focussed on identifying the beliefs for which that evidence provides justification. But we are not mere passive recipients of evidence. While some comes to us unbidden, we often actively collect it. This has long been recognised, but typically epistemologists have taken the norms that govern inquiry to be practical, not epistemic. The recent (...) literature challenges this assumption and uncovers a rich range of questions about the epistemic normativity of inquiry. In this paper, I approach these questions from the formal side of epistemology. Developing out of the philosophy of science, as it did, this branch of epistemology has long discussed inquiry. And, building on the insights of Janina Hosiasson (1931), David Blackwell (1951), and I. J. Good (1967), it has produced a reasonably well-developed framework in which to understand norms of inquiry, both epistemic and practical. In the first half of the paper, I will present the pragmatic versions of this framework due to Hosiasson, Blackwell, and Good, and the epistemic version due to Graham Oddie (1997); in the second half of the paper, I put this framework to work, turning to some of the questions from the recent debate about inquiry and asking how the framework can help us answer them. Questions include: When should we initiate an inquiry, when should we continue it, when should we conclude it, and when should we reopen it? How do epistemic norms of inquiry relate to epistemic norms of belief or credence, and can they conflict, as Jane Friedman (2020) contends? How should we resolve the apparent puzzle raised by Friedman's example of counting the windows in the Chrysler Building? How should we direct our attention, as Georgi Gardiner (2022) asks? How should we choose and reason after receiving evidence we'd rather not have received? And how should we understand the epistemic error that occurs when someone is resistant to evidence in the way Mona Simion (2023) describes? (shrink)

The notion of the value of information is discussed. The value one attributes to information is determined by the result of its reception by an open nonequilibrium system. Qualitative reasoning shows that the concept of value of information makes sense only in nonequilibrium situations, and is directly connected with the nonredundancy of information. In biology it is the value and not the amount of information that is important. The value of (...) information is especially high if there are instabilities in the system; these are connected with the notions of purpose and of freedom of will. The notion of selective value, introduced by Eigen in the theory of the prebiological evolution of macromolecules, is discussed. The amount of information in various codons is calculated and the conventional definition of its value is given based on the determination of the danger of the replacement of one amino acid by another with a different value of hydrophobicity. It is shown that the relative probability of transversion is considerably lower than that of transition. As most nonsense mutations are transversions, the genetic code provides decreased probability for the most dangerous mutations. It is shown that the information of the codonUGG(Trp) is highest in both amount and value. (shrink)

This article addresses the value of information that affects the ambiguity faced by a decision maker. Our analysis is applied to the case of a farmer whose production can be damaged by a pest attack with unknown probability, this damage being reduced if the farmer decides to use a pesticide. Early warning systems have precisely been implemented in many countries to help farmers avoid inappropriate decisions in terms of pesticide use. We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, how farmers (...) value these systems. We propose a two-state self-insurance model in which an α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\alpha$$\end{document}-MaxMin Expected Utility farmer may use pesticides that reduce the loss in the accident state while incurring a cost in both states. Her decision to self-insure or not depends on risk and ambiguity attitudes. We compile and compare the value of two types of information leading to a reduction of ambiguity and analyze their properties with respect to ambiguity attitude. Both types of information are valued positively if the farmer is ambiguity averse. We conduct a framed field experiment in which farmers and agricultural students have to decide whether or not to apply pesticides depending on risk, ambiguity and the associated monetary gains resulting from pesticide cost. The experimental findings support the theory. The average value of information among all participants is between €0.9/ha and €3.3/ha depending on the information gain. (shrink)

In his discussion of minimax decision rules, Savage presents an example purporting to show that minimax applied to negative expected utility is an inadequate decision criterion for statistics; he suggests the application of a minimax regret rule instead. The crux of Savage’s objection is the possibility that a decision maker would choose to ignore even “extensive” information. More recently, Parmigiani has suggested that minimax regret suffers from the same flaw. He demonstrates the existence of “relevant” experiments that a minimax (...) regret agent would never pay a positive cost to observe. On closer inspection, I find that minimax regret is more resilient to this critique than would first appear. In particular, there are cases in which no experiment has any value to an agent employing the minimax negative income rule, while we may always devise a hypothetical experiment for which a minimax regret agent would pay. The force of Parmigiani’s critique is further blunted by the observation that “relevant” experiments exist for which a Bayesian agent would never pay. I conclude with a discussion of pessimism in the context of minimax decision rules. (shrink)

What is the most general common set of attributes that characterises something as intrinsically valuable and hence as subject to some moral respect, and without which something would rightly be considered intrinsically worthless or even positively unworthy and therefore rightly to be disrespected in itself? This paper develops and supports the thesis that the minimal condition of possibility of an entity's least intrinsic value is to be identified with its ontological status as an information object. All entities, even (...) when interpreted as only clusters of information, still have a minimal moral worth qua information objects and so may deserve to be respected. The paper is organised into four main sections. Section 1 models moral action as an information system using the object-oriented programming methodology (OOP). Section 2 addresses the question of what role the several components constituting the moral system can have in an ethical analysis. If they can play only an instrumental role, then Computer Ethics (CE) is probably bound to remain at most a practical, field-dependent, applied or professional ethics. However, Computer Ethics can give rise to a macroethical approach, namely Information Ethics (IE), if one can show that ethical concern should be extended to include not only human, animal or biological entities, but also information objects. The following two sections show how this minimalist level of analysis can be achieved. Section 3 provides an axiological analysis of information objects. It criticises the Kantian approach to the concept of intrinsic value and shows that it can be improved by using the methodology introduced in the first section. The solution of the Kantian problem prompts the reformulation of the key question concerning the moral worth of an entity: what is the intrinsic value of x qua an object constituted by its inherited attributes? In answering this question, it is argued that entities can share different observable properties depending on the level of abstraction adopted,and that it is still possible to speak of moral value even at the highest level of ontological abstraction represented by the informational analysis. Section 4 develops a minimalist axiology based on the concept of information object. It further supports IE's position by addressing five objections that may undermine its acceptability. (shrink)

In my paper I will focus my attention on some philosophical aspects of the Information Ethics displayed by Luciano Floridi. Floridi’s Information Ethics has the methodological merit of providing the interpretation of the Informational Turn with a solid philosophical basis, the roots of which deserve a careful investigation. In this perspective, I will analyse a key question, which is essential not only from a theoretical but also from a practical point of view, i.e. whether or not Floridi’s construction (...) of information is consistent with a pluralistic conception of Being. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between Savage's sure thing principle and the value of information. We present two classes of results. First, we show that, under a consequentialist axiom, the sure-thing principle is neither sufficient nor necessary for perfect information to be always desirable: specifically, under consequentialism, the sure thing principle is not implied by the condition that perfect information is always valuable; moreover, the joint imposition of the sure thing principle, consequentialism and either one of (...) two state independence axioms does not imply that perfect information is always desirable. Second, we demonstrate that, under consequentialism, the sure thing principle is necessary for a nonnegative value of possibly imperfect information (though of course the principle is still not sufficient). One implication of these results is that the sure thing principle, under consequentialism, plays a somewhat different role in ensuring dynamic consistency in decision making under uncertainty than does the independence axiom in decision making under risk. (shrink)

Solutions to the problem ofprotecting informational privacy in cyberspacetend to fall into one of three categories:technological solutions, self-regulatorysolutions, and legislative solutions. In thispaper, I suggest that the legal protection ofthe right to online privacy within the USshould be strengthened. Traditionally, inidentifying where support can be found in theUS Constitution for a right to informationalprivacy, the point of focus has been on theFourth Amendment; protection in this contextfinds its moral basis in personal liberty,personal dignity, self-esteem, and othervalues. On the other hand, (...) the constitutionalright to privacy first established by Griswoldv. Connecticut finds its moral basis largelyin a single value, the value of autonomy ofdecision-making. I propose that an expandedconstitutional right to informational privacy,responsive to the escalating threats posed toonline privacy by developments in informationaltechnology, would be more likely to find asolid moral basis in the value of autonomyassociated with the constitutional right toprivacy found in Griswold than in the varietyof values forming the moral basis for the rightto privacy backed by the Fourth Amendment. (shrink)

Various hypotheses about the importance of psycho-neural concomitants are reviewed and their implications discussed for the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness -- especially, as viewed by cognitive and ecological psychology. In Ecological Psychology, where the subjective-objective dichotomy is repudiated, these concepts are without foundation, and are replaced by informed awareness, which is argued to play an important, perhaps, indispensable role in goal- directed actions and thus to have survival value. The significance of informed awareness is illustrated in several (...) real- world goal-directed tasks. (shrink)

The paper aims at a perspicuous representation of Isaac Levi's pragmatist epistemology, spanning from the 1967 classic "Gambling with Truth" to his 2004 book on "Mild Contraction". Based on a formal framework for Levi's notion of inquiry, I analyse his decision-theoretic approach with truth and information as basic cognitive values, and with Shackle measures as emerging structures. Both cognitive values figure prominently in Levi's model of inductive belief expansion, but only the value of information is employed in (...) his model of belief contraction. I argue that the former model is more successful than the latter. (shrink)

In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism, namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this ‘value of information’ (VOI). I show that VOI conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view (...) that epistemic rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where VOI fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of VOI. (shrink)

Classical logic of formal provability includes Löb’s theorem, but not reflection. In contrast, intuitions about the inferential behavior of informal provability (in informal mathematics) seem to invalidate Löb’s theorem and validate reflection (after all, the intuition is, whatever mathematicians prove holds!). We employ a non-deterministic many-valued semantics and develop a modal logic T-BAT of an informal provability operator, which indeed does validate reflection and invalidates Löb’s theorem. We study its properties and its relation to known provability-related paradoxical arguments. We also (...) argue that T-BAT is a fairly sensible candidate for a formal logic of informal provability. (shrink)

The Value of Evidence thesis (VE) tells us to gather evidence before deciding in any decision problem, if the evidence is free. This appar- ently plausible principle faces two problems. First, it fails on evidence externalism or nonclassical decision theories. Second, it’s not general enough: it tells us to prefer gaining free evidence to gaining no evi- dence, but it doesn’t tell us to prefer gaining more informative evidence to gaining less informative evidence when both are free. This paper (...) defends an alternative value-of-evidence principle that solves the above two problems. We call it ‘the Comparative Value of Evidence for the Resolute (CVER).’ CVER not only generalizes VE to the comparative case but is also compatible with evidence externalism and nonclassical decision theories. Our argument, if successful, broadens the scope of the value-of-evidence principle and shows that it’s more robust than previously imagined. (shrink)

Sometimes we believe that others receive harmful information. However, Marschak’s value of information framework always assigns non-negative value under expected utility: it starts from the decision maker’s beliefs – and one can never anticipate information’s harmfulness for oneself. The impact of decision makers’ capabilities to process information and of their expectations remains hidden behind the individual and subjective perspective Marschak’s framework assumes. By introducing a second decision maker as a point of reference, this paper (...) introduces a way for evaluating others’ information from a cross-individual, imperfect expectations perspective for agents maximising expected utility. We define the cross-value of information that can become negative – then the information is “harmful” from a cross-individual perspective – and we define (mutual) cost of limited information processing capabilities and imperfect expectations as an opportunity cost from this same point of reference. The simple relationship between these two expected utility-based concepts and Marschak’s framework is shown, and we discuss evaluating short-term reactions of stock market prices to new information as an important domain of valuing others’ information. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea that it is instrumentally valuable to learn normative truths. We consider an argument for "normative hedging" based on this principle, and examine the structure of decision-making under moral uncertainty that arises from it. But it also turns out that the value of normative information is inconsistent with the principle that learning *empirical* truths is instrumentally valuable. We conclude with a brief comment on "metanormative regress.".

This chapter contains sections titled: Where we are When truth at a world depends on more than how that world is A diagram to give the key idea A language where truth at a world is, by stipulation, a function of which world is actual On looking for examples of two–dimensional sentences in the English of the folk How should we approach questions like, How do we use the word “water”? and, How do we use the word “Gödel”? More on (...) the evidential role of intuitions about possible cases What information do we impart with the word “water”–first pass With enemies like these, who needs friends?16 What information do we impart with the word “water”–second pass The issue about narrow content18 Proper names and information (I) Proper names and information (II) Coda. (shrink)

Sissela Bok's1 and Torbjörn Tännsjö's2 writings on trust and informed consent were sources of inspiration for my article.3 It is gratifying to have a chance to respond to their thoughtful comments.Bok concurs with my scepticism that the ‘trust-promotion argument for informed consent’ can successfully generate commonsense morality's full set of informed consent norms. But she finds that argument even more wanting, perhaps so wanting as to be unworthy of critical attention. What she seems to find particularly objectionable is the fact (...) that the argument treats all social trust as valuable. For Bok, misplaced trust in health practitioners who are deceitful or violate patients’ other rights lacks any value whatsoever. There isn't even a pro tanto duty in favour of promoting it.My own inclination is to say that nearly all trust has some social value, if only thanks to its tendency to promote social stability or its tendency to promote medical adherence . But often, trust also tends to generate bad outcomes, and in many cases of misplaced trust, that tendency will make its value negative on balance. Still, in my view, …. (shrink)

Personal Information Management Systems (PIMS) aim to facilitate the sharing of personal information and protect privacy. Efforts to enhance privacy management, aligned with established privacy policies, have led to guidelines for integrating transparent notices and meaningful choices within these systems. Although discussions have revolved around the design of privacy-friendly systems that comply with legal requirements, there has been relatively limited philosophical discourse on incorporating the value of privacy into these systems. Exploring the connection between privacy and personal (...) autonomy illuminates the instrumental value of privacy and highlights the importance of intentionally embedding the value of privacy into these systems. To translate the value of privacy into concrete design requirements, this study constructs a values hierarchy consisting of values, norms, and design requirements. After analyzing the relationships between privacy and autonomy and identifying norms, the design requirements translated from the norms associated with the components of personal autonomy are specified at the lowest layer. These requirements include a design to prevent unauthorized access and dark patterns and to provide effective and efficient notices and choices. The findings contribute to expanding the requirements for designing the aspect of privacy as a legal requirement to incorporate the value of privacy into systems. (shrink)

This study examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility -related information and the value of financial analysts’ stock recommendations. The information environment in which analysts operate in is affected by CSR-related reports that companies voluntarily issue as well as information that becomes available through third-party analysis and rating institutions. We find an inverse relationship between the value of both upgrade and downgrade revisions and the supply of CSR-related information compiled by third-party institutions, suggesting that (...) CSR-related data are associated with a richer information environment that makes it more challenging for analysts to issue informative recommendations, thereby mitigating their contribution to the price discovery process. We further find that the value of analysts’ recommendation revisions is lower for companies that voluntarily issue CSR-related reports compared to those that do not make such disclosures and that the overall effect of CSR on the informativeness of analysts is stronger in the recent years. Our findings have implications for the evolution of CSR reporting as the incorporation of CSR-related information into market prices legitimizes the relevance of such reports. Furthermore, these findings contribute to our understanding of the role and value of information intermediaries in changing information environments. (shrink)

This paper reports on the findings of the first stage of a research project that experiments with the use of laddering technique in an attempt to enhance understanding of the influence of values in the behaviour of HRM professionals. Laddering has been chosen because it allows flexible, systematic investigation of aspects of ethics and people management which have hitherto been difficult to clarify. It also provides the opportunity to undertake both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data obtained. The research (...) design incorporates two phases – a questionnaire and a laddering interview; it involves a sample of respondents drawn from HRM practitioners participating in the CIPD Professional Qualification Scheme. In comparing the results obtained from each phase of the research, it is clear that the laddering interviews have enabled more detailed information to be elicited and more specific goals to be identified. The authors believe that laddering can provide valuable additional insight into ethical practice, behaviour and goals. (shrink)

In this article, I develop three conceptual innovations within the area of formal metatheory, and present a computer program, called Reconstructor, that implements those developments. The first development consists in a methodology for testing formal reconstructions of scientific theories, which involves checking both whether translations of paradigmatically successful applications into models satisfy the formalisation of the laws, and also whether unsuccessful applications do not. I show how Reconstructor can help carry this out, since it allows the end-user to specify a (...) formal language, input axioms and models formulated in that language, and then ask if the models satisfy the axioms. The second innovation is the introduction of incomplete models (for which the denotation of some terms is missing) into scientific metatheory, in order to represent cases of missing information. I specify the paracomplete semantics built into Reconstructor to deal with sentences where denotation failures occur. The third development consists in a new way of explicating the structuralist notion of a determination method, by equating them with algorithms. This allows determination methods to be loaded into Reconstructor and then executed within a model to find out the value of a previously non-denoting term (i.e. it allows the formal reconstruction to make predictions). This, in turn, can help test the reconstruction in a different way. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions about additional uses the program may have. (shrink)

Prevailing views of delusional beliefs frame them as pathological and harmful, leaving little room for understanding why delusions may emerge. Lisa Bortolotti’s book, “Why Delusions Matter,” offers a more compassionate perspective on delusions, framing them as adaptive and meaningful responses to crises. Many psychologists and philosophers have asserted that delusions can function as psychological defense mechanisms or adaptive coping strategies that protectively obscure painful realities. However, some delusions, especially those that arise in the context of traumatic experiences and psychosis, can (...) be better understood as the body’s attempt to alert us to sources of harm and reveal, rather than obscure, important information. Drawing from neuroscience literature and the author’s personal encounters with psychosis and trauma, this article explores the ways in which some delusions can help us access interoceptive information from the body, uncovering sources of pathology, as well as previously unconscious information about harmful traumatic experiences. Ultimately, taking an epistemic justice lens to delusions, uplifts their value in revealing very real embodied experiences of the individual expressing them. (shrink)

Many philosophers are skeptical about the scientific value of the concept of biological information. However, several have recently proposed a more positive view of ascribing information as an exercise in scientific modeling. I argue for an alternative role: guiding empirical data collection for the sake of theorizing about the evolution of semantics. I clarify and expand on Bergstrom and Rosvall’s suggestion of taking a “diagnostic” approach that defines biological information operationally as a procedure for collecting empirical (...) cases. The more recent modeling-based accounts still perpetuate a theory-centric view of scientific concepts, which motivated philosophers’ misplaced skepticism in the first place. (shrink)

Information and Communication Technologies have profoundly changed many aspects of life, including the nature of entertainment, work, communication, education, healthcare, industrial production and business, social relations and conflicts. They have had a radical and widespread impact on our moral lives and hence on contemporary ethical debates. The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, first published in 2010, provides an ambitious and authoritative introduction to the field, with discussions of a range of topics including privacy, ownership, freedom of (...) speech, responsibility, technological determinism, the digital divide, cyber warfare, and online pornography. It offers an accessible and thoughtful survey of the transformations brought about by ICTs and their implications for the future of human life and society, for the evaluation of behaviour, and for the evolution of moral values and rights. It will be a valuable book for all who are interested in the ethical aspects of the information society in which we live. (shrink)

Parents influence the development of their offspring in many ways beyond the transmission of DNA. This includes transfer of epigenetic states, nutrients, antibodies and hormones, and behavioural interactions after birth. While the evolutionary consequences of such nongenetic inheritance are increasingly well understood, less is known about how inheritance mechanisms evolve. Here, we present a simple but versatile model to explore the adaptive evolution of non-genetic inheritance. Our model is based on a switch mechanism that produces alternative phenotypes in response to (...) different inputs, including genes and non-genetic factors transmitted from parents and the environment experienced during development. This framework shows how genetic and non-genetic inheritance mechanisms and environmental conditions can act as cues by carrying correlational information about future selective conditions. Differential use of these cues is manifested as different degrees of genetic, parental or environmental morph determination. We use this framework to evaluate the conditions favouring non-genetic inheritance, as opposed to genetic determination of phenotype or within-generation plasticity, by applying it to two putative examples of adaptive non-genetic inheritance: maternal effects on seed germination in plants and transgenerational phase shift in desert locusts. Our simulation models show how the adaptive value of non-genetic inheritance depends on its mechanism, the pace of environmental change, and life history characteristics. (shrink)

Informed consent is a vital part of ethical research. In emergency health care research environments such as ambulance services and emergency departments, it is sometimes necessary to conduct trial interventions or observations without patient consent. At times where treatment is time critical, it may be impossible or inappropriate to seek consent from next of kin. Emergency medicine is one of the few areas where the process of informed consent can be waived to allow research to proceed without patient consent. This (...) article will explore the ethics of informed consent in the prehospital emergency research context. This will include an overview of current Australian guidelines for ethical research, and recent changes in law internationally which have affected the conduct of international emergency health research. An overview of the ethical reasoning behind the waiver of informed consent in emergency research is presented, also addressing issues relating to emergency health research such as proxy consent, unconscious patients, and patient decision making capacity. The unusual circumstances encountered in the prehospital ambulance environment will also be discussed, including the dependent and coercive relationship between patients and ambulance professionals, and a lack of alternatives for care and transport for patients who refuse consent. The conflict arising from differences in medical culture and values between patients and health care professionals will also briefly be discussed. It will be argued that, while emergency care research should not require informed consent due to the restrictions of time and dependent nature of the relationship between patient and health professional, emergency health researchers still have a responsibility to consider the patients’ perspective when considering the ethical issues of an emergency research project, particularly in the prehospital environment. (shrink)

In the middle of the 19th century a new value began to appear in Western Europe - the belief that (in the words of Matthew Arnold) 'the exercise of a creative activity is the true function of man'. This book gives an account of the stages by which, and the reasons why, this development occurred at that time. In so doing it reveals a historical puzzle, for the main factors which can be seen to have given rise to the (...) new value - mainly scientific, technological, economic and political - were not reflected in the value itself, for that was applied almost exclusively to artistic and cultural activity. John Hope Mason sets out to explain this puzzle by showing how throughout European history there have been two radically different views of the creative attribute. An early example of one view was the character of Prometheus in Greek mythology; influential examples of the second were the figures of God the Creator in Judaeo-Christian theology and the neo-Platonic One in Hellenistic philosophy. The book shows how the contrast represented by those figures informed discussions of genius in the 18th century and indicates why the notion of creativity which came to prevail then assimilated it with purely aesthetic and moral concerns. Combining a broad perspective with a close analysis of key figures - from Adam Smith, Rousseau and Kant, to Arnold, Marx and Nietzsche - this book casts a new light on a central value of the modern world. (shrink)

In the United States and elsewhere, there is substantial controversy regarding the use of race and ethnicity by police in determining whom to stop, question, and investigate in relation to crime and security issues. In the ethics literature, the debate about profiling largely focuses on the nature of profiling and when (if ever) profiling is morally justifiable. This essay addresses the related, but distinct, issue of whether states have a duty to collect information about the race and ethnicity of (...) persons stopped by police. I argue that states in the U.S. do have such a duty on the grounds that such information collection would help secure the value of persons’ human rights against discrimination and unfair policing. Nonetheless, a large number of states do not require it. I begin by distinguishing rights from the value of rights, and arguing that under certain conditions persons have claims to the value of rights themselves, and that states have duties to secure that value. I then turn to the issue of profiling and offer the value of rights argument in favor of information collection about the race and ethnicity of persons stopped by police. (shrink)

Background: While academics contribute to the development of society through all the subjects that they work on, they also have other important tasks to fulfill, such as being role models for their students and society. Therefore, the place of academic ethical values is a significant topic for academic nurses. Objective: The main objective of this research was to examine the attitudes of academic nurses toward academic ethics. Research design: This descriptive and cross-sectional research study was conducted between March and June (...) 2017 in three different public universities in Turkey. The research sample consisted of 132 nurses in different professional positions at different universities who volunteered to participate in the study. The data were collected with an Information Form and an Academic Ethical Values Scale developed in Turkey. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was granted by the institutions involved, and all participants provided informed verbal consent. Findings: The attitudes of academics participating in the research on academic ethical values were found to be highly positive. When the sub-dimensions of the scale were examined, the dimension with the highest average attitudinal score is found to be “values regarding the teaching process” and the dimension with the lowest average attitude score is found to be “values regarding society.” Depending on the participants’ academic position, it was determined that the total average score for the Academic Ethical Values Scale and the average scores of the “values regarding scientific research” and “values regarding the teaching process” sub-dimensions differed significantly (p < 0.05). Conclusion: It was found that academic nurses had highly positive attitudes of toward academic ethical values. It can be argued that academics act more responsibly with regard to the ethical values of the teaching process than other areas. In addition, academics who are professors are most sensitive in their perception of academic ethical values. (shrink)

. Luciano Floridi argues that every existing entity is deserving of at least minimal moral respect in virtue of having intrinsic value qua information object. In this essay, I attempt a comprehensive assessment of this important view as well as the arguments Floridi offers in support of it. I conclude both that the arguments are insufficient and that the thesis itself is substantively implausible from the standpoint of ordinary intuitions.

Purpose Employees may feel overwhelmed with information privacy choices and have difficulties understanding what they are committing to in the digital workplace. This paper aims to analyze the role of different thinking styles for effort reduction, such as the use of intuition, when employees make decisions about the credibility and trustworthiness of workplace information privacy issues in Slovakia. While the General Data Protection Regulation sets precise requirements for valid consent, organizations are classified as data controllers and are subject (...) to credibility judgments by their employees. Design/methodology/approach Data was collected from 230 employees in Slovakia using a survey questionnaire. Quantitative analysis using SPSS was conducted to describe employees thinking preferences when judging the credibility of information privacy in their organizations. Findings The survey participants revealed their perceived credibility and trust in personal data protection and thinking preferences. Unconscious thinking is the type of effort reduction often reported by participants, who perceive high credibility and trust in personal data protection. This study can help managers and data controllers in small- and medium-sized enterprises in reflecting about the way in which people use different thinking processes for decision-making about information privacy in their organizations. Research limitations/implications This study set out to explore how decision-making processes at the workplace relate to credibility of data practices. Focusing on the use of different types of intuition, the authors explored whether the preference for a specific decision-making style can explain the perceived credibility of data practices. The part of the workforce in the sample did not have a strict predisposition to use either intuitive or rational thinking. Practical implications The contribution provides scholars with an overview of the field of intuition, a field that is likely to grow given the challenges of digitalization for organizations, such as shitstorms, cyberattacks and whistleblowing. Originality/value The most well-known concepts from intuition research, e.g. the dual process theory, and practice are tested simultaneously, therewith contributing to the applied literature on domain-specific preferences for intuition and deliberation in decision-making. (shrink)

This study identifies and describes the values espoused by the 62 companies that have consistently appeared on the “Fortune 100 Best Companies to Work For” list. We identify 24 separate values and offer an analysis of the keywords and phrases used to promote them. We confirm that these values fall within the categories of four well-accepted theoretical frameworks of corporate values and culture. We then provide evidence for three underlying dimensions transcending all four models. They are values that guide relationships (...) and self-regulation; values that describe desired outcomes and performance; and values that inform learning and change. Next, we present the results of a qualitative study describing how these companies put their values into practice. Finally, using publicly available information from the Great Place to Work® Institute, we show how the espoused values we identified relate to: what employees report about their experiences and company self-descriptions. Our findings highlight connections between leadership and values and they offer guidance to those seeking to understand keys to values-based cultures. (shrink)

By means of a survey of Thoreau's writings, this article analyses his thoughts on health, emphasising some features that fit well with contemporary debates in the philosophy of medicine. Thoreau understands health as an environmental value, one that cannot be achieved without a personal relation to nature, but he does not provide a static definition of health within a fixed hierarchy of values. Thus he avoids a certain degree of essentialism that, when imposed on his work, makes it seem (...) more utopian and anti-scientific than it really is. The meaning of health for Thoreau is often contradictory and hard to disambiguate, and his context was different in many respects to ours, but his ideas on this topic still serve to criticise some of modern medicine's views on health and disease, and to steer it towards a more environmentally-informed approach to these phenomena. (shrink)