Genetic and other biotechnologies are starting to impact significantly upon society and individuals within it. Rose and Novas draw on an analysis of many patient groups to sketch out the broad notion of biocitizenship as a device for describing how the empowered and informed individual, group or network can engage with bioscience. In this paper, we examine critically the notion of biocitizenship, drawing on both sociological fieldwork that grounds the debate in the views of a large and varied group of (...) concerned actors. Using work within green politics, we identify shortcomings in the concept of biocitizenship as it has so far been explicated. The value assumptions lying behind an account of biocitizenship, and its tendency to see issues through a reductive lens, are examined. Alternative views of values and goals, which may undermine any alleged rights and duties, are explored using interviews and other ethnographic data that illustrates the complexity of the terrain. The reductive lens of biocitizenship is explored through contrast with the wider scope of concerns emanating from various sources, including many within green politics. If such complexities are not recognised, there is a danger that a concept of biocitizenship may serve to create and amplify inequalities. Problems with identity issues are key: the construction of identity is complex and many groups are explicitly rejecting the ‘biological’ label. We discuss the multiple relations of citizens with the biotech and pharmaceutical industries. Arguably, existing inequalities in power relationships, exploitation, commodification and ownership patterns are being perpetuated in novel ways through the new biosciences. We pose the question of whether it is possible to construct a concept of biocitizenship that overcomes these problems. (shrink)

Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically (...) delusional); otherwise the presumption should be that persons with DID are indeed responsible for their actions. We find their interpretation of DID and of the way in which the requirements for criminal insanity relate to this condition worrying and likely to result in injustice to DID sufferers. Our thesis is that persons with DID cannot be responsible for their actions if the usual features of the condition are present. A person with DID is a single person in the grip of a very serious mental disorder. By focusing on the features of DID which have, as we argue, the effect of deluding the patient, we try to show that such a person is unable to fulfill the ordinary conditions of responsible agency (namely, autonomy and self-control). (shrink)

This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit or for harm avoidance.

Facing increased competition, universities are driven to project a positive image to their internal and external stakeholders. Therefore some of these institutions have begun to develop and implement corporate identity programs as part of their corporate strategies. This study describes a Turkish higher education institution’s social responsibility initiatives. Along with this example, the study also analyzes a specific case using concepts from the Corporate Identity and Corporate Social Responsibility literature. The motives leading the university to manage its corporate (...) identity, the social responsibility initiatives in the local and national communities, and the possible benefits of these initiatives for the parties involved are all identified. The major finding is that philanthropy is one of the main elements of Istanbul Bilgi University’s corporate identity program and that the university has altruistic motives for its social responsibility initiatives. (shrink)

Moral responsibility seems to presuppose personal identity. However, there are problems with this view, raised by Derek Parfit’s arguments for the view that personal identity isn’t what matters for our practical concerns. While Parfit discusses moral responsibility only in passing, the problems that arise for the connection between moral responsibility and personal identity have recently been sharpened by David Shoemaker. This paper defends the claim that moral responsibility presupposes personal identity against these problems. It argues, first, (...) that only reductionist views about personal identity have problems with the connection between responsibility and identity, which suggests that personal identity is a non-reductionist concept. Second, it argues that while non-reductionism is problematic, there is a novel view—non-representationalism about personal identity, according to which we account for personal identity in terms of a distinctive non-representational function—that is equally well-positioned to rescue the connection as non-reductionism, without suffering from non-reductionism’s problems. (shrink)

This article contributes to the emerging discussion on responsible leadership by providing an analysis of the inner theatre of a responsible leader. I use a narrative approach for analyzing the biography of Anita Roddick as a widely acknowledged prototype of a responsible leader. With clinical and normative lenses I explore the relationship between responsible leadership behavior and the underlying motivational systems. I begin the article with an introduction outlining the current state of responsible leadership research and explaining the kind of (...) magnifying glasses used to examine the case. I continue with a brief summary of Anita Roddick’s development from childhood to adulthood, which provides the biographical background for exploring her motivational systems as a leader. Against this backdrop, I analyze the relationship between motivational drivers and a responsible leadership identity as revealed by Roddick in different behavioral leadership roles. I conclude the article by providing a number of lessons learned for responsible leadership and the development of future global leaders. (shrink)

Based on the assumption that consumers will reward firms for their support of social programs, many organizations have adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. Drawing on social identity theory, a model of influence of CSR on loyalty is developed and tested using a sample of real consumers. Results demonstrate that CSR initiatives are linked to stronger loyalty both because the consumer develops a more positive company evaluation, and because one identifies more strongly with the company. Moreover, identity salience (...) is shown to play a crucial role in the influence of CSR initiatives on consumer loyalty when this influence occurs through consumer-company identification. A strong identifier is not necessarily in a constant state of salience, but activating identity salience of a particular consumer social identity (a company) will affect consumer reactions to product stimuli, increasing consumer loyalty. (shrink)

In this paper the moral responsibility of a Healthcare Organization (HCO) is conceived as an inextricable aspect of the identity of the HCO. We attempt to show that by exploring this relation a more profound insight in moral responsibility can be gained. Referring to Charles Taylor we explore the meaning of the concept of identity. It consists of three interdependent dimensions: a moral, a dialogical, and a narrative one. In section two we develop some additional arguments to apply (...) his concept of personal identity to organizations. The final section works out the relationship of three dimensions of identity to some actual issues in contemporary HCOs: the tension between care and justice, the importance of dialogues about the diversity of goods, and the relevance of becoming familiar with the life-story of the HCO. Identity of an HCO is established and developed in commitments to and identification with certain goods that are central for a HCO. However, many of these goods are interwoven with everyday practices and policies. Therefore, moral responsibility asks for articulation of goods that often stay implicit and should not be reduced to a merely procedural approach. However difficult this articulation may be, if it is not tried at all HCOs run the risk of drifting away from their very identity as healthcare institutions: to offer care to patients and to do this in accordance with demands of social justice. (shrink)

Many people believe that for someone to now be responsible for some past action, the agent of that action and the responsible agent now must be one and the same person. In other words, many people that moral responsibility presupposes numerical personal identity. In this paper, I show why this platitude is false. I then suggest an account of what actual metaphysical relationship moral responsibility presupposes instead.

If someone with dissociative identity disorder commits a wrongful act, is she responsible? If one adopts the Multiple Persons Thesis, it may seem that one alter cannot be responsible for the actions of another alter. Conversely, if one regards the subject as a single person, it may seem that she is responsible for any actions she performs. I will argue that this subject is a single person, but one who suffers from delusions of disownership and therefore does not fulfill (...) ordinary requirements for responsible agency. This is because she suffers from extreme ambivalence: her deep-seated needs and desires conflict, and she forms alter-personalities as a way to cope with inner discord without abandoning any of these contradictory impulses. However, although the ability to exercise autonomous agency is eroded in such cases, the capacity for autonomous agency is preserved. The subject with DID is weakly responsible for her wrongful acts. (shrink)

The exploration of personal identity and theories of narrative in Narrative Identity and Personal Responsibility is extraordinarily suggestive, resulting in implications for theories of action as well as ethics and psychology. Taking seriously the thought that we mediate our relations with the world by means of self-defining narratives grounded in the natural phenomenon of desire provides new answers to old puzzles of what it means to be human.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 46, no. 2. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 287 Julienne Obadia Responsibility, Respectability, Recognition, and Polyamory: Lessons in Subject Formation in the Age of Sexual Identity Introduction: It’s About Time “Sexuality” has become a strikingly capacious category in recent years. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans* have been joined by queer, questioning, intersex, pansexual, Two Spirit, asexual, and ally, as the acronym LGBT increasingly serves as (...) a base for expanded formulations such as LGBTQQIP2SAA. In light of this trajectory, perhaps it should not have surprised me to hear so many of my polyamorist interlocutors identifying polyamory as their sexual orientation. While polyamory’s emergence as a named practice in 1990 was more closely associated with the sexual revolution than the gay liberation movement, the increasing intelligibility of polyamory as a sexual orientation, I argue, offers important insights into how, and to what effect, the category of sexuality is expanding, and illuminates contemporary mechanisms of subject formation in American late liberalism. It is tempting to analyze this phenomenon solely within the historical context of the twentieth century rise of identity politics. However, a focus on recent decades is insufficient for understanding the increasing capaciousness of the sexual orientation framework. I argue that, more than simply demonstrating a proliferation of sexual identities, polyamory ’s reconfiguration also highlights the powerful demands made of subjects of sexual orientation to be respectable by espousing particular forms of intimacy over others. These demands call for a longer historical 288 Julienne Obadia view of marriage, monogamy, and whiteness as constitutive of US social, political, and legal recognition. Consider my encounter with Steve: At the 2013 annual “Poly Living” convention in Philadelphia, organized by the polyamory advocacy group, Loving More, I gathered with the other attendees in a large circle in the main hall. After a brief welcome by the organizers, we introduced ourselves one by one and then dispersed for drinks and informal mingling. I took a seat alone and, after a moment, a man in his sixties with a graying ponytail and wearing a Hawaiian shirt approached me. “You’re an anthropologist?” he asked. “Can I talk to you for a minute?” I smiled and gestured at the seat across from me, and he introduced himself, putting his beer on the table beside mine and sitting down. Fidgeting nervously, he explained that he and his wife had been married for over twenty years, but the last several years had been sexless, with her desire waning while his had not. After learning about polyamory, he cautiously suggested it and she reluctantly agreed to let him do some sexual exploring outside the marriage, but with tight restrictions: He could go to events like these and could have limited sexual interaction with others, but he could not have penetrative sex, nor could he pursue any emotional or more-than-casual intimacy with anyone. He found these constraints difficult, understandably so at such events, where people were in fact encouraged to seek out emotional intimacy and enjoy a wide range of consensual connections. Such limitations ran counter to polyamory’s ethos, which, as indicated by the organization’s name, sought more love, although particular arrangements varied significantly. As he elaborated on these details, I realized that Steve was not simply sharing as people often did, unprompted, at these events, which seek to foster open communication, curiosity, and self-exploration. He was torn about how to identify his sexual desire and make sense of his difficulty finding fulfillment within his wife’s conditions. He paused, looking at me searchingly with a mix of distress and hope, and asked if his desire to see other people was natural. “Is it possible,” he asked, “that being poly is a sexual orientation I was born with, like being gay?” He hoped that, precisely in my capacity as an anthropologist, I might have some definitive expert knowledge about human sexuality—an incontrovertible yes or no about the provenance of his desire and the legitimacy of his dissatisfaction. Julienne Obadia 289 As Steve’s conundrum makes clear, the intelligibility of polyamory as an immutable sexual orientation is very recent. Its inclusion marks a dramatic shift from Eve Sedgwick’s observation nearly three decades ago... (shrink)

Critical evaluations of the current movement of corporate social responsibility commodification have neglected an important question: How do CSR professionals manage the tensions resulting from the search for both profit and social responsibility? This article addresses this question by analyzing the discourse of CSR consultants with the aim of understanding how they deal with such tensions through identity work. Our findings suggest that people who claim, or who are ascribed, paradoxical professional identities may engage in ‘paradoxical identity mitigation’ (...) – a process whereby the concomitant and paradoxical use of linguistic strategies is aimed at simultaneously embracing and distancing oneself from contradictory identity demands. In uncovering how CSR professionals discursively manage the tensions engendered by CSR commodification, our results also advance current knowledge of CSR by shedding light on the underlying processes whereby new ‘hybrid’ identities are constituted and mobilized by actors to make sense of their professional activities. (shrink)

We thank the commentators for their thoughtful responses to our article.1 Due to space constraints, we will confine our discussion to just three key issues. The first issue relates to the central ethical conundrum for clinicians working with young people like Phoenix: namely, how to respect, value and defer to a person’s own account of their identity and what is needed for their well-being, while staying open to the possibility that such an account may reflect a work in progress. (...) This conundrum thus relates both to what will be beneficial for that person and what constitutes respecting their autonomy, and clinicians must dwell on these questions when deciding what forms of medical intervention to offer. D’Angelo,2 Lemma3 and Wren4 highlight the importance of considering Phoenix (or, indeed, any person pursuing gender-affirming interventions) as a ‘whole person in context’ (p5)2 prior to initiating treatment or care. In this way, they advocate for a process of ‘therapeutic exploration’ (p1),4 which includes taking sufficient time to explore Phoenix’s personhood with them so as to support them in achieving an ‘authentic self-discovery’ (p5).2 We agree with these authors that identity (including gender identity) development is a complex, life-long process that is influenced by biological, psychosocial and relational aspects, all of which may contribute to an individual’s desire to pursue gender-affirming interventions. To explore the various factors—both conscious and unconscious—that might be motivating Phoenix’s decision to pursue ongoing puberty suppression (OPS), D’Angelo,2 Lemma3 and Wren4 describe a comprehensive psychological approach to working with transgender (trans) and gender diverse (TGD) individuals and propose questions to guide such discussions. Consistent with this approach, we stipulated that Phoenix had undergone regular psychological counselling and that the psychologist had judged that ‘Phoenix’s distress is significant and enduring…not a symptom …. (shrink)

Facing increased competition, universities are driven to project a positive image to their internal and external stakeholders. Therefore some of these institutions have begun to develop and implement corporate identity programs as part of their corporate strategies. This study describes a Turkish higher education institution’s social responsibility initiatives. Along with this example, the study also analyzes a specific case using concepts from the Corporate Identity and Corporate Social Responsibility literature. The motives leading the university to manage its corporate (...) identity, the social responsibility initiatives in the local and national communities, and the possible benefits of these initiatives for the parties involved are all identified. The major finding is that philanthropy is one of the main elements of Istanbul Bilgi University’s corporate identity program and that the university has altruistic motives for its social responsibility initiatives. (shrink)

How can corporate social responsibility initiatives influence brand love? Based on the theory of social identity complexity, we examined whether greater complexity of a sport fan’s multiple identifications with sport leagues led to higher multicultural tolerance and more positive perceptions of leagues’ corporate social responsibility activities. Further, brand authenticity was tested as a variable intervening between perceived corporate social responsibility and brand love. We analyzed this serial mediation effect impacting sport fans’ brand love for their multiple, favored and less (...) favored, sport leagues. Participants answered the scale item questionnaire for model assessment. The hypothesized model was supported as the indirect effect through all mediators was significant. Our results suggest that when sport fans acknowledge a high overlap among league fan groups, their tolerance is more likely to be higher than those who have a low overlap. Such high levels of tolerance influence how fans perceive corporate social responsibility initiatives, and these effects build up for fans to perceive the brand to be more authentic. These antecedents affected brand love through a serial mediation. Sport league managers should consider the diverse aspects across leagues for harmonious coexistence with other leagues and maintain brand authenticity for their social initiatives to result in a greater brand love in the consumer’s mind. (shrink)

We are very grateful to Richard Ashcroft 1 and Andrew McGee 2 for their thoughtful and articulate criticisms of our views. 3 Ashcroft has disappointingly low aspirations for the law. Of course he is right to say that the law is not a ‘self-sufficient, integrated and self-interpreting system of doctrine’. The law is often philosophically incoherent and internally contradictory. But it does not follow from this that all areas of the law are philosophically unsatisfactory. And if that were true, the (...) response should not be Ashcroft’s contemptuous despair, but a determination to make it better. Ashcroft would say that such idealism is unrealistic in the light of the very nature of ‘the Law’: ‘...a complex assemblage of institutions, rules, accredited persons, practices and systems’. That isa radically ‘legal realist’ position and is plainly unsustainable. We can demonstrate its unsustainability while demonstrating both that he is wrong... (shrink)

In chapter 3 of Wild Animal Ethics Johannsen argues for a collective obligation based on beneficence to intervene in nature in order to reduce the suffering of wild animals. In the same chapter he claims that the non-identity problem is merely a “theoretical puzzle” which doesn’t affect our reasons for intervention. In this paper I argue that the non-identity problem affects both the strength and the nature of our reasons to intervene. By intervening in nature on a large (...) scale we change which animals come into existence. In doing so, we enable harmful animals to inflict harms on other animals, and we put other animals in harm’s way. The harms that these animals will inflict and endure are foreseeable. Furthermore, since non-human animals aren’t moral agents, harmful animals cannot be morally responsible for their harmful actions. I argue therefore that by causing animals to exist, knowing that they will inflict and suffer harms, we become morally responsible for those harms. By engaging in identity-affecting actions then we take on secondary moral duties towards the animals we have thereby caused to exist, and these secondary moral duties may be extremely demanding, even more so than the initial costs of intervention. Finally, these duties are duties of justice rather than duties of beneficence, and as such are more stringent than purely beneficence-based moral reasons. Furthermore, this conclusion flows naturally from several plausible principles which Johannsen explicitly endorses. (shrink)

This study brings an organizational identity perspective to the debate regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) and multinational corporations (MNCs). The basic proposition is that organizational identities warrant closer attention since they influence CSR strategies. It is further argued that a more explicit distinction between principles and practices, or between 'being' and 'doing', is needed when debating whether multiple organizational identities are required for MNCs operating in locations characterized by different stakeholder demands. In terms of identity construction, two translation (...) processes are suggested to be pertinent; from hypernorms to organizational principles and the translation of organizational principles to practices. The first translation is relevant since 'hypernorms' alone do not create the distinctiveness needed for an organizational identity to develop and the second translation helps in explaining the ability to endorse local contracts. (shrink)

The underdetermination of theory by data obtains when, inescapably, evidence is insufficient to allow scientists to decide responsibly between rival theories. One response to would-be underdetermination is to deny that the rival theories are distinct theories at all, insisting instead that they are just different formulations of the same underlying theory; we call this the identical rivals response. An argument adapted from John Norton suggests that the response is presumptively always appropriate, while another from Larry Laudan and (...) Jarrett Leplin suggests that the response is never appropriate. Arguments from Einstein for the special and general theories of relativity may fruitfully be seen as instances of the identical rivals response; since Einstein’s arguments are generally accepted, the response is at least sometimes appropriate. But when is it appropriate? We attempt to steer a middle course between Norton’s view and that of Laudan and Leplin: the identical rivals response is appropriate when there is good reason for adopting a parsimonious ontology. Although in simple cases the identical rivals response need not involve any ontological difference between the theories, in actual scientific cases it typically requires treating apparent posits of the various theories as mere verbal ornaments or computational conveniences. Since these would-be posits are not now detectable, there is no perfectly reliable way to decide whether we should eliminate them or not. As such, there is no rule for deciding whether the identical rivals response is appropriate or not. Nevertheless, there are considerations that suggest for and against the response; we conclude by suggesting two of them. (shrink)

An important role of memory, both individual and collective, is to remind us of what we owe to the past. To understand this role, we need to conceive memory not merely in cognitive terms, but also as what Nietzsche called "memory of the will." It is this "conative" aspect of memory which explains the link between memory and identity. There still remain problems of how to explain how a collective memory "of the will" is transmitted over long periods of (...) time, and how to explain certain familiar pathologies. In the later parts of the paper, I look at Jan Assmann's important contributions to this question. (shrink)

This article examines the emerging possibility of “brain-state transitioning,” in which one brain state is prompted through manipulating the dynamics of the active brain. The technique, still in its infancy, is intended to provide the basis for novel treatments for brain-based disorders. Although a detailed literature exists covering topics around brain-machine interfaces, where targets of brain-based activity include artificial limbs, hardware, and software, there is less concentration on the brain itself as a target for instrumental intervention. This article examines some (...) of the science behind brain-state transitioning, before extending beyond current possibilities in order to explore philosophical and ethical questions about how transitions could be seen to impact on assessment of responsibility and personal identity. It concludes with some thoughts on how best to pursue this nascent approach while accounting for the philosophical and ethical issues. (shrink)

Intentionality is a curious notion and so is partial identity; the latter is employed by Christopher Tomaszewski (henceforth, CT) in his paper to afford solutions to a wide array of different philosophical problems. The author’s central thesis is that intentionality is a kind of partial identity; i.e. when the mind is intentionally directed towards an external object, it "takes in" a part of the object – its form, but not its matter. In my essay I first expound Franz (...) Brentano's views on intentionality - inspired by Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism. Contrary to what CT suggests, I conclude (in light of Brentano's later work) that intentionality should not be characterized as a genuine relation since one can be intentionally directed towards existing as well as non-existing objects and since, in the case of the latter, it remains unclear what it is that the mind “takes in”. Second, I clarify the notion of partial identity. In this context it is not obvious to me what exactly CT's appeal to partial identity contributes to the solution of the problem of material constitution. Third, I explicate CT's thesis that intentionality is partial identity (based on previously given definitions) and conclude that his argument in support of mind/body-dualism fails. Overall, skepticism remains as to whether partial identity adequately captures the tricky terrain of intentionality. (shrink)

The extent to which people identify with an organization is dependent on the attractiveness of the organizational identity, which helps individuals satisfy one or more important self-definitional needs. However, little is known about the antecedents of company identity attractiveness (IA) in a consumer–company context. Drawing on theories of social identity and organizational identification, a model of the antecedents of IA is developed and tested. The findings provide empirical validation of the relationship between IA and corporate associations perceived (...) by consumers. Our results demonstrate that the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) contribution to company IA is much stronger than that of Corporate Ability (CA). This may be linked to increasing competition and of decreasing CA-based variation in the marketplace. (shrink)

There has recently been a growth in research that examines how corporations respond to allegations of unethical actions. Although scholars have gained much insight about the range of responses available to and used by organizations, there has been almost no study of why firms choose one response over another. In this article, the authors present a framework of likely organizational response choices to allegations of wrongdoing; we propose that response choices are based on the degree of reputational (...) risk from stakeholder withdrawal of support and on perceived threats to the firm’s primary or secondary identity. (shrink)

In this paper we open up the topic of ethical corporate identity: what we believe to be a new, as well as highly salient, field of inquiry for scholarship in ethics and corporate social responsibility. Taking as our starting point Balmer’s (in Balmer and Greyser, 2002) AC2ID test model of corporate identity – a pragmatic tool of identity management – we explore the specificities of an ethical form of corporate identity. We draw key insights from conceptualizations (...) of corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory. We argue ethical identity potentially takes us beyond the personification of the corporation. Instead, ethical identity is seen to be formed relationally, between parties, within a community of business and social exchange. Extending the AC2ID test model, we suggest the management of ethical identity requires a more socially, dialogically embedded kind of corporate practice and greater levels of critical reflexivity. (shrink)

Spillover occurs when one environmentally sustainable behaviour leads to another, often initiated by a behaviour change intervention. A number of studies have investigated positive and negative spillover effects, but empirical evidence is mixed, showing evidence for both positive and negative spillover effects, and lack of spillover altogether. Environmental identity has been identified as an influential factor for spillover effects. Building on identity process theory the current framework proposes that positive, negative, and a lack of spillover are determined by (...) perceived threat of initial behaviour and identity process mechanisms evaluating the behaviour. It is proposed, that an environmental behaviour change intervention may threaten one’s existing identities, leading to either (a) integration, (b) compartmentalisation, or (c) conflict between one’s environmental identity and non-environmental identities. Initial evidence for the proposed framework is based on a field intervention which included a meat reduction programme in a canteen of a medium size private sector company. Semi-structured interviews and an explorative visualisation method that aimed at assessing identity change were implemented with thirteen employees (i.e. intervention participants) before and after the intervention. The qualitative data was analysed by using thematic analysis via NVivo12. Results of the visualisation task and interview method provided initial evidence of direct and indirect positive contextual spillover effects, with comparatively less evidence a lack of spillover and a relative absence of reported negative spillover. This paper provides a novel theoretical approach, centred on identity process theory to enhance understanding of positive spillover, negative spillover, and the lack of spillover. (shrink)

I would like to thank all who have taken the time to read and comment on my target article in which I compare state neutrality and perfectionism as approaches to justify public health policy and ar...

This paper explores Gandhi’s attitude towards diversity of religions and examines as to how he attempted to bring inter-faith harmony. Religious diversity has been a topic of serious debate in the contemporary philosophical discourse on understanding religion. Religious pluralism is one of the approaches that deal with issues concerning the diversity of religions. It is believed that no single religion can make absolute claims about the nature of divine reality, its relation to man and the world. It stands in direct (...) opposition to exclusivism, inclusivism and also to fundamentalism by denying that any one religion is the sole possession of the whole truth. Different religions seem to put forward different and incompatible interpretations about the nature of ultimate reality, about the modes of divine activity, the nature and destiny of the human race. (shrink)

The multi-disciplinary interest in social responsibility on the part of individuals and organizations over the past 30 years has generated several descriptors of corporate social responsibility and employee social responsibility. These descriptors focus largely on socially responsible behavior and, in some cases, on socially responsible identity. Very few authors have combined the two concepts in researching social responsibility. This situation can lead to an oversimplification of the concept of CSR, thereby impeding the examination of congruence between employees and organizations (...) with regard to social responsibility. In this article, we connect two dimensions of social responsibility—identity and behavior—to build a Social Responsibility Matrix consisting of four patterns for classifying the social responsibility of employees and employers: Low Social Responsibility, Identity-based Social Responsibility, Behavior-based Social Responsibility, and Entwined Social Responsibility. The positioning of employers and employees on the same matrix is vital for assessing the level of congruence between employers and employees with regard to social responsibility and for discussing the possible outcomes for both parties. These identity and behavior-based patterns, determinants, and levels of congruence connecting employees and employers form the foundation for the multi-dimensional, dynamic ESR–CSR Congruence Model, as exemplified in a case study. This contribution enhances the existing literature and models of CSR, in addition to improving the understanding of employee–employer congruence, thereby broadening the array of possibilities for achieving positive organizational outcomes based on CSR. (shrink)

In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. (...) My objections centre around the claim that Parfit employs an impoverished conception of 'life'. Parfit misconceives the connection between 'I' and one's body, and, so, despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', remains within the logic of Cartesianism. What Parfit and other reductionists call an 'impersonal' perspective, I shall call the third-person perspective: a perspective which one in general may take. Against Parfit I shall offer a more complex conception of 'self' through the concept of 'bodily perspective'. I emphasize the irreducible ambiguities of human embodiment in order to show the presuppositions and the limitations of Parfit's view. Of interest is the conception of time and the model of continuity that is appropriate to an embodied subject's life. I employ Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'human time' to argue that the reflective character of human experience demands a model of temporality and continuity that differs significantly from the one Parfit employs. (shrink)

Research and policy interest in questions of environmental waste is growing, especially plastic bag pollution. Where trash disposal and recycling are not highly regulated, the proliferation of plastic bags has created dramatic social and environmental consequences. In this article, we draw on 30 interviews with women who sell goods in markets in Mali as an entry point into investigating this issue through the interrelated dimensions of identity, gender, globalization, and the environment. We find the choices of women become suspect (...) and blamed for this environmental issue despite their having few socio-political options, while global and local political and economic elites have largely been responsible for implementing a series of policies and programs that have heightened the local effects of globalization while diminishing the services available to deal with the environmental and cultural dimensions of these changes. The issue of plastic bag pollution demonstrates the environmental consequences of development strategies that have emphasized economic growth with seemingly little concern or value for local cultures and environments, let alone the experiences and lives of poor women. (shrink)

I defend my paper ‘The Non-identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter’ against objections from Bryan Frances and Jeffrey King.