A definition of nonstandard universe which gets over the limitation to the finite levels of the cumulative hierarchy is proposed. Though necessarily nonwellfounded, nonstandard universes are arranged in strata in the likeness of superstructures and allow a rank function taking linearly ordered values. Nonstandard universes are also constructed which model the whole ZFC theory without regularity and satisfy the $\kappa$-saturation property.

This chapter presents three reasons why Marxists should abandon the base and superstructure model. All of them are directed towards the claim that it is possible to exclude superstructural phenomena from a concept of the material base. Plamenatz contends first that it is impossible to define the relations of production without using legal terminology, and second that the property rights involved in some relations of production depend upon legal systems for their existence. Finally, the chapter adds to these points (...) by arguing more broadly that the material base must include a normative dimension in order for it to possess the necessary stability and reliability to last long enough for a social formation to occur. The law, therefore, appears to function in both base and superstructure and cannot be pigeonholed at the periphery of a social formation. (shrink)

First Published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Narrative Representation Theory, an evolved framework of Verse Analysis, has come into existence with the mission of explaining the operation of macro-systemic structure that could be hardwired in the brain. Based on the analyses of creoles or archetypal human languages, the theory puts forward the premise stating that the fundamental design of the human language faculty possesses the computational system for internalized discourse. The theory preserves the principles of Quint-patterning, Idea-formatting, N-ary-branching and X-numbering, complying respectively with the hierarchical orderings of (...) constituency, the atomic elements of componentiality, the linear sequences of precedence and the specific measurement of terminal nodes. NRT tells that the macro-system of narrative superstructure must have emerged autonomously, yet links closely with the micro-system of phonology, morphology and syntax. This article explores for the first time scientific insights into the nature of human language, referring to recent research on the right cerebrum as well as on the prefrontal lobes of the brain, the relationship between mental disorders and their genetic deficiencies, and the investigations of human evolution during the period 200,000–40,000 years BP. All the converging evidence in biological sciences reinforces the hypothesis that the narrative superstructure of language faculty manifests as an inherent linguistic capacity in our mind. (shrink)

The appearance and intensive development of a socialist orientation as a distinctive form of noncapitalist development of formerly oppressed countries and peoples are among the outstanding phenomena of our time and require the most serious theoretical and methodological interpretation. The national-democratic revolutions that have taken place in these countries have removed the bases of imperialist and feudal domination, interrupted the rise of capitalism at its earliest level, and embarked on a noncapitalist path of social progress. A gradual process bringing the (...) orientation toward socialism into convergence with a people's democratic development of society began in the course of radical reorganization of precapitalist or early capitalist structures. (shrink)

This article considers Cohen’s claim that the economic structure or base can be conceived independently of the superstructure by adressing his attempt to identify “a rechtsfrei (moralitätsfrei, etc.) economic structure to explain law (morals, etc.)”. It examines his programme of presenting relations of production as a set of (non-normative) powers and constraints that ‘match’ the rights and obligations of property relations. It is argued that, first, Cohen does not carry through this programme rigorously but, second, he could not do (...) so, since it cannot be carried out at all. Three arguments are advanced, the first two against the possibility of a determinate ‘objective’ account of such powers and constraints, the third against the possibility of abstracting norms (constitutive and regulative, formal and informal) from contractual relationships: it is argued that one cannot identify the powers and constraints embodied in norm-governed economic relationships independently of the norms which govern them. Alternative interpretations are considered of Cohen’s programme that might escape these objections, but these are rejected as untrue to his purpose, and in any case ineffective. It is concluded that Cohen fails to distinguish base from superstructure in the manner required. (shrink)

If moral epistemology can be naturalized, there must be genuine moral knowledge, knowledge of what it is morally right for someone or even everyone to do in a particular situation. The naturalist hopes to explain how such knowledge can be acquired by ordinary empirical means, without appealing to a special realm of moral facts separate from the rest of nature, and a special faculty equipped to detect them. Various learning mechanisms for acquiring moral knowledge have been proposed. Most, however, have (...) the following deficiency: What they actually explain is moral acculturation with respect to accepted or author-preferred moral norms, not the acquisition of moral knowledge. Of course, an additional premise to the effect that accepted moral norms or author-preferred norms embody moral truths would deal nicely with this problem, but at the expense of the distinction between opinion and knowledge, or true belief, in which epistemologists are necessarily interested. (shrink)

The status of laws of nature has been the locus of a lively debate in recent philosophy. Most participants have assumed laws play an important role in science and metaphysics while seeking their objective ground in the natural world, though some skeptics have questioned this assumption. So-called Humeans look to base laws on actual, particular facts such as those specified in David Lewis’s Humean mosaic. Their opponents argue that such a basis is neither necessary nor sufficient to support the independent (...) existence of scientific laws. This essentially metaphysical debate has paid scant attention to the details of scientific practice. It has mostly focused on so-called fundamental laws, assumed to take a particular form. I propose a pragmatist alternative—not as another position in the debate but as an alternative to the debate itself. This pragmatist alternative offers a view that questions the representational conception of truth presupposed by participants to the debate as well as the metaphysical import of fundamental laws. Statements of law serve many different purposes in science: I’ll look at some. But their central role is in inference, primarily to improve the epistemic state of a scientist with limited access to information. To play this role, a scientific law statement need be neither necessary, unconditionally universal nor even true. It must merely be sufficiently reliable within its domain of application. The use of laws in astrophysics and metrology will help to illustrate these points. (shrink)

The unitary approach, developed in the Prison Notebooks, to the study of ideology, superstructures and language can be considered one of the most important and original contributions made by Gramsci to Marxist theory. With the definition of the gnoseological function of the superstructures/ideologies, and of the intrinsic link between ideology and language, Gramsci establishes a network of relations between “truth” and “politics”, with the mediation of the “translatability of languages”, which redefines in a substantial way both these spheres and, in (...) this way, also the notion of “universality”. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the inversion of essential cultural values, such as physical perfection and the sports spirit, in 20th-century Europe. Periods emerged when physical perfection, once celebrated, morphed into tools for eugenics, racial theories, and ideological segregation. Similarly, the sports spirit became entangled in political and ideological conflicts. I approach this through the Marxist lens of ‘base—superstructure’ relations, focusing on the biological ‘base’, often misinterpreted through social Darwinism. This base is not subject to dialectical changes, does not (...) develop spirally but remains a constant fundament of human existence. It anchors pre-human and human interactions centered on physical fitness and interpersonal competition rooted in sexual selection. From this premise, I propose a philosophical model progressing from the general to the specific, built on four levels. At its foundation lies the unchanging physicality-agonistic ‘base’. From this base emerge three enduring cultural ‘structures’: physical culture, agonistic culture, and the uniting of these two sports cultures. These structures produce two cardinal values—physical perfection and sports spirit—while also giving rise to inversive superstructures that veer toward cultural distortions. I connect these inversions to the influence of elite groups shaping public opinion, aligning this analysis with Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. In this last stage, this perspective finds synergy with traditional Marxism, highlighting the role of elites in steering societal values and cultural frameworks. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the inversion of essential cultural values, such as physical perfection and the sports spirit, in 20th-century Europe. Periods emerged when physical perfection, once celebrated, morphed into tools for eugenics, racial theories, and ideological segregation. Similarly, the sports spirit became entangled in political and ideological conflicts. I approach this through the Marxist lens of ‘base—superstructure’ relations, focusing on the biological ‘base’, often misinterpreted through social Darwinism. This base is not subject to dialectical changes, does not (...) develop spirally but remains a constant fundament of human existence. It anchors pre-human and human interactions centered on physical fitness and interpersonal competition rooted in sexual selection. From this premise, I propose a philosophical model progressing from the general to the specific, built on four levels. At its foundation lies the unchanging physicality-agonistic ‘base’. From this base emerge three enduring cultural ‘structures’: physical culture, agonistic culture, and the uniting of these two sports cultures. These structures produce two cardinal values—physical perfection and sports spirit—while also giving rise to inversive superstructures that veer toward cultural distortions. I connect these inversions to the influence of elite groups shaping public opinion, aligning this analysis with Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. In this last stage, this perspective finds synergy with traditional Marxism, highlighting the role of elites in steering societal values and cultural frameworks. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Marx and Analytical Marxism Explaining Superstructure and Ideology Marxist Ethics.

This article establishes the existence of a definable , countably saturated nonstandard enlargement of the superstructure over the reals. This nonstandard universe is obtained as the union of an inductive chain of bounded ultrapowers . The underlying ultrafilter is the one constructed by Kanovei and Shelah [10].

In what follows, I will argue that racist ideology should be understood in terms of racist social norms that constitute certain incentive structures. To this end, I will motivate my position by examining two existing accounts of ideology: those of Tommie Shelby and Sally Haslanger. First, I will begin by reconstructing Shelby’s account of racism as ideology. After analysing three dimensions of ideology (epistemic, genetic and functional), I will argue that his view is too cognitivist. In this regard, Shelby’s view (...) is doxastic in viewing that racist ideologies consist in misguided beliefs. Rather, what is essential in ideology is its functional dimension. Here, ideologies persist because they function to stabilize and reinforce the unjust status quo of subordination and oppression. Then, I will turn to Haslanger’s account of ideology as cultural technēs. Her view is more functional than Shelby’s since the former is based on the account of social practice and culture. While Haslanger is right about her critique of Shelby’s cognitivist view of ideology, I argue that what she calls nonideal moral epistemology weakens her overall insight. The problem is that without considering how to intervene in concrete social mechanisms, merely knowing certain moral truths may not practically motivate subjects under ideologies. Taken together, both Shelby and Haslanger narrowly understand ideology in terms of epistemic deficiency. Even though Shelby and Haslanger deal with the discursive superstructure of ideology, both underestimate the functional substructure of ideology such as social and psychological motives, desires and needs. Ultimately, I will argue that ideology is better understood in terms of a racist social norm. This account is explanatorily superior to Shelby and Haslanger’s views in its stress on the nonepistemic, nonmoral and functional aspects of ideology. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that a broadly Kantian strategy for demonstrating and explaining the existence, semantic structure, and psychological function of essentially non-conceptual content can also provide an intelligible and defensible bottom-up theory of the foundations of rationality in minded animals. Otherwise put, if I am correct, then essentially non-conceptual content constitutes the semantic and psychological substructure, or matrix, out of which the categorically normative a priori superstructure of epistemic rationality and practical rationality - Sellars's "logical space of (...) reasons" - grows. (shrink)

Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2015, Page 310-346.

This article focuses on the role played by the critique of political economy and Marxian philosophy in the redefinition of Gramsci’s political philosophy during his intellectual moment known as the “return to Marx’’. On the one hand, we show the theoretical importance of the concept of mercato determinato in the formation of notions such as “civil society” and “relations of forces”. On the other hand, the Italian philosopher’s prison revisitation of some of Marx’s works are evaluated; as well as its (...) effects on the revision of certain topics such as the relationship between structure-superstructure or the theory of hegemony. Through an original interpretation of the critique of political economy; and also re-examining the theoretical principles of “historical materialism” in a “philosophy of praxis”, the final aim is to present an interpretation of Gramscian social ontology able to provide a theory on the genesis, reproduction and crisis of a given social formation. (shrink)

Biofilms can be viewed as tissue‐like structures in which microorganisms are organized in a spatial and functional sophisticated manner. Biofilm formation requires the orchestration of a highly integrated network of regulatory proteins to establish cell differentiation and production of a complex extracellular matrix. Here, we discuss the role of the essential Bacillus subtilis biofilm activator RemA. Despite intense research on biofilms, RemA is a largely underappreciated regulatory protein. RemA forms donut‐shaped octamers with the potential to assemble into dimeric superstructures. The (...) presumed DNA‐binding mode suggests that RemA organizes its target DNA into nucleosome‐like structures, which are the basis for its role as transcriptional activator. We discuss how RemA affects gene expression in the context of biofilm formation, and its regulatory interplay with established components of the biofilm regulatory network, such as SinR, SinI, SlrR, and SlrA. We emphasize the additional role of RemA played in nitrogen metabolism and osmotic‐stress adjustment. (shrink)

Morality bears certain elements connected to genetic, or biological determination to the protection and sustenance of human life on the one hand; however, on the other hand, includes a social and cultural superstructure regarding protection and sustenance of human life, which, in many situations, can even be in contradiction to our biological determination and can be the decisive point in our morality.

The design of Hindu temple follows the design of vastupurusha-mandala as described in several Hindu texts on architecture. The design of temple is divided into ground plan and vertical alignment, the superstructure. Herein the present study, our focus is on architecture of the superstructure, especially Shikhara style of superstmcture, in the temple of Nepal. Shikhara style architecture came into Nepal from Lidia over a millennium ago. The purpose of this research is to understand the significance of Shikhara Style (...) temples in the capital of Nepal, the Kathmandu valley. The first segment of the study reports the overall architecture of Hindu temple and then the common styles of architecture of superstructure (vertical alignment/tower) applied in building the temples in Nepal, which involves the Shikhara Style, the Pagoda Style, and the Stupa Style. The Shikhara style architecture is described in detail while other two are briefly discussed. The second segment of the study introduces some of the recognized temples of the Kathmandu valley that have Shikhara style architecture. And finally summing up everything, the conclusion of this research tries to recognize, acknowledge and bring to the fore the significance of Shikhara style temples in Nepal and also wrap the research by understanding the concept of architecture through pre-ancient perspective. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:22nd Niwano Peace Prize Commemorative AddressTokyo, November 5, 2005Hans KüngThere are dreams that never come true, and on the other hand one can experience realities in life which one would never have dreamt of. Indeed, when I first traveled to Japan as a young professor in 1964 and later when I visited Rissho Kosei-kai headquarters and had the privilege to meet founder Nikkyo Niwano in 1982, it never came (...) to my mind that I might once stand here as a laureate of the prestigious Niwano Peace Prize. This prize is an extraordinary honor for me and I am deeply grateful to the Niwano Peace Foundation for having selected me as this year's laureate. I consider this distinction as a threefold encouragement:1. For me personally as an acknowledgment of my life-long activities for ecumenism among the Christian churches and for dialogue among religions.2. For the Global Ethic Foundation for intercultural and interreligious research, education, and encounter, of which I am the president.3. For all those around the world who strive for a global ethic as a basis of harmony among human beings and thus a more peaceful world.I receive this prize precisely for my efforts to promote a global ethic and I would therefore like to recall some of its dimensions. Certainly you are all aware that:4 Global Ethic is not a new ideology or superstructure.5 It will not make the specific ethics of the different religions and philosophies superfluous; it would be ridiculous to consider Global Ethic as a substitute for the discourses of the Buddha, the sayings of Confucius, the Bhagavadgita, the Torah, the Sermon on the Mount, or the Qur'an.6 Global Ethic is nothing but the necessary minimum of common values, standards, and basic attitudes. In other words, a minimal basic consensus relating to binding values, irrevocable standards, and moral attitudes that can be affirmed by all religions despite their undeniable dogmatic or theological differences and should also be supported by nonbelievers. [End Page 203]This consensus is formulated in the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic (Parliament of the World's Religions, Chicago 1993). The Global Ethic as presented in the Chicago Declaration is based on two principles without which no human community or society can survive. First, what is common to all human beings is their humanity, and therefore "Every human being should be treated humanely," according to his or her inalienable human dignity, a foundation also of universal human rights. This principle still remains very formal and therefore the declaration recalls a second principle, "which is found and has persisted in many religious and ethical traditions of humankind..." This is known as the "Golden Rule" of reciprocity: "What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others," or, in positive terms, "What you wish done to yourself, do to others." It is striking to discover that this basic rule of human behavior appears already in the Analects of the Chinese master Confucius, five centuries BCE, and can indeed be found, in slightly differing formulations, in the teachings of all religions.1 In the scriptures of Buddhism it reads: "A state that is not pleasant or delightful to me must be so for him also; and a state which is not pleasant or delightful for me, how could I inflict that on another" (Samyutta Nikaya).These guidelines of humane behavior exist in all religions and also in nonreligious ethics and can therefore form the basis for a humanist ethic, in the sense that it should be acceptable for all human beings. A Buddhist leader at the Chicago Parliament told me that through the four directives he could hear the voice of the Buddha. He certainly thought of the four precepts formulated in the Dhammapada (183): "I vow to abstain from killing living beings. I vow to abstain from taking what is not given. I vow to abstain from sexual misconduct. I vow to abstain from lying" (a fifth precept—"I vow to abstain from taking intoxicants"—does not encounter consensus among religions; it only occurs in Buddhism and some other religions and is therefore not included in the Global... (shrink)