We are all acquainted with persons who seem to have a talent for making things over-complex, persons who invent exceedingly devious explanations for what can be simply explained. Such individuals strike us as hardened violators of Occam's Razor: Entities are not to be multiplied unnecessarily. We shall say briefly that such persons goropise.

There are three points which Professor Schlesinger makes in his criticism of my discussion of the principle of simplicity. He holds that the principles of simplicity and verifiability may in actual use contradict each other. The simpler hypothesis will be rejected, he maintains, if it leads to unverified consequences.He holds that it is legitimate to add auxiliary hypotheses to one's theory, if it is desired to allow, let us say, for the creation of the universe by a (...) deity, or to exclude the possibility for all time of such events as a pail of water freezing on fire.He maintains with Bridgman that the cosmogonists' use of the simple notion that the same laws of nature hold throughout space-time leads to “perfectly hair-raising extrapolations” which a verificationist will reject. (shrink)

A widespread assumption in experimental comparative cognition is that, barring compelling evidence to the contrary, the default hypothesis should postulate the simplest cognitive ontology consistent with the animal’s behavior. I call this assumption the principle of cognitive simplicity . In this essay, I show that PoCS is pervasive but unjustified: a blanket preference for the simplest cognitive ontology is not justified by any of the available arguments. Moreover, without a clear sense of how cognitive ontologies are to be (...) carved up at the joints—and which tools are appropriate for the job—PoCS rests on shaky conceptual ground. (shrink)

Various formulations of the principle of simplicity in science are examined and rejected in favor of Goodman's proposal, the essence of which is to concentrate attention upon the predicates that form the extralogical basis of any given theory and to provide measures for comparing the relative structural simplicity of different sets of such predicates. The postulational basis of Goodman's method is set out and explained, together with some important amendments and additions, and a number of theorems are (...) proved, with whose aid the simplest theory to account for a certain corpus of scientific phenomena is readily determinable. (shrink)

The following paper is a continuation of an attempt to explore the possibility of intensifying sociological analysis through the development of heuristic devices. The value of heuristic devices lies, so it seems to me, in their essential simplicity and the consequent broadness of their applicability. A heuristic device differs from a law in that it is not an if, then type of proposition. It is a guide to analysis rather than a statement of the necessary issue of the analysis. (...) It suggests how the analysis may be carried forward rather than states how it must come out. The principle of limits as presented below is an attempt to show how this relatively simple heuristic device may be used in a variety of areas of social analysis. (shrink)

According to Principles of Sufficient Reason, every truth (in some relevant group) has an explanation. One of the most popular defenses of Principles of Sufficient Reason has been the presupposition of reason defense, which takes endorsement of the defended PSR to play a crucial role in our theory selection. According to recent presentations of this defense, our method of theory selection often depends on the assumption that, if a given proposition is true, then it has an explanation, and this will (...) only be justified if we think this holds for all propositions in the relevant group. I argue that this argument fails even when restricted to contingent propositions, and even if we grant that there is no non-arbitrary way to divide true propositions that have explanations from those that lack them. Further, we can give an alternate explanation of what justifies our selecting theories on the basis of explanatory features: the crucial role is not played by an endorsement of a PSR, but rather by our belief that, prima facie, we should prefer theories that exemplify explanatory power to greater degrees than their rivals. This guides our theory selection in a manner similar to ontological parsimony and theoretical simplicity. Unlike a PSR, our belief about explanatory power gives us a prima facie guiding principle, which provides justification in the cases where we think we have it, and not in the cases where we think we don't. (shrink)

The principle of economy favours the theory which gives the most accurate predictions; of two equally accurate theories, economy favours the one which incorporates least metaphysics. The intention is to show that were metaphysical commitments of theories openly acknowledged and simplicity and other virtues generally accepted as judges in theory choice, the progress rate of science would likely become more optimal.

xi should hope for "first and foremost" from any historical investigation, including his own, was that "it may not be too tedious. " II That hope is generally realized in Mach's historical writings, most of which are as lively and interesting now as they were when they appeared. Mach did not follow any existing model of historical or philosophical or scientific exposition, but went at things his own way combining the various approaches as needed to reach the goals he set (...) for himself. When he is at his best we get a sense of the Mach whom William James met on a visit to Prague, the Mach whose four hours of "unforgettable conversation" gave the forty year old, well traveled James the strongest "impression of pure intellectual genius" he had yet received, and whose "absolute simplicity of manner and winningness of smile" captivated him completely. 12 Consider, for example, the first few chapters of this book, Principles of the Theory of Heat, which Mach devotes to the notion of temperature, that most fundamental of all thermal concepts. He begins by trying to trace the path that leads from our sensations of hot and cold to a numerical temperature scale. (shrink)

Health care is ubiquitous in the industrialized world. Yet, every medical development, technique, and procedure impacts the environment. Green bioethics synthesizes environmental ethics and biomedical ethics, thus creating an interdisciplinary approach to sustainable health care. Notably, green bioethics addresses not the structure of environmental sustainability in health-care institutions but the sustainability of individual health-care offerings. It parallels traditional biomedical ethics by providing four principles for ethical guidance: distributive justice, resource conservation, simplicity, and ethical economics. Through these four principles, green (...) bioethics presents a coherent framework for evaluating the sustainability of medical developments, techniques, and procedures. The future of our world may very well depend on how effectively we halt ecological destruction and conserve our resources in all areas of life. The principles of green bioethics, outlined in this book, will advance sustainability in health care. (shrink)

The correspondence in 1680 and 1681 between John Flamsteed and Isaac Newton on Flamsteed’s theory of the comet of 1680 tells half the story. Related manuscripts reveal Newton was pursuing his own comprehensive line of inquiry based on principles that were the antithesis of Flamsteed’s procedures. Following generally accepted views in England, Newton’s work was marked by critical evaluation of data but marred by uncritical use of simple calculating techniques based on what might be termed Platonic archetypes of straightness. Flamsteed’s (...) intervention provided useful data and allowed Newton to seek additional information. Although Newton supposedly briefly considered a solution that vaguely resembled his parabolic approximation of the path of the comet determined 5 years later, the evidence Newton provided (based on simple hypotheses) did not support such a highly curved path or one in which the sun apart from the solar vortex exerted influence. Newton’s work, including an alleged harmonic law of tails, was quietly abandoned in favor of other work. With new insight, Newton revived work on comets as fully gravitational objects immediately following Halley’s visit in 1684. This little known side of the episode provides a fresh opportunity to examine Newton’s sources and actual practice in developing a new line of inquiry. An appendix dating sections of Newton’s Waste Book entries on comets is included. (shrink)

We address the problem of predicting how people will spontaneously divide into groups a set of novel items. This is a process akin to perceptual organization. We therefore employ the simplicity principle from perceptual organization to propose a simplicity model of unconstrained spontaneous grouping. The simplicity model predicts that people would prefer the categories for a set of novel items that provide the simplest encoding of these items. Classification predictions are derived from the model without information (...) either about the number of categories sought or information about the distributional properties of the objects to be classified. These features of the simplicity model distinguish it from other models in unsupervised categorization (where, for example, the number of categories sought is determined via a free parameter), and we discuss how these computational differences are related to differences in modeling objectives. The predictions of the simplicity model are validated in four experiments. We also discuss the significance of simplicity in cognitive modeling more generally. (shrink)

The idea of elegance in science is not necessarily a familiar one, but it is an important one. The use of the term is perhaps most clear-cut in mathematics - the elegant proof - and this is where Ian Glynn begins his exploration. Scientists often share a sense of admiration and excitement on hearing of an elegant solution to a problem, an elegant theory, or an elegant experiment. The idea of elegance may seem strange in a field of endeavour that (...) prides itself in its objectivity, but only if science is regarded as a dull, dry activity of counting and measuring. It is, of course, far more than that, and elegance is a fundamental aspect of the beauty and imagination involved in scientific activity. Ian Glynn, a distinguished scientist, selects historical examples from a range of sciences to draw out the principles of science, including Kepler's Laws, the experiments that demonstrated the nature of heat, and the action of nerves, and of course the several extraordinary episodes that led to Watson and Crick's discovery of the structure of DNA. With a highly readable selection of inspiring episodes highlighting the role of beauty and simplicity in the sciences, the book also relates to important philosophical issues of inference, and Glynn ends by warning us not to rely on beauty and simplicity alone - even the most elegant explanation can be wrong. (shrink)

This paper suggests a new principle for confirmation theory which is called the principle of explanatory surplus. This principle is shown to be non-Bayesian in character, and to lead to a treatment of simplicity in science. Two cases of the principle of explanatory surplus are considered. The first (number of parameters) is illustrated by curve-fitting examples, while the second (number of theoretical assumptions) is illustrated by the examples of Newton's Laws and Adler's Theory of the (...) Inferiority Complex. (shrink)

In this article we analyse the role of the principle of relativity and the generalisation of Lorentz transformations in Einstein's relativistic physics, whose philosophical ideal was the construction of an image of nature endowed with maximum unity and logical simplicity. In his critical-rationalist realism, Einstein aimed to develop a "conception of the world" that expressed the logical unity of nature. Throughout his scientific career, this philosophical programme led him to produce "great syntheses", seeking compatibility between different physical systems.

The main point of this paper is to underscore the link between simplicity and truth in an unsupervised machine learning context. More precisely, we argue that parametric and dimensional simplicity are not indicators of truth but the methodological principle that urges us to pay attention to such notions of simplicity is truth conducive. The truth that we are looking for are specific geometrical shapes and we know which algorithm can find which shapes provided that we pay (...) attention to parametric and dimensional simplicity. (shrink)

This paper offers a discussion of the rationale for the creation of sports categorization criteria based on sporting genealogy and the gendered body, as proposed by Torres et al. in their article ‘Beyond Physiology: Embodied Experience, Embodied Advantage, and the Inclusion of Transgender Athletes in Competitive Sport’. The strength of their ‘phenomenological’ account lies in its complex account of human experience; but this is also what makes it impractical and difficult to operationalize. Categorization rather requires simplicity and practicability, if (...) it is to be applied to all athletes (and not exceptionally to transgender athletes). This discussion helps us to formulate three general principles for the process of categorization of athletes, relating to fairness, verifiability and practicability. (shrink)

The author presents a version of the ontological scheme of Newton’s mechanistic worldview based on both the study of previous versions of its understanding and the text of the “Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy”. Newton developed a model of new universality or a homogeneous and isotropic world in which uniform laws operate. This model is based on several ontological postulates Newton introduced, which can be isolated from several provisions of his classic work. The new mechanistic worldview is based on the (...) imputation of the world of universal simplicity. The quantitative “unit” of a simple, homogeneous, physical-geometric universe is an ambivalent corpuscle-point. The main constants of the “mechanistic universe” are the diversity of the numbers of masses, motions, and forces connected by clear reciprocal relationships. Newton also introduced theoretical space and time as a privileged, absolute reference system. Finally, in the Newtonian version of the mechanistic worldview, there are compelled metaphysical ingredients or inexplicable and transcendental qualities. They are gravity, ether, and God. Thus, the ontological scheme of Newton’s mechanistic worldview is a construction based on the sequential mental experiment of presenting the universe exclusively from the side of its “objectivity” and “sensory certification”. (shrink)

According to Richard Swinburne, the principle of simplicity is of great importance to theory choice scenarios and theoretical changes in the sciences. In particular, he holds that the theory choice criterion of fit with background evidence can be reduced to the criteria of simplicity and of yielding the data. We will, however, rebut this reduction thesis and show that three central aspects of theoretical change (confirming power of empirical data, reliability of experimental methods, and truth of new (...) theoretical proposals) cannot be adequately reconstructed if simplicity is regarded as a key criterion of theory choice. (shrink)

The recently much discussed phenomenon of testimony as a social source of knowledge plays a crucial justificatory role in Richard Swinburne's philosophy of religion. Although Swinburne officially reduces his principle of testimony to the criterion of simplicity and, therefore, to a derivative epistemic source, we will show that simplicity does not play the crucial role in this epistemological context. We will argue that both Swinburne's philosophical ideas and his formulations allow for a fundamental epistemic principle of (...) testimony, by showing that Swinburne has already implicitly justified the use of testimony as an epistemic source via his fundamental a priori principle of credulity. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to Bolzano’s theory of grounding (Abfolge) in his Wissenschaftslehre. Bolzanian grounding is an explanatory consequence relation that is frequently considered an ancestor of the notion of metaphysical grounding. The paper focuses on two principles that concern grounding in the realm of conceptual sciences and relate to traditionally widespread ideas on explanations: the principles, namely, that grounding orders conceptual truths from simple to more complex ones (Simplicity), and that it comes along with a certain theoretical economy (...) among them (Economy). Being spelled out on the basis of Bolzano’s notion of deducibility (Ableitbarkeit), these principles are revealing for the question to what extent grounding can be considered a formal relation. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Descartes thoughts on the seat of the soul or that part of the body which the soul is directly and intimately united. Descartes explains the simplicity principle: If the soul is simple, or indivisible, it can interact directly with only one object at once, thus indivisible. For example, if an animal's heart is taken and cut into pieces, the soul's indivisibility means that the soul cannot act directly upon the dissected parts of the heart. Descartes (...) also consistently identified the pineal gland as the seat of the soul— partly because it was mobile, durable, protected from outside influence, and accessible to the nerves. It also explains that the mind is not affected by all parts of the body, but only the brain and one small part of the brain only where a certain part of the brain is affected while other parts are doing other things. This chapter finally reveals that the simplicity principle of Descartes will have strong difficulties in the final analysis in relation to the truth of God. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the ontological Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR-O). I analyse various versions of this principle and various ways of justifying it. Then I attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR-O. There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-Ostand can only be valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there (...) are serious arguments against this possibility. The necessary condition of the PSR-Onon-stand is the existence of a necessary substance: that substance would be a direct reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be indirect reasons for all other contingent states of affairs and things. There are two advantages of the PSR-Onon-stand: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity. (shrink)

Intractability and optimality are two sides of one coin: Optimal models are often intractable, that is, they tend to be excessively complex, or NP-hard. We explain the meaning of NP-hardness in detail and discuss how modem computer science circumvents intractability by introducing heuristics and shortcuts to optimality, often replacing optimality by means of sufficient sub-optimality. Since the principles of decision theory dictate balancing the cost of computation against gain in accuracy, statistical inference is currently being reshaped by a vigorous new (...) trend: the science of simplicity. Simple models, as we show for specific cases, are not just tractable, they also tend to be robust. Robustness is the ability of a model to extract relevant information from data, disregarding noise.Recently, Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group (1999) have put forward a collection of fast and frugal heuristics as simple, boundedly rational inference strategies used by the unaided mind in real world inference problems. This collection of heuristics has suggestively been called the adaptive toolbox. In this paper we will focus on a comparison task in order to illustrate the simplicity and robustness of some of the heuristics in the adaptive toolbox in contrast to the intractability and the fragility of optimal solutions. We will concentrate on three important classes of models for comparison-based inference and, in each of these classes, search for that to be used as benchmarks to evaluate the performance of fast and frugal heuristics: lexicographic trees, linear modes and Bayesian networks. Lexicographic trees are interesting because they are particularly simple models that have been used by humans throughout the centuries. Linear models have been traditionally used by cognitive psychologists as models for human inference, while Bayesian networks have only recently been introduced in statistics and computer science. Yet it is the Bayesian networks that are the best possible benchmarks for evaluating the fast and frugal heuristics, as we will show in this paper. (shrink)

The Minimalist Program in generative linguistics is predicated on the idea that simplicity is a defining property of the human language faculty, on the one hand; on the other, a central aim of linguistic theorising. Worryingly, however, justifications for either claim are hard to come by in the literature. We sketch a proposal that would allow for both shortcomings to be addressed, and that furthermore honours the program’s declared commitment to naturalism. We begin by teasing apart and clarifying the (...) different conceptions of simplicity underlying generative inquiry, in both ontological and theoretical capacities. We then trace a path towards a more robust justification for each type of simplicity principle, drawing on recent work in cognitive science and in philosophy of science, respectively. The resulting proposal hinges on the idea that simplicity is an evolved, virtuous cognitive bias—one that is a condition of our scientific understanding and, ultimately, of successful scientific practice. Finally, we make a case for why minimalists should take this proposal seriously, on the one hand; and for why generative linguistics would make for an interesting case study for philosophy of science, on the other. (shrink)

Rabbi Simcha Wasserman was a rosh yeshivah; kiruv pioneer; advisor; foster father; storyteller; transmitter of tradition; founder of yeshivos; hatzalah activist. This book captures him speaking with patience, simplicity, and intellect, about burning topics such as Holocaust, Kabbalah, Providence, and child-rearing. Includes a biographical sketch.

This article explores the profound influence of Zen Buddhism on the formation of Japanese aesthetics, focusing on key concepts such as simplicity (kanso), naturalness (shibumi), and impermanence (mujo). Zen realism, characterized by the acceptance of reality without subjective embellishments, is examined as a foundational principle that shaped not only Japanese cultural identity but also a universal aesthetic language. The study highlights the philosophical tenets of Zen, including the principles of «non-duality» (fuju) and «direct intuition» (jikan), which guide the (...) perception of reality as it is and foster a unique artistic and cultural worldview.Relevance: In the context of globalization and cultural exchange, the Zen-inspired Japanese approach to aesthetics offers valuable insights into contemporary issues of sustainability, mindfulness, and design thinking. The enduring appeal of Japanese minimalism in modern art, architecture, and design underscores the universality and adaptability of Zen principles, making this topic highly pertinent for cross-cultural studies and global artistic dialogues.Objective: The purpose of this study is to investigate how Zen Buddhist values influenced the development of Japanese aesthetics and contributed to creating a universal artistic and philosophical framework.Tasks: To achieve this objective, the article:- Analyzes the philosophical underpinnings of Zen realism in shaping the perception of reality.- Explores the aesthetic principles of simplicity (kanso), naturalness (shibumi), and impermanence (mujo) in traditional and modern Japanese art.- Examines the impact of Zen-inspired aesthetics on contemporary global design and architecture.The study demonstrates that the pursuit of simplicity, rooted in Zen practice, transcends cultural boundaries and has become a universal language in the realms of art and design. Examples include Tadao Ando’s architecture, which embodies harmony between light, space, and void, and the minimalist design philosophy of brands like Muji, which resonates globally. The analysis also underlines the role of Zen aesthetics in fostering ecological awareness and a deeper connection to the present moment, aligning with contemporary global challenges.The article concludes by emphasizing the potential of Zen-inspired aesthetics to serve as a universal cultural category, capable of bridging diverse traditions and promoting cross-cultural dialogue. Future research directions include examining Zen principles as a framework for addressing ecological, social, and philosophical issues in an increasingly interconnected world. (shrink)

In previous publications, I have historically traced the prevalence and the influence of an argument—an argument which Kant calls the Achilles, the most powerful, of all rationalist demonstrations in the history of ideas. This proof, which ultimately derives from Plato has been repeatedly used and has had a major influence in shaping philosophic discussions since the Hellenic Age. The form of the argument is fairly straightforward: the essential nature of the soul consists in its power of thinking; thought, being immaterial, (...) is unextended, i.e., simple, having no parts; and what is simple is indestructible; a unity; and an identity. I have attempted to map the incidence and force of this demonstration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant —a time when it becomes crucial in questions concerning the immortality of the soul; the “transcendental” condition necessary for the unity of consciousness ; the necessary and sufficient criteria for the establishment of personal or moral identity; and its use as a sometimes hidden or unconscious premise, but often explicit “principle,” of certain metaphysical and epistemological idealist doctrines. Thus, if thought and soul are essentially unextended, it at once becomes problematic how an immaterial soul can know a material, extended, “external” world. (shrink)

Physical laws are strikingly simple, yet there is no a priori reason for them to be so. I propose that nomic realists—Humeans and non-Humeans—should recognize simplicity as a fundamental epistemic guide for discovering and evaluating candidate physical laws. This proposal helps resolve several longstanding problems of nomic realism and simplicity. A key consequence is that the presumed epistemic advantage of Humeanism over non-Humeanism dissolves, undermining a prominent epistemological argument for Humeanism. Moreover, simplicity is shown to be more (...) connected to lawhood than to mere truth. (shrink)

Treating the principle of charity as a non-empirical, foundational principle leads to insoluble problems of justification. I suggest instead treating semantic properties realistically, and semantic terms as theoretical terms. This allows us to apply ordinary scientific reasoning in meta-semantics. In particular, we can appeal to widespread verbal agreement as an empirical phenomenon, and we can make use of probabilistic reasoning as well as appeal to theoretical simplicity for reaching the conclusion that there is a high rate of (...) agreement in belief between speakers who have a high rate of verbal agreement. Although this does not by itself imply that the beliefs agreed upon are generally true, it does imply that any single speaker who is party to such a verbal agreement is justified in taking the other speakers to have mostly true beliefs. She is so justified because of the fact that it is incoherent to take her own beliefs not to be mostly true. Indirectly, this justifies a version of the principle of charity as an empirically correct principle. (shrink)

In contrast to the most common view, I argue that one can consistently affirm that fundamental moral principles are objective and invariable, and yet are dependent on God. I explore and reject appealing to divine simplicity as a basis for affirming this conjunction. Rather, I develop the thesis that God is identical to the Good (the Identity View or IV) and argue that the IV does not fall to the criticisms of simplicity. I then consider a divine will (...) theory (DWT) that claims moral principles are grounded in God’s will. When the IV is conjoined with a DWT, there is reason to affirm an objective, theistically based ethics. The IV and DWT proposed here are models and while I attempt to increase their plausibility, I do not argue for their truth. The IV conjoined with a moral theory such as DWT explains the dependence of moral principles on God, while allowing for objectivity since morality is rooted in the eternal unchanging standard of the Good. (shrink)

The nexus of the moral luck debate is the control principle, which says that people are responsible only for things within their control. In this paper, I will first argue that the control principle should be restrained to blameworthiness, because responsibility is too wide a concept to square with control. Many deniers of moral luck appeal to the intuitiveness of the control principle. Defenders of moral luck do not share this intuition and demand a stronger defence of (...) the control principle. I will establish a defence of the control principle based on the value of simplicity for selecting a theory of blameworthiness. A simpler theory of blameworthiness is more likely to be true, and not being falsely judged blameworthy is desirable. I will conclude that simplicity advices the acceptance of the control principle over other theories of blameworthiness that embrace factors beyond control. (shrink)

Two experiments were performed to explore the mechanisms of human 3D shape perception. In Experiment 1, the subjects’ performance in a shape constancy task in the presence of several cues (edges, binocular disparity, shading and texture) was tested. The results show that edges and binocular disparity, but not shading or texture, are important in 3D shape perception. Experiment 2 tested the effect of several simplicity constraints, such as symmetry and planarity on subjects’ performance in a shape constancy task. The (...) 3D shapes were represented by edges or vertices only. The results show that performance with or without binocular disparity is at chance level, unless the 3D shape is symmetric and/or its faces are planar. In both experiments, there was a correlation between the subjects’ performance with and without binocular disparity. Our study suggests that simplicity constraints, not depth cues, play the primary role in both monocular and binocular 3D shape perception. These results are consistent with our computational model of 3D shape recovery. (shrink)

The book attempts to develop an account of simplicity in terms of testability, and to use this account to provide an adequate characterization of induction, one immune to the class of problems suggested by Nelson Goodman. It is then shown that the past success of induction, thus characterized, constitutes evidence for its future success. A qualitative measure of confirmation is developed, and this measure - along with the considerations of simplicity - is used to provide an account of (...) the consilience of inductions, and also an inductivist account of the structure and progress of scientific theory. An appendix extends the treatment of simplicity to statistical distributions and provides a reasonable interpretation of the maximum entropy principle. Thus, this book is an attempt to characterize induction in terms of a well-defined notion of simplicity and to use that characterization as a basis of an account of empirical, and in particular, scientific reasoning. (shrink)

I argue that Kant’s four Paralogistic conclusions concerning (a) substantiality; (b1) unity and (b2) immortality, in the famous “Achillesargument”; (c) personal identity; and (d) metaphysical idealism, in the first edition Critique of Pure Reason (1781), are all connectedby being grounded in a common underlying rational principle, an a priori (universal and necessary) presupposition, namely, that boththe mind and its essential attribute of thinking are immaterial and unextended, i.e., simple. Consequently, despite Kant’s predilectionfor architectonic divisions and separations, I show that (...) in fact the simplicity assumption grounds all four Paralogisms and reinforcesKant’s corresponding commitments to the principles of continuity and coherence. Further, I maintain that Kant, under the influence ofhis earlier Leibnizian and subjective idealist leanings, continued to be guided in the first edition Critique, not only in the Paralogismsbut also in certain sections of the Analytic, by emphasizing unconscious activities, which once more reinforced his commitments to aparadigm of the simplicity, unity, and identity of self-consciousness or apperception. (shrink)

We examine a number of investigations of perceptual economy or, more specifically, of minimum tendencies and minimum principles in the visual perception of form, depth, and motion. A minimum tendency is a psychophysical finding that perception tends toward simplicity, as measured in accordance with a specified metric. A minimum principle is a theoretical construct imputed to the visual system to explain minimum tendencies. After examining a number of studies of perceptual economy, we embark on a systematic analysis of (...) this notion. We examine the notion that simple perceptual representations must be defined within the "geometric constraints" provided by proximal stimulation. We then take up metrics of simplicity. Any study of perceptual economy must use a metric of simplicity; the choice of metric may be seen as a matter of convention, or it may have deep theoretical and empirical implications. We evaluate several answers to the question of why the visual system might favor economical representations. Finally, we examine several accounts of the process for achieving perceptual economy, concluding that those which favor massively parallel processing are the most plausible. (shrink)

Debates concerning the types of representations that aid reading acquisition have often been influenced by the relationship between measures of early phonological awareness (the ability to process speech sounds) and later reading ability. Here, a complementary approach is explored, analyzing how the functional utility of different representational units, such as whole words, bodies (letters representing the vowel and final consonants of a syllable), and graphemes (letters representing a phoneme) may change as the number of words that can be read gradually (...) increases. Utility is measured by applying a Simplicity Principle to the problem of mapping from print to sound; that is, assuming that the “best” representational units for reading are those which allow the mapping from print to sounds to be encoded as efficiently as possible. Results indicate that when only a small number of words are read whole-word representations are most useful, whereas when many words can be read graphemic representations have the highest utility. (shrink)

Contrary to the received opinion, the fundamentals of Newton's dynamics can be set forth quite simply. In the first edition of the Principia, Newton employs a device that relates to Galileo's analysis of uniform rectilinear motion. In the second and third editions, Newton introduces an alternate device that relates to Huygens's analysis of uniform circular motion. A third device is also introduced but is hidden away as a corollary to a problem rather than set forth clearly as a theorem. Following (...) the appearance of the first edition, Newton proposed, but never published, a grand new scheme for revising his dynamics in which he clearly set forth each dynamics ratio with a complementary set of solutions to the problems. As published, however, the alternate methods are not clear and are a source more of confusion than of clarification. (shrink)

According to a doctrine widely held by most medieval philosophers and theologians, whether in the Muslim or Christian world, there are no metaphysical distinctions in God whatsoever. As a result of the compendious theorizing that has been done on this issue, the doctrine, usually called the doctrine of divine simplicity, has been bestowed a prominent status in both Islamic and Christian philosophical theology. In Islamic philosophy some well-known philosophers, such as Ibn Sina (980–1037) and Mulla Sadra (1571–1640), developed this (...) doctrine through a metaphysical approach. In this paper, considering the historical order, I shall first concentrate on Ibn Sina’s view. Then I shall turn to the theory of divine simplicity of Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274), as the most developed and comprehensive version of the medieval theories in Christian world. Finally, I will return to Islamic philosophy and explore the more complicated and mature account of the doctrine as it was introduced by Mulla Sadra according to his own philosophical principles. (shrink)

Explication usually plays the role of the method of language revision. The paper sticks to the Carnapian project of explication and develops some of the formal requirements imposed on the explicatum. However, it departs from Carnap’s view when it comes to how to construe the simplicity condition. It is suggested that in some cases the simplicity condition, which in the Carnapian project plays the derived role with respect to the other three conditions—the similarity, exactness, and fruitfulness conditions—may be (...) substantive for the overall evaluation of explications. Based on a case study of three different explications of the H-D concept of confirmation :391–437, 1991; Erkenntnis 41:183–188, 1994; Gemes in Philos Sci 60:477–487, 1993; Erkenntnis 49:1–20, 1998; Sprenger in Philos Compass 6:497–508, 2011), we show that there are cases where competing explicata of a common explicandum satisfy the first three conditions equally well. In those cases, then, the simplicity condition is supposed to make the difference. However, instead of using Carnap’s construal of simplicity, we suggest a Principle of instrumental simplicity according to which, ceteris paribus, the simpler the explicatum is, the more likely is its ‘survival’ in competition with other explicata. Moreover, it is suggested that whereas the similarity, exactness and fruitfulness conditions are, in some sense, formal criteria, the simplicity condition is rather tested empirically. (shrink)

The present article reports on the finding of the principle behind quantum mechanics. The principle, referred to as genuine fortuitousness, implies that the basic event, a click in a counter, comes without any cause and thus as a discontinuity in spacetime. From this principle, the formalism of quantum mechanics emerges with a radically new content, no longer dealing with things to be measured. Instead, quantum mechanics is recognized as the theory of distributions of uncaused clicks that form (...) patterns laid down by spacetime symmetry and is thereby revealed as a subject of unexpected simplicity and beauty. The departure from usual quantum mechanics is strikingly borne out by the absence of Planck's constant from the theory. The elimination of indeterminate particles as cause for the clicks, which the principle of genuine fortuitousness implies, is analogous to the elimination of the ether implied by the principle of relativity. (shrink)

Although different perspectives on the essence and qualities of the absolute existence have been put forward by the philosophers, theologians, and Sufī philosophers, in the context of this article, we will examine whether absolute existence has a causal efficacy in addition to special existence in the unity of the First Principle and the first effect. We will discuss the views of two Ottoman scholars, Baghdādīzāda (who lived in the second part of the 10th/16th century) and Arpacīzāda (d.1033/1623), who analyzed (...) the effect of absolute existence with its aforementioned qualities on the simplicity of the First Principle and its being a part of the complete cause as an incomplete cause. It is generally accepted by the philosophers that the First Principle is the simple complete cause of the first effect by virtue of its essence without the need for conditions, tools, or the removal of any obstacle. Therefore, the First Principle must be the cause of the first effect with its simple existence that does not consist of any sensory or intellectual parts. Therefore, the decisive issue in the discussions regarding the definition of the complete cause is the inclusion of both simple and compound entities. Because the definition of a complete cause that includes only simple or compound causes would be incomplete since it does not include all entities. The definition of complete cause preferred by philosophers such as al-Asīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d.663/1265) and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d.675/1277), who made important contributions to the conceptualization of complete and incomplete causes, as the totality of the things on which the maʿlūl depends in its existence, can only include composite entities. As a matter of fact, al-Sayyīd Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), in his Sharh al-Mawāqif and Hāshiya al-Tajrīd, states that the aforementioned definition of complete cause, which was mentioned by his predecessors al-Abharī and al-Kātibī has the possibility of including only composite entities, but he expresses that this situation is not a necessity with the example that a simple substance can be formed from a simple complete cause. The Ottoman scholar al-Khatībzāda (d.901/1496), who supported al-Jurjānī's sentiment that the aforementioned definition of the complete cause could only include composite entities, emphasized in his commentary on Tajrīd al-iʿtikād the possibility of accepting absolute existence as a necessary element for the realization of the complete cause, which led to the writing of separate treatises following the traces of this problem. In the context of al-Jurjānī and al-Khatībzāda's explanations, al-Baghdādīzāda addressed the possibility of absolute existence being a part of the complete cause without damaging the simplicity of the First Principle and wrote a separate treatise emphasizing that absolute existence does not eliminate the First Principle”s being a simple complete cause. Arpacīzāda was another Ottoman scholar who wrote a critical text in response to this treatise, which analyzed the effect of absolute existence on the existence of the first effect as a part of the complete cause and its relation to the special existence of the First Principle. In this article, we will try to reveal the effect of absolute existence on the First Principle's being a simple complete cause and the possibility of accepting it as a part of the complete cause through these individuals and treatises. (shrink)

Swinburne relies on principle P in The Existence of God to argue that God is simple and thus likely to exist. In this paper, I argue that Swinburne does not support P. In particular, his arguments from mathematical simplicity and scientists’ preferences both fail. Given the central role P plays in Swinburne’s overall argument in The Existence of God , I conclude that Swinburne should further support P if his argument that God likely exists is to be persuasive.