We analyze the usage of computer simulation at the LHC and derive seven jointly necessary requirements for a simulation to be considered ’trustworthy’, such that it can be used as proxy for experiments. We show that these requirements can also be applied to systems without direct experimental access and discuss their validity for properties that have not yet been probed. While being necessary, these requirements are not sufficient. Such trustworthy simulations will be analyzed for the relative epistemic statuses (...) of simulation and material measurements, from which we argue that claims of their parity are unfounded. Instead, using credibility as a measure for epistemic status, and in view of the temporal and epistemic dependence of simulation on material measurements, we argue that the latter have a higher epistemic status than the former. We further argue that suggestions to qualify the epistemic status by ’defocussing’ on the material connection to the target system of either human or natural experiments are misleading. (shrink)

Link trustworthiness evaluation is a crucial task for information networks to evaluate the probability of a link being true in a heterogeneous information network. This task can significantly influence the effectiveness of downstream analysis. However, the performance of existing evaluation methods is limited, as they can only utilize incomplete or one-sided information from a single HIN. To address this problem, we propose a novel multi-HIN link trustworthiness evaluation model that leverages information across multiple related HINs to accomplish link trustworthiness evaluation (...) tasks inherently and efficiently. We present an effective method to evaluate and select informative pairs across HINs and an integrated training procedure to balance inner-HIN and inter-HIN trustworthiness. Experiments on a real-world dataset demonstrate that our proposed model outperforms baseline methods and achieves the best accuracy and F1-score in downstream tasks of HINs. (shrink)

Since anonymous agents can spread misinformation with impunity, many people advocate for greater accountability for internet speech. This paper provides a veritistic argument that accountability mechanisms can cause significant epistemic problems for internet encyclopedias and social media communities. I show that accountability mechanisms can undermine both the dissemination of true beliefs and the detection of error. Drawing on social psychology and behavioral economics, I suggest alternative mechanisms for increasing the trustworthiness of internet communication.

In schools, trustworthiness is a foundational value taught to students through values education as well as the school activities, ethos and climate. A key determining factor for the establishment o...

Although trustworthiness has been described as a source of competitive advantage, its value extends to organizational governance and wealth creation. We identify the importance of the commitment—compliance continuum in the decision to trust and note that trustworthiness is a subjective perception viewed through each person's mediating lens. That lens and each person's interpretation of the social contract impact one's commitment to cooperate. We suggest five propositions that integrate trustworthiness, governance, and wealth creation.

It is simple enough to claim that academic research institutions ought to be trustworthy. Building the culture and taking the steps necessary to earn and preserve institutional trust are, however, complex processes. The experience motivating this special report—a request for the Center for Talented Youth at Johns Hopkins University to collaborate on research regarding the genetics of intelligence—illustrates how ensuring institutional trustworthiness can be in tension with a commitment to fostering research. In this essay, we explore the historical context (...) for biomedical research institutions like Johns Hopkins that have worked to build local community trust. In so doing, we consider how the example under focus in this special report can lead to greater consideration of how research institutions balance fostering trust with their other commitments. (shrink)

This paper examines how science advice can provide policy recommendations in a trustworthy manner. Despite their major political importance, expert recommendations are understudied in the philosophy of science and social epistemology. Matthew Bennett has recently developed a notion of what he calls recommendation trust, according to which well-placed trust in experts’ policy recommendations requires that recommendations are aligned with the interests of the trust-giver. While interest alignment might be central to some cases of public trust, this paper argues against (...) the significance of interest-alignment to meritorious public trust. First, political bodies and citizens can have a basic kind of well-placed recommendation trust in science advice based on an all-things-considered judgement regarding the possession of relevant competencies, responsible conduct, and a proper institutional design. Moreover, scientists’ policy recommendations can be seen as open-ended and as dynamic proposals that enable inter-institutional reasoning and political deliberation. Finally, by providing conditional recommendations, scientists can expand the scope of feasible policy options from which political bodies can choose, thus making the condition of interest alignment even less significant to the trustworthy provision of recommendations. (shrink)

The approach of responsible research and innovation has been proposed to support the introduction of technologies that touch upon socially sensitive issues. RRI is intended to help designers and manufacturers of new technologies identify and accommodate public concerns when developing a new technology by engaging with a wide range of relevant actors in an interactive, transparent process. However what this approach amounts to exactly remains elusive as of yet, i.e. it is unclear what its contribution to the societal embedding of (...) new technologies should consists of exactly. The transition to a sustainable bio-economy that uses biomass as its main resource is a complicated trajectory involving many actors and touching upon societally sensitive issues such as the use of genetic modification. In this paper we pose the question in what way RRI can stimulate the development and diffusion of a sustainable bio-economy in The Netherlands and Europe. We claim that for the further development and diffusion of the bio-economy, trust among actors in the relevant value-chain is a prerequisite. RRI can play a pivotal part in the bio-economy by providing conditions for trustworthiness of actors and by enhancing trusting relationships. This can be achieved through instruments such as personal relationships, third person guarantors, institutions and the communication of values. From the application of RRI to the context of the bio-economy, lessons can be drawn for other socially intricate technological trajectories. (shrink)

Appraising public policies about using technoscientific innovations requires attending to the values reflected in the interests expected to be served by them. It also requires addressing questions about the efficacy of using the innovations, and about whether or not using them may occasion harmful effects ; moreover, judgments about these matters should be soundly backed by empirical evidence. Clearly, then, scientists have an important role to play in formulating and appraising these public policies. However, ethical and social values affect decisions (...) made about the criteria for identifying the range of risks, and of relevant empirical data needed for making judgments about them, that should be considered in public policy deliberations, and for determining how well claims concerning risks should be supported by the available data in order to warrant that they have a decisive role in the deliberations. Consider the case of public policies about using GMOs. Concerning the range of data: is it sufficient for risk assessment only to be informed by data relevant to investigating the risks of using GMOs that may be occasioned by way of physical/chemical/biological mechanisms directly triggered by events within their modified genomes? Or: should data pertaining to the full range of ecological and socioeconomic effects of using them, in the environments in which they are used and under the socioeconomic conditions of their use, also inform this assessment? Those interested in producing and using GMOs, in the light of their adhering to values of capital and the market, are likely to give a positive answer to the first question; those holding competing values, e.g., connected with respect for human rights and environmental sustainability, to the second. And, concerning the degree of support: the former – citing the ethical gravity of losses that would be incurred by failing to use GMOs on a wide scale – are likely to require less stringent standards of evidential appraisal than the latter. Scientists, qua scientists, however, do not have special authority in the realm of values. Thus, their judgments, about the evidential support that claims about risks have, may sometimes be reasonably contested partly on value-laden grounds – as they have been in the GMO case, where the contestation has generated considerable controversy, and continues to do so. It follows that, in the context of deliberations about public policy, unless scientists engage with representatives of all stakeholders in the outcomes of the policies – taking into account that their competing values may lead to making different decisions about what are the relevant data, as well as about the degree of support required for their claims about risks to gain the required credibility to inform the deliberations; and respecting "tempered equality" of participants in the dialogue – their trustworthiness is put into question and their authority diminished. (shrink)

How trustworthy can you be? Take on the challenge to be the most awesome you, you can be. Approachable text filled with examples from the child's world paired with engaging photos makes important SEL learning fun. Plus, a bonus activity at the end lets young readers practice their new skills.

Evaluating the trustworthiness of sources is important in today’s society. However, research has shown that students struggle when applying this skill. This study in history education aims to gain insight into students’ procedural knowledge about evaluating the trustworthiness of sources and into the value students attach to learning this skill. Grade 9 students (N = 132) performed tasks and filled out a questionnaire. Students applied more correct criteria of trustworthiness than they reported knowing. They considered this skill somewhat important and (...) useful, but less interesting. Procedural knowledge and task value were significant predictors of students’ task performance. Therefore, it is important to make students aware of the knowledge they implicitly possess and to make learning this skill more interesting for students. (shrink)

Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially important forms of trustworthiness solely in terms of the instrumentally rational seeking of one’s interests, in response to external sanctions or rewards. A richer psychology is required. So, second, possession of moral character is a plausible explanation of some socially important instances when people are trustworthy. I defend this conclusion against the influential account of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’, given by Russell Hardin, on (...) which most trustworthiness is explained by the interest of continuing relationship. (shrink)

Because of the importance of board members’ resource provision and monitoring, a substantial body of research has been devoted to ascertaining how directors can be incented to perform their responsibilities. We use social exchange theory to empirically examine how board members’ resource provision and monitoring are affected by their perceptions of the CEOs’ trustworthiness. Our findings suggest that board members’ perceptions of the CEO’s ability, benevolence, and integrity have different effects on the board members’ resource provision and monitoring. Our results (...) further suggest that board members’ governance behaviors are moderated by the board’s performance evaluation practices. (shrink)

With the increasing use of AI in high-stakes domains such as medicine, law, and defense, organizations spend a lot of time and money to make ML models trustworthy. Many books on the subject offer deep dives into theories and concepts. This guide provides a practical starting point to help development teams produce models that are secure, more robust, less biased, and more explainable. Authors Yada Pruksachatkun, Matthew McAteer, and Subhabrata Majumdar translate best practices in the academic literature for curating (...) datasets and building models into a blueprint for building industry-grade trusted ML systems. With this book, engineers and data scientists will gain a much-needed foundation for releasing trustworthy ML applications into a noisy, messy, and often hostile world. (shrink)

Believing someone is, as Elizabeth Anscombe said, “trusting him for the truth.” Recent accounts of how we trust speakers for the truth have given a central role to speaker trustworthiness but have said little about what speaker trustworthiness is. I argue that it is best to think of speaker trustworthiness as the virtue of truthfulness. I give an account of truthfulness, show how that account solves problems for other accounts of speaker trustworthiness, and then use my account to explain the (...) epistemic benefits of trusting a truthful speaker. (shrink)

I present and defend an account of three-place trustworthiness according to which B is trustworthy with respect to A in domain of interaction D, if and only if she is competent with respect to that domain, and she would take the fact that A is counting on her, were A to do so in this domain, to be a compelling reason for acting as counted on. This is not the whole story of trustworthiness, however, for we want those we (...) can count on to identify themselves so that we can place our trust wisely. (shrink)

Organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) are essential for effective organizational functioning. Decisions by employees to engage in these important discretionary behaviors are based on how they make sense of the organizational context. Using fairness heuristic theory, we tested two important OCB predictors: manager trustworthiness and interactional justice. In the process, we control for the effects of dispositional factors (propensity to trust) and for system-based organizational fairness (procedural and distributive justice). Results, based on surveys collected from 120 employee–supervisor dyads, indicate that manager (...) trustworthiness explains variance in OCBs over and above the variance accounted for by interactional fairness. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Within medical ethics, there is widespread agreement that morally valid consent includes an understanding condition. Disagreement centers on what is meant by that understanding condition. Tom Dougherty proposed that this understanding condition should be divided into the two mutually exclusive categories of descriptive information and contextual information. Further, Dougherty argues that each type of information is necessary to satisfy the understanding condition. In contrast, I argue that when the deontic aspect of valid consent is in view, each type of information (...) can be sufficient to satisfy the understanding condition on its own. Moreover, by analyzing delegation, which is conceptually related to consent since both are morally transformative actions, I show that delegation often depends not on descriptive or contextual information but on trust. So, I argue that trustworthiness can also be a type of information that does the same work as descriptive and contextual information in satisfying the understanding condition for valid consent. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of trustworthy AI. Its central idea is that whether AIs are trustworthy is a matter of whether they live up to their function-based obligations. We argue that this account serves to advance the literature in a couple of important ways. First, it serves to provide a rationale for why a range of properties that are widely assumed in the scientific literature, as well as in policy, to be required of trustworthy AI, such (...) as safety, justice, and explainability, are properties (often) instantiated by trustworthy AI. Second, we connect the discussion on trustworthy AI in policy, industry, and the sciences with the philosophical discussion of trustworthiness. We argue that extant accounts of trustworthiness in the philosophy literature cannot make proper sense of trustworthy AI and that our account compares favourably with its competitors on this front. (shrink)

When it comes to using patient data from the National Health Service for research, we are often told that it is a matter of trust: we need to trust, we need to build trust, we need to restore trust. Various policy papers and reports articulate and develop these ideas and make very important contributions to public dialogue on the trustworthiness of our research institutions. But these documents and policies are apparently constructed with little sustained reflection on the nature of trust (...) and trustworthiness, and therefore are missing important features that matter for how we manage concerns related to trust. We suggest that what we mean by ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ matters and should affect the policies and guidance that govern data sharing in the NHS. We offer a number of initial, general reflections on the way in which some of these features might affect our approach to principles, policies and strategies that are related to sharing patient data for research. This paper is the outcome of a ‘public ethics’ coproduction activity which involved members of the public and two academic ethicists. Our task was to consider collectively the accounts of trust developed by philosophers as they applied in the context of the NHS and to coproduce an argumentative position relevant to this context. (shrink)

Leaders in today's world face the challenge of earning the trust and commitment of organizational members if they expect to guide their companies to success in a highly competitive global context. In this article, we present empirical results indicating that when leadership behaviors are perceived as trustworthy through the observer's mediating lens, trust increases and leaders are more likely to be viewed as ethical stewards who honor a higher level of duties. This article contributes to the growing body of (...) literature about the importance of ethical stewardship in the trust relationship. (shrink)

Abstract: We examine how trustworthy behaviour can be achieved in the financial sector. The task is to ensure that firms are motivated to pursue long-term interests of customers rather than pursuing short-term profits. Firms’ self-interested pursuit of reputation, combined with regulation, is often not sufficient to ensure that this happens. We argue that trustworthy behaviour requires that at least some actors show a concern for the wellbeing of clients, or a respect for imposed standards, and that the behaviour (...) of these actors is copied in such a way that it becomes a behavioural norm. We briefly suggest what such behavioural norms might need to be if trustworthy behaviour is to be achieved, and consider how they might be supported; we describe the research that is necessary in order to understand these norms in more detail. We argue that the norms of traders are different from the norms of those engaged in other activities, since they are inevitably self-interested, and we consider the risk that traders’ norms might undermine those of other actors. We analyse the task for governance in dealing with this problem, and the role which leadership by a corporate board and management might play in doing this. We describe the need for further research in to describe how this might be done. (shrink)

The life of medieval peasants was dominated by the Church and local society. Both institutions were hierarchical and dependent upon inequality. The Church sought to teach the laity about Christian...

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are interactive tools used to assist in one’s choice of a party or candidate to vote for in an upcoming election. They have the potential to increase citizens’ trust and participation in democratic structures. However, there is no established ground truth for one’s electoral choice, and VAA recommendations depend strongly on architectural and design choices. We assessed several representative European VAAs according to the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI provided by the European Commission using publicly (...) available information. We found scores to be comparable across VAAs and low in most requirements, with differences reflecting the kind of developing institution. Across VAAs, we identify the need for improvement in (i) transparency regarding the subjectivity of recommendations, (ii) diversity of stakeholder participation, (iii) user-centric documentation of algorithm, and (iv) disclosure of the underlying values and assumptions. (shrink)

Discussions on the trustworthiness of science concern scientific objectivity. Scientific products, methods, and institutions are objective in three different senses. In each case, the notion of objectivity is applied to the outcomes of the scientific enterprise. This interpretation neglects the human side of objectivity. The trust in science is rational only when it is not grounded in an impersonal view of knowledge. Since trust is a value that connects people, society places its credence not in a system of propositions, a (...) methodology, a tradition, or even—an institution, but rather in the living people that practice science today. (shrink)

Simion and Kelp defend a non-anthropocentric account of trustworthy AI, based on the idea that the obligations of AI systems should be sourced in purely functional norms. In this commentary, I highlight some pressing counterexamples to their account, involving AI systems that reliably fulfil their functions but are untrustworthy because those functions are antagonistic to the interests of the trustor. Instead, I outline an alternative account, based on the idea that AI systems should not be considered primarily as tools (...) but as technological participants in social practices. Specifically, I propose to source the obligations of an AI system in the norms that should govern the role it plays within the social practices it participates in, taking into account any changes to the social practices that its participation may bring about. This proposal is anthropocentric insofar as it ascribes obligations to AI systems that are similar to those of human participants in social practices, but only modestly so, as it does not require trustworthy AI to have contentious anthropomorphic capacities (e.g. for consciousness or moral responsibility). (shrink)

What is trustworthiness? -- Being trustworthy -- Spreading trust -- Glossary -- Find out more -- Index -- About the author.

Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive (...) reasons to do so. In this paper, we argue for a version of anti-reductivism. Roughly, we argue that we have default entitlement to trust someone to φ so long as there is an operative norm that requires S to φ. At least in such circumstances (and absent defeaters), we don’t need any positive reasons to trust S to φ. (shrink)

Overconfidence is typically damaging to one’s reputation as a trustworthy source of information. Previous research shows that the reputational cost associated with conveying a piece of false information is higher for confident than unconfident speakers. When judging speaker trustworthiness, individuals do not exclusively rely on past accuracy but consider the extent to which speakers expressed a degree of confidence that matched the accuracy of their claims (their “confidence-accuracy calibration”). The present study experimentally examines the interplay between confidence, accuracy and (...) a third factor, namely evidence, in the assessment of speaker trustworthiness. Experiment 1 probes the hypothesis that overconfidence does not backfire when a confident but inaccurate claim is justified: the trustworthiness of a confident speaker who turns out to be wrong is restored if the confidence expressed is based on strong evidence (good confidence-evidence calibration). Experiment 2 investigates the hypothesis that confidence can backfire if a confident and accurate claim is not justified: the trustworthiness of a confident speaker who turns out to be right is damaged if the confidence expressed is based on weak evidence (bad confidence-evidence calibration). Our results support both hypotheses and thus suggest that “confidence-evidence calibration” plays a crucial role in the assessment of speaker trustworthiness. (shrink)

What is trustworthiness? -- Being trustworthy -- Spreading trust.

BackgroundDespite the recognition that developing artificial intelligence (AI) that is trustworthy is necessary for public acceptability and the successful implementation of AI in healthcare contexts, perspectives from key stakeholders are often absent from discourse on the ethical design, development, and deployment of AI. This study explores the perspectives of birth parents and mothers on the introduction of AI-based cardiotocography (CTG) in the context of intrapartum care, focusing on issues pertaining to trust and trustworthiness.MethodsSeventeen semi-structured interviews were conducted with birth (...) parents and mothers based on a speculative case study. Interviewees were based in England and were pregnant and/or had given birth in the last two years. Thematic analysis was used to analyze transcribed interviews with the use of NVivo. Major recurring themes acted as the basis for identifying the values most important to this population group for evaluating the trustworthiness of AI.ResultsThree themes pertaining to the perceived trustworthiness of AI emerged from interviews: (1) trustworthy AI-developing institutions, (2) trustworthy data from which AI is built, and (3) trustworthy decisions made with the assistance of AI. We found that birth parents and mothers trusted public institutions over private companies to develop AI, that they evaluated the trustworthiness of data by how representative it is of all population groups, and that they perceived trustworthy decisions as being mediated by humans even when supported by AI.ConclusionsThe ethical values that underscore birth parents and mothers’ perceptions of trustworthy AI include fairness and reliability, as well as practices like patient-centered care, the promotion of publicly funded healthcare, holistic care, and personalized medicine. Ultimately, these are also the ethical values that people want to protect in the healthcare system. Therefore, trustworthy AI is best understood not as a list of design features but in relation to how it undermines or promotes the ethical values that matter most to its end users. An ethical commitment to these values when creating AI in healthcare contexts opens up new challenges and possibilities for the design and deployment of AI. (shrink)

Our rationality depends on the reasons we have for accepting and preferring what we do. But where do reasons come from? What makes what I accept a reason for a conclusion or what I prefer a reason for action? We can explain where reasons come from without postulation or regress. The explanation rests on our trustworthiness combined with our acceptance of it and our preference for it. The explanation reveals that theoretical and practical reason are intertwined in a loop of (...) trustworthiness in what we accept, what we prefer and how we reason. The loop is the keystone of our rationality. (shrink)

Data from surveys indicate that people, in general, do not trust others. On the other hand, in one-shot trust games, where the player decides whether to send money to an anonymous partner, the actual rate of trust is relatively high. In two experiments, we showed that although reciprocity expectations and profit maximization matter, they are not decisive for trusting behaviour. Crucial factors that motivate behaviour in trust games seem to be altruism and a type of moral obligation related to a (...) social norm encouraging cooperative behaviour. Finally, we were able to divide participants into specific profiles based on amount of money transferred to the partner, altruistic motivation, and belief in partners’ trustworthiness. This shows that the trust game is differently perceived and interpreted by different participants. (shrink)

Simion and Kelp explain the trustworthiness of an AI based on that AI’s disposition to meet its obligations. Roughly speaking, according to Simion and Kelp, an AI is trustworthy regarding its task if and only if that AI is obliged to complete the task and its disposition to complete the task is strong enough. Furthermore, an AI is obliged to complete a task in the case where the task is the AI’s etiological function or design function. This account has (...) a strength in that it can provide a unificatory rationale for the trustworthy-making properties of AIs. According to this account, being explainable, being safe, and being transparent are the trustworthy-making properties of an AI because an AI can fulfill its etiological or design functions in the case where it is explainable, safe, and transparent. This paper shows that though Simion and Kelp’s account has a strength, this account is not satisfactory for two reasons. The first reason is that an AI’s trustworthiness is not determined just by the AI’s disposition to meet obligations, and the second reason is that it is difficult to explain how an AI’s etiological function and design function have to do with that AI’s obligations. To provide a full-fledged account, Simion and Kelp should dismiss these concerns. (shrink)

Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications (...) of its adoption) as well as something about trust (in particular, that the conditions necessary for genuine trust include a belief in a capacity for robust dispositions). (shrink)

What is it to trust someone? What is it for someone to be trustworthy? These are the two main questions that this paper addresses. There are various situations that can be described as ones of trust, but this paper considers the issue of trust between individuals. In it, I suggest that trust is distinct from reliance or cases where someone asks for something on the expectation that it will be done due to the different attitude taken by the trustor. (...) I argue that the trustor takes Holton’s ‘participant stance’ and this distinguishes trust from reliance. I argue that trustworthiness is different from reliability and that an account of trustworthiness cannot be successful whilst ignoring the point that aligning trustworthiness with reliability removes the virtue from being trustworthy. On the question of what it is distinguishes trustworthiness from reliability, I argue that the distinction is in the opportunity for the trustee to act against the wishes of the trustor and the trustee’s consideration of the value of the trust that has been placed in them by the trustor. (shrink)

The paper explores Lehrer's notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between them; it adopts a historical approach, looking at how Lehrer's views on these topics have evolved over the years.

Confucius’s teachings fall under four headings: “culture, moral conduct, doing one’s best, and being trustworthy in what one says” (7/25).1 Trust or, more precisely, being trustworthy, plays a central role in the Confucian ethic. This paper begins by examining the Confucian concept of trustworthiness. The second part of the paper discusses how the ideal of trustworthiness makes itself felt inbusiness practices within China. The paper concludes by raising and addressing several objections to the Confucian emphasis ontrustworthiness.

Machine unlearning (MU) is often analyzed in terms of how it can facilitate the “right to be forgotten.” In this commentary, we show that MU can support the OECD’s five principles for trustworthy AI, which are influencing AI development and regulation worldwide. This makes it a promising tool to translate AI principles into practice. We also argue that the implementation of MU is not without ethical risks. To address these concerns and amplify the positive impact of MU, we offer (...) policy recommendations across six categories to encourage the research and uptake of this potentially highly influential new technology. (shrink)

Exploring the locality stereotype with respect to CEO’s trustworthiness, we find that firms whose CEOs are from more reputable hometowns have a higher likelihood of stock price crashes, indicating the presence of a CEO “Trust Exploitation” effect, i.e. a high-trust identity does not guarantee managerial ethics; to the contrary, it could tempt CEOs to abuse outsiders’ trust, camouflage their misconducts and conceal adverse information more severely. The effect of CEO’s perceived trustworthiness on tail risk of stock price remains robust when (...) controlling for the region-level trust of firm’s headquarters, and in 2SLS regression with an instrumental variable. Further, CEO’s “Trust Exploitation” effect is more prominent among firms with lower disclosure quality, higher capital market pressure and higher CEO incentives. Our findings highlight an unexplored imperfection of individual-level trustworthiness as a reliable substitute for formal monitoring devices in terms of improving stock market stability. (shrink)

There is much to learn from Durán and Jongsma’s paper.1 One particularly important insight concerns the relationship between epistemology and ethics in medical artificial intelligence. In clinical environments, the task of AI systems is to provide risk estimates or diagnostic decisions, which then need to be weighed by physicians. Hence, while the implementation of AI systems might give rise to ethical issues—for example, overtreatment, defensive medicine or paternalism2—the issue that lies at the heart is an epistemic problem: how can physicians (...) know whether to trust decisions made by AI systems? In this manner, various studies examining the interaction of AI systems and physicians have shown that without being able to evaluate their trustworthiness, especially novice physicians become over-reliant on algorithmic support—and ultimately are led astray by incorrect decisions.3–5 This leads to a second insight from the paper, namely that even if some AI system happens to be opaque, it is still not built on the moon. To assess its trustworthiness, AI developers or physicians have different sorts of higher order evidence at hand. Most importantly, …. (shrink)

A widespread assumption in debates about trust and trustworthiness is that the evaluative norms of principal interest on the trustor’s side of a cooperative exchange regulate trusting attitudes and performances whereas those on the trustee’s side regulate dispositions to respond to trust. The aim here will be to highlight some unnoticed problems with this asymmetrical picture – and in particular, how it elides certain key evaluative norms on both the trustor’s and trustee’s side the satisfaction of which are critical to (...) successful cooperative exchanges – and to show that a symmetrical, ‘achievement-first’ approach to theorising about trust and trustworthiness (and their relation to each other) has important advantages by comparison. The view I develop is guided by a structural analogy with practical reasoning. Just as practical reasoning is working as it should only when there is realisation (knowledge and action) of states (belief and intention) with reverse directions of fits (mind-to-world and world-to-mind), likewise, cooperation between trustor and trustee is functioning as it should only when there is an analogous kind of realisation on both sides of the cooperative exchange – viz., when the trustor ‘matches’ her achievement in trusting (an achievement in fitting reliance to reciprocity) with the trustee’s achievement in responding to trust (an achievement in fitting reciprocity to reliance). An upshot of viewing cooperation between trustor and trustee as exhibiting achievement-theoretic structure is that we will be better positioned to subsume trustworthiness (and its cognates on the trustee’s side), like trust, under a wider suite of evaluative norms that regulate attempts, dispositions, and achievements symmetrically on both sides of a cooperative exchange, with ‘matching achievements’ as the gold standard. (shrink)

If educators are to educate they must be accorded some level of trust. Anthony Giddens claims that because trust is not easily created, it is now being replaced with ‘confidence’ because this latter disposition is much easier to give and is more convenient. It is argued in this paper that this shift from trust to confidence stifles education because emphasis is placed solely upon qualifications and competence, and is neglectful of disclosing one’s motives and desires—which are considered to be essential (...) elements for relationships and communities which depend upon trust. Therefore, educators ought to seek to become more trustworthy by going beyond evidence-based practices and codes of ethics, towards articulating a developed personal philosophy of education outlining the ultimate end-purposes to which they aspire. Through such a philosophy, educators identify their ultimate desires and commitments and this self-disclosure can make trust-giving more likely. Demonstrated evidence of achievements and qualifications encourage confidence and this has some value. In addition to these artefacts of evidence, it is argued here that educators must also articulate what they actually desire. This can be understood as John Dewey’s virtue of ‘genuine interest’ which he characterises as being wholehearted, persistent and impartial. For educators, this is often represented in our personal philosophy of education and because it is personal, it is also existential in the sense that it pertains to giving sense, meaning and purpose to all of our activities and way of life for which we are individually responsible and passionately committed to as professionals. As a consequence of being existential, our philosophy and our commitment to it has an intellectual and moral aspect and because it reaches to the very depths of our raison d’être, it pertains to our passion as described by Søren Kierkegaard. This paper shall draw upon Dewey’s notion of wholeheartedness and Kierkegaard’s notion of purity of heart, to make the case that if educators embrace these in their practices, we may become more trustworthy. (shrink)

In ‘Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’, we develop a novel account of how it is that AI can be trustworthy and what it takes for an AI to be trustworthy. In this paper, we respond to a suite of recent comments on this account, due to J. Adam Carter, Dong-yong Choi, Rune Nyrup, and Fei Song. We would like to thank all four for their thoughtful engagement with our work, as well as the Asian Journal of Philosophy for publishing (...) the symposium on our paper. The game plan for the paper is as follows. We will first briefly rehearse the account and then respond to comments in turn. (shrink)

This paper argues that trustworthiness is an epistemic virtue that promotes objectivity. I show that untrustworthy imposture can be an arrogant act of privilege that silences marginalized voices. But, as epistemologists of ignorance have shown, sometimes trickery and the betrayal of epistemic norms are important resistance strategies. This raises the question: when is betrayal of trust epistemically virtuous? After establishing that trust is central to objectivity, I argue for the following answer: a betrayal is epistemically vicious when it strengthens or (...) promotes oppressive, exclusive networks of trust, and a betrayal is epistemically virtuous when it expands trust networks to involve the oppressed. These criteria correctly account for both the epistemic vice of a recent case of Internet imposture and the epistemic virtue of resistant tricksters. (shrink)

Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...) the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends. (shrink)

I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is (...) not trustworthy. We ought not use it as a basis for inference or action and ought not give others to believe it. The trustworthiness of a belief, I urge, depends on its being backed by reasons—considerations that other members of the appropriate epistemic community cannot reasonably reject. Trustworthiness is intersubjective. It both depends on and contributes to the evolving cognitive values of an epistemic community. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel way to understand trust in blockchain technology by analogy with trust placed in institutions. In support of the analysis, a detailed investigation of institutional trust is provided, which is then used as the basis for understanding the nature and ethical limits of blockchain trust. Two interrelated arguments are presented. First, given blockchains’ capacity for being institution-like entities by inviting expectations similar to those invited by traditional institutions, blockchain trust is argued to be best conceptualized as (...) a specialized form of trust in institutions. Keeping only the core functionality and certain normative ideas of institutions, this technology broadens our understanding of trust by removing the need for third parties while retaining the value of trust for the trustor. Second, the paper argues that blockchains’ decentralized nature and the implications and effects of this decentralization on trust issues are double-edged. With the erasure of central points, the systems simultaneously crowd out the pivotal role played by traditional institutions and a cadre of representatives in meeting their assigned obligations and securing the functional systems’ trustworthy performances. As such, blockchain is positioned as a technology containing both disruptive features that can be embedded with meaningful normative values and inherent ethical limits that pose a direct challenge to the actual trustworthiness of blockchain implementations. Such limits are proposed to be ameliorated by facilitating a shift of responsibility to the groups of people directly associated with the engendering of trust in the blockchain context. (shrink)

Trustworthiness is typically regarded as a desirable feature of national identification systems (NISs); but the variegated nature of the trustor communities associated with such systems makes it difficult to see how a single system could be equally trustworthy to all actual and potential trustors. This worry is accentuated by common theoretical accounts of trustworthiness. According to such accounts, trustworthiness is relativized to particular individuals and particular areas of activity, such that one can be trustworthy with regard to some (...) individuals in respect of certain matters, but not trustworthy with regard to all trustors in respect of every matter. The present article challenges this relativistic approach to trustworthiness by outlining a new account of trustworthiness, dubbed the expectation-oriented account. This account allows for the possibility of an absolutist (or one-place) approach to trustworthiness. Such an account, we suggest, is the approach that best supports the effort to develop NISs. To be trustworthy, we suggest, is to minimize the error associated with trustor expectations in situations of social dependency (commonly referred to as trust situations), and to be trustworthy in an absolute sense is to assign equal value to all expectation-related errors in all trust situations. In addition to outlining the features of the expectation-oriented account, we describe some of the implications of this account for the design, development, and management of trustworthy NISs. (shrink)