Much of feminist theory takes issue with traditional, liberal theories of consent and obligation. Though none have proposed abandoning obligation outright, there has been a general shift among feminists towards a responsibility paradigm. Responsibility models acknowledge given relationships and interdependence, and so posit responsibilities as given, regardless of whether they are voluntary. But in theories that take freedom as a principal value, a move from a socially unembedded voluntarism to socially embedded responsibility leaves something missing. Constructive accounts of and (...) prescriptions for freedom must consider the reality of social life; yet acknowledging that relations are given need not require subordinating the role of voluntarism and consent in most relationships. In this paper I offer a commitment framework that seeks to supplant obligation while also reconciling relational given-ness and voluntarism. I propose an analysis of commitment that takes relations as the starting point and then show how the concept can: 1. guide actions 2. account for responsibilities 3. enhance freedom and 4. avoid a large share of coercive forces that are believed as necessary for reinforcing obligation and responsibility fulfillment. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the discussion of social freedom in the family in Axel Honneth's most recent book Freedom's Right. I argue, on the one hand, that radical democrats have much to learn from Honneth's method of normative reconstruction because it provides a much needed corrective to the “social weightlessness” that characterizes their thought about democracy. In contrast to the current preoccupation with rarefied issues of political ontology, Freedom's Right exemplifies a type of sociologically attuned (...) thinking that is essential for addressing issues of power and inequality. On the other hand, I argue that Honneth's reliance on a teleological notion of historical progress has deeply constraining effects on his critique of power. First, in so far as it underestimates the impact of growing social inequality on personal and intimate relations, it fails to acknowledge just how extensive, radical and, potentially deeply contentious the political measures needed to realize social freedom in the family may have to be. Second, Honneth's teleological reconstruction provides too thin a basis to generate substantive normative solutions to issues of social justice in the family. Third, teleology tends to depoliticize the process of emancipatory social change by construing it in terms of impersonal mechanisms and developmental tendencies rather than as open-ended, often polemical and deeply contested forms of political struggle. (shrink)

The study focuses on the theoretical-methodological analysis of the concept of social freedom as a special concept of individual autonomy in relation to the social conditions of its applicability. The aim of the analysis is to reveal and clarify the main political implications and normative claims that result from it for political theory. The thesis is formulated and argued in the article that the philosophical concept of social freedom in its applicability programmatically leads to a (...) model of the politics of emancipation as a process of social transformation and political overcoming of recognized forms of unfreedom, historical forms of social oppression and domination. Social understanding of individual freedom becomes the normative basis of politics as a form of collective activity through which associated individuals govern the social conditions of their lives. By comparing the two basic forms of emancipatory politics – class politics and identity politics – the main problems of such an understanding of politics are discussed. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of what history an obstacle that stands in the way of our performing a certain action must have in order to render us socially unfree to x. The most promising view on this question is the moral responsibility view, according to which such an obstacle renders us socially unfree to x, if and only if another person is morally responsible for its existence. The main challenge of this view is to identify a serviceable test for (...) establishing when someone is morally responsible for the existence of an obstacle. Numerous attempts to do so have been made over the years, but none of them proved to be successful. In my discussion of the moral responsibility view I will expose the failure of the most recent and powerful attempt to identify such a test. Then I will suggest a more plausible test and defend it from a few possible objections. Before discussing the moral responsibility view I will discuss its main rivals and show why it is superior to them in the first place. (shrink)

The responsibility view of social freedom views obstacles as constraints on freedom if and only if there is an agent morally responsible for the obstacle's existence or nonsuppression. However, the test of moral responsibility offered by S.I. Benn and W.L. Weinstein is too narrow, W.E. Connolly's is too broad and D. Miller's is either trivial or wrong depending on whether a permissive or narrow interpretation is adopted. A plausible definition assigns moral responsibility for nonsuppression of an obstacle (...) when a reasonable person could have been expected to suppress the obstacle. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Freedom’s Right, Axel Honneth articulates the social freedom of friendship with reference to its institutionalised norms. These action norms, however, are not specific to friendship; they apply to modern intimacy per se. Such non-specificity cannot adequately account for the experience of social freedom in friendship. Addressing this issue, I evaluate friendship as a form of recognition and identify a generative recognition deficit functional to its relational autonomy. Then, taking Honneth’s institutional approach to friendship as (...) a point of departure, I ascertain an institutional deficit that both sustains friendship’s autonomy and constrains the generalisability of its social freedom by way of institutional connectivity to heterosexuality. I suggest that only a differentiating approach to friendship that fathoms its extraordinary position among interpersonal relationships can yield new insights. That done, friendship can in turn provide a prism through which to assess the conceptual approach... (shrink)

In his most recent voluminous work Das Recht der Freiheit (2011) Axel Honneth brings his version of the recognition paradigm to full fruition. Criticizing Kantian theories of justice, he develops a Hegelian alternative which has at its core a different conception of freedom. In this paper, I will scrutinize Honneths latest work to see whether he offers a promising alternative to mainstream liberal theories of justice. I will focus on two key differences with Kantian theories of justice. Substantively, Honneth (...) criticizes the Kantian concept of ‘reflexive freedom’ and proposes instead as the core of his own theory the concept of ‘social freedom’. Methodologically, he proposes a method of ‘normative reconstruction’, and explicitly develops this in contrast to Kantian constructivism. I investigate the robustness of these shifts by seeing how they are actually used in Honneth’s reconstruction of the market sphere. I conclude that his method of normative reconstruction does not provide the kind of guidance Honneth thinks it does. His conception of social freedom fares slightly better but can either be reduced to the mainstream’s idea of reflexive freedom, or else faces some serious challenges. (shrink)

In Freedom's Right Axel Honneth seeks to provide a theory of justice by appropriating Hegel's account of ethical substance in the Philosophy of Right, but he wants to do so without endorsing Hegel's more robust idealist commitments. I argue that this project can only succeed if Honneth can offer an alternative, comparatively robust demonstration of the rationality and normative coherence of existing social institutions. I contend that the grounds Honneth provides for this claim are insufficient for his purposes. (...) In particular, I argue that Honneth's claim that “justice and individual self-determination are mutually referential,” even were it to be accepted, would be insufficient to underwrite his more robust identification between the normative foundations of justice, autonomy and reciprocal self-realization. In the final section of the paper, I turn to Honneth's analysis of the “social institution” of friendship, which he, following Hegel, holds up as a paradigmatic instantiation of social freedom understood as, in Hegel's words, “being with oneself in another” . I argue that an analysis of the normative import of friendship wholly in terms of mutual recognition misses an important aspect of the kind of self-realization that friendship makes possible. (shrink)

This article explores objections made against ideal theorizing in political philosophy by two prominent contemporary critical theorists: Axel Honneth and Charles Mills. In Freedom’s Right, Honneth...

How should we define liberty or social freedom? Which obstacles constitute constraints? Is poverty one? By what method of conceptual analysis can a definition of social freedom best be generated? These and related questions form the subject matter of Kristjánsson’s interesting critical review of so-called “responsibility” accounts of social freedom. Together with his critical exegesis of rival views, Kristjánnson explains and defends his own “responsibility view.”.

Abstract:The coronavirus pandemic has challenged the ability of countries to both protect personal freedoms and effectively counteract viral infections. Attempts to reduce viral vulnerability and increase immunity based on liberal or authoritarian principles seem to be either failing or succeeding at the price of eliminating freedoms altogether. The concept of social freedom, as an alternative to that of liberal autonomy, may provide a third alternative, integrating freedom with elements of social responsibility. However, I argue that it (...) too will fail, since all attempts to ensure immunity without challenging the exploitation of natural environments from where the virus originated do not go to the source of the problem. (shrink)

This article explores how Axel Honneth's critical theory, when adapted to a materialist depth realism, can be utilised as a critique of Fredrick Hayek's ‘neoliberalism’, an antipolitics influenced by Karl Popper's neo-positivism. In response to the neoliberal challenge, it is proposed that Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, when grounded in anthropological (‘critical’) materialism, provides a robust defence of an irreducible social agency. When interpreted through this lens, recognition is one aspect of the system of human needs based on subject–subject (...) interactions, the other being a subject–object interaction of humans with non-human objects. By contrast, Honneth's more recent theory of social freedom relies on a Hegelian process of historical reconstruction and so remains vulnerable to the same epistemic errors that inform neoliberal attempts to universalise homo economicus, that is, of reducing reality to various ways in which it is conceptualised. In this regard, anthropological materialism must presuppose depth realism. The importance of this can be seen when the implications for Honneth's move towards a more orthodox Hegelianism in his more recent works are considered. (shrink)

In this article I describe and defend an account of social freedom grounded in intersubjective recognition. I term this the ‘normative authorisation’ account. It holds that a person enjoys social freedom if she is recognised as a discursive equal able to engage in justificatory dialogue with other social agents about the appropriateness of her reasons for action. I contrast this with Axel Honneth’s theory of social freedom, which I term the ‘self-realisation’ account. According (...) to this view, the affirmative recognition of others is necessary for obtaining a positive relation-to-self and hence freedom. I identify several problems with this account, which challenge the connection Honneth draws between social recognition and freedom. I show how the normative authorisation account avoids these problems and captures some basic features of our everyday, normative interactions. Finally, I suggest that the account fits well with recent work on epistemic injustice. Specifically, it shows that securing the social conditions of freedom requires ensuring epistemically-just social relations. Thus, the normative authorisation account is an explanatorily powerful, inclusive theory of social freedom that fits well with wider accounts of justice and freedom. Thus, it represents the most promising way of understanding social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition. (shrink)

When is it correct to say that a person's freedom is restricted? Can poverty constrain freedom? Can you constrain your own freedom, for instance through weakness of the will or self-deception, and are you not truly free unless you act on a rational choice? Kristján Kristjánsson offers a critical analysis of the main components of a theory of negative liberty: the nature of obstacles and constraints, the weight of obstacles and the relation of freedom to power (...) and autonomy. Through this discussion, which examines much of the contemporary work on political freedom, he develops his own theory of negative liberty, the so-called 'responsibility view', which meets many of the goals of advocates of positive liberty while retaining its distinctive 'negative' nature. He also argues for, and implements, a method of naturalistic revision as a way of solving conceptual disputes in social philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, Honneth’s Freedom’s Right is discussed with the intent to assess its potential for offering a view of justice, grounded in social freedom, more adequate than the theories of justic...

This paper examines the justice of unconditional basic income (UBI) through the lens of the Hegel-inspired recognition-theory of justice. As explained in the first part of the paper, this theory takes everyday social roles to be the primary subject-matter of the theory of justice, and it takes justice in these roles to be a matter of the kind of freedom that is available through their performance, namely ‘social’ freedom. The paper then identifies the key criteria of (...) social freedom. The extent to which the introduction of an UBI would meet these criteria is then examined, with a focus on the social role that stands to be most affected by an UBI, namely that of the worker-earner. It is argued that while an UBI is likely to be only partially effective as an instrument of specifically social freedom, its main justification lies not here, but in securing a basis for the subjective freedom that social freedom presupposes. (shrink)

What is the fundamental purpose that justifies the existence of the modern university? The answer proposed in this essay is the promotion of social freedom. The essay begins by distinguishing social freedom from negative freedom and reflective freedom along the lines proposed by other theorists of social freedom, such as Frederick Neuhouser and Axel Honneth. After noting the need for a more developed account of the university than has so far been provided (...) by these other theorists, the essay analyses the various dimensions in which universities have, at their best, promoted social freedom. The essay then explains why it is through the promotion of social, as distinct from negative or reflective freedom, that universities fulfil their purpose. It concludes with some reflections on how this understanding of the purpose of the university fits an “immanent” model of social criticism. (shrink)

This book attacks the assumption found in moral philosophy that social control as such is an intellectually and morally destructive force. It replaces this view with a richer and deeper perspective on the nature of social character aimed at showing how social freedom cannot mean immunity from social pressure. The author demonstrates how our competence as rational and social agents depends on a constructive adaptation of social control mechanisms. Our facility at achieving our (...) goals is enhanced, rather than undermined, by social control. The author then articulates sources, contracts, and degrees of legitimate social control in different social and historical settings. Drawing on a wide range of material in moral and political philosophy, law, cognitive and social psychology, anthropology and literature, Professor Schoeman shows how the aim of moral philosophy ought to be to understand our social character, not to establish fortifications against it in the name of rationality and autonomy. (shrink)

Defends a link between political and social freedom, and argues both for an understanding of social freedom and for institutional safeguards for this kind of freedom.

One topic of growing interest in the debate on intergenerational justice is the duty to respect the freedom of future generations. One consideration in favor of such a duty is that the decisions of present generations will affect the range of decisions that will be available to future people. As a consequence, future generations’ freedom to direct their lives may be importantly restricted such that present generations can be seen as taking future people’s lives into their hands and (...) disempowering them. This article defends the idea that present generations have an obligation to sustain a certain threshold of freedom for members of present and future generations alike. It argues that we should regard sustainability policies as a way to redistribute freedom across members of different generations. It starts by explaining the centrality of social freedom to the way we conceive of moral persons, then explains how freedom can be understood as an object of redistribution. It then argues that by imposing some risks—such as that of resource depletion or destruction of the ecosystem—on future generations, present generations push future generations’ freedom below an acceptable threshold. The paper concludes with examples of how this focus on freedom can offer guidance in selecting and justifying sustainability policies—for example, measures for conserving biodiverse environments—even when it is not clear how they will directly contribute to the well-being of future persons. (shrink)

『자유의 권리』(2011) 이후 호네트는 “사회적 자유”를 사회비판의 “선도이념”(Leitidee)으로 제안한다(IS: 154). 그런데 이 개념은 호네트도 인정하다시피 오늘날의 우리에게는 “매우 특이하고 이상해 보일 수 있다”(RF: 94). 이 논문은 이러한 사회적 자유 개념을 가능한 한 명료하게 체계적으로 분석･해명하고, 이 개념의 타당성을 검토하는 것을 주된 목적으로 한다. 먼저 이 개념과 호네트가 구상하는 사회비판과의 관계를 밝힌다(1). 이어서 소극적 자유와 성찰적 자유에 대한 호네트의 이해를 살펴본다(2). 이제 이를 배경으로 해서 한편으로는 (일상의 예들도 활용하여) 호네트의 사회적 자유 개념을 가능한 한 우리들의 직관에 친숙하고 그럴 듯하게 제시하고, 다른 (...) 한편으로는 그러면서도 이 자유 개념의 특성을 분석적으로 명료하게 드러낸다(3). 마지막 절에서는 두 가지 점에서 호네트의 사회적 자유 개념의 난점을 검토한다. 하나는 연대 개념과의 관계이며, 다른 하나는 롤즈의 “합당한 다원주의의 사실” 논제를 받아들일 때 호네트의 사회적 자유 기획이 마주하게 되는 어려움이다(4). (shrink)

The accounts of social freedom offered by G. W. F. Hegel and Axel Honneth identify the normative demands on social institutions and explain how individual freedom is realized through rational participation in such institutions. While both offer normative reconstructions of the market economy, public sphere and family, they both derive the norms of educational institutions from education’s role in preparing people for participation in other institutions. We argue that this represents a significant defect in their accounts (...) of social freedom because they both fail to account for the distinctive aims and norms of education. Only educational institutions bring individuals into a both shared and autonomous standpoint necessary for participation in social life. We thus argue both that Hegel’s and Honneth’s accounts are empirically inadequate and that they neglect the normative demands on schools to contribute to individual moral and intellectual development. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Conflicts between the good of each and the good of all are often presented in terms of freedom versus equality, with liberals pulled one way by libertarians and the other by social democrats. When we distinguish between negative and positive notions not only of freedom but also of equality, the liberal freedom ‘to pursue our own good in our own way’is a positive freedom involving a negative idea of equality . Yet ‘equity’is not strong (...) enough to deal with the problem of public goods. Trust is a public good, essential if markets are to work and dependable only where there is a moral commitment to a positive basic equality among citizens. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Axel Honneth’s normative reconstruction of the market as a sphere of social freedom in his 2014 book, Freedom’s Right. Honneth’s position is complex: on the one hand, he acknowledges that modern capitalist societies do not realise social freedom; on the other hand, he insists that the promise of social freedom is implicit in the market sphere. In fact, the latter explains why modern subjects have seen capitalism as legitimate. (...) I will reconstruct Honneth’s conception of social freedom and investigate how it is realised in the sphere in which Honneth sees it most successfully at work, the sphere of interpersonal relations. I then move on to the sphere of the market economy and discuss two related problems of this view that stem from his interpretation of Hegel. Next, I consider Honneth’s method of “normative reconstruction” and his reconstructions of the sphere of consumption and, finally, the labour market. My conclusion will be that market institutions cannot realise social freedom, and that this insight should orient the philosophical direction of critical social theory. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se argumentará que, para expandir las capacidades de todos, hay que promover que los indivíduos, partiendo de su reconocimiento mutuo, auto contraigan sus elecciones para acomodarse y promover las libertades de otros y así lograr sus propios objetivos. Esta auto contracción no restringe la libertad, sino que la posibilita. Se partirá del diálogo entre las distintas concepciones de Libertad del Enfoque de Capacidades y Libertad Social, de Honneth. Se planteará que la Libertad consistirá en poder moverse entre sus (...) distintas concepciones, respondiendo a las distintas prácticas sociales de reconocimiento en las que se desarrolla. ABSTRACT I will argue that, to expand the capabilitites of everybody, we must promote that the individuals, starting from their mutual recognition, self-contract their elections to accommodate and promote the liberties of others and achieving their own objectives by these means. This self-contraction is not a freedom restriction, but it makes possible. I will start from the dialog between the different Honneth's conceptions of the Freedom from the Capability Approach and the Social Freedom. I will propose that the Freedom consists in the flow between their different conceptions, responding to the different social practices of recognition in which they develop. (shrink)

This article explores how Axel Honneth's critical theory, when adapted to a materialist depth realism, can be utilised as a critique of Fredrick Hayek's ‘neoliberalism’, an antipolitics influenced by Karl Popper's neo‐positivism. In response to the neoliberal challenge, it is proposed that Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, when grounded in anthropological (‘critical’) materialism, provides a robust defence of an irreducible social agency. When interpreted through this lens, recognition is one aspect of the system of human needs based on subject–subject (...) interactions, the other being a subject–object interaction of humans with non‐human objects. By contrast, Honneth's more recent theory of social freedom relies on a Hegelian process of historical reconstruction and so remains vulnerable to the same epistemic errors that inform neoliberal attempts to universalise homo economicus, that is, of reducing reality to various ways in which it is conceptualised. In this regard, anthropological materialism must presuppose depth realism. The importance of this can be seen when the implications for Honneth's move towards a more orthodox Hegelianism in his more recent works are considered. (shrink)

Laing is a psychoanalyst who "is engaged in research on schizophrenia and on the family at Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, London," while his collaborator, Cooper, "is a psychiatrist at Shenley Hospital, Hertfordshire, concerned with research on families and on groups." Both men are strongly impressed by the importance of Sartre's most recent major works: Saint Genet, Search for a Method, and Critique de la Raison Dialectique, which they see as major landmarks in modern intellectual history. Sartre, they say, is.

ABSTRACT This article critically examines Axel Honneth’s account of social freedom by paying particular attention to the conceptual apparatus of normative reconstruction that is supposed to lend social freedom its explanatory force. More specifically, the article demonstrates, through an immanent critique, that Honneth is unable to follow through with his ambitious view of the capitalist market as an institutional expression of social freedom. Furthermore, Honneth’s inability to derive robust relations of cooperative solidarity from the (...) actuality of contemporary liberal democratic ethical life leads him to posit socialism as a regulative idea. Honneth’s idea of socialism risks succumbing to the very pitfalls that he continues to associate with neo-Kantian proceduralism. Such an aporia poses a particular challenge for Honneth’s attempt at advancing a persuasive neo-Hegelian alternative to neo-Kantian proceduralism. As a means of addressing this aporia, I suggest a possible strategy that Honneth could adopt to retrieve his historically informed and radically reformist conception of justice without unwittingly rendering socialism a purely regulative idea. Such a strategy involves re-Hegelianizing Honneth’s socialism and the idea of social freedom that it seeks to actualize. (shrink)