Psychiatric phenomenology emerged from the willingness to spread Husserl’s program of going back to the things themselves into the psychiatric field. However, what this initial will then became is not very clear. We show that if this will to go back to the things themselves really enabled to bring phenomenology and psychiatry together (especially by the Swiss psychiatrist L. Binswanger), the thing to whom we have to go back changed over time: first conceived as the experience lived by people (...) with a psychiatric disorder, it was then conceived as the psychiatric disorder itself. We show that both of these ideas are inadequate. Our thesis is that psychiatric phenomenology has to be considered as belonging to the hermeneutical field (as defined by Ricoeur and Gadamer). We show that this hypothesis leads to a more insightful understanding of what is psychiatric phenomenology and what status we should concede to it. (shrink)

Where is the disconnect between what we consider beautiful, and how we actually shape our surroundings? Is there something about humans coming together as civilizations that results in the destruction of beauty and biodiversity? This essay examines the world through the history of forests – and it raises more questions than it answers – but the questions are of vital importance.

This collection of essays addresses emergent trends in the meeting of the disciplines of phenomenology and performance. It brings together major scholars in the field, dealing with phenomenological approaches to dance, theatre, performance, embodiment, audience, and everyday performance of self. It argues that despite the wide variety of philosophical, ontological, epistemological, historical and methodological differences across the field of phenomenology, certain tendencies and impulses are required for an investigation to stand as truly phenomenological. These include: description of experience; a move (...) towards fundamental conditions or underlying essences; and an examination of taken-for-granted presuppositions. The book is aimed at scholars and practitioners of performance looking to deepen their understanding of phenomenological concepts and methods, and philosophers concerned with issues of embodiment, performativity and enaction. (shrink)

This paper summarised the main arguments presented in "Consciousness, brain and the physical world" Philosophical Psychology (1990) to introduce a symposium on that paper. This was the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism). This summary of the 1990 paper was followed by three critiques (by Robert Rentoul, Norman Wetherick, and Grant Gillett) followed by two replies. At the time of this upload (25 years later) many of the points in the 1991 paper (...) have become common currency, however some of the confusions about the implications of the reflexive model persist, so the discussion continues to have contemporary relevance. See academia.edu link for the entire symposium. (shrink)

So far as his critical employment of the concept is concerned, the thing in itself is not a second object. The thing in itself is given in its appearances; it is the object which appears. In other words, the object is taken in a twofold sense. There is no contradiction, Kant maintained, in supposing that one and the same will is, as an appearance, determined by the laws of nature and yet, as a thing in (...) itself, is free. He never meant to hold that the self of the theoretical reason and the self of the practical reason are two separate and distinct entities. It is one and the same object considered from two perspectives. In this sense the thing in itself is purely a limiting concept. So far as the critical method is concerned, objects are always considered from a particular and limited perspective, e.g. science, morality, art, et cetera. This is the central meaning of his theory of appearances. In this employment of the concept it is completely meaningless to speak of the thing in itself as a cause of appearances. The critical distinction between appearances and things in themselves is not intended to be a distinction between subjective sense data and public objects, but between public objects as given according to two or more modes. This involves no extension of the category of causality beyond appearances. Moreover, it is not open to the charge that an unknown object is given the attribute of existence. The thing in itself is known as an appearance. By definition that is the only way that it could be known. To say that we know only appearances and not things in themselves is to state an obvious tautology, namely that objects are known only as they are known. (shrink)

Today it is a rare journal article that does not begin with the words "on the threshold of the third millennium." Someone might say, "What do you, philosophers, have to do with the swift flow of time? You're always talking about the eternal!" But he would not be right. First, although philosophy reflects on the eternal, it exists in time. Like any intellectual community, philosophy has its beginning and history; indeed, a history full of dramatic and even tragic pages, including (...) death at the stake for one's ideas, the irreconcilable confrontation of systems, the blind disregard of some thinkers in their lifetime and the undeserved fame of others, and so on. And what will the future bring? This is a question raised by philosophers "on the threshold of the third millennium," as they ponder the fate and paths of their activity. Second, the central philosophical problem is the problem of Being and man's place in it; hence, the question what the philosophy of the twenty-first century will be like is the question of how we shall represent being itself, man himself, the meaning of human life. Can we today at least name the most general features of the future philosophy? To answer this question I have tried to compare two past philosophical systems—I. Kant's and A. Schopenhauer's. And the reason is this both philosophers are one in their passionate desire to find the Truth for humanity and the individual and, although they begin their reflections from the same positions, they end up with results that are quite incompatible. But both poles of philosophy—the rationalist and the irrationalist—have proved equally valid for humanity. And I think that these two systems determined one of the paths of philosophy in the twentieth century that will continue into the twenty-first. (shrink)

In modern philosophy, the status of the concept of the thing-in-itself and the history of its origin and transformation are being conceptualized. This article examines the conceptual shift that happened to the notion of the thing-in-itself in XIX century philosophy, because this notion still remains important in the context of the possibility of having knowledge about reality and the status of reality itself. The rethinking of the thing-in-itself in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche (...) and neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school (Cohen, Cassirer, Natorp) is considered. A comparative analysis of the works of all these authors allows us to say that the primary orientation of all these authors is to the specific elimination of the concept of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself outside Kantian philosophy went through changes connected with an attempt to get rid of it or to define it in a non-contradictory (because the transcendent form of thing-in-itself gives us a contradiction) way for transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

The "thing-in-itself" theory occupies a pivotal position in the whole of Kantian philosophy, and scholars have expressed varying views on the intricate content of the theory. In the realm of epistemology, the theory implies at least three things: the origin of sensation, the limits of knowledge, and the rational idea. The last implication leads directly to moral reality in the realm of ethics. Interwoven and mutually comprehended, these implications are dipped in the general meaning of agnosticism. The first (...) and third implications are the opposites of a "thing-in-itself," and the second is a transition from the first to the third. (shrink)

Why might someone consider the answer to the titular question to be trivial? Perhaps because she has read some mereology and understands that mereologists distinguish between parthood on the one hand and proper parthood on the other. She understands that, at least when talking in the language of mereology, a thing is necessarily not a proper part of itself, but is necessarily a part of itself. Whether the English word “part” expresses parthood or proper parthood does not (...) seem too important, seeing as either can be taken as primitive and one defined in terms of the other. Thus, whether something is part of itself or not is indeed a trivial matter of definition. If by “part” one means parthood, everything is part of itself. If by “part” one means proper parthood, nothing is part of itself. (shrink)

In a bold series of pronouncements, Arthur Schopenhauer maintains that the Kantian thing-in-itself is Will. The division between the world as Will and representation, with its impressive array of implications, is Schopenhauer's most important and distinctive contribution to metaphysics. To understand what Schopenhauer means by ‘Will’ as opposed to the empirical ‘will’, and his reasons for identifying thing-in-itself with Will, we must look in detail at two related arguments by which Schopenhauer proposes to link these concepts. (...) The arguments appear in the first and second editions of Schopenhauer's masterwork, The World as Will and Representation. The differences between the two versions appear to represent a change in his thinking about the most persuasive way to demonstrate the nature of thing-in-itself. The arguments are reconstructed for the sake of comparison, and critically evaluated in light of a variety of objections. While Schopenhauer's first, analogical, argument is inconclusive, his second argument offers a highly defensible inference identifying thing-in-itself as Will. (shrink)

A fanciful re-shuffling of Kantian words and hints from such works as Baldwin's Dictionary into a metaphysic involving an existential "I-in-itself" which posits subsistent things-in-themselves to constitute its world. --L. K. B.

Kant's concept of the "thing in itself" constitutes a formidable challenge to the project of "historical ontology" with which the name of Li Zehou has become synonymous. Li's radical reinterpretation of Kant's critical philosophy, which locates the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and experience within historical and social evolution and thus seeks to allow for a form of human self-determination, brings us face to face with the dose relation between the epistemological/ontological and normative dimensions of the notion (...) of the thing in itself. My paper attempts to tease out some of the conceptual presuppositions and repercussions of Li's approach to the thing in itself in the Critique of Critical Philosophy, while locating his reading in the broader context of Kant's transcendentalism. (shrink)

Kant has been the target of innumerable objections, and yet his thought involves correct scientific aperçus, as well as viable ethical ideas, which are increasingly embraced in the Global Village. Kant's critical philosophy involves profound puzzles. In the first Critique, a spatial force field is identified as an a priori and yet material condition of experience . In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Good Will is of singular but odd importance , and the Categorical Imperative has a (...) noumenal, yet comprehensible status, and involves two starkly different "versions" . To solve these puzzles requires us to unify and contextualize Kant. The critical philosophy is a piece of a larger philosophical whole—the ideas Kant advanced before and after the 1780s. Kant's overall thought needs to be understood as a product of the pantheist Enlightenment, which was shaped by the Confucian Classics. In the first section, I paint a portrait of Kant's thing in itself. I speculate that it is an interactive bond of forces in space, governing nature; and I contend that this structural-dynamic perspective may not only unify Kant's insights but also supply an ontological narrative that integrates scientific knowledge today. In the second section, I interpret the historical record. I argue that the structural-dynamic perspective was a driving idea of the early Enlightenment; that this idea arrived from China through the Rites Controversy; and that this idea, mediated by others, informed Kant. In the third section, I examine Kant's first book, Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces . I argue that this exotic idea is the core of his theory of dynamics, and that the key features of his theory of dynamics withstood the test of time. (shrink)

The central claim of Schopenhauer's metaphysics is that the thing in itself is will. He arrives at this by way of an observation about self‐knowledge: I can know myself only as willing or active, not as subject of knowledge. He claims that this unique knowledge gives access to my essence, and moves from this to the claim that the world in itself is will, of which the plurality of empirical things is an objectification. The chapter examines the (...) problem of knowing the thing in itself at all. It is argued that Schopenhauer's conception of the thing in itself as will is a response to questions familiar in post‐Kantian philosophy, and there is a brief comparison with Schelling's conceptions of will and nature. (shrink)

I shall develop the suggestion that the thing in itself is not in any sense a thing. Nor is it a term which refers to a reality in opposition to which objects of experience are unfavorably compared. Yet Kant uses language which sometimes suggests both, providing ground for Schrader's observation about both the obscurity and the perversity of the doctrine.

The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotiv among scholars. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will continues to be a thorny puzzle in the secondary literature, and it presents perhaps the greatest challenge to Schopenhauer scholars. Schopenhauer borrows the term ‘thing-in-itself’ from Immanuel Kant, who uses it to (...) refer to a reality that is distinct from what appears to us, and hence unknowable. Despite the fact that several interpretations have been offered to make sense of Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will, there appears to be no consensus about how to interpret this identification as well as his understanding of the term ‘thing-in-itself’. Unlike the other interpretations, the interpretation that I offer here distinguishes between three distinct and mutually incompatible views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself. I argue that it is not only difficult to give a coherent, consistent account of Schopenhauer’s position, but also not worth trying, because such an endeavor comes at the cost of ignoring the textual richness and depth of thought that Schopenhauer’s works offer. (shrink)

What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: (...) the thing itself is knowable as are the processes that construct conscious appearances. Conscious appearances (empirical evidence) and the theories derived from them can represent what the world is really like, even though such empirical knowledge is partial, approximate and uncertain, and conscious appearances are species-specific constructions of the human mind. Drawing on the writings of Husserl, Hoche suggests that problems of knowledge, mind and consciousness are better understood in terms of a “pure noematic” phenomenology that avoids any reference to a “thing itself.” I argue that avoiding reference to a knowable reality (behind appearances) leads to more complex explanations with less explanatory value and counterintuitive conclusions—for example Hoche’s conclusion that consciousness is not part of nature. The critical realism adopted by reflexive monism appears to be more useful, as well as being consistent with science and common sense. (shrink)

It is a familiar story that, where Kant humbly draws a line beyond which cognition can’t reach, Husserl presses forward to show how we can cognize beyond that limit. Kant supposes that cognition is bound to sensibility and that what we experience in sensibility is mere appearance that does not inform us about the intrinsic nature of things in themselves. By contrast, for Husserl, it makes no sense to say we experience anything other than things in themselves when we enjoy (...) sensory perception. Kant’s conception, then, by doing just that, is nonsensical. I argue that Husserl’s account does not deliver on its promise. Things as they are in themselves are just as cognitively out of reach on Husserl’s understanding of them as they are on Kant’s. Further, the charge of nonsense Husserl raises against Kant’s conception of things in themselves applies—indeed, with greater force—to his own. (shrink)

In a rich and thought-provoking paper, Lambros Malafouris argues that taking material culture seriously means to be ‘systematically concerned with figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 55). As I understand this view, there are really two intertwined claims to be established. The first is that the things beyond the skin that make up material culture (in other words, the physical objects and artefacts in which cultural networks (...) and systems of human social relations are realized) may be essential to the enactment of, and be partly constitutive of, certain cognitive systems or operations. The consequence of establishing this claim is supposed to be that we have a mandate to recast the boundaries of the mind so as to include, as proper parts of the mind, things located beyond the skin. Thus, in talking about the contribution of the world to cognition, Malafouris (2004, 58) concludes that ‘what we have traditionally construed as an active or passive but always clearly separated external stimulus for setting a cognitive mechanism into motion, may be after all a continuous part of the machinery itself; at least ex hypothesi’. This is the position that, in philosophical circles, is known increasingly as the extended mind hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Menary forthcoming). Henceforth I shall refer to this hypothesis as EM. A stock example will help bring the idea into view. Rumelhart et al. (1986) note that most of us solve difficult multiplication problems by using ‘pen and paper’ as an external resource. This environmental prop enables us to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set of simpler ones, and to temporarily store the results of certain intermediate calculations. For the fan of EM, the distributed combination of this external resource and certain inner psychological processes constitutes a cognitive system in its own right. (shrink)

Western philosophers have traditionally concentrated on theory as the means for expressing knowledge about a variety of phenomena. This absorbing book challenges this fundamental notion by showing how objects themselves, specifically scientific instruments, can express knowledge. As he considers numerous intriguing examples, Davis Baird gives us the tools to "read" the material products of science and technology and to understand their place in culture. Making a provocative and original challenge to our conception of knowledge itself, _Thing Knowledge _demands that (...) we take a new look at theories of science and technology, knowledge, progress, and change. Baird considers a wide range of instruments, including Faraday's first electric motor, eighteenth-century mechanical models of the solar system, the cyclotron, various instruments developed by analytical chemists between 1930 and 1960, spectrometers, and more. (shrink)

이 글은 게롤트 프라우스의 해석에 대한 비판적 이해를 바탕으로 칸트의 사물 자체 개념의 의미와 실체 및 선험적 대상과의 관계를 밝힌다. 프라우스의 해석에 따르면 자신 자체에서 고찰된 사물(res in se spectata)로 읽어야 하는 칸트의 사물 자체는 경험적 사물 자체와 선험 철학적 사물 자체로 구분될 수 있다. 이에 칸트가비판하려는 기체화(基體化)된 단위 용어로서의 사물 자체의 의미를 추가할 수 있다. 칸트에 따르면 언제나 선험적 통각을 발휘하는 오성은 여러 현상체들의 동일한 가상적 상관자로서 어떤 선험적 대상=X를 설정하고 이것이 나타난 것으로 여겨지는 현상체들에 선차적으로 범주들을 적용한다. 이 (...) 범주들 중 경험적 사물 자체의 동일성을 확보해주는 범주는 바로 실체이다. 즉 실체는 경험적 사물 자체의 선험적범주적 상관자이며, 선험적 대상은 선험적 통각의 상관자로서 선험 철학적 사물 자체의 동일성을 의미하는 개념이다. 경험적 실재론과 동시에 선험적 관념론을 기초 짓는 칸트의 사물 자체 개념은 그 후 독일 고전철학의 형이상학적 이정표로 기능했다. (shrink)