This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving (...) consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic. (shrink)

본 논문은『十門和諍論』〈佛性有無和諍門〉에 나타난 불성 유 · 무(佛性有無)에 대한 논쟁 및 이에 대한 원효(617∼686) 해석의 특성을 검토하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 기존 연구에서는 유성 · 무성론의 논법보다 원효의 화쟁 내용이나 일심과의 관련에 초점을 두었다. 하지만『十門和諍論』의 불성 논의에는 원효의 회통 부분이 남아 있지 않다. 따라서 유성론과 무성론의 논쟁에 대한 원효 해석을 통해 화쟁 방식을 추론할 수밖에 없다는 점에서, 원효가 불성 유 · 무(佛性有無) 논의를 정리하는 방식에 대한 검토가 필요하다고 보았다.BR 이러한 시각에서 본 논문에서는 불성 유 · 무에 대한 두 입장의 타당성과 이에 대한 (...) 원효 해석의 특성을 검토하고자 한다. 이를 통해 귀류법(prasaṅga) 등 전통적 논법을 사용하면서도 오류논법 등을 포섭하여 부정을 통한 긍정으로 이쟁(異諍)을 화(和)하는 방식을 분석할 것이다. 또한 법성(dharmatā)과 도리(yukti)의 차원에서 다양한 경증과 이증을 통해 해당 논의를 회통하는 방식을 검토할 것이다.BR 『十門和諍論』잔간에서는 유성론과 무성론의 양 입장을 서술한 후, 관련 오류를 지적하는 방식으로 논의가 진행되고 있다. 단, 무성론 비판에서 경증 자체가 아니라 경증에 대한 잘못된 해석이나 논리적 오류만을 드러내는 점을 고려해 보면, 유성론 비판에서도 이와 유사한 형태를 취했을 것으로 추정된다. 특히『釋華嚴敎分記圓通鈔』의 인용내용 등에 의거할 때, 산실부에서 이어졌을 화쟁은 대승적 견지에서 양론을 동등하게 포섭했을 것으로 생각된다. 다만 부정 이후, 긍정을 유도한다는 점에서『涅槃宗要』의 긍정적 종합과 달리, ‘선별적 부정 및 관점에 따른 긍정’ 방식이 활용되었을 것으로 보인다. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Illusions of KnowingMatthew T. Kapstein (bio)Knowing Illusion: Bringing a Tibetan Debate into Contemporary Discourse, Volume I: A Philosophical History of the Debate, and Volume II: Translations. By The Yakherds ( José Cabezón, Ryan Conlon, Thomas Doctor, Douglas Duckworth, Jed Forman, Jay Garfield, John Powers, Sonam Thakchöe, Tashi Tsering, and Geshé Yeshes Thabkhas). New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.Metaphysics is a subject much more curious than useful, the knowledge of (...) which, like that of a sunken reef, serves chiefly to enable us to keep clear of it.Charles S. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear"I. The Elusive Way to the MiddleKnowing Illusion: Bringing a Tibetan Debate into Contemporary Discourse is the fruit of collaborative efforts by the Yakherds, a group of scholars stemming from the earlier Cowherds, in which two of the present herdsmen—Sonam Thakchöe and Jay Garfield—were active as well.1 In moving from the broad issues of Buddhist philosophy that occupied the Cowherds to a tightly focused study of a particular debate in Tibet, the group has parted from the gentle cattle of the Indian plains to tend more rugged Himalayan stock. The present work, in two volumes, offers an exceptionally lucid guide to some of the main lines of Madhyamaka thought in Tibet and the disputes that these engendered. It constitutes an essential contribution to our knowledge of the philosophical traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, but, beyond this, merits the attention of those focusing on their Indian background and on Buddhist philosophies more generally. Indeed, Knowing Illusion is among the rare works in this area that may be profitably taken up by philosophers who are not specifically concerned with Buddhist or other Asian ways of thought, but who may wish to explore approaches beyond those of the Euro-American tradition to some of the central topics of philosophy overall: truth and falsehood, knowledge and ignorance, existence and illusion, belief and argument. Of the many interesting [End Page 1023] questions raised in Knowing Illusion, whether from the perspective of specialized Tibetan Buddhist Studies or of philosophy more broadly, only a sample can be addressed in the space of this review.The unifying thread in Knowing Illusion is a series of written disputes that were provoked by a fifteenth-century teacher belonging to the Sakyapa order of Tibetan Buddhism, Taktsang Sherab Rinchen (1405–1477), in his treatise titled Freedom from Extremes Accomplished through Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy (hereinafter Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy).2 Central to these debates was the challenge of squaring the Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna (second century c.e.), whose teaching of ultimate emptiness (śūnyatā) seemed to undermine most—perhaps all—claims to knowledge, with the positive theory of knowledge (pramāṇa) advanced by Dignāga (fifth century c.e.) and Dharmakīrti (sixth century c.e.). The problem had already preoccupied Indian Buddhist thinkers, including philosophers Bhāviveka (sixth century c.e.) and Śāntarakṣita (eighth century c.e.), who sought to harmonize the insights of Madhyamaka with those of the pramāṇa school, and Dharmakīrti's contemporary Candrakīrti, whose trenchant interpretations of Nāgārjuna appeared to undermine the entire project of a 'theory of knowledge'.3 In Tibet, thinkers of the former camp came to be known as proponents of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (so-called because they affirmed that emptiness could be established through positive proof, svatantra), while those allied with Candrakīrti were said to follow Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika (who allowed only indirect proof, reductio ad absurdum, or prasaṅga).4The debate reemerged forcefully in Tibet, and not merely as a historical exercise, in tandem with the expansion of monastic colleges there during the twelfth century, as Tibetan teachers increasingly elaborated original perspectives on the Indian classics. Many aspects of the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika split were co. (shrink)