_Theories of Happiness: An Anthology_ introduces readers to many difficult philosophical questions surrounding the concept of happiness. With historical and contemporary readings in philosophy, psychology, and the social sciences, the anthology reflects a dialogue between ideas, providing for a rich conversation that brings out the key insights and strengths of several competing views. Each of the included readings is contextualized by the editors and situated to speak to the larger issues, including the value of happiness and its (...) connection to well-being, the relationship of happiness to morality, whether happiness can be accurately and meaningfully measured, and whether there are universal standards for a happy life. (shrink)

본 논문의 목표는, ‘칸트 윤리학의 현재와 미래’를 문제사적으로 고찰하여 오늘날 칸트 연구가들에게 현실적으로 요구되는 과제는 고대 그리스의 ‘철학적 삶의 기술론’의 주제이던 ‘좋은 삶으로서의 행복’을 칸트의 ‘자율도덕’의 틀 안에서 통합하는 ‘자율적 행복론’의 정립임을 밝히고 그 가능성을 짚어보는 데 있다. 이를 위해 먼저 저 과제에 이르게 되는 문제를 낳게 한 ― 그리고 1970년대 ‘실천철학의 복권 운동’을 일으킨 ― 존 롤즈(John Rawls)의 사회정의론에서 칸트 윤리학의 연구를 고찰하여 본다. 이에 따르면 칸트의 윤리학은 ‘의무론적 도덕의 근거지움의 프로그램’이라는 좁은 의미의 도덕철학적 반성으로 제한되며, 여기서 고대 그리스의 (...) 철학적 삶의 기술론의 중심 주제이던 좋은 삶으로서의 행복은 더 이상 철학적-윤리적 반성의 대상의 지위를 갖지 못한다. 다음으로 롤즈의 ‘사회정의론’이 바탕으로 하고 있는 칸트의 의무론에 대한 비판을 통해 고대 그리스의 좋은 삶의 문제를 윤리학의 근본주제로 복권시키려는 ― 1980년대에 본격적으로 등장한 ― 신아리스토텔레주의의 문제제기와 이에 대한 영미권의 소위 구성주의적 칸트주의자들과 독일어권의 담론윤리적 칸트주의자들의 ― 결과적으로 불충분한 ― 숙고들을 논하여 본다. 신아리스토텔레주의의 비판은 근본적으로 두 가지인데, 첫 번째는 칸트에게서 좋은 삶의 추상으로부터 가능한 정언명법을 통한 도덕의 근거지움에 대한 것이고, 두 번째는 저 좋은 삶으로서의 행복을 윤리학의 중심 주제로 다시 설정하는 것에 관한 문제이다. 이 두 번째 문제는 자율 도덕 역시 도덕의 의미와 관련하여 매우 진지하게 받아들이지 않으면 안 될 매우 중요한 윤리적 반성의 대상이다. 그리하여 여기서 자율 도덕의 틀 안에서 가능한 철학적 행복론인 자율적 행복론의 가능성은 칸트 연구가들에게 필연적인 윤리적 과제가 된다. 이에 연결하여 2000년대 들어서 저 자율적 행복론의 가능성을 매우 설득력 있게 보여준 오트프리트 회페(Otfride Höffe)에게서 칸트 윤리학의 행위론적 연구를 짧게 고찰하여 본다. 그리고 회페의 저 연구를 바탕으로 하여 칸트의 최고선에 관한 이론을, 특히 아리스토텔레스적 좋은 삶의 물음의 자율 도덕적 완성이라는 시각을 통해 자율 도덕의 틀 안에서 통합된 좋은 삶의 윤리학으로서의 ‘자율적 행복론’으로 해석하여 본다. 이 자율적 행복론에서 중심이 되는 물음은 도덕의 근거지움에 관한 것이 아니라, 도덕이 행복으로 인도하여주는지 여부와 정도에 대해 묻는 도덕적 행위의 행복론적인 의미이다. 이 경우 칸트에게서 자율 도덕은 좁은 의미의 도덕철학적 근거지움에 관한 윤리이론적 방식이 아닌 행위론적인 반성을 통해 최고선의 물음에 이르게 된다. 여기서 자율 도덕과 좋은 삶으로서의 행복은 윤리-필연적 조건관계를 갖게 되며, 그리하여 ‘도덕적 삶의 행복론적 의미’를 윤리적 물음의 대상으로 갖게 되는 ‘자율적 행복론’이 칸트에게서 정립될 가능성이 열린다. 끝으로 이 자율적 행복론의 미래적 전망과 의의를 또한 응용윤리적 물음과 관련하여 짧게 언급한다. (shrink)

In research on Augustine, Peter Brown’s paradigm of ‘two Augustines’ has been widely used. According to Brown, Augustine experienced a shift from optimism to pessimism. In his earlier works, Augustine held that humans could achieve happiness in this life by reason. In contrast, in his later works, Augustine emphasised grace, original sin and the imperfection of life. Against Brown’s framework, this paper argues that Augustine does not experience a pessimistic turn. Augustine holds that humans can achieve happiness through (...) faith, hope and love.Contribution: This article explores Augustine’s theory of happiness and revises the ‘two Augustines’ paradigm. On the one hand, Augustine does not deny the freedom of will. On the other hand, Augustine is confident in happiness through faith, hope and love. (shrink)

Fred Feldman conceives of happiness in terms of the aggregation of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure, but he distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and excludes extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure from the aggregation that constitutes happiness. I argue that Feldman has not provided a strong reason for this exclusion.

According to the popular Whole Life Satisfaction theories of happiness, an agent is happy when she judges that her life fulfils her ideal life-plan. Fred Feldman has recently argued that such views cannot accommodate the happiness of spontaneous or pre-occupied agents who do not consider how well their lives are going. In this paper, I formulate a new Whole Life Satisfaction theory which can deal with this problem. My proposal is inspired by Michael Smith’s advice-model of desirability. (...) According to it, an agent is happy when a more informed and rational hypothetical version of her would judge that the agent’s actual life matches the best life-plan for her. This view turns out to be a flexible model which can avoid many problems of the previous theories of happiness. (shrink)

If we had to identify the most controversial concept today, “happiness” would certainly figure among the main candidates for this role. On the one hand, “happiness” has represented one of the main ethical axes in the history of philosophy – from Greek _eudaimonia_ to Bentham’s “greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” Ethics was almost inextricably connected with the search for happiness, which was already in Greek synonymous for the “good life”. On the other hand, (...) capitalism today, notwithstanding the general apathy and despair due to the permanent crises of the capitalist system (climate change, pandemics, financial crises, etc.), still legitimises itself with, if not guarantees, at least a promise of happiness. Despite different historical contexts which again and again gave meaning to the concept of happiness, a common denominator can still be identified, which today, in the era of late capitalism, has even gained the status of a cornerstone of our hegemonic image of happiness. Happiness is a question of being. The evocation of happiness usually raises the question of whether one is happy or not, what it means to be happy, and how we become so. Happiness is thus inextricably connected to the question of identity: it is the sensual expression of our being, of what we supposedly are. In contrast to this “ontologisation of happiness”, the article tries to show not only that there is a _materialist concept of happiness_, but also that the latter bases itself on the primacy of the verb “having” instead of “being”. From a materialist perspective, happiness is something that we have or encounter, and not something that we are. Two references are crucial in this articulation: first, Benjamin’s formulation of happiness from his last essay “On the concept of history”, and second, the Freudian-Lacanian theory of repetition. (shrink)

에피쿠로스는 쾌락을 최고선으로 보고, 쾌락과 행복을 동일시한다. 그는 쾌락과 고통의 관계를 모순 관계로 파악함으로써 ‘고통 없음’을 ‘쾌락’과 동일시하고 같은 논리로 고통 부재의 평온함(ataraxia)에서 ‘불행하지 않음’을 ‘행복’과 동일시한다. 그러나 고통의 부재가 곧 쾌락을 의미하는 것이 아닐 수도 있고, 평온함 속에서 ‘불행하지 않음’이 곧 행복을 의미하는 것이 아닐 수도 있다. 고통의 부재는 쾌락과 고통의 중립 상태를 의미할 수도 있고, 불행하지 않음도 행복과 불행의 중립 상태를 의미할 수 있다. 더욱이 고통 없는 상태의 평온함은 무료와 권태로 이어져서 불행을 야기할 수도 있다. 이처럼 ‘고통 없는 (...) 상태에서의 불행 내지 행복하지 않음’은 얼마든지 가능하다. 쾌락과 행복하지 않음의 양립 가능성은 쾌락—행복 동일론을 반증한다. 따라서 아타락시아는 행복을 위해서 필요한 것일 수는 있어도 그 자체를 행복이라고 하기는 어렵다. 또한 고통의 부재 상태로서의 평온함은 그것과 구별되는 순수한 쾌락의 존재 가능성과 그것이 더 큰 상위의 목적을 위한 수단으로 사용될 가능성을 배제하지 못한다. 따라서 아타락시아는 최고선이 될 수 없다. 에피쿠로스가 이상적인 상태로 보는 아타락시아는 결코 행복과 동일한 것이 아닐 뿐만 아니라 최고선도 아니다. 에피쿠로스의 쾌락주의 행복론은 ‘고통 없음’을 쾌락과 동일시하고 ‘불행하지 않음’을 행복과 동일시함으로써 행복이 아닌 것을 행복이라고 강변하는 오류에 빠졌다. (shrink)

본 논문은 헤겔 철학에서 아직 충분히 연구되지 않은 ‘행복(Glück 혹은 Glückseligkeit)’의 의미를 검토하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 본 논문은 행복에 관한 헤겔의 기본적인 문제의식에 집중할 것이며, 이를 통해 그의 철학에서 행복은 욕망과 쾌락의 주관성과 공동체적 삶 사이의 분열을 극복한 상태인 ‘인륜적 삶’이라고 주장할 것이다.BR 본 논문은 우선 헤겔의 행복관에 관한 기존 연구를 검토하고 그 한계 또는 보완될 점을 지적할 것이다. 그 다음으로 행복에 대한 헤겔의 철학적 문제의식이 구체적으로 형태로 드러나는 예나 시기 단편들과 특히 『정신현상학』을 분석할 것이다. 여기서 헤겔이 행복을 주로 근대 (...) 사회의 분열을 배경으로 논의하였으며, 그 핵심적인 요소는 욕망과 쾌락의 충족과 밀접한 연관이 있음이 드러날 것이다. 그리고 본 논문은 헤겔 행복관의 고유한 특징을 이전의 연구들이 주목하지 못한 ‘삶의 욕망’과 ‘자기 확신의 충동’의 충족에서 찾을 것이며, 결론적으로 헤겔의 행복관이라고 간주될 수 있는 인륜적 삶이란 욕망 충족과 실질적인 인정관계를 그 필수적인 전제조건으로 삼는다는 것을 밝힐 것이다. 그리고 마지막으로 간략하게나마 이러한 헤겔 행복관이 가지는 현대적 의미를 제시해 볼 것이다. (shrink)

Philosophers tended to identify happiness with either subjective psychological states or conditions (feelings, emotions or a set of judgments), or with the objective conditions of a life—how well the life is going for the person living it. Each approach captures different but important features of our intuitions, making it difficult to accept either a purely subjective or objective view. This has led some philosophers to suggest that these are not competing accounts of one thing, ‘happiness,’ but accounts of (...) several different things. Others propose that happiness is a matter of possessing both the relevant subjective and objective properties. I think this latter view is right, but that we need to better understand why or how these two elements are important and how they might be linked. In this paper I argue that an affect theory of happiness is best able to reconcile both the subjective and objective strands of our intuitions about happiness. (shrink)

I defend a methodology for theorizing about happiness. I reject three methods: conceptual analysis; scientific naturalism; and the “pure normative adequacy” approach, where the best conception of happiness is the one that best fills a role in moral theory. The concept of happiness is a folk notion employed by laypersons who have various practical interests in the matter, and theories of happiness should respect this fact. I identify four such interests in broad terms and then (...) argue for a set of desiderata that theories of happiness ought to satisfy. The theory of happiness falls within the province of ethics. It should, however, be viewed as autonomous and not merely secondary to moral theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Descartes developed an early theory of happiness, which he rhetorically claimed to have stemmed from his choice of vocation in 1619. I provide a sketch of his theory in the Discours, noting, however, some problems with the historicity of the text. I then turn to his Olympica and associated writings that date from this period, where he literally asked, “What way in life shall I follow?” I take Descartes’ dreams as allegorical and provide (...) an interpretation of his curious claim that poets are better equipped to discover truth than philosophers, made at a time when he chose to become a philosopher and not a poet. My way out of this conundrum is to identify in this text a philosophical psychology that I argue is consistent with the Regulae and the Discours, is part of what he took to be his “foundation of the wonderful science,” and is the essence of his early theory of happiness. (shrink)

本书的思想创新和理论力度颇有古代哲学家气度,作者认为伦理学只有幸福和公正两个基本问题,并且声称发现了关于幸福和公正的最好理论,并提出了著名的“无立场”哲学方法论。.

Undeniably, life is unfair. So, why play fairly in an unfair world? The answer comes from combining the ancient Greek conception of happiness with a modern conception of self-respect. The book is about why it is bad to be bad and good to be good, and what happens in between.

Abstractabstract:The Discourse on Happiness is Émilie du Châtelet's most translated work, but there is no systematic interpretation of her account of the nature and means to happiness in the secondary literature. I argue that the key to understanding her account lies in interpreting the various roles of the "great machines of happiness." I show that Du Châtelet provides a sophisticated hedonistic account of the nature of happiness, in which passions and tastes are the means to self-perpetuating, (...) increasing, and long-lasting sources of pleasure. In addition, I argue that the remaining "great machines of happiness" are not logically necessary conditions for happiness, but rather character traits that support our tastes and passions. (shrink)

There is a lively debate about the descriptive concept of happiness. What do we mean when we say (using the word to express this descriptive concept) that a person is “happy”? One prominent answer is subjective local desire satisfactionism. On this view, to be happy at a time is to believe, with respect to the things that you want to be true at that time, that they are true. Wayne Davis developed and defended an interesting and sophisticated version of (...) this view in a series of papers. I present, explain, and attempt to refute his version of the theory. I then sketch what I take to be a better theory of happiness -- a form of intrinsic attitudinal hedonism. (shrink)

데카르트의 도덕론에서 ‘최고선’의 문제는 궁극적으로 ‘잘 사는 삶’의 문제와 밀접한 관계에 놓여 있다. 그는 전통적인 윤리와 근대의 새로운 윤리 사이에서 전대의 도덕적 목표를 당연한 것으로 간주하고 이를 실현하는 수단이나 방법만을 탐구한 것이 아니며, 도덕적 목표들 그 자체에 대한 의문과 관심을 여러 곳에서 드러낸다. 이성을 통한 자연의 통제와 그 방법론은 자연학의 프로그램을 넘어서는 그의 도덕론을 통해 그 의미를 더 분명하게 드러낼 수 있다.BR 최고선에 관한 데카르트의 논의들은 크게 두 가지 논제들에 관련되어 있다. 최고선의 본성과 행복에 대한 최고선의 관계에 관한 문제이다. 데카르트는 (...) 최고선이 덕에 놓여 있다고 주장한다. 그는 그것을 우리가 최선이라고 판단한 모든 것을 행사하려는, 그리고 잘 판단하기 위해 이해력의 모든 힘을 기울이려는 확고하고도 항구적인 의지를 갖는 것으로 정의한다. 데카르트는 최고선이 확실하게 행복에 필수적이라고 생각한다. 그에게는 그것이 정신의 참된 만족 또는 충족이며 그것은 행복과 동일한 것이 아니다. 그는 덕을 얻기 위해 애쓰는 일과 정신의 만족을 얻으려고 노력하는 일은 그것들이 비록 같은 결과를 가져온다 할지라도 그와 무관하게 두 개의 다른 목표들이라고 주장한다. 데카르트는 행복과 최고선의 문제를 통해 ‘잘 사는 삶’을 위한 도덕철학을 구성한다. (shrink)

Examining the fundamental thinking underpinning the foundation for economic studies of happiness, this book explores the theories of key economists and philosophers from the Greek philosophers to more modern schools of thought. Lall Ramrattan and Michael Szenberg explore the general measures of happiness, utility as a method, metrical measures of happiness, happiness in literature, and the scope of happiness in this concise book. Fundamentals of Happiness builds on major moral and philosophical theories (...) from the ancient, medieval, and modern schools that form the foundation of utility analysis. The authors classify the economics of happiness based on psychological, individual, social, and institutional views of happiness, revealing how historical schools of thought implicitly or explicitly deal with this. The book also focuses on the relationship between happiness and society and welfare, analysing the measurement of subjective well-being. This will be an invigorating read for economics students, in particular those studying the history of economic thought, looking to understand the basic principles underlying the economics of happiness. (shrink)

인간은 몸과 마음으로 구성되어 있다. 따라서 육체적인 행복과 정신적인 행복 중 어느 한 분야만 강조하게 되면 한계에 부딪치게 되고 참된 행복을 영위하지 못하게 된다. 정신적인 행복을 등한시하고 물질적 풍요로움을 통해 육체적인 행복만 추구하게 되면 죽음이라는 육체적 한계에 부닥치게 된다. 이러한 한계를 제대로 극복하지 못하게 되면 단지 물질적 풍요로움과 육체적 쾌락 추구를 통해서만 행복을 찾게 된다. 그 결과 자신의 安樂만 중시하게 되기 때문에 다른 사람의 행복은 고려하지 않게 된다. 그리고 인간의 육체적 욕구는 무한하지만 이를 만족시킬 수 있는 물질은 제한되어 있다. 따라서 (...) 만족감을 갖지 못하고 욕구가 달성되지 못한 것에 대한 정신적 스트레스를 극복하지 못하게 되면 오히려 행복감을 잃어버리게 된다. 한편 인간의 행복은 정신적인 즐거움과 그 만족에서 오는 것이 대부분이지만, 육체적인 행복을 등한시하고 너무 정신적인 행복만을 추구하게 되면 인간의 삶을 유지하기 위한 기본적인 육체적 욕구를 등한시하게 되고, 현실적 쾌락과 물질적 풍요로움의 중시하는 현대인들의 정서와 맞지 않게 된다. 진정한 행복은 육체적인 행복과 정신적 행복이 중용적으로 조화되는 것이며, 다른 사람과 더불어 행복을 나누면서 천부적 본성대로 살아갈 때 완성된다. 이런 측면에서 육체적 행복과 정신적 행복의 조화를 중시하는 『書經』 「周書」 洪範의 五福을 주목할 필요가 있다. (shrink)

The paper outlines Aristotelian and Aquinian eudaimonistic conception of hap_piness and its criticism in modern ethics in the context of the rehabilitation of this concept in contemporary moral philosophy. On the background of the modern discussion it presents the objectivist theory of happiness in the frame of Neoaristotelian ethics of virtues. In its description the author introduces the inclusive concept of happiness. He defines the true happiness as an optimal relationship between the subject and the world, making (...) a difference between an apparent and a true hap_piness and stressing the function of practical reason in reaching the latter.The principle of the true happiness is true love, which is made possible by the moral virtues considered as good dispositions, supporting the operative human skills. The ideal of happiness works as an regulative idea, which directs the human behavior and gives it its meaning. (shrink)

이 글은 행복이 감정 상태로 설명될 수 있다는 헤이브론의 주장을 비판적으로 검토하여 문제점을 제시하는 것을 목표로 한다. 문제점을 제시하기 전에 우선 헤이브론의 행복론을 설명한다. 헤이브론에 따르면, 긍정적인 감정을 가지는 성향으로 인해 지속적으로 긍정적인 감정 상태를 가지는 것이 행복한 상태이다. 이 주장의 첫 번째 문제점으로 동일시(identification)라는 조건이 제시된다. 헤이브론이 제시하는 조건들을 다 충족시켜도, 그러한 모습을 자신의 모습으로 동일시하지 않으면 행복한 상태일 수 없다고 논자는 주장한다. 또한 헤이브론의 행복론은 행복의 다양한 양상을 포섭하지 못한다고 주장한다. 논자는 공시적인(synchronic) 행복과 통시적인(diachronic) 행복 그리고 전체적인 행복과 (...) 부분적인 행복 등에 대해서 제시한다. 이에 덧붙여, 헤이브론이 말하는 바대로 긍정적인 감정을 가진다 해도 그것이 다른 사람에게 속은 결과로 인해 가지게 된 것이라면 그것은 행복한 상태일 수 없다고 논자는 주장한다. (shrink)

This book examines the eighteenth-century novel in the context of emerging theories of happiness in early Enlightenment Europe. This important and richly interdisciplinary book offers both a new understanding of the cultural work the eighteenth-century novel performed, as well as an original interpretation of the Enlightenment’s ethical legacy.

The Manifesto develops further the Critical Theory of Religion intrinsic to the Critical Theory of Society of the Frankfurt School into a new paradigm of the Psychology, Sociology, Philosophy and Theology of Religion.

“Aristotle is the father of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics is hot”, Howard Curzer states in the introduction of his Aristotle and the virtues . Aristotelian virtue ethics has attracted so much attention that it has become one of the three major approaches in normative ethics since its revival in post-war Anglo-Saxon philosophy. In his new book, Paul Bloomfield is, like these virtue ethicists, not so much interested in the modern ethical question of how to treat others, but in the (...) ancient Greek question how we should lead a good life. He also adopts from the Greeks the idea that moral virtues are conducive to a happy or well-lived life. The book, however, states that the assumption that the moral life is better than its alternatives should not be taken for granted. For example, as we all know of bad people who seem to be happy and successful, we are in need of an argument that shows why virtue is even necessary for people who only care about their self-interest.Despite his inter .. (shrink)

The article presents a historical and philosophical analysis of happiness as a socio-cultural phenomenon, considers the proposed criteria and components of the state of happiness as well as proposes the author's integrative definition of happiness. The relevance of this study is determined by the importance of the actual humanitarian indicators in assessing socio-political progress. As a result of the analysis of how the concept of happiness was historically formed and developed, it was shown that (a) the (...) concept of happiness became widespread in the humanitarian discourse relatively late, (b) its predecessors are the ancient Greek concepts ofagathon(the good) andeudaimonia(welfare, prosperity, supreme good), (c) in Western European philosophy, the understanding of good is contradictory and includes a wide range of meanings, from utilitarian to axiological, (d) the content of the concept of happiness includes two aspects: one is in the person's power and the other is determined by external factors. The article analyzes modern theories of happiness and feelings of life satisfaction as well as scientific studies of the components of the state of happiness. As a result of the analysis of these approaches, it is shown that in most modern studies, the emphasis in understanding happiness is placed on either socio-biological or socioeconomic factors. The author examines the criteria for the state of happiness. The author quotes other researchers and proposes certain steps as an algorithm for determining happiness, i.e., a formula for happiness. The importance of harmony of the following components of the human personality and life is substantiated: the belief system (and living in accordance with one's beliefs), abilities (and the possibility of their implementation in professional, cognitive activity), geographical location of residence, as well as social circle (and the balance of socio-psychological proximity and distancing). (shrink)

Happiness: Personhood, Community, Purpose (Happiness from now on) is, among other things, a book about the holistic interrelationship that exists between the concepts of happiness, rationality and ethics. The conception of happiness at issue is, in broad outline, Aristotle's, which is to say that it is about the meaning of life. He referred to this conception as eudaimonia. Perhaps the fundamental guiding question that has motivated me to write Happiness in the first place is ‘Why (...) even bother about being ethical?' After a long period of nihilistic scepticism regarding the possibility of properly addressing this question, I came to see in Aristotle a possible solution, and I ran with it. I am still running. The relevant sense of rationality at issue allows us to claim that we are rational creatures as opposed to the sense that is most directly related to our characterisation of persons as creatures capable of conscious rational thinking. I argue that happiness is a rational ideal, understood as a manner of operating. And this manner of operating cannot properly be understood in isolation from an understanding of the ethic from which human goodness flows. Moreover, I argue that individual happiness cannot be separated from what I characterise as collective eudaimonia and what this in effect means is that the theory of happiness that I advance entails a particular conception of the political domain. The conception at issue, as we shall see, is, in key respects, very un-Aristotelian. That said, it is in an other sense very Aristotelian indeed insofar as I argue that being ethical is constitutive of happiness and, presumably and in some sense, we all want to live happy lives. Being ethical, moreover, involves working to create and perpetuate the social conditions for human flourishing. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(4) 2004: 336-342. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophical reflection on the nature of language by reading some exemplary works of literature. Drawing on the thought of philosophers—especially Plato, Kant, Hegel, Emerson, Benjamin, Adorno, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, the author argues that language is the bearer of a utopian or messianic promise of happiness, and that by redeeming the revelatory power of words, the two writers in this study are contributing to the redemption of the promise of happiness in a world of reconciled (...) antagonisms and contradictions. (shrink)

Julia Annas has written a monumental work that is in the best sense of the word, a “conversation” with ancient theories of morality. Indeed what we have in the Morality of Happiness is a sustained conversation with the various ancient schools on the nature of eudaimonia and the moral dimensions of the best life for humans. This is a work that takes the Hellenists seriously, and as such, gives us both a fresh way of assessing Aristotle in terms (...) of the refinements that were to come later, as well as insights about the Hellenist foundation of many of our modern formulations. But the trajectory into modern morality is not Annas’ primary aim. On the whole, for the duration of this book, we are immersed in the debate between the various schools themselves and in the richness of their own dialogue. To be sure, there are lessons to be learned for ourselves and our own way of doing moral theory. But these stand out primarily from the contrasts. So for example, Plato’s Protagoras aside, Annas argues that notions of maximization and algorithmic procedures for arriving at right action are not to be found in ancient theory. A “problem-solving mechanism” for hard cases is simply not the ancient preoccupation, despite the fact that conflicts abound in the ancient world no less than in the modern era. (shrink)

The Logic of Happiness guidebook explores the logic concepts introduced in the novel and includes excerpts of original works by some of the most significant philosophers in human history: the Buddha, Lao Tzu, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius, Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Charles Darwin. The readings will introduce students to an array of theories about how to achieve happiness while also teaching them to use classical logic techniques to discern whether or not those (...) theories are sound enough to be applicable in modern daily life. The guidebook also contains discussion questions that will get students thinking critically and deeply about different aspects of the philosophical theories, giving them practice examining, analyzing, and evaluating the strength of various arguments. -/- This guidebook can be used by instructors, but it is meant to be a companion book to the novel that enables students to understand the theories and beliefs of a diverse group of individuals who explored the problem of how to find happiness in a complicated world filled with complicated people. Students who work through it will find themselves more thoughtful and discerning—and more prepared to work toward establishing for themselves a life that will bring them their own happiness. (shrink)

Comparisons betw western philosophies are uncommon and this, among other things, hinders global philosophical discourse. Thus, in this essay I want to compare the philosophies of the Buddha and Epicurus for similarities, particular in regard to what I call "negative happiness." Once I have establish this, I want to give a brief critique of negative happiness, which subsequently amounts to a selective critique of Buddhism and Epicureanism.

Nel Noddings claims that there is an important normative element in happiness. For support, she points to the Aristotelian idea of the eudaimonic life, a concept that is often translated into English as ‘the happy life’. However, in light of the wide divergence between the Aristotelian view of eudaimonia as a life of virtuous activity and most contemporary psychologists’ and lay people’s view of happiness as subjective wellbeing, the authors of this article believe that Noddings’s merging of the (...) two has several shortcomings. Aside from ambiguity and confusion, it encourages us to deny that, given the human condition, we must sometimes choose between happiness as pursuit of positive emotion and personal satisfaction and happiness as pursuit of the common good and the virtuous life. (shrink)

This doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant’s conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant’s underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant’s practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays (...) a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant’s anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant’s claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one’s overall, long term happiness, given Kant’s conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant’s justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant’s conception of equity or fairness as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state. (shrink)

Paul Bloomfield’s latest book, The Virtues of Happiness, is an excellent discussion of what constitutes living the Good Life. It is a self-admittedly ambitious book, as he seeks to show that people who act immorally necessarily fall short of living well. Instead of arguing that immorality is inherently irrational, he puts it in terms of it being inherently harmful in regards to one’s ability to achieve the Good Life. It’s ambitious because he tries to argue this starting from grounds (...) which the immoralist (usually an egoist) would accept. He starts from premises about our desire to be happy, and how happiness is inconsistent with a lack of self-respect, which he claims are premises even an egoist would accept. His key argument is then that self-respect is tied to one’s respect for others, so that being happy is therefore inconsistent with a disrespect for others. He then goes on to argue about the necessity of virtue for truly being as happy as we can be. -/- Bloomfield’s book is an interesting synthesis of the traditional Greek focus on eudaimonia (i.e. living well) with the Kantian concern of a respect for persons. I found myself in agreement with much of what he had to say, making this review a bit challenging. Nevertheless, I will endeavor to point out areas where, despite my agreement on his conclusions, I think his arguments could be challenged and would require further support. (shrink)

A Review of Paul Bloomfield's book _The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the Good Life_ (OUP 2014).

Many theologians have concluded that supernatural causes are not needed to explain the rise of our great religious traditions, that religion, like the rest of culture, is a purely human creation. Many people take this as a reason for giving up the serious practice of religion. But Don Cupitt argues that it opens up fascinating unexplored territory. In The Way to Happiness, he gives an account of the liberating power of religion and the intense happiness that it can (...) engender. This novel sort of apologetics invites readers to abandon religious authority and dogma, and 'come of age'. (shrink)

This particular volume differs from other members of the series, in that it is historically as well as dialectically oriented, and is also less encyclopedic than the others. The first part develops six different theories of happiness and the second presents different controversies about happiness. In the first chapter, the author proposes Aristotle's eudemonism [[sic]] as the most complete and most influential of all theories of happiness, and he uses it as a matrix for most (...) of the discussions in the second part. Chapters following this initial exposition of Aristotle treat Plato's "mixed" eudemonism [[sic]], Stoic suppression of desire, concepts of transcendent happiness in Plotinus, Augustine and Aquinas, Kant's valorization of duty and Hegel's critique thereof, and Bentham's and Mill's utilitarianism. Moral issues discussed in the second part include: self-realization, happiness vs. performance of duty, fulfillment vs. prudence, and eudemonism [[sic]] vs. hedonism. The last thirty pages focus on contemporary pursuits of the good life, centered around the issue of self-actualization. This section is predominantly psychological, and treats very briefly some theories of Kurt Goldstein, G. W. Allport, Robert W. White, A. H. Maslow, Marie Jahoda, Carl Rogers, and Fromm. Although the author take sides, he does stimulate reflection about the good life through expositions which avoid more difficult philosophical problems but which definitely evoke practical individual and social overtones.--C. M. R. (shrink)

In his critical notice entitled ‘An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness?’ focusing on my article that was previously published in this journal, Fred Feldman raises an important objection to a suggestion I made about how to best formulate the whole life satisfaction theories of happiness. According to my proposal, happiness is a matter of whether an idealised version of you would judge that your actual life corresponds to the life-plan, which he or she has (...) constructed for you on the basis of your cares and concerns. Feldman argues that either the idealised version will include in the relevant life-plan only actions that are possible for you to do or he or she will also include actions and outcomes that are not available for you in the real world. He then uses examples to argue that both of these alternatives have implausible consequences. In response to this objection, I argue that what it is included in the relevant life-plan depends on what you most fundamentally desire and that this constraint is enough to deal with Feldman’s new cases. (shrink)

Medieval theories of ethics tended on the whole to regard self-perfection as the goal of human life. However there was profound disagreement, particularly in the late thirteenth century, over how exactly this was to be understood. Intellectualists such as Aquinas famously argued that human perfection lay primarily in coming to know the essence of God in the next life. Voluntarists such as the Franciscan John Peckham, by contrast, argued that ultimate perfection was to be achieved _in patria_ through the (...) act of loving God. The present article argues that Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent defended a different sort of voluntarism with respect to the final destiny of human beings. Rather than claiming that the goal of human life lay in the perfection of the self, they argued instead that ultimate union with God was to be achieved mystically through an act of self-transcendence, which occurred through ecstasy or quasi-deification. (shrink)

Mill on Liberty was first published in 1983 and has become a classic of Mill commentary. The second edition reproduces the text of the first in full, and in paperback for the first time. To this, John Gray adds an extensive postscript which defends the interpretation of Mill set out in the first edition, but develops radical criticisms of the substance of Millian and other liberalism. The new edition is intended as a contribution to the current debate about the foundations (...) of liberalism, and it looks closely at the recent seminal contributions to liberal thought by Raz, Feinberg, Rawls and Berlin. Central to its argument is Gray's contention that, like other liberalisms that ground themselves on an ideal of autonomy or individuality, Millian liberalism has a Eurocentric bias that cannot be given rational justification. Gray addresses the question of whether any form of liberal theory, can, in fact, avoid the bias, and concludes that it cannot. This book will be indispensable both to those familiar with On Liberty and to those coming to it for the first time. In addition, the book will also be of great interest to moral and political theorists, to students of law and jurisprudence and to intellectual historians. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that Robert Nozick's experience machine argument poses an insurmountable obstacle to hedonism as a theory of well-being. After an initial attempt to demonstrate that the persuasiveness of this argument rests on a key ambiguity, I argue that the intuitions to which the thought experiment appeals are not nearly as clear as many philosophers suppose they are. I believe that a careful consideration of the origin of those intuitions -- especially in light of the so-called "paradox of hedonism" (...) -- reveals that they can, in fact, fit quite comfortably into a hedonistic theory of well-being. (shrink)