During the fall of 2001 (October 22–25), The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) and the Agricultural University of Norway arranged a consensus conference on the protection of the environment against ionising radiation. The motive for the conference was the need to study the ethical and philosophical basis for protection of nature in its own right. The conference was funded by Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS), in cooperation with the International Union of Radioecology (IUR). The National Committee for Research Ethics in (...) Science and Technology (NENT) was hired as facilitators for the consensus process. This paper will give a brief outline of the aims and method of the conference, distinguishing these from other kinds of consensus conferences. The paper ends with some general reflections on the appropriateness of seeking consensus on ethics-related issues among experts. (shrink)

This article presents the results of the longitudinal study of Addiopizzo, a successful anti-bribery organization founded in Sicily in 2004. It analyzes how this organization has used information disclosure as a strategy to fight adverse environmental conditions and the immoral activities of the Sicilian Mafia. This article extends the business ethics and corporate social responsibility literature by showing how multi-level strategic information disclosure processes can help gain organizational legitimacy in adverse social environments and successfully fight against social resistance to change, (...) low levels of moral imagination and attacks from criminal organizations. This article provides an additional contribution to the literature by linking the three research streams on corporate transparency, the fight against corruption, and organizational legitimacy. The results of this research also contribute to the special issue of the EBEN AC 2010, “Which values for which organizations”, since it provides a unique example of an organization capable of spreading the values of social justice and honesty in a difficult social environment plagued by Mafia. (shrink)

This paper is a review of the 18th National Ethics Conference that took place in November 2022 and was organized by the Department of Ethical Studies of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The aim of this review is to give publicity to the event by informing of the thematic panels, the titles of the reports and the names of the researchers who participated.

Given important structural barriers facing trainees, making small victories is an important goal of pedagogical innovations in Latin American bioethics pedagogy. Here, I describe an in-person workshop with 11 trainees in which they received a class on writing dialectics and subsequently sent an abstract to the 17th World Congress of Bioethics. All abstracts were accepted, helping students gain confidence in their ability to formulate an argument, progress towards completion of their Master’s thesis, and increase the visibility of their work on (...) the global stage. (shrink)

I argue that the claim that all value is conferred is incompatible with the view that the capacity to set ends is unconditionally valuable. While this objection has been made, I offer a rebuttal and then a counterexample to the rebuttal. I also argue that, if all value were conferred, then the Kantian notion that moral wrongness consists in a practical contradiction is undermined.

9th and 10th Nov. 2013 at Kyoto University. Organizers: Takeshi Sato and Shunsuke Sugimoto.

The lack of metaphysical grounding of environmental values, and impatience towards the enterprise of seeking such grounding, result in a superficial and wrongheaded view of anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism is best understood as a limiting condition, a point from which we can begin to reformulate an understanding of ourselves, our values, and our relation to the environment. It is not principally a starting point for the existence of values, as is assumed under traditional theories of anthropocentrism. To demonstrate and elaborate on this (...) position, the paper focuses on environmental values and how we traditionally assume them to be formed and legitimated. A critique of the analyses of two prominent figures in the field of environmental ethics, Bryan Norton and Eugene Hargrove, serves as the backdrop against which an alternative view is formed. This alternative is metaphysically grounded in an ecologically informed analysis of valuational activity. Against the tradition, the argument establishes two main points: 1) that attempts to ground environmental values on human preferences, agreements, traditions, or culturally driven commitments are liable to legitimate contrary values; and 2) that an ecologically driven analysis of values shows that valuations of the environment are not fundamentally conferred onto it by human beings. Positively, the paper attempts to show that our inclusion as members of the ecological community makes our valuational activity an integral and transformational element within more comprehensive ecological processes. As such, our moral commitment to the environment must be radically reshaped in order adequately to incorporate this renewed understanding. (shrink)

In Common Values, now with a new preface, Bok writes eloquently and clearly while combining moral theory with practical ethics, demonstrating how moral values apply to all facets of life—personal, professional, domestic, and international. Drawing on a great deal of historical material, Bok also includes in her examination consideration of the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights; the World Parliament of Religions; the publication of Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II's proclamation on morality; and the International Commission of (...) Global Governance. Bok's defense of shared morality addresses a crucial topic for our time. (shrink)

One feature of the individuals Nietzsche considers paradigms of greatness is that they are, in some capacity, rare —an exception to the majority.1 It would be difficult to overstate the frequency of this association in the texts. From as early as UM, Nietzsche repeatedly contrasts the “rarest and most valuable exemplars” with the pejorative “herd [Heerde]”, the “common [gemein]”, the “mediocre [mittelmässig]”, and the “rabble [Pöbel]”.2 This contrast becomes more explicit in Nietzsche’s mature period, where, for example, he writes plainly (...) that “what can be common has ever but little... (shrink)

I Conceptual Foundations Ethical problems emerging from modern medical technology have been evaluated on an issue-by-issue basis. ...

Preserving wild nature has been an important goal of the conservation and environmental movements throughout their existence. The reasons given for preserving wild species and wild places sometimes focus on the benefits to human beings and sometimes on the intrinsic value of wild things themselves. In either case, more or less emphasis may be given to wildness per se as a direct value-conferring property. Though nature lovers have won many battles, overall we are losing the war to (...) preserve the wild. Little wild nature will remain a century from now unless humanity consciously and forcefully commits to limiting our numbers and our economic demands on the biosphere. For those who place a high value on wild nature, creating societies that preserve wildness on the landscape remains a key, ineliminable component of a proper environmentalism. (shrink)

I have two objectives in this paper. The first is to investigate whether, and to what extent, truth is valuable. I do this by first isolating the value question from other normative questions. Second, I import into the debate about the nature of truth some key distinctions hailing from value theory. This will help us to clarify the sense in which truth is valuable. I then argue that there is significant variability in the value of truth in (...) different areas of discourse. I shall call this the axiological variability conjecture. I illustrate and substantiate AVC by contrasting the occurrence of disagreement in two paradigmatically evaluative areas of discourse, viz. matters of taste, on the one hand, and morality, on the other. I claim that there is a reasonable tendency to care much more about settling moral disagreements than taste disagreements and that this difference has to do, at least partly but significantly, with the different value that truth exhibits in these two areas of discourse. I then turn to the second objective of the paper—namely, to discuss how pluralistic accounts of the nature of truth may deal with the value of truth in light of AVC. I will argue that AVC is a problem for all versions of truth pluralism that are committed to the following two theses: that truth is a value concept; and that this characteristic of the concept has to be reflected in the metaphysical nature of any admissible truth properties—i.e., all the various properties that are admissible in the pluralist account are value-conferring properties and thus intrinsically valuable. In so doing, I will focus primarily on Michael Lynch’s functionalist incarnation of truth pluralism. Lynch terms this “Manifestation Alethic Pluralism”. My reason for this is twofold: first and foremost, MAP is a paradigmatic exemplification of a model of truth pluralism that is committed to both and ; second, MAP has, to date, enjoyed the most discussion, and currently provides the most developed account of truth pluralism. However, I argue that MAP lacks the resources to account for AVC. Owing to this, I suggest two ways out for an advocate of MAP, which force various structural changes in her view. (shrink)

For Howard Gardner, Multiple Intelligences Theory (MI) constitutes “a new understanding of human nature,” on a par with those proffered by Socrates and Freud. While the educational community in general has responded enthusiastically to MI, because it enables them to deal with students more holistically, MI embeds a significant dualism that is detrimental to truly holistic education. I will argue that: values are pervasive; intelligence requires the exercise of judgment, which no computational system can emulate; domains in which intelligence functions (...) are contested, as much as in the realm of “values,” judgments about “values” are “intelligent” in seeking to determine what conditions will promote flourishing, and the more appropriate distinction to draw is not between two structural domains of “empirical fact” and “subjective value,” but between structural conditions and directional responses to these conditions. (shrink)

According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention (...) is that agent-regret is a mode of valuing: a way in which the agent expresses and confers value. (shrink)

This conference is, in part, an expression of respect for Joseph Raz and his work from which we have all learned much. I thought it apt, then, to talk about Raz's (2001) views about respect as developed in chapter four of Value, Respect, and Attachment. Raz describes his views as having a Kantian origin. This might raise the eyebrow of some neo•Kantians or anyone inclined to interpret Kant as a formalist or as a constructivist. Nevertheless, I believe that Raz's (...) views and Kant's, properly interpreted and developed, have more in common than even Raz suspects. To bring this out, I will take up three questions that Raz raises concerning Kant's doctrine. (shrink)

The concept of ecosystem health is problematic. Do ecosystems as such exist? Is health an objective condition of organisms or is it socially constructed? Can 'health' be unequivocally predicated of ecosystems? Is ecosystem health both objective and valuative? Are ecosystem health and biological integrity identical? How do these concepts interface with the concept of biodiversity? Ecosystems exist, although they are turning out to be nested sets of linked process-functions with temporal boundaries, not tangible superorganisms with spatial boundaries. Ecosystem health – (...) or normal occurrence of ecological processes and functions – is an objective condition of ecosystems, although the concept of ecosystem health allows some room for personal and social determination or construction. Ecosystem health is prudentially, aesthetically, and intrinsically valuable, although the value of ecosystem health is subjectively conferred. Biodiversity and biological integrity are different from, but not unrelated to, ecosystem health. Together these three normative concepts represent complementary conservation goals. (shrink)

When it comes to the establishment of an ethical corporate culture, there appear to be at least two inter-related foundational requirements: (1) the existence of an explicit set of core ethical values; and (2) the presence of ethical leadership, i.e., an ethical ‘tone at the top.’ Some companies appear, however, to have been more successful than others when it comes to establishing an appropriate ‘tone at the top’, i.e., leaders who behave according to an explicit set of core ethical values. (...) Building on previous values-based leadership research, this study examines the process of one Canadian-based firm’s initial efforts, following a series of embarrassing scandals and negative publicity, to inculcate values-based leadership via a set of core ethical values. (shrink)

L. W. Sumner argues that humanism—the position that all and only humans possess moral standing—is false. I agree. Critically examining an argument purporting to establish the exclusive part of humanism—that only humans possess moral standing—Sumner argues that we should not confuse ultimate and objective value, value and welfare, and “formal” and “substantive” theses about value. Again I have no disagreement.

In this exploratory study, we look at the professed values that people have, and their performance in a negotiation. We found relations between Schwartz values and conflict handling behaviors, and distributive, integrative, and compatible negotiation outcomes in a controlled environment using Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM) analysis.

(1996). Values, cultural identity, and European integration: Towards a theoretical model. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 619-626.

Corporate success is understood as stakeholder value, which is based on three licenses: the licenses to innovate, to compete, and to operate. Stakeholders contribute to these three licenses through their benefit and risk potentials. Based on four cases, a stakeholder value management system is developed which provides managers with a tool to systematically use the benefit potentials that lie in stakeholder relations. The links between corporate value creation and stakeholders are identified.

The family is hotly contested ideological terrain. Some defend the traditional two-parent heterosexual family while others welcome its demise. Opinions vary about how much control parents should have over their children's upbringing. Family Values provides a major new theoretical account of the morality and politics of the family, telling us why the family is valuable, who has the right to parent, and what rights parents should—and should not—have over their children. Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that parent-child relationships produce (...) the "familial relationship goods" that people need to flourish. Children's healthy development depends on intimate relationships with authoritative adults, while the distinctive joys and challenges of parenting are part of a fulfilling life for adults. Yet the relationships that make these goods possible have little to do with biology, and do not require the extensive rights that parents currently enjoy. Challenging some of our most commonly held beliefs about the family, Brighouse and Swift explain why a child's interest in autonomy severely limits parents' right to shape their children's values, and why parents have no fundamental right to confer wealth or advantage on their children. Family Values reaffirms the vital importance of the family as a social institution while challenging its role in the reproduction of social inequality and carefully balancing the interests of parents and children. (shrink)

A trait is of adaptive value if it confers a fitness advantage to its possessor. Thus adaptiveness is an ahistorical identification of a trait affording some selective advantage to an agent within some particular environment. In results reported here we identify a trait within natural language discourse as having adaptive value by computing a trait/fitness covariance; the possession of the trait correlates with the replication success of the trait’s possessor. We show that the trait covaries with fitness across (...) multiple unrelated discursive groups. In our analysis the trait in question is a particular statistically derived word-in-context, that is, a word set. Variation of the word-usage is measured as the relative presence of the word set within a particular text, that is, the percentage of the text devoted to this set of words. Fitness is measured as the rate in which the text is responded to, or replicates, within an online environment. Thus we are studying the micro-evolutionary dynamics of natural language discourse. (shrink)

Originally published in 1928, this book was written to provide members of the National Union of Teachers with a souvenir upon the occasion of their 1928 conference, which took place in Cambridge during the Easter vacation. It presents a concise guide to the city, with information on the history of the university and other areas. Illustrative figures are incorporated throughout. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the National Union of Teachers and the history (...) of Cambridge. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of ‘areti’ as encountered in the Aristotelian ethical system in order to establish its relationship to the modern concept of virtue as well as to that of moral truth, that is, to identify its truth-value. I intend to show that the Aristotelian ‘areti’ as a developed state of character and as an advanced stage of ethical understanding entails moral truth. ‘Areti’ as a good-in-itself possesses an intrinsic value which reflects moral truth, and as (...) a means for the accomplishment of ‘eudaimonia’ (ultimate happiness) it possesses an instrumental value. I also wish to argue that this position calls for a realist as well as an objectivist (or nonrelativist) approach in Aristotle. To that effect, I examine the elements of ‘areti’ that relate it to truth, and then I use reference to some of theAristotelian virtues, such as ‘andreia’ (courage), ‘philia’ (friendship), ‘dikaiosyne’ (justice), and ‘megalopsychia’ (magnanimity), in order to examine the way moral truth functions. This examination will also try to show that Aristotle’s aretaic approach does not suffer from the ills of virtue ethics theories. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more (...) epistemic value on a belief than the property of being true. The Secondary Value is a problem of understanding how, for instance, property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are ongoing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth. (shrink)

Demonstrating value is an ongoing process and requirement for institutional survival for ethics programs. Although our ethics program has significantly increased our ethics consultation volume and maintains a robust database that tracks ethics consultation data, these data regarding ethics consultations alone do not accurately represent the program’s overall activities and value to the institution. The roles and responsibilities of clinical ethicists extend beyond clinical ethics consultation, and there are many other ways that clinical ethicists contribute and add (...) class='Hi'>value to their institutions. This article describes our ethics program’s early efforts to systematically track ethics program activities outside of ethics consultations as a way to demonstrate additional value to the institution that goes beyond ethics consultation. By systematically tracking activities such as internal ethics education sessions, conference presentations, publications, grants, committee/policy work, and other activities, our ethics program has been able to gather substantial quantitative data that highlight our program’s numerous activities and outreach, both within and outside the institution, that provide additional value to the institution beyond our ethical consultation activities. (shrink)

Moral responsibility requires control of one’s behavior. But there are different kinds of control. One sort of control entails the existence of genuinely accessible alternative possibilities. I call this regulative control. I believe that an agent can control his or her behavior without having control over it. In such a circumstance, the agent enjoys what I call guidance control, but not regulative control. He guides his behavior in the way characteristic of agents who act freely, yet he does not have (...) alternative possibilities with respect to his decision or action. I contend that moral responsibility requires guidance control, but not regulative control. In this paper, I wish to provide a measure of intuitive appeal to the claim that guidance control is all the control (or freedom) necessary for moral responsibility by sketching the picture that supports this claim. (shrink)

The distinction of fact and value and the problems entailed by it are concerns only for modern, Western thought. The distinction is supported by Kant, who, however, also attempts to solve its consequent problems. His first attempt is made by arguing that the standard of value is itself a fact. This brings fact and value together, but only in an intelligible world. Kant's second attempt is found in the third Critique in the argument that man, as both (...) rational and animal, must view the world in teleological terms; so doing advances the task of science, finds support in objects of natural beauty, and leads to the creation of beauty in art. Thus, ultimately, the highest complete good, a world under moral laws is itself seen as in fact really possible as the final goal of human creative artistic activity. (shrink)