We work with symmetric extensions based on Lévy collapse and extend a few results of Apter, Cody, and Koepke. We prove a conjecture of Dimitriou from her Ph.D. thesis. We also observe that if V is a model of $$\textsf {ZFC}$$ ZFC, then $$\textsf {DC}_{<\kappa }$$ DC < κ can be preserved in the symmetric extension of V in terms of symmetric system $$\langle {\mathbb {P}},{\mathcal {G}},{\mathcal {F}}\rangle$$ ⟨ P, G, F ⟩, if $${\mathbb {P}}$$ P is $$\kappa$$ (...) κ -distributive and $${\mathcal {F}}$$ F is $$\kappa$$ κ -complete. Further we observe that if $$\delta <\kappa$$ δ < κ and V is a model of $$\textsf {ZF}+\textsf {DC}_{\delta }$$ ZF + DC δ, then $$\textsf {DC}_{\delta }$$ DC δ can be preserved in the symmetric extension of V in terms of symmetric system $$\langle {\mathbb {P}},{\mathcal {G}},{\mathcal {F}}\rangle$$ ⟨ P, G, F ⟩, if $${\mathbb {P}}$$ P is ($$\delta +1$$ δ + 1 )-strategically closed and $${\mathcal {F}}$$ F is $$\kappa$$ κ -complete. (shrink)

We establish the choice property, a weak analogue of definable choice, for certain tame expansions of o‐minimal structures. Most noteworthily, this property holds for dense pairs of real closed fields, as well as for expansions of o‐minimal structures by a dense independent set.

We investigate, within the framework of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF, the interrelations between weak forms of the Axiom of Choice AC restricted to sets of reals.

Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are often used to elicit preferences, for instance, in health preference research. However, DCEs only provide binary responses, whilst real-life choices are made with varying degrees of conviction. We aimed to verify whether eliciting self-reported convictions on a 0–100 scale adds meaningful information to the binary choice. Eighty three respondents stated their preferences for health states using DCE and the time trade-off method (TTO). In TTO, utility ranges were also elicited to account for preference (...) imprecision. We verified the properties of the conviction across three areas: (1) response to various choice task modifications (e.g. dominance, increase in complexity, distance from the status quo) and association with rationality violations (e.g. intransitivity); (2) association with test–retest results; (3) relation to the utility difference and imprecision estimated in TTO. Regarding (1), conviction increased in choice tasks with lower complexity, larger relative attractiveness, and lower distance to the status quo. Regarding (2), choices made with above-median conviction were sustained in 90% of the cases, compared to 68% for below-median conviction. Regarding (3), the conviction increases with utility difference and it decreases with utility imprecision; overconfidence seems to prevail: non-zero conviction is reported even for identical utilities. Self-reported conviction in DCE is associated in an intuitive way with the observed choices. It may, therefore, be useful in explaining or predicting behaviour or bridging the gap between the results of various elicitation tasks. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that we have no good reason to accept any one theory of properties as correct. To show this, I present three possible bases for theory-choice in the properties debate: coherence, explanatory adequacy, and explanatory value. Then I argue that none of these bases resolve the underdetermination of our choice between theories of properties. First, I argue considerations about coherence cannot resolve the underdetermination, because no traditional theory of properties is obviously incoherent. Second, I argue considerations (...) of explanatory adequacy cannot resolve the underdetermination, because every traditional theory of properties lacks the theoretical resources to adequately explain resemblance, causal powers, and predication. However, these inadequacies are easily remedied with theoretical modifications. But this results in an overabundance of modified, but adequate, theories of properties. Third, I argue explanatory virtues cannot resolve the underdetermination, because we have no reason to think explanatory virtues make theories of properties more likely to be true. I reject the common argument that explanatory virtues are truth-conducive in theories of properties because they are truth-conducive in scientific theories. Since none of the three bases for theory choice can resolve the underdetermination, I conclude that we have no good reason to accept any one theory of properties as correct. Finally, I consider the possibility of choosing one theory over the others on pragmatic grounds. But I argue that pragmatic grounds cannot resolve the underdetermination either. Instead, I suggest we accept the view I call 'instrumental pluralism,' which allows practitioners to use whatever theory of properties they find useful. Adviser: Jennifer McKitrick. (shrink)

We work in set theory ZF without axiom of choice. Though the Hahn-Banach theorem cannot be proved in ZF, we prove that every Gateaux-differentiable uniformly convex Banach space E satisfies the following continuous Hahn-Banach property: if p is a continuous sublinear functional on E, if F is a subspace of E, and if f: F → ℝ is a linear functional such that f ≤ p|F then there exists a linear functional g : E → ℝ such that (...) g extends f and g ≤ p. We also prove that the continuous Hahn-Banach property on a topological vector space E is equivalent to the classical geometrical forms of the Hahn-Banach theorem on E. We then prove that the axiom of Dependent choices DC is equivalent to Ekeland's variational principle, and that it implies the continuous Hahn-Banach property on Gateaux-differentiable Banach spaces. Finally, we prove that, though separable normed spaces satisfy the continuous Hahn-Banach property, they do not satisfy the whole Hahn-Banach property in ZF+DC. (shrink)

In many voting systems, voters’ preferences on a set of candidates are represented by linear orderings. In this context, scoring rules are well-known procedures to aggregate the preferences of the voters. Under these rules, each candidate obtains a fixed number of points, sk\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$s_k$$\end{document}, each time he/she is ranked k\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$k$$\end{document}th by one voter and the candidates are ordered according to the total number of (...) points they receive. In order to identify the best scoring rule to use in each situation, we need to know which properties are met by each of these procedures. Although some properties have been analyzed extensively, there are other properties that have not been studied for all scoring rules. In this paper, we consider two desirable social choice properties, the Pareto-optimality and the immunity to the absolute loser paradox, and establish characterizations of the scoring rules that satisfy each of these specific axioms. Moreover, we also provide a proof of a result given by Saari and Barney, where the scoring rules meeting reversal symmetry are characterized. From the results of characterization, we establish some relationships among these properties. Finally, we give a characterization of the scoring rules satisfying the three properties. (shrink)

With the Axiom of Choice, for any infinite cardinal but, without, we cannot conclude any relationship between and for an arbitrary infinite cardinal. In this paper, we give some properties of in the absence of and compare them to those of for an infinite cardinal. Among our results, we show that “ for any infinite cardinal and any natural number n” is provable in although “ for any infinite cardinal ” is not.

In this article, we model FPTP systems as social preference rules and give two characterizations. We show that a social preference rule is an FPTP system if, and only if, it satisfies the axioms of subset consistency, district consistency, subset cancellation, and district cancellation. The second characterization consists of the axioms of subset consistency, subset anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, Pareto optimality, district consistency and district cancellation. The characterizations give us an opportunity to compare the characteristic properties of FPTP systems to the (...) characteristic properties that we found for list systems of proportional representation (list PR systems) in Hout et al. (Social Choice and Welfare, 27:459–475, 2006), where we modelled those systems also as social preference rules. We find that consistency and anonymity distinguish list PR systems from FPTP systems. On the other hand, it is district cancellation that distinguishes FPTP systems from list PR systems. (shrink)

Representing moral choice as a function of rational choice is carried out by formalizing moral evaluation into a functional mechanism called "Moral Choice Function" whose domain is information on a state of affairs and range is a moral judgment, and upon which formal and substantive requirements are imposed. The notions such as impartiality, universalizability, proportionality, and informational invariance are employed for the issue of how to solve conflict of values faced by an individual as well as collective (...) moral agent. By utilizing the structural affinity with post-Arrovian social choice theory, it is shown that inter-attribute commensurability is indispensable for any serious moral agent who wants to solve conflict of values through pluralistic maximizing. It is also shown that once the morally relevant attributes are identified, formal requirements are powerful enough to qualify the function to behave in a certain way such that the formulas for pluralistic maximizing vary with the modes of inter-attribute commensurability. It is also shown how it is still possible to manage conflict of values rationally without value commensurability by interpreting John Rawls's theory of justice as neo-Kantian in dealing with conflicting desiderata from Kantian deontology and utilitarian consequentialism. The metaethical tenets for the project are also argued for such that it is neutral about the ontological status of morality; but it is anti-Humean with its supervenience thesis, anti-Moorean with its reducibility thesis, and anti-naturalist with its syntheticity thesis. It is also argued that behind the project there lies a fundamental metaphysical conception of an entity as a bundle of properties conjoined with epistemic foundationalism, which is evidenced not only in moral evaluation but also in other kinds of cognitive activity. (shrink)

Property and Practical Reason makes a moral argument for common law property institutions and norms, and challenges the prevailing dichotomy between individual rights and state interests and its assumption that individual preferences and the good of communities must be in conflict. One can understand competing intuitions about private property rights by considering how private property enables owners and their collaborators to exercise practical reason consistent with the requirements of reason, and thereby to become practically reasonable agents (...) of deliberation and choice who promote various aspects of the common good. The plural and mediated domains of property ownership, though imperfect, have moral benefits for all members of the community. They enable communities and institutions of private ordering to pursue plural and incommensurable good ends while specifying the boundaries of property rights consistent with basic moral requirements. (shrink)

Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting (...) system democratic? How can a collective (e.g., electorate, legislature, collegial court, expert panel, or committee) arrive at coherent collective preferences or judgments on some issues, on the basis of its members' individual preferences or judgments? How can we rank different social alternatives in an order of social welfare? Social choice theorists study these questions not just by looking at examples, but by developing general models and proving theorems. (shrink)

Property rights are the rules governing ownership in society. This Element offers an analytical framework to understand the origins and consequences of property rights. It conceptualizes of the political economy of property rights as a concern with the follow questions: What explains the origins of economic and legal property rights? What are the consequences of different property rights institutions for wealth creation, conservation, and political order? Why do property institutions change? Why do legal reforms (...) relating to property rights such as land redistribution and legal titling improve livelihoods in some contexts but not others? In analyzing property rights, the authors emphasize the complementarity of insights from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, including Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics, including the Bloomington School of institutional analysis and political economy. (shrink)

In this paper, we apply relating semantics to the widely discussed problem of free choice between permitted actions or situations in normative systems. Leaving aside contexts in which the free choice principle is obviously unacceptable or uncontroversially valid, we concentrate on free choice for explicit permissions. In order to construct a formal representation of explicit permissions, we introduce a special constant, $\texttt {permit}$, which is analogous to the constant $\texttt {violation}$ used in the Andersonian–Kangerian approach to deontic (...) logic with respect to prohibition and obligation. Consequently, we define a permission operator on the basis of the $\texttt {permit}$ constant and a relation of legitimization. The general idea is that $P \varphi $ is true if and only if $\texttt {permit}$ is true, which means that a permission is actually issued and $\varphi $ is legitimized by $\texttt {permit}$. The intuitive notion of legitimization is formally represented by an operator of relating implication: a non-classical implication that is semantically defined by adding a constraint to the classical meaning of implication to the effect that arguments are related by a special relation. The properties of this relation are based on an informal, intuitive meaning of legitimization and determine the properties of the permission operator. We show that the resulting permission operator possesses the free choice property and avoids certain unwanted consequences that follow from alternative approaches. (shrink)

This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.

The problem of intertemporal choice arises when outcomes are received in different moments of time. This paper presents an axiomatic model of intertemporal choice when consumption in the previous moment of time contributes to utility evaluation of consumption in the current moment. This model generalizes classic discounted utility theory (also known as constant or exponential discounting) in two ways. First, in every moment of time, a decision maker derives utility not only from current consumption but also from “residual” (...) consumption in the previous moment of time. Second, these utilities are discounted with weights that are essentially a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function. The paper presents an application of the proposed model to the problem of optimal consumption and savings given a fixed income (wealth). When a decision maker derives satisfaction from both instantaneous consumption as well as a share of consumption in the previous moment of time, optimal consumption path is cyclic—periods of relatively high consumption are interchanged with periods of relatively low consumption. These cycles decay over time. Asymptotically, the consumption path exhibits conventional properties (constant, increasing or decreasing over time when a gross interest rate multiplied by discount factor is correspondingly equal to, greater than, or less than one). (shrink)

The rationalization of a choice function, in terms of assumptions that involve expansion or contraction properties of the feasible set, over non-finite sets is analyzed. Schwartz's results, stated in the finite case, are extended to this more general framework. Moreover, a characterization result when continuity conditions are imposed on the choice function, as well as on the binary relation that rationalizes it, is presented.

In this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic of choice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act, i.e., about their default choice behavior. To do this, we merge one of the most prominent logics of agency in the philosophical literature, namely stit logic, with the well-known logic of counterfactuals due to Stalnaker and Lewis. A key component of our semantics for counterfactuals is to distinguish between deviant (...) and non-deviant actions at a moment, where an action available to an agent at a moment is deviant when its performance does not agree with the agent’s default choice behavior at that moment. After developing and axiomatizing a stit logic with action types, instants, and deviant actions, we study the philosophical implications and logical properties of two candidate semantics for choice-driven counterfactuals, one called rewind models inspired by Lewis, 455–476 1979) and the other called independence models motivated by well-known counterexamples to Lewis’s proposal Slote, 3–27 1978). In the last part of the paper we consider how to evaluate choice-driven counterfactuals at moments arrived at by some agents performing a deviant action. (shrink)

Rawls defended the model of a property‐owning democracy; critically reflected on the US constitutional history of free speech; and argued that “both Hiroshima and the fire‐bombing of Japanese cities were great evils.” What ties these and many other disparate concerns together is the idea of the original position. “Justice as Fairness,” published in 1958, included several crucial developments. Rawls proposes his “two principles of justice,” which, through various revisions, he would defend for the rest of his career: a principle (...) of equal liberty and a principle encompassing fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. Rawls argues that parties would accept his two principles in two stages: first, by a comparison with average utilitarianism, which focuses on his first principle, and then by a comparison with so‐called “mixed conceptions,” which focuses on the second principle. Rawls continues to claim that the original position establishes a form of objectivity. (shrink)

The case of highland Yemen up to around the middle of the twentieth century involves a history different from most Muslim societies in that, from 1919, the Yemeni state was independent. The problem I address concerns the utility of thinking about the highland property regime in this era in relation to the categories of "private" and "public." What sort of antecedents existed, at the level of property relations, for later commercial transformations that would culminate in such things as (...) Pizza Hut franchises? In Yemen, the polity of the period was a type of Islamic state, one based on the shari`a in ideology and in application and headed by a classical form of jurist-leader, a figure known as an imam. Prior to the twentieth century, this Yemeni form of a shari`a-based Islamic polity had a thousand year history in the highlands. Shari`a courts had exclusive competence as state tribunals, and judges, trained on old-style law books, heard the full gamut of litigation. By contrast, colonial changes in other Muslim societies typically entailed a sharp alteration and restriction of the sphere of the shari`a, often limiting application to the domain of "family law" alone. At the same time, the highlands had yet to commence the other great and, elsewhere, ongoing modern transformation of the shari`a, codification and legislation, which would not begin in Yemen until after the Revolution of 1962.Highland society at mid-century was agrarian, based primarily on settled plow cultivation, and the associated property regime was almost exclusively "private." In Yemen, the "private" property regime centered conceptually on milk, a category of individual ownership of immoveable property, and on the concept of mal, a commercial commodity. As a form of private, landed property, milk involved rights that could be acquired, alienated and inherited, and the associated agricultural production was based on lease contracts between landlords and sharecroppers. Pious endowments were the basis for one of the great Muslim "public" institutions, which supported mosques, schools, water systems, etc. Another fundamental "public" institution was an extension of the "private" commercial notion of mal into the state institution of the 'House of Mal,' or Treasury. Other key "public" institutions were the imamate itself, a form of Islamic state, and the shari`a court. This shari`a system can be thought of in terms of three levels of legal texts. At the highest level, shari`a doctrine, the jurisprudence of the period, constituted an ideology of the property regime. The doctrine provided models for both the range of substantive undertakings and for court processes, but the relationship of these models to the property relations and to litigation on the ground is a key question. At the lowest level, the routine documents of ongoing, uncontested practice proliferated. These included ordinary sale documents, leases, marriage contracts, endowment instruments, wills and estate inheritance instruments. Between high doctrine and low instruments were the records of shari`a court judgments, records in which the conflicts and contradictions of the property system were expressed, argued and ruled upon. In certain problem areas of the law, the ruling imams's personal doctrinal "choices" were designed to guide court judges in their rulings. (shrink)

The Nash axiom is a basic property of consistency in choice. This paper proposes weaker versions of the axiom and examines their logical implications. In particular, we demonstrate that weak Nash axioms are useful to understand the relationship between the Nash axiom and the path independence axiom. We provide an application of weak Nash axioms to the no-envy approach. We present a possibility result and an impossibility result.

There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem’s notion of ‘good sense’. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus in (...) science, and show that it is superior to its rivals in two respects: it is more faithful to Duhemian good sense, and it cashes out the effect that virtues have on scientific progress. We then defend the social consensus account against objections that highlight the positive role of diversity and division of labour in science. (shrink)

In 1908 the German mathematician Ernst Zermelo gave an axiomatization of the concept of set. His axioms remain at the core of what became to be known as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. There were two axioms that received diverse criticisms at the time: the axiom of choice and the axiom of separation. This paper centers around one question this latter axiom raised. The main purpose is to show how this question might be solved with the aid of another, more recent (...) mathematical theory of sets which, like Zermelo’s, has numerous philosophical underpinnings. Keywords: properties of sets, foundations of mathematics, axiom of separation, subobject classifier, truth values. (shrink)

In this article, we model FPTP systems as social preference rules and give two characterizations. We show that a social preference rule is an FPTP system if, and only if, it satisfies the axioms of subset consistency, district consistency, subset cancellation, and district cancellation. The second characterization consists of the axioms of subset consistency, subset anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, Pareto optimality, district consistency and district cancellation. The characterizations give us an opportunity to compare the characteristic properties of FPTP systems to the (...) characteristic properties that we found for list systems of proportional representation (list PR systems) in Hout et al. (Social Choice and Welfare, 27:459–475, 2006), where we modelled those systems also as social preference rules. We find that consistency and anonymity distinguish list PR systems from FPTP systems. On the other hand, it is district cancellation that distinguishes FPTP systems from list PR systems. (shrink)

We study whether it is possible to generalise Seidenfeld et al.’s representation result for coherent choice functions in terms of sets of probability/utility pairs when we let go of Archimedeanity. We show that the convexity property is necessary but not sufficient for a choice function to be an infimum of a class of lexicographic ones. For the special case of two-dimensional option spaces, we determine the necessary and sufficient conditions by weakening the Archimedean axiom.

We study the mathematical properties of bilateral state-based modal logic (BSML), a modal logic employing state-based semantics (also known as team semantics), which has been used to account for free choice inferences and related linguistic phenomena. This logic extends classical modal logic with a nonemptiness atom which is true in a state if and only if the state is nonempty. We introduce two extensions of BSML and show that the extensions are expressively complete, and develop natural deduction axiomatizations for (...) the three logics. (shrink)

Numerous countries are heading toward digital infrastructures. In particular this new technology promises to help support methods for elections. However, one should be careful that such an infrastructure does not hinder the voting and representation issues. On the contrary, it should support those issues and help citizens have a clearer picture of the underlying mechanisms. This paper deals with the limits of voting procedures as they are described in classical collective choice theory and reflects on ways to aggregate electronic (...) votes stemming from various individuals that would be at the same time democratic, decisive and rational which is not feasible when candidate rankings alone are taken into account. This paper shows how electronic voting procedures could improve the situation by introducing preference-based votes. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that Hintikka's game theoreticalsemantics for Independence Friendly logic does not formalize theintuitions about independent choices; it rather is aformalization of imperfect information. Furthermore it is shownthat the logic has several remarkable properties (e.g.,renaming of bound variables is not allowed). An alternativesemantics is proposed which formalizes intuitions aboutindependence.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and (...) the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided. (shrink)

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, (...) the interval-order property, and acyclicity. (shrink)

Preferences and choices have central roles in moral philosophy, economics, and the decision sciences in general. In a formal language we can express and explore the properties of preferences, choices, and their interrelations in a precise way, and uncover connections that are inaccessible without formal tools. In this chapter, the plausibility of different such properties is discussed, and it is shown how close attention to the logical details can help dissolve some apparent paradoxes in informal and semi-formal treatments.

There are two ways to understand any proposed properties of language-of-thoughts (LoTs): As diagnostic or constitutive. We argue that this choice is critical. If candidate properties are diagnostic, their homeostatic clustering requires explanation via an underlying homeostatic mechanism. If constitutive, there is no clustering, only the properties themselves. Whether deep neural networks (DNNs) are alternatives to LoTs or potential implementations turn on this choice.

The realization relation is commonly explicated via, or identified with, the causal role playing relation. However, the realization relation does not formally match the causal role playing relation. While realization is a relation between a base realizer property and a single higher level realized property, I argue that the causal role playing relation as typically defined is a relation between a base property and two higher-level role properties. Advocates of using causal role playing to explicate realization must (...) therefore decide which of the two kinds of role property they identify with realized properties; I argue that neither choice is good, and the fact that one must make a choice is worse. A search for a new way of defining realization is in order. (shrink)

Intellectual property (IP) can internalize positive externalities associated with the creation and discovery of ideas, thereby increasing investment in efforts to create and discover ideas. However, IP law also causes negative externalities. Strict IP rights raise the transaction costs associated with consuming and building on existing ideas. This causes a tragedy of the anticommons, in which valuable resources are underused and underdeveloped. By disincentivizing creative projects that build on existing ideas, IP protection, even if it increases original innovation, can (...) inadvertently reduce the rate of iterative innovation. The net effect of IP law on innovation and welfare depends on the relative magnitude of these positive and negative externalities. We argue that the current regime probably suffers from excessive, and excessively rigid, IP protection. This motivates the search for institutional alternatives and complements. We suggest that a monocentric IP rights regime may not be the only, or the most efficient, way to internalize the positive externalities of innovation. The knowledge economy supports the emergence of diverse, polycentric forms of bottom-up self-governance, both market and community led, that entail the citizen coproduction of the norms and practices of intellectual creation and discovery. (shrink)

We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate (...) boundedly rational and sophisticatedly rational choice. Since properties can be recombined in new ways, it also offers resources for predicting choices in unobserved contexts. (shrink)

This paper explores some issues about the choice of variables for causal representation and explanation. Depending on which variables a researcher employs, many causal inference procedures and many treatments of causation will reach different conclusions about which causal relationships are present in some system of interest. The assumption of this paper is that some choices of variables are superior to other choices for the purpose of causal analysis. A number of possible criteria for variable choice are described and (...) defended within a broadly interventionist approach to causation. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the semantic typology of dependent indefinites, by accounting for the distribution and interpretation of the Romanian indefinite vreun. It is shown that its occurrences are restricted to negative polarity and a subset of modal contexts. More specifically, the study of its behavior in intensional environments reveals that vreun is systematically incompatible with non-epistemic operators, a restriction we capture by proposing a novel empirical generalization (‘the epistemic constraint’). To account for the observed pattern, we adopt the unitary (...) approach to polarity in Chierchia (Logic in Grammar: polarity, free choice and intervention, 2013a; in: Fălăuş (ed.) Alternatives in semantics, 2013b) and derive the properties of vreun from its obligatory association with alternatives. Its distributional restrictions are argued to follow from the interplay between the types of alternatives it activates (scalar and subdomain alternatives), the way these alternatives are factored into meaning (via an independently motivated mechanism of exhaustification) and the lexical semantics of the operators in the context of occurrence. We propose that the epistemic constraint arises from the lexicalization of an inference (anti-total variation) that non-epistemic operators can never satisfy. (shrink)

A new property of collective choice rules that we refer to as superset robustness is introduced, and we employ it in several characterization results. The axiom requires that if all individual preference orderings expand weakly (in the sense of set inclusion), then the corresponding social preference relation must also expand weakly. In other words, if a given profile is changed by adding instances of weak preference to some individual relations, then the social weak preference relation for the expanded (...) profile must contain the social weak preference relation for the original—that is, the social relation cannot contract in response to the addition of pairs to the individual relations. We begin by examining social welfare functions (that is, collective choice rules such that the resulting social preferences are orderings) and then move on to rules that generate transitive (but not necessarily complete) social rankings. The remaining results of the paper focus on Suzumura-consistent collective choice rules. In all of these cases, it turns out that the property of superset robustness is closely related to classes of agreement-based collective choice rules. These are rules such that the social relation is determined by collecting the pairs on whose relative rankings the members of the decisive sets agree. (shrink)

We propose a modification of the exhaustivity operator from Fox Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 71–120, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230210752_4) that on top of negating all the Innocently Excludable alternatives affirms all the ‘Innocently Includable’ ones. The main result of supplementing the notion of Innocent Exclusion with that of Innocent Inclusion is that it allows the exhaustivity operator to identify cells in the partition induced by the set of alternatives whenever possible. We argue for this property (...) of ‘cell identification’ based on the simplification of disjunctive antecedents and the effects on free choice that arise as the result of the introduction of universal quantifiers. We further argue for our proposal based on the interaction of only with free choice disjunction. (shrink)

. Fresh evidence from Free Choice Items (FCIs) in French question the current perception of the class. The role of some standard distinctions found in the literature is weakened or put in a new perspective. The distinction between universal and existential is no longer an intrinsic property of FCIs. Similarly, the opposition between variation-based vs intension-based analyses is relativized. We show that the regime of free choiceness can be characterized by an abstract constraint, that we call Non-Individuation (NI), (...) and which can be satisfied in different ways that match current distinctions. NI says that the information conveyed by a sentence containing a FCI should not be reducible to a referential situation, that is a situation in which particular individuals satisfy the sentence in the current world. The widely used resource of modal variation becomes a particular scenario of free-choiceness, not its essence. In fact, we show that under certain conditions, FCIs can occur in episodic, non-modal sentences, a fact that NI can accommodate. We also discuss more fine-grained aspects of the semantics of FCIs, such as their emotional colour. (. . .) the tripod fell spontaneously, because, though it stood on its feet so as to serve for a seat, it did not fall so as to serve for a seat. Aristotle, Physics II,6. (shrink)

A detailed theoretical analysis is presented of what five utility representations – subjective expected utility (SEU), rank-dependent (cumulative or Choquet) utility (RDU), gains decomposition utility (GDU), rank weighted utility (RWU), and a configural-weight model (TAX) that we show to be equivalent to RWU – say about a series of independence properties, many of which were suggested by M. H. Birnbaum and his coauthors. The goal is to clarify what implications to draw about the descriptive aspects of the representations from data (...) concerning these properties. The upshot is a sharp rejection of SEU and RDU and no clear choice between GDU and TAX, but a list of 8 properties is given that should receive more attention to discriminate between the latter two models. (shrink)