Traditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue that we should analyze sarcasm in terms of meaning inversion, as the traditional theory does; but that we need to construe 'meaning' more broadly, to include illocutionary force (...) and evaluative attitudes as well as propositional content. I distinguish four subclasses of sarcasm, individuated in terms of the target of inversion. Three of these classes raise serious challenges for a standard implicature analysis. (shrink)

Pairing bright, hilarious illustrations with witty one-liners that most people would never dare say out loud, each Co-edikit book is a celebration of the human experience and the kind of gift that ensures its reader will maintain a laughing perspective on life. "I don't like morning people...or mornings...or people." On those days when life gets on your last nerve, Sarcasm is the perfect pick-me-up!

This essay looks at two young English-speaking Iraqi bloggers whose internationally recognized writings describe the chaos in post-Saddam Iraq. It examines sarcasm as a mode of resistance as employed by Salam Pax, characterized by BBC Radio in 2003 as “the most famous diarist in the world,” and Riverbend, whose blog was published as a book and translated into several languages. By subjecting the colonial discourse to ridicule, they not only successfully convey the angst their people suffer, but also mock (...) a stereotypical rhetoric that haunts the Western mentality regarding the Middle East. This essay negotiates their use of sarcasm as a means of non-violent resistance. It demonstrates how, for instance, they shift from the sarcastic to the absurd to unravel the banality of the colonial mind and the conceited position of its liberating enterprises. The aim of the paper is, therefore, to shed light on the emergence of a digitalized group of subalterns who write back to the center in the wake of the American intervention to topple the Baath regime in Iraq. Pax and Riverbend distinctively succeed in subverting the colonial and hegemonic gaze by unravelling the encroaching uncertainties of war through the deployment of sarcasm to signify resistance, and by transforming the coalition forces’ theatre of war into a theatre of the absurd. (shrink)

The goal of the present research was to determine whether certain speaker intentions conveyed through prosody in an unfamiliar language can be accurately recognized. English and Cantonese utterances expressing sarcasm, sincerity, humorous irony, or neutrality through prosody were presented to English and Cantonese listeners unfamiliar with the other language. Listeners identified the communicative intent of utterances in both languages in a crossed design. Participants successfully identified sarcasm spoken in their native language but identified sarcasm at near-chance levels (...) in the unfamiliar language. Both groups were relatively more successful at recognizing the other attitudes when listening to the unfamiliar language. Our data suggest that while sarcastic utterances in Cantonese and English share certain acoustic features, these cues are insufficient to recognize sarcasm between languages; rather, this ability depends on language experience. (shrink)

Irony and sarcasm are two quite different, sometimes morally dubious, linguistic tropes. We can draw a distinction between them if we identify irony as a speech act that calls what is bad good and, correspondingly, sarcasm calls good bad. This allows us to ask, which one is morally worse. My argument is based on the idea that the speaker can legitimately bypass what is good and call it bad, which is to say that she may literally mean what (...) she says. This is not true of the opposite case: one cannot bypass what is bad and, therefore, she paradoxically does not mean what she says. In other words, irony is a morally less guilty trope. What is bad has its faults and thus it can be ironized; what is good is without blemish and thus it is difficult to know how it could be called bad. Also, irony can be freely intended, or verbal, or it can be situational in social context. I also discuss dramatic irony in Classical context. Sarcasm does not allow such complexity. Instead, we speak of cynicism and even nihilism as moral attitudes that accompany sarcasm and give it its typical force; or sarcasm may lead to cynicism and nihilism, that is, to the denial of values. Irony does not entail any corresponding attitudes or moral positions. This paper is a philosophical contribution to the ethics of communication and language. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the linguistic concept of implicit offensiveness. On the one hand, implicitness will be juxtaposed with indirectness as the two concepts are not conceived of here as synonymous. On the other hand, a typology of offensiveness (vs offensive language and vs offendedness) will be proposed, as well as the overarching term ‘covert meaning’ that will span figurative implicitness and non-figurative implicitness. The gradability of various forms of covert meaning and its (...) overlap with overt meaning (subsuming explicit literal meaning and implicit literal meaning) will also be discussed. In the analysis, two sample implicit concepts will be examined (irony vs sarcasm) based on corpus data (of general English and dedicated offensiveness corpus) and using non-contextual embeddings. Theory-wise, the paper demonstrates that implicitness is a complex term which is fuzzy and gradable; methodology-wise, it shows how computational tools can be used to attest theoretical assumptions related to offensive covert terms. (shrink)

Recognition of sarcastic statements has been a challenge in the process of sentiment analysis. A sarcastic sentence contains only positive words conveying a negative sentiment. Therefore, it is tough for any automated machine to identify the exact sentiment of the text in the presence of sarcasm. The existing systems for sarcastic sentiment detection are limited to the text scripted in English. Nowadays, researchers have shown greater interest in low resourced languages such as Hindi, Telugu, Tamil, Arabic, Chinese, Dutch, Indonesian, (...) etc. To analyse these low resource languages, the biggest challenge is the lack of available resources, especially in the context of Indian languages. Indian languages are very rich in morphology which pose a greater challenge for the automated machines. Telugu is one of the most popular languages after Hindi among Indian languages. In this article, we have collected and annotated a corpus of Telugu conversation sentences in the form of a question followed by a reply for sarcasm detection. Further, a set of algorithms are proposed for the analysis of sarcasm in the corpus of Telugu conversation sentences. The proposed algorithms are based on hyperbolic features namely, Interjection, Intensifier, Question mark and Exclamation symbol. The achieved accuracy is 94%. (shrink)

As the use of automated social media analysis tools surges, concerns over accuracy of analytics have increased. Some tentative evidence suggests that sarcasm alone could account for as much as a 50% drop in accuracy when automatically detecting sentiment. This paper assesses and outlines the prevalence of sarcastic and ironic language within social media posts. Several past studies proposed models for automatic sarcasm and irony detection for sentiment analysis; however, these approaches result in models trained on training data (...) of highly questionable quality, with little qualitative appreciation of the underlying data. To understand the issues and scale of the problem, we are the first to conduct and present results of a focused manual semantic annotation analysis of two datasets of Twitter messages, associated with; hashtags commonly employed in automated sarcasm and irony detection approaches, and tweets relating to 25 distinct events, including, scandals, product releases, cultural events, accidents, terror incidents, etc. We also highlight the contextualised use of multi-word hashtags in the communication of humour, sarcasm and irony, pointing out that many sentiment analysis tools simply fail to recognise such hashtag-based expressions. Our findings also offer indicative evidence regarding the quality of training data used for automated machine learning models in sarcasm, irony and sentiment detection. Worryingly only 15% of tweets labelled as sarcastic were truly sarcastic. We highlight the need for future research studies to rethink their approach to data preparation and a more careful interpretation of sentiment analysis. (shrink)

Findings from two experiments argue in favor of the superiority of default, preferred interpretations over non-default less favored counterparts, outshining degree of non-salience, non-literalness, contextual strength, and negation. They show that, outside of a specific context, the default interpretation of specific negative constructions is a non-salient interpretation 1; their non-default interpretation is a salience-based alternative. In contrast, the default interpretation of the affirmative counterparts is a salience-based interpretation ; their non-default interpretation is a non-salient alternative. When in equally strongly supportive (...) contexts, default yet non-salient negative sarcasm is processed faster than non-default, non-salient yet affirmative sarcasm and faster than non-default yet salience-based negativ.. (shrink)

Emoji appear to be an important cue to judge whether a statement is sarcastic in computer-mediated communication. In this study, we investigated whether the smiling emoji, an indicator of sarcastic intention in the Chinese culture, exerts an influence on sarcasm interpretation across the lifespan. Statements accompanied with or without a smiling emoji were compared in unambiguous (Experiment 1) and ambiguous (Experiment 2) contexts. The results of Experiment 1 illustrated that for teenagers and the 20-year-olds the smiling emoji enhanced the (...) perceived sarcasm of sarcastic statements significantly. However, there was no difference in interpreting sarcastic statements with or without a smiling emoji in other age groups. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1. We found both teenagers and the 20-year-olds were more likely to arrive at a sarcastic interpretation of the ambiguous statement followed by a smiling emoji, which were less frequent in participants aged in their 30s, 40s, 50s and individuals over 60 years old. This might be because people of varying ages differ in decoding the emotions of the emoji. Age-related differences in the use of sarcasm and participants’ experiences with using emoji might be possible factors that were closely related to the interpretation of emoji-based sarcasm. (shrink)

Theorists have debated whether our ability to understand sarcasm (pertaining here to verbal irony) is principally determined by the context or by properties of the comment itself. The current research investigated an alternative view that broadens the focus on the comment itself, suggesting that mitigating a highly positive concept by using negation generates sarcastic interpretations by default. In the current study, pretests performed on the target utterances presented in isolation established their default interpretations; novel affirmative phrases (e.g., He is (...) the best lawyer) were interpreted literally, whereas equally novel negative counterparts (e.g., He isn’t the best lawyer) were interpreted sarcastically. In Experiment 1 (an eye-tracking study), prior context biased these utterances toward literal or sarcastic interpretations. Results showed that target utterances were easier to process in contexts supporting their default interpretations, regardless of affirmation/negation. Results from a second eye-tracking experiment suggested that readers’ tendency to interpret negative phrases sarcastically is related to their own tendency to use malicious humor. Our findings suggest that negation leads to certain ambiguous utterances receiving sarcastic interpretations by default and that this process may be further intensified by personality factors. (shrink)

Verbal irony is used daily in social interactions, fulfilling various functions in human communication. As much as about 8% of all conversational turns among English-speaking friends living in the...

Nearly everyone shares the intuition that sarcasm or verbal irony1 is a use of language in which speaker meaning and sentence meaning come apart. Two millennia ago, Quintilian defined irony as speech in which “we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said.”2 More recently, Josef Stern sharply distinguishes metaphor, which he argues is semantic, from irony: in the latter case, he says, we are not “even tempted to posit an ironic meaning in the utterance in (...) addition to the ordinary literal meanings of the words used.”3 Indeed, sarcasm is frequently cited as a paradigm case of pragmatic meaning. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis study aimed to investigate the emotional impact of sarcasm. Previous research in this area has mainly required participants to answer questions based on written materials, and results have been mixed. With the aim of instead examining the emotional impact of sarcasm when used in a more conversational setting, the current study utilized animated video clips as stimuli. In each clip, one individual answered general knowledge questions while the other provided feedback that could be delivered either literally or (...) sarcastically, and either complimented or criticized the question answerer’s performance. Participants rated the feedback based on the anticipated emotional impact on the recipient, how the speaker intended the recipient to feel, and whether the speaker intended to be humorous. Results overall supported the Tinge Hypothesis, showing that sarcastic criticism was rated as less negative than literal criticism, and sarcastic compliments were rated as... (shrink)

In this article, the aim is to explore Lebanese folklore through proverbs and to demonstrate how the dynamic field of imagination behind concise oral statements influences contemporary society and anchors, in the collective thinking of several generations, the values of a community, whether they are well-founded or not. Although Lebanese society is patriarchal, men are often depicted as beasts, frequently domestic and specifically as draft animals. The parody, satire, and humor that generally characterize proverbs feed into the images that circulate (...) in the collective unconscious. Durand's theriomorphic symbolism and its resulting ramifications, while referring to Bourdieu's “male domination,” highlight customs and traditions that devalue women and represent them as inferior beings or even as the embodiment of evil on earth. As one facet of folklore, these popular expressions sometimes originate from mythical, biblical, or traditional stories that are the result of beliefs and rituals passed down through centuries. (shrink)

Critique of Sarcastic Reason is a philosophical dissertation that combines several different fields in order to pave the way for those studying sarcasm at the neurobiological, communicative and socio-political levels of analysis where sarcasm appears, respectively, through associated brain activity, between two or more individuals with higher level metabeliefs, and as a method by which political, religious and other social ideologies are attacked (i.e., one form of "biting sarcasm"). The academic disciplines involved in Critique of Sarcastic Reason (...) include social cognitive and developmental psychology, neuroscience, critical theory, modern and contemporary philosophy of mind, evolutionary biology, logic, metaphysics and epistemology. Sarcasm is argued to only function at the highest levels of metacognition, and sarcasm occurs within social situations during which there are tendencies for two or more people to form desires and disgusts directly related to beliefs about beliefs. Sarcasm is compared to deception and is argued to be best analyzed as either spontaneous or rehearsed. (shrink)

-/- Irony is an intriguing topic, central to the study of meaning in language. This book provides an introduction to the pragmatics of irony. It surveys key work carried out on irony in a range of disciplines such as semantics, pragmatics, philosophy and literary studies, and from a variety of theoretical perspectives including Grice's approach, Sperber and Wilson's echoic account, and Clark and Gerrig's pretense theory. It looks at a number of uses of irony and explores how irony can be (...) misunderstood cross-culturally, before delving into the key debates on the pragmatics of irony: is irony always negative? Why do speakers communicate via irony, and which strategies do they usually employ? How are irony and sarcasm different? Is irony always funny? To answer these questions, basic pragmatic notions are introduced and explained. It includes multiple examples and activities to enable the reader to apply the theoretical frameworks to actual everyday instances of irony. (shrink)

Criticism and sarcasm are interspersed with description and analysis throughout Marx's work. Most of the criticism is aimed at one or another side of a single target: what Marx sees as capitalism's pretensions of freedom, equality, and prosperity in the face of exploitation and recurrent crises. But the remarks on commodity fetishism in the first volume of Capital seem to be directed at a different target. Here Marx tells us that a commodity is ‘a queer thing, abounding in metaphysical (...) subtleties and theological niceties.’ But instead of going on to reveal the nature of commodites-the task that occupies him for the preceding 30 and subsequent 700 pages-Marx takes the opportunity to explore their ‘mystical’ character. The passage repays careful consideration. It is one of the few places in his mature writings in which Marx returns to the tone of his youthful works. It is also the passage in which commentators have claimed to find grounds for attributing a doctrine of ‘false consciousness’ to Marx. (shrink)

Irony and sarcasm are common linguistic tropes. They are both based on falsehoods that the speaker pretends to be true. I briefly characterize their differences. A third trope exists that works when the relevant propositions are true – yet its rhetorical effect resembles irony and sarcasm, I call it mocking. It is mimetic evil: an agent copies another so that the result ridicules him. The image is, in a limited way, true of him and it hurts; we all (...) are vulnerable. I provide a systematic framework for understanding this phenomenon, mocking, in terms of emulation and simulation. Finally, I introduce an idea of universal mimesis and discuss René Girard’s theory of desire. He argues that desires are copies of a model. This may not be possible, and I suggest a modification to his theory. I pay attention to his idea of mimetic desire as a source of hatred, which is obviously related to what I call here mimetic mocking. (shrink)

Nature of irony -- Sarcasm -- Impersonal irony -- Self-disparaging irony -- Ingenu irony -- Irony of self-betrayal -- Irony of simple incongruity -- Dramatic irony -- General irony -- Romantic irony.

Mobsters and others engaged in risky forms of social coordination and coercion often communicate by saying something that is overtly innocuous but transmits another message ‘off record’. In both ordinary conversation and political discourse, insinuation and other forms of indirection, like joking, offer significant protection from liability. However, they do not confer blanket immunity: speakers can be held to account for an ‘off record’ message, if the only reasonable interpreta- tions of their utterance involve a commitment to it. Legal liability (...) for speech in the service of criminal behavior displays a similar profile of significant protection from indirection along with potential liability for reasonable interpretations. Specifically, in both ordinary and legal contexts, liability depends on how a reasonable speaker would expect a reasonable hearer to interpret their utterance in the context of utter- ance, rather than on the actual speaker’s claimed communicative intentions. (shrink)

What Nietzsche Really Said gives us a lucid overview -- both informative and entertaining -- of perhaps the most widely read and least understood philosopher in history. Friedrich Nietzsche's aggressive independence, flamboyance, sarcasm, and celebration of strength have struck responsive chords in contemporary culture. More people than ever are reading and discussing his writings. But Nietzsche's ideas are often overshadowed by the myths and rumors that surround his sex life, his politics, and his sanity. In this lively and comprehensive (...) analysis, Nietzsche scholars Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins get to the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy, from his ideas on "the will to power" to his attack on religion and morality and his infamous Übermensch (superman). What Nietzsche Really Said offers both guidelines and insights for reading and understanding this controversial thinker. Written with sophistication and wit, this book provides an excellent summary of the life and work of one of history's most provocative philosophers. (shrink)

Socratic irony is potentially fertile ground for exegetical abuse. It can seem to offer an interpreter the chance to dismiss any claim which conflicts with his account of Socratic Philosophy merely by crying ‘irony’. If abused in this way, Socratic irony can quickly become a convenient receptacle for everything inimical to an interpretation. Much recent scholarship rightly reacts against this and devotes itself to explaining how Socrates actually means everything he says, at least everything of philosophical importance. But the fact (...) that a commentator needs to argue that Socrates is really serious when he disavows knowledge or claims to be the saviour of Athens is by itself sufficient to establish that there is an abundance of what I will call ‘play’ in the Socratic dialogues. The term ‘play’ refers to occasions when Socrates at least appears not to be speaking straightforwardly. ‘Play’ covers cases of real or apparent humour, mockery, teasing, irony, and sarcasm, without differentiation or further elaboration. When left undefined, as often, the phrase ‘Socratic irony’ seems to be used to refer to what I am calling ‘play’. (shrink)

Compiled by disciples of Confucius in the centuries following his death in 479 B.C.E., _The Analects of Confucius_ is a collection of aphorisms and historical anecdotes embodying the basic values of the Confucian tradition: learning, morality, ritual decorum, and filial piety. Reflecting the model eras of Chinese antiquity, the Analects offers valuable insights into successful governance and the ideal organization of society. Filled with humor and sarcasm, it reads like a casual conversation between teacher and student, emphasizing the role (...) of the individual in the attainment of knowledge and the value of using historical events and people to illuminate moral and political concepts. Confucius's teachings focus on cultural and peaceful pursuits and the characteristics of benevolent and culturally distinguished government. He also discusses ancestor worship and other rites performed for the spirits of the dead. The single most influential philosophical work in all of Chinese history, _The Analects of Confucius_ has shaped the thought and customs of China and neighboring countries for centuries. Burton Watson's concise translation uses the pinyin romanization system and keeps explanatory notes to a minimum, yet his intimate knowledge of the Confucian tradition and precise attention to linguistic detail capture the original text's elegance, cogency, and wit. (shrink)

How do social actors get addressees to stop retreating to metadiscussions that derail ground-level discussions, and why do they expect the strategies to work? The question is of both theoretical and practical interest, especially with regard to ground-level discussions of systemic sexism and racism derailed by qualifying “not all men” and “not all white people” perform the sexist or racist actions that are the topic of discussion. I use a normative pragmatic approach to analyze two exemplary messages designed to halt (...) retreats to metadiscussions about using “not all men” and “not all white people” qualifiers in discussions of systemic sexism and racism. I find that social actors use strategies that may at first glance appear to be out of bounds in an ideal critical discussion—e.g., demanding, shouting, cussing, sarcasm, name-calling—to cultivate a context where using not-all qualifiers becomes increasingly costly. The strategies are designed to get addressees to recognize that using not-all qualifiers is not an epistemic correction of a hasty generalization or ethical intervention to halt promulgation of stereotypes about men and white people. Instead, the strategies display that using not-all qualifiers is a fallible sign of willful hermeneutical ignorance, willful ignorance, and an attempt to reassert a measure of social dominance. These findings affirm the need to investigate the various strategies and normative materials social actors actually bring to bear to regulate disagreement. (shrink)

This paper considers four lines of objection to the efficacy or worth of Grice's cancellability test for conversational implicatures – the coherence objection, the entailment objection, the sarcasm objection, and the ambiguity objection. I argue that the test survives these objections relatively unscathed; and hence conclude that the cancellability test is still a significant, useful, reliable indicator at the semantics/pragmatics interface.

Recourse to meta-argument is an important feature of successful argument exchanges; it is where norms are made explicit or clarified, corrections are offered, and inferences are evaluated, among much else. Sadly, it is often an avenue for abuse, as the very virtues of meta-argument are turned against it. The question as to how to manage such abuses is a vexing one. Erik Krabbe proposed that one be levied a fine in cases of inappropriate meta-argumentative bids (2003). In a recent publication (...) (2022) Beth Innocenti expands on this notion of a penalty, arguing that some meta-arguments should be halted with “shouting, cussing, sarcasm, name-calling.” In this essay, we review Innocenti’s case that these confrontations and haltings improve the argumentative circumstances. We provide three reasons that this promise is not well-founded. First, that such confrontations have a significant audience problem, in that they are more likely to be interpreted as destroying the argumentative context than improving it. Second, that Innocenti’s procedural justification, that those who lose meta-discussions should pay a penalty, is not satisfied if the meta-discussion is halted. And third, there is a boundary problem for the cases, since it seems there is no principled reason to restrict halting meta-arguments just to these cases (especially if there is no meta-discussion on the matter to make the bounds explicit). Though expressions of anger can be appropriate in argument, we argue, it cannot take the place of argument. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Dialogue:The Principle of Civility in Academic DiscourseForest HansenSeveral months ago New York Times columnist David Brooks addressed the lack of civility in recent public discourse. "So... you get narcissists who believe they or members of their party possess direct access to the truth.... You get people who prefer monologues to dialogue.... You get people who... loathe their political opponents."1One might think that by contrast academia, and especially academic (...) publications, would provide a bastion of civil discourse. Alas, even academia has been infiltrated. At least it so appears to me when I read some of what has been recently published in the name of the philosophy of music education.I find that disheartening.However one defines "philosophy," it minimally entails raising questions whose answers are reasonably debatable. The key word here is "reasonably." Those who are committed to philosophical activity criticize positions they oppose by formulating arguments, giving examples, calling on accepted facts, clarifying the meaning of terms, and bringing to bear the principles of formal and informal logic. And thus they open themselves to counter-criticism of the same [End Page 198] sort. Nowhere in this enterprise is there need—or room—for invective, sarcasm, name-calling, ad hominems, or any other kind of personal abuse. One might call this The Principle of Civility in Academic Discourse.Philosophy differs in this respect from polemics. In one of its senses "polemics" means "the art or practice of disputation or controversy," and so seems a close cousin to philosophy. However, while "philosophy" traces its etymological roots to "love" and "wisdom," "polemics" is derived from "war." Polemics is a kind of verbal warfare. Typically polemicists are willing to use any tool at their disposal—even underhanded ones—to "win" the war of ideas. Polemics in this usual sense dispenses with objectivity and fairness (though it may make such a pretense). In fact, people who mount personal attacks thereby reveal their lack of philosophical tools and diminish their argument.Distinguishing philosophy from polemics does not mean that all philosophical claims are equal. Some positions are stronger than others, some weaker. Some can be dismissed relatively out of hand if they are illogical or do not square with normal experience. But even when positions are inadequate, the persons who advance the positions deserve to be treated with courtesy, respect, and collegiality.Typically, people trained in philosophy assimilate this principle as a matter of course. They have learned that over the centuries great minds have disagreed about every philosophical issue—whether the make-up of ultimate reality, the nature and sources of knowledge, the existence of god, the justification of morality. So too with what the nature of music is, what music should be taught and how, what is the purpose of music education.No one has a corner on the answers to such questions. The floor should always be open to debate—to consideration of new proposals and reconsideration of old ones. In disciplines where some matters are more or less settled (as in natural science and mathematics), such arguments disappear and new quests hope to find new settled answers. But in philosophy, more fundamentally than in any other traditional academic discipline, the discussion, the reasoned argumentation, is ongoing.Many years ago Douglas Morgan, in his essay "Must Art Tell the Truth"2 eloquently captured this spirit of philosophy:Philosophy is itself to be conceived as an invitational, dialectical activity rather than as any system of dicta. A philosopher can be thought of as [one] who, far from commanding assent with any thunderous barrage of argumentative artillery, invites you to think [about] the world or some aspect of it in a somewhat different way. "Come in," [the philosopher] says cordially, "and welcome. Sit down. Let me mix you an idea. Sip this thought, and tell me how your own experience looks. If you should find my way of construing our [End Page 199] world unappetizing or unpromising, pray show me your way. Let us once again in the good old Greek way, dia-lego, talk it through together."Finally, The Principle of Civility in Academic Discourse ought to be conveyed in our classrooms, as we foster new generations in... (shrink)

There is a remarkable difference between Plato scholarship and Aristotle scholarship. Despite Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates was the ironic philosopher par excellence, and Plato’s own writing style quite obviously preserved, or even further enhanced, this distinguished quality of his teacher. Although Plato himself left no doubt that Socrates’ questioning and irony was no play, but rather quite literally a matter of life and death, Plato had recourse to playfulness in his presentation of such deadly matters, be it only in order to (...) cope with his own mourning for Socrates and to express, as well as hide, his bitter sarcasm, scorn, and anger for those people who finally sentenced Socrates to death. Teaching, learning, and interpretation often have an aspect of assimilation. Thus, there is a large tribe whose members—sometimes playfully, sometimes less so—claim that studies on Plato should adopt the peculiar quality of the object of their studies. Even some of the members of the other tribe of Plato scholarship, the Vlastonians, sometimes cannot avoid doing so, and one can gratefully acknowledge that they often perform this half-voluntary exercise in a graceful manner. None of this can be found in scholarship on Aristotle. Aristotle’s texts, which were almost exclusively notes for lectures, are for the most part extremely sober. So, too, is the scholarship on Aristotle. The division of playfulness and labor within Plato scholarship itself, as well as between research on Plato and Aristotle, is certainly very fruitful and by no means unreasonable. Still, a certain playfulness in Reiner Schürmann’s thinking has always waited for an echo in Aristotle studies; for a response to one aspect of his wide-ranging interests. In this paper, I will first comment upon some fragments of one of Aristotle’s dialogues. This will be followed by a few general remarks on the notions of τί ἦν εἶναι and οὐσία. Thereupon, I will address aspects of Metaphysics VII:4-6, in which Aristotle discusses the notion of τί ἦν εἶναι. Finally, in light of the preceding sections of this paper, I will take up Reiner Schürmann’s interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of ἀρχή. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article presents an attempt to analyze the strategic perspective of discourse, applying Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) concepts and Crisis Communication analytical tools. The study aims to reveal key strategies employed by a political actor to form public perception while communicating a crisis, based on Donald Trump’s discourse on the COVID-19 pandemic. Results suggest four groups of strategies: (1) legitimization (through emotions, altruism, a hypothetical future, voices of expertise, rationality, defeasibility, simple denial and bolstering), (2) delegitimization (through negative evaluations, (...) accusations, sarcasm, nicknaming, attacking the accuser, shifting the blame), (3) mitigation (transcendence and differentiation) and (4) intensification (through the use of repetitions, metaphors, superlatives, intensifiers). The research concludes that the macro goal underlying the described strategies is to present the Trump administration’s efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic as hard and effective. The study illustrates the use of language to model public perception and construct meaning in the context of a crisis. The research findings contribute to prior scientific inquiry into discursive strategies through suggesting a more comprehensive typology and extending CDA classifications by Crisis Communication categories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:78 Discussion c:\users\kenneth\documents\type3401\rj 3401 193 red.docx 2014-05-14 8:54 PM MORE WIT IN PM Michael E. Berumen 37155 Dickerson Run Windsor, co 80550, usa [email protected] eldom does one find a piece by Bertrand Russell without a morsel of humour or wryness. Sometimes the Russellian wit is obvious. Other times it is more subtle, maybe even requiring a second look just to be sure. Headlong into some of his most technical (...) and difficult works, a delightful bon mot might suddenly punctuate the philosophical solemnity. One doesn’t ordinarily think of Principia Mathematica as a sourcebook for Russellian waggishness, but it is there, to be sure—albeit one will negotiate many pages of symbols and scant prose before finding a specimen. Perhaps the best-known witticism amongst cognoscenti is, after having proved 1 + 1 = 2 (PM ∗110.643, 2: 83), the authors observe, “The above proposition is occasionally useful.” The most complete directory for these jewels that I know is by Kenneth Blackwell.1 I thought it unlikely another would be found, so imagine my surprise when, after having dusted off my seldom-used Volume 3 to look something up, I came across a droll nugget that (to the best of my knowledge) has not been highlighted before. Something tells me Russell was biting down on his pipe stem and had a twinkle in his eye when he (I assume Russell, but they, anyway) wrote in the summary of Section A of Part vi, “Quantity”: Great difficulties are caused, in this section, by the existence-theorems and the question of types. These difficulties disappear if the axiom of infinity is assumed, but it seems improper to make the theory of (say) 2/3 depend upon the assumption that the number of objects in the universe is not finite. (PM 3: 234; italics mine) “Improper” indeed, the erstwhile Victorian says! By way of explanation, he goes on to say, We have, accordingly, taken pains not to make this assumption, except where, as in the theory of real numbers, it is really essential, and not merely convenient. Even that has a bit of Russellian sarcasm. So, accept the challenge and find another. In the meantime, take comfort in the knowledge that the sometimes controversial Axiom of Infinity is an unnecessary assumption in mixing one part soda and two parts Red Hackle. 1 “The Wit and Humour of Principia Mathematica”, Russell 31 (2011): 151–60. S... (shrink)

With candid, witty, and compelling experiences of yoga from renowned memoirists, including Cheryl Strayed (author of the number-one New York Times bestseller Wild), Claire Dederer (author of national bestseller Poser: My Life in 23 Yoga Poses), Dinty W. Moore (author of The Accidental Buddhist), Neal Pollack (author of Stretch: The Making of a Yoga Dude) and many others, Going Om shares a range of observations about this popular practice. Unlike books on yoga that provide instruction on technique, Going Om is (...) a unique collection of personal narratives from celebrated authors. This anthology of original material values the quality of writing over the authors' flexibility. Ira Sukrungruang shares his heartbreaking struggle as a 375 pound yoga student discovering self-worth on his mat; Gloria Munoz explores the practice of stillness with lyrical elegance in the midst of her busy mind; Neal Pollack's signature sarcasm leads to surprising turns at yoga class with his dad; Elizabeth Kadetsky uses yogic wisdom while coping with her mother's devastating Alzheimer's. (shrink)

Les banquets politiques – réformistes, républicains, démocratiques – se multiplièrent durant les années 1847-1849. Les sources, trop souvent silencieuses sur l’importance respective des hommes et des femmes dans ces manifestations, permettent malgré tout de percevoir la très nette prédominance masculine. Quand une présence féminine était tolérée, ces convives exceptionnelles, considérées comme des fleurs éminemment décoratives, pouvaient se trouver reléguées en marge du banquet, à la lisière des tables. Quelques cas de banquets de femmes sont attestés, parfois organisés par des femmes (...) catholiques et républicaines, qui prenaient soin de rappeler leurs consœurs à leurs devoirs d’épouses et de mères, parfois par des femmes socialistes, dont les initiatives engendraient sarcasmes et pamphlets. (shrink)

Les Cahiers noirs de Martin Heidegger ont suscité des réactions si divergentes qu’il n’est pas illégitime de s’interroger sur la cause de cette plurivocité. Est-il possible qu’une série de textes produise des réactions si discordantes – de la minimisation à l’exaspération, du sarcasme à la caricature, du scandale à l’excommunication? Il est opportun de chercher dans les Cahiers noirs les racines de cette fragmentation. Cet article soutenir la thèse selon laquelle la structure et les contenus mêmes des Cahiers noirs porteraient (...) en eux une sorte de double contrainte entre le dessin antimétaphysique et la « rechute » dans une métaphysique puissance deux : une contradiction interne à la trame des Cahiers noirs, qui produit deux figures de pensée incompatibles entre elles mais qui représente le contenu philosophique le plus précieux de ces textes. (shrink)

Né à Dijon en 1861, Maurice Blondel s'est d'abord fait connaître par deux ouvrages retentissants, L'Action de 1893 et la Lettre sur l'Apologetique de 1896. Dans ces deux oeuvres de jeunesse, qui demeurent pourtant ses chefs-d'œuvre, il prenait hardiment position aussi bien contre la philosophic scolastique que contre la philosophic moderne. Ce qui lui valut aussitôt, avec les remontrances des théologiens intégristes, les sarcasmes des philosophes rationalistcs. Qu'est-ce qui pouvait bien le pousser, lui fervent catholique, à rejeter la vénérable scolastique? (...) En quoi la philosophic moderne, qu'il connaissait pourtant bien, lui paraissait-elle inacceptable? Entre l'aristotélisme et le kantisme, comment ce fougueux prétendait-il frayer sa propre voie? Comment pensait-il, enfin, concilier ses exigences de philosophe avec ses croyances de chrétien? (shrink)

On se souvient de la formule de Churchill : " La démocratie est le pire des régimes, à l'exception de tous les autres". A l'évidence, nous n " aimons " pas la démocratie. Et pourtant nous sommes tous démocrates... Étrange procès en désamour que celui-là, dont la virulence égale l'ancienneté : toute petite déjà, à Athènes, la démocratie ne manquait pas de détracteurs... Myriam Revault d'Allonnes s'interroge, non pas sur les critiques ou les sarcasmes dont la démocratie est l'objet, mais (...) sur la nature de l'expérience démocratique, travaillée par l'incertitude, le conflit, l'inachèvement, inextricablement liée à ce qui s'oppose à elle et la menace. Comment l'homme démocratique, confronté à cette existence toujours problématique, ne serait-il pas en proie à l'insatisfaction et à la déception permanentes? Cependant, si nous n' "aimons" pas la démocratie, pouvons-nous ne pas la vouloir? Car c'est bien l'expérience démocratique qui fait de nous des sujets éthiques et politiques, des citoyens qui ne veulent pas être ainsi gouvernés : " pas comme ça, pas pour ça, pas par eux ". (shrink)

Needleman's (1993) reply to our article in this journal (Emhart, Scarr, & Geneson, 1993) is a good example of the tactics he uses to deflect attention from questions of his scientific misconduct. Rather than address the many doubts about his scientific conduct, he attempted to focus readers' attention on (a) the motives and character of colleagues who question his research, (b) legitimate debates in the research literature on low-level lead effects on children, and (c) testimonials by colleagues who cannot know (...) about misconduct in his research. He did not address our major thesis-that procedures by which investigations of scientific misconduct are carried out require revision. Our experiences as whistleblowers were used to illustrate the need for change. Needleman's reply illustrates how he has dealt with the series of investigations of his scientific misconduct-with sarcasm and innuendoes about the honesty and character of investigators, portrayed as conspirators with the lead industry (and newspaper columnists?) to bring him down. For more details of his obfuscation, see Scarr (1993), Emhart (1993), and Ernhart and Scarr (in press). (shrink)

«Philosophe énergumène, sceptique par excellence, mais aussi iconoclaste et insolent, amer et ironique, Cioran est toujours déconcertant : il est un des penseurs les plus corrosifs et lucides de notre siècle. Cet ouvrage nous invite à découvrir ce singulier héritier des moralistes de l’ère des Lumières, dont la réflexion est une perpétuelle incitation à la révolte intellectuelle. Il revendique la souveraineté de l’esprit ; le doute, le sarcasme, le paradoxe sont ses armes les plus efficaces pour parvenir à la découverte (...) de la vérité, une vérité qui n’est pas toujours bonne à dire, car elle n’apporte pas des réponses, mais des questions sur le grand mal de l’être, l’histoire, la civilisation, la mystique, la littérature, l’art et les systèmes métaphysiques.»--Quatrième de couverture. (shrink)

The writings of David Hume (1711–1776) are a treasure trove for those eager to find pithy, polished memorable quotes to bolster their arguments in favor of freedom, justice, and against the arrogance and follies of governments. It is difficult to resist the youthful élan of his major philosophical work, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), his provocative ironic style, witticisms, irreverence, and occasional sarcasm, which made him an international celebrity, the darling of Parisian salons, and, even now, a reader’s (...) delight. (shrink)

This article focuses onsarcasm, for which the definitions have often been loose and confusing, integrating it into the concept ofirony. My approach is based on a large corpus of examples taken from two contemporary television-series, which help identify the wide range of linguistic processes at the core of sarcastic utterances. I present a quantitative and descriptive analysis of the main processes found in two American television-series:House M.D.andThe Big Bang Theory. The results show the intricate meanings created in sarcasm through (...) various linguistic mechanisms, such as repetition, explicitation, metonymy, metaphor, shift of focus, reasoning, and rhetorical questions. This more holistic analysis, including a broad corpus of instances and a more detailed analysis of the examples, aims to fill the unexplored gaps in more classical analyses, emphasizing the complexities and implications that can be drawn in interaction. (shrink)

This essay begins with the premise that Italo Calvino’s Memos serve as a fundamentally educational proposition. Each of his lectures can be regarded as a substantive proposal, encouraging a revaluation of our contemporary world through unconventional forms of knowledge, especially considering the challenges posed by the new millennium. The essay’s central objective is to further the intellectual movement initiated by Calvino, but with a specific focus on theorizing education. It aims not to simply apply Calvino’s principles and insights to education (...) or provide a pedagogical analysis but rather to actively engage with them, fostering educational-philosophical reflections centred around the concept of “lightness”, as identified by the Italian writer. Key questions emerge from this exploration: How can “lightness” be considered an educational quality? Can it serve as a valuable guide for navigating the complexities of contemporary education? Can the notion of “lightness” inspire the creation of new pedagogical languages that resist the instrumentalizing tendencies in education? The essay proceeds to elucidate Calvino’s primary theses on “lightness” while also examining the potential for a productive dialogue between Calvino and Richard Rorty’s ideas on irony, both in public and private dimensions. It illustrates how ironic practices, such as sarcasm, satire, and wit, conveyed through artistic expressions, can embody the essence of “lightness” that Calvino encourages. Ultimately, the essay concludes by reflecting on the pedagogical implications of embracing “lightness” in education, particularly in the affirmative/post-critical and Arendtian sense, as a means of bequeathing a world that genuinely belongs to future generations. (shrink)

The inferentialism due to Robert Brandom presents a compelling normative-deontic picture of language and discursive practices, and as such it is well positioned to address phenomena like lying. This short work outlines a simple account of how lying can be conceptualized within that framework. To that end, the basic Brandomian position is extended to include a novel type of status – namely, pseudo-commitments, which are unique in their being non-binding. The traditional definition of lying is then given a status-oriented form, (...) such that lying consists in presenting a pseudo-commitment with the intention for it to be attributed as a standard commitment. Importantly, this can be articulated in our scorekeeping practices, which is demonstrated with three example exchanges – one featuring an undetected lie, one featuring a detected lie, and one featuring a bald-faced lie. Though simple, the account works and invites extension to other similar phenomena, like sarcasm, acting, bullshit, etc. The notion of pseudo-commitment may also find application outside of the inferentialist context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Rejoinder to MoriThomas M. LennonGianluca Mori and I are broadly in agreement about everything in my paper except the answer to its main question, viz., how Bayle's use of Saint-Evremond is to be understood in the third Eclaircissement. Mori thinks that Bayle's use of Saint Evremond was one of his "provocations aimed at orthodox readers." It is an instance of his thesis that "Bayle's professions of Christian faith, (...) though frequent, are generally far from being above suspicion: indeed almost every one of them raises questions about their actual significance."1 On my view, one line of argument for not taking Bayle's use of Saint-Evremond "at face value in his profession of religious faith... is highly questionable."2 That is, as far as his use of Saint-Evremond is concerned, Bayle should be taken as the fideist that he, here and in many other places, in effect claimed to be.We are in agreement about the nature of the key text itself that Bayle cites from the Conversation. It is a "ridiculous" text, dripping with sarcasm, an ironic parody of the very views that Bayle claims to believe. Moreover, Bayle himself is in agreement with this view of the text, and expresses it in so many words. The knot of our disagreement consists in how Bayle could have used such a text to express fideist views. Mori thinks that the very use of the text itself is sufficient to call those views into doubt. "Bayle was fully aware that the text he presented as a 'clarification' of his fideism had very little right to be considered as Christian orthodoxy,... In a word, Bayle knew full well that his fideism would be regarded as insincere and destructive of faith."3The basis for my view begins with what Bayle says about this text in a statement that Mori has so far not acknowledged either in his book or in his reply to me. Says Bayle after citing Saint-Evremond, "Give this thought a more serious and proper tone and it will become reasonable." It is here that Bayle [End Page 335] acknowledges the inappropriateness of Saint-Evremond's text, but he does so to reject it as it stands. Bayle did not, as Mori claims, present the text "as a clarification of his fideism." Only when the text is given a "more serious and proper tone," that is, when it is stripped of its irony and sarcasm, does it cease to be a parody of his views and become an accurate expression of them. Bayle explicitly dissociates himself from the unamended text, introducing it with the comment that "this thought has been given a ridiculous sense, in the hands of a master."4 But Mori takes this text as it stands to convey Bayle's message, as if Bayle had not commented on it at all. It is as if, to repeat the text at the end of my paper, the Bible were to be cited as stating the claim that there is no God. It does so, of course, but only preceded by the disclaimer that only "the fool hath said in his heart there is no God" (Psalm 14: 1).According to Mori, Bayle's use of Saint-Evremond was provocative. Bayle's text is not provocative, however. Had he intended it to be, he would have directly cited Saint-Evremond, without comment. Instead, he is perfectly clear about whom he is quoting and how that source should be understood. To be sure, such a citation is dramatic, and no doubt designed for effect, but the effect is to show how unexceptional Bayle took his conception of the faith-reason relation to be. Bayle in the Eclaircissement is not trying to convert anyone but to explain his position in a way that makes it acceptable to the Consistory of the Walloon Church. To be sure, it is an irony that Saint-Evremond's text, slightly but importantly corrected, expresses Bayle's view, but it is not an irony in the sense of winking sarcasm.Mori insists that, as a matter of historical fact, Bayle's text was found to be provocative... (shrink)

Contrairement à la plupart des écrits néoplatoniciens sur Aristote, le commentaire de Syrianus sur les Livres M et N de la Métaphysique revêt un ton particulièrement polémique. Certes, il s’agit là peut-être d’une réaction prévisible au contenu fortement antiplatonicien de M et N, mais il n’en demeure pas moins que Syrianus choisit délibérément de commenter ces textes-là. À cette fin, il a recours à divers procédés de polémique rhétorique, qu’il manie avec grande habilité. La première stratégie consiste à traiter Aristote (...) avec condescendance, en lui exposant simplement, ainsi qu’à nous, la doctrine platonicienne véritable. Ailleurs, il l’affronte en échangeant sarcasme pour sarcasme. Cependant il lui arrive aussi de chercher à réfuter le Stagirite dans les termes mêmes de ce dernier, en citant Aristote contre Aristote. Je discute quelques exemples de ces trois procédés en les traitant l’un après l’autre puisque chacun présente un intérêt particulier. Je conclus toutefois que cette polémique ne signifie pas forcément que Syrianus rejette le consensus néoplatonicien sur l’accord fondamental entre Platon et Aristote. (shrink)