A reading of the Anglo-Dutch physician and thinker’s philosophical project from the hitherto neglected perspective of his lifelong interest in the theme of honour.

Honor killings are graceless and ferocious murders by chauvinists with an antediluvian mind. These are categorized separately because these killings are committed for the prime reason of satisfying the ego of the people whom the victim trusts and always looks up to for support and protection. It is for this sole reason that honor killings demand strict and stern punishment, not only for the person who committed the murder but also for any person who contributed or was party to the (...) act. A positive change can occur with stricter legislation and changes in the ethos of the society we live in today. (shrink)

Confucius and Aristotle share the conviction that the virtuous deserves honor. While Aristotle thinks that the completely virtuous person should make claims to the honor he rightly deserves, Confucius maintains that he should be humble and disregard such claims. This radical opposition between Aristotle and Confucius about the good man’s attitude toward honor provides a case for examining the exemplary person for them. The author considers the reasons for their differences by focusing on the following questions: Who accords the honor? (...) Does honor have any effect on the good man’s actions, attitudes, virtues and self-knowledge? Whose account is superior? And to which criteria should we appeal for adjudicating Aristotle’s and Confucius’ contradictory claims? Focusing on ‘pride’, the author examines if the virtue of honor which gives rise to these rival claims in Aristotle and Confucius can provide the resources for resolving their conflicts. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between honour and recognition in the context of normative heterosexuality, and the implications of this relationship for sustaining and transforming problematic sexual norms. Building on recent attempts to move beyond a narrow and restrictive focus on consent as a means of thinking through the ethics of heterosexual sex, we reflect critically on the concept of honour in this domain. Honour, in our approach, is a cluster concept that houses a number of related (...) normative values and affective attitudes, including respect, self-respect, pride, dignity, esteem, integrity, trust, and honesty. We examine how honour is distributed by heterosexual imaginaries in ways that privilege men in the sexual encounter, and argue that part of cultivating ethical heterosexual relations is to imagine a sexual honour code where both men and women see themselves, and are seen by their counterpart, as entitled to sexual respect. To conclude, the paper examines and defends the cultivation of ethical, just, and honourable heterosexual relations as a necessarily embodied, intersubjective, and imaginative endeavour that involves challenges to, and shifts within, multiple imaginaries and sensibilities that cluster to support damaging norms of sexual conduct. (shrink)

Given its psychological and sociological importance, especially in non-liberal societies, honor may be the most undertheorized normative phenomenon. Philosophical neglect of honor is due partly to the doubtful moral bona fides of honor: honor-typical motives have been usually viewed by philosophers in both the Christian and liberal West as either non-moral or immoral but replaced by morally sounder ones. More practically, honor (and what is usually translated into the English “honor”) connotes a number of apparently contradictory meanings, further bedeviling analyses. (...) Four particularly salient conceptions of honor emerge in the anthropological, literary, and philosophical literature on honor: honor as prestige, honor as the ethos characteristic of “cultures of honor,” honor as honestas, and honor as agonism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 30.1 (2006) 102-117 [Access article in PDF] Gossip and Literary Narrative Blakey Vermeule Northwestern University Since its murky origins in Grub Street, a specter has haunted the novel—the specter of gossip. In its higher-minded mood, literary narratives have been very snobbish about gossip and the snobbishness is unfair. Even the most casual reader of social fiction will recognize that gossiping is what characters do most passionately. (...) However, they can neither admit nor be aware of it. Only minor or morally compromised characters are allowed to indulge in its pleasures. Matronly middle-aged women, chatty maids, little girls, and effeminate fops are the ones who gossip; their more reflective counterparts—the men and women designated as heroes and heroines—only briefly tolerate such idle chatter. Gossip is derided, decried, condemned, and maligned. It is womanish, low, slavish, servantish, silly, pert, loose, wanton, jiggetty, mean. It is the "tittle-tattle of Highbury" in Austen's Emma, an activity for the old maid Miss Bates and her even older, blind, and senile mother. In Middlemarch, although the world is "apparently a huge whispering-gallery," the greatest gossip of all is Mrs. Cadwallader, a matron with a mind like "phosphorous, biting at everything" (Spacks, p. 194). In Richardson's Clarissa, Lovelace—a man not known for his indifference to social information—airily dismisses gossip as "the female go-round." (In novels, the male equivalents of the "female go-round" tend to be such despised modes of exchange as business letters, gambling, chess, and games of chance.) Gossip has always been a part of charivari with the power to turn the world upside down. It also has the power to destroy lives (Les Liasons Dangereuses) and to derail love (when it becomes the "prejudice" of Pride and Prejudice). If it ever innocent, it is only because it is meaningless.Gossip is all of these things even—especially—when it powers the [End Page 102] whole narrative. This paradox is evident almost anywhere we choose to look. Social novelists view the stuff of direct, unmediated social information as so intense that it requires special handling—even disavowal. I will briefly survey examples from French, English, and Russian fiction. The first is a lurid and overheated speech by Henri de Marsay, the peculiar hero of Balzac's short novel, The Girl with the Golden Eyes (1815). De Marsay is a dissipated aristocrat in love with a mysterious young girl who, he finds out much later, is the sexual slave of de Marsay's long-lost sister. But first, after a night of passion that "had begun with a slow trickle of pleasures and ended in overflowing torrents," de Marsay realizes, when his lover accidentally lets slip the name of his rival, that the person he is competing with is female. The next day he becomes consumed with a bitter plan to kill his faithless lover. He reflects to his friend Paul "Upon my honor, man is a clown dancing on the edge of a cliff. We're told about the immorality of Les Liaisons dangereuses, and some book with the name of a chambermaid. But there is one ghastly, dirty, dreadful, corrupting book that is always open and never closed, the great book of the world—not to mention another book, a thousand times more dangerous, that consists of everything passed on by word of mouth between men or women behind their fans at the ball."1 Even though de Marsay is a corrupt aristocrat, his sentiments are little different from those the narrator expresses in the book's opening chapter, a panoptic survey of Parisian life as a glorious mosaic of infection, rot, and moral disease.In Emily Bronte's Wuthering Heights, Heathcliff's new tenant Lockwood breaks his self-imposed exile from social life by pressing the housekeeper Nellie Dean to do what housekeepers do best and launch into an aggrieved saga about her master's family. He wants her to serve up the gossip hot. "I ate..., hoping sincerely she would prove a regular gossip, and either rouse me to animation, or lull me to sleep... (shrink)

The moral sense is at the heart of Hutcheson's system. Its prominent role in this philosopher's morals and posterior commentary eclipses the rest of the senses, but there is at least one sense that deserves more attention in scholarship: the sense of honour. The reason the sense of honour, and its subordination to the moral sense, is attention-worthy is that it combats Mandeville's idea of honour as artifice. First, I flesh out the tension between pride and (...) the moral sense and a possible tension between the sense of honour and the moral sense. Next, I show how Hutcheson expanded and elaborated on the sense of honour, particularly in his later works ( System and Compendiaria). His strategy consisted in dissolving the tension between the sense of honour and the moral sense. (shrink)

In his writings Philosophical Remarks, the Austrian-British Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein draws an octahedron with the words of pure colours such as “white”, “red” and “blue” at the corners and argues: “The colour octahedron is grammar, since it says that you can speak of a reddish blue but not of a reddish green, etc”. He uses the word “grammar” in such a specific way that the grammar or grammatical rules describe the meanings of words/expressions, in other words, how we use them (...) in our language. Accordingly, the colour octahedron can also be taken to represent grammatical rules about how we apply words of colour, e.g., that we can call a certain colour “reddish-blue”, but not “reddish-green”. In a different context, the Japanese philosopher Shūzō Kuki explores in his work The Structure of Iki what the Japanese word “iki” means. This word is often translated as “chic” or “stylistic” in English, but Kuki holds that it is an aesthetic Japanese concept that cannot be translated one-to-one, instead encompassing three aspects: “coquetry”, “pride and honour” and “resignation”. To explain the meanings of the word “iki” and other related words all of which Kuki calls “tastes”, he introduces a rectangular prism as a geometrical representation similar to Wittgenstein’s colour octahedron. In this paper, I argue that the rectangular prism does not solely explain how the modes of Japanese tastes are related to each other, but also has a grammatical character. On this score, I suggest that one can regard this rectangular prism as a description of the grammatical rules of the Japanese language. By appeal to the arguments of both philosophers and in comparison with them, I will not only clarify what they claim by geometrical representations but also examine what role this kind of representation plays as an explanation of grammar in general. Keywords: grammar, colour octahedron, rectangular prism, Shūzō Kuki, Wittgenstein. (shrink)

The problem that I am primarily concerned with in this paper is the nature of moral capacity as it relates to virtue in Hume’s ethical system.1 In particular, I am concerned with the relationship between virtue and moral sense. Hume’s remarks about this matter are both brief and scattered. I will argue, nevertheless, that when we piece together his various claims and observations on this subject we discover some important insights that add to the overall coherence and credibility of his (...) system. The most important of these is the suggestion that our ability to acquire and sustain the virtues depends in large measure on our capacity for moral sense. Throughout this paper I will explore this theme and show how it relates to other key components in Hume’s scheme. (shrink)

Based on in-depth interviews with 18 Korean immigrant working couples, this study explores Korean immigrant working wives' ongoing challenge to male dominance at home and to the unequal division of family work. A main factor in wives' being less obedient to their husbands is their psychological resources such as pride, competence, and honor, which they gain from awareness of their contribution to the family economy. Under immigrant family circumstances in which working for family survival is prioritized, wives feel that (...) their negligence of family work, rejection of the superwoman ideal, and perceived right to demand their husbands' help with family work is legitimized. However, Confucian patriarchal beliefs lead these wives to place limits on the degree of challenge. The findings highlight the interplay of wives' psychological resources, gender norms, and the social standing of being immigrant families in affecting wives' challenge to gender inequality at home. Differences in effects among Korean immigrant families are explored. (shrink)

Values, Virtues, and Vices, Italian Style is an interdisciplinary study that examines the lives and work of four historical figures: Caesar, Dante, Machiavelli, or Garibaldi, as well as Italian culture and the moral psychology of pride, arrogance, justification, excuse, repentance, and the concept of honor.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Drinking Rules! Byron and BaudelaireJoshua Wilner (bio)This essay 1 takes up two nineteenth-century texts on the theme of intoxication in which the poetic word can no longer, if it ever could, stably figure itself as the metaphoric other of the drug, that is, as a legitimate means of imaginative transport, and in which the writer’s enthrallment by the transporting substance of words shows us its addictive and, one might (...) say, prosaic face.The first of these pieces is a pair of stanzas from Canto II of Byron’s Don Juan, the other, Baudelaire’s brief prose poem “Enivrez-vous,” pieces that Jean Pommier [341] and, following Pommier, Robert Kopp [314–15] have suggested may be connected, though neither reader enters into much more detail than to note that both bits of writing, in Kopp’s words, “chant[e] l’ivresse.” Now the praise of drunkenness is of course a poetic commonplace, and the mere fact of its appearance in these two bits of text argues about as intimate a bond of kinship as that involved in pointing out that you and I are both Noah’s children. But there are, I would argue, compelling reasons for looking at these pieces in relation to one another and to which I believe Pommier was responding.That Byron mattered to Baudelaire is attested to by a number of references scattered throughout the latter’s work and letters, references which, while faulting Byron for garrulousness, praise him for having the thing that makes poets: “une diabolique personnalité” [OC 2: 232]. Perhaps the most interesting of these references occurs in a well-known letter that Baudelaire wrote to his mother in July 1857, shortly after Les fleurs du mal had been published and while the storm of controversy that was to culminate in the prosecution and expurgation of the collection for obscenity was rapidly gathering:On me refuse tout, l’esprit d’invention et même la connaissance de la langue française. Je me moque de tous ces imbéciles, et je sais que ce volume, avec ses qualités et ses défauts, fera son chemin dans la mémoire du public lettré, à côté des meilleurs poésies de V. Hugo, de Th. Gautier et même de Byron.[CP 1: 411][They deny me everything, the spirit of invention and even knowledge of the French language. I could care less about all these imbeciles, and I know that this volume, with its qualities and its faults, will make its way in the memory of the [End Page 34] lettered public, along with the best poetry of V. Hugo, of Th. Gautier, and even of Byron.]The pride of place Baudelaire reserves for Byron in this list was somewhat dated even in its time 2 and odd in other ways, especially given the more qualified expressions of admiration we meet elsewhere in his writings. But it becomes more understandable if one considers that for Baudelaire’s mother, who was of Byron’s generation and had early ties to England 3 (in fact, she apparently taught Charles English during his childhood [E. Crépet 30], making it, strangely enough, part of his “mother tongue”), Byron’s would have been the emblematic case of a writer for whom a reputation for depravity was overtaken by poetic honor, perhaps at the cost of his death in a noble cause.Apart from this evidence of a felt affinity, there are specific formal grounds for associating the two pieces. Since they are fairly brief, allow me first of all to cite them both. Here are the stanzas from Canto II of Don Juan: 179 Man, being reasonable, must get drunk; The best of life is but intoxication: Glory, the grape, love, gold, in these are sunk The hopes of all men, and of every nation; Without their sap, how branchless were the trunk Of life’s strange tree, so fruitful on occasion! But to return, - Get very drunk; and when You wake with head-ache, you shall see what then. 180 Ring for your valet - bid him quickly bring Some hock and soda-water, then you’ll know A pleasure worthy Xerxes the... (shrink)

One of the critical crises observed in human society, especially in the so-called advanced and industrial societies, is the spiritual crisis. Spirituality in various types of cultural and religious concepts is considered a spiritual path one in which can achieve something like a high level of consciousness, wisdom or union with God. In addition, self-esteem is a sense of worth. This feeling comes from the sum of our thoughts, feelings, emotions and experiences throughout life. Dignity also means honour and (...) pride, which has been mentioned many times in the Qur'an. In contrast to dignity, there is humiliation, which means lack of dignity in which one simply accepts defeat. Religious teachings, especially Islamic teachings, do not summarise dignity as wealth, luxury and the enjoyment of material possibilities, but interprets dignity as spirituality, and liberation from the shackles of worldliness, which give Muslims a moral identity. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the mediating role of moral identity between spiritual intelligence and self-esteem of Muslims. The statistical population includes 834 Muslim employees working in 20 branches of one Iranian university. Necessary data were collected by standard questionnaires. Pearson's correlation coefficient and regression analysis in SPSS software (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) were used to analyse the data. According to the results of the analysis, there is a positive relationship between spiritual intelligence and self-esteem of Muslims. There is also a positive relationship between moral identity and self-esteem. Furthermore, moral identity plays a mediating role in the relationship between spiritual intelligence and self-esteem, and it strengthens this relationship. CONTRIBUTION: The present study proves the mediating role of ethical identity on the relationship between spiritual intelligence and self-esteem in an Islamic society. (shrink)

In these brief remarks, I sketch Aquinas’s account of humility, courage, and magnanimity. The nature of humility for Aquinas emerges nicely from his account of pride, and it also illuminates Aquinas’s view of magnanimity. For Aquinas, pride is the worst of the vices, and it comes in four kinds. The opposite of all these kinds of pride in a person is his disposition to accept that the excellences he has are all gifts from a good God and (...) are all meant to be given back by being shared with others. Aquinas believes that all the virtues come together as a set. Consequently, a person who has humility also has courage. Aquinas takes the deepest kind of courage as a gift of the Holy Spirit. On his view, taken as a gift, courage manifests itself in a disposition to act on the settled conviction that one will be united to God in heaven when one dies. It is not easy to see how magnanimity could be a virtue if humility is. The solution is to see that for Aquinas the honor for the Christian virtue of magnanimity is not honor from human beings but honor from God. A person can have the virtue of humility and still strive for the greatest honors, as Aquinas sees it. The conclusion of Aquinas’s account of humility, courage, and magnanimity is this: it is morally obligatory to go for glory, because glory is a matter of being honored by God as faithful. (shrink)

Michael Holland presents an early and little-known article by Maurice Blanchot, whose subject is the memorial concert in honour of Claude Debussy which took place in Paris in June 1932, following the unveiling of a monument to the composer earlier in the day. Blanchot provides a detailed account of the concert, emphasising the international co-operation that lay behind the expression of national pride, and arguing, against the grain of contemporary opinion, that the pure art of music transcends any (...) notion of national genius. (shrink)

Tarski's argumentative use of the liar paradox is well-known, but officially it is the Grelling paradox that has final pride of place in Tarski's argument, not the Liar at all. Tarski explicitly gives argumentation that adverts to the liar argument, but it is an alternative argument—one he only hints at and which adverts to the Grelling—which he says has the advantage of removing any empirical element. In this paper, we will examine how the Grelling might be used in place (...) of the Liar in Tarski's argument for his exact indefinability thesis, and assess in what way the difference might be significant. If successful, Tarski's use of the Grelling puts pressure on how Convention T can be justified. (shrink)

Pride is a status-related self-conscious emotion. The present study aimed to investigate the nature of status behind pridein four studies with using the two-facet model of pride, status maintenance strategies and with differentiating subjective social status (SSS) and objective social status (OSS). In Study 1 and 2 we used questionnaire methods with structural equation modeling (SEM) in order to identify the relationship patterns between SSS, OSS, status maintenance strategies and pride. In Study 3 and 4 we used (...) vignette methods and SEM to identify these links. All four studies gave evidence for the SSS  prestige status maintenance strategy  authentic pride relationship pattern. Similarly consistent result was found regarding the dominance status maintenance strategy  hubristic pride link. Depending on the assessment method (questionnaire vs. vignette) and the evaluative frame of reference (self vs. other), OSS was related to either authentic and hubristic pride, only hubristic pride, or neither of them. Based on these results, one thing can be taken for granted: pride is a subjective status-related emotion. However, the present results suggest that it is not necessarily true for objective social status. (shrink)

Pride has rarely been explored in the context of moral disengagement and unethical decision-making. Although some research has examined the associations between “authentic” and “hubristic” pride and unethical behaviour, little attention has been paid to potential mechanisms. Across two correlational studies (N = 379), we explore the associations between two facets of pride rooted on comparisons – social comparison-based pride, and self-based pride, moral disengagement, and unethical decision-making. Results show that social comparison-based pride consistently (...) (positively) relates to moral disengagement, and that moral disengagement accounts for the association between social comparison-based pride and unethical decision-making. In sum, our findings contribute in novel ways to the understanding of how pride based in different comparison frames may lead to antisocial decision-making. (shrink)

I contend that Adam Smith and David Hume offer re-interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of greatness of soul, focusing on the kind of magnanimity Aristotle attributes to Socrates. Someone with Socratic magnanimity is worthy of honor, responds moderately to fortune, and is virtuous—just and benevolent. Recent theorists err in claiming that magnanimity is less important to Hume’s account of human excellence than benevolence. In fact, benevolence is a necessary ingredient for the best sort of greatness. Smith’s “Letter to Strahan” attributes this (...) greatness to Hume. It encourages us to admire Hume as an exemplar of human excellence, to seek Hume’s virtues for ourselves, and to approve of the “love of literary fame” which Hume calls his “ruling passion.”. (shrink)

Parents in Arab society did not take any responsibility for their children in the pre-Islamic era. The husband, as the head of the family, used to treat family members as his servants and forced them in the direction of his interests. No matter the rationale behind it, the burial of daughters in the pre-Islamic era is an outrageous and ill-treated tradition. In this study, it is possible to see which tribes in the Arab society started this repellent custom and which (...) ones were more common. In the society, it is possible to find that there were conscientious and virtuous people trying to prevent these events which can be called as a shame of this humanity, which does not approach the events with the value judgments of that day. Before shedding light on the motivations behind this tradition in the Jahiliyyah Arab society, the examination of the treatment towards daughters in other parts of the World in the same era, would be meaningful in terms of enlightening the phenomenon. This study aims to crystallize the causes, extent, and responses by wise people towards the burial of daughters in the pre-Islamic and Prophetic era.Summary: The burial of daughters or their slaughter in a variety of ways was not unique to the Arabs. At that time people and animals in many parts of the world were sacrificed to give thanks to the gods and to ease their anger. When the killings of girls are considered, Arab society comes to mind. In that time, other countries and nations in the world were not different from the Arabs. During this period, daughters were killed in different ways, not through the burial of living alive.During the Jahiliyya period, among the Arabs who murdered the children of the boys, the girls, and children who were considered to be the weakest members of the family were conducted with this treatment. Men who were the head of the family could tolerate having one or a maximum of two girls. When the number of girls increased, they regarded it as a matter of honour so that when a new daughter was born, the inevitable attempt was to murder her.In the Arabian peninsula - rich merchant families exceptional - families were trying to survive with scarce opportunities. The food and clothing materials used were usually exported and extremely expensive. Therefore, there was a necessity for male members of the family who would provide for the family. From this perspective, so many sons meant dignity. The economy of the day was based on looting and pillaging except for the trade of the elite. Therefore, one had to be strong. The birth of a daughter meant shame, sadness and grief instead of joy and happiness for them. The man would wait excitedly for good news. If the baby was a boy the family rejoiced. However, if it was a daughter the father would be upset. When a person said, “She was a daughter” she could not know what to do with her shame and how to hide from people.When the Arab tribes were examined in general, the burial of daughters was not extended to the whole population. The question of murdering the girl by burying her child was common among Bedouin Arabs who lived in the desert rather than the city. It was extremely difficult to see this tradition in the tribe of Quraish, which were regarded as the masters of the Arabs. When we look at the sources of Jahiliyya and Islamic history, it is observed that the examples of this outrages customs were generally realized in the near term. It is understood that the memory of society is not rich enough to comment. The main reason for this is that Arab society has not a written culture.For the Jahiliyya Arabs, her daughters were ashamed. If they married their daughters even before they had married their daughters into adultery, seeing it as lighter than their children. One of the main reasons was jealousy. The data show that this style was applied more intensely among the Bedouin tribes and especially the tribes of Temim, which is considered to have started the process of burying girls. It is also said that the most jealous tribe of the Arabs is the Rebia tribe. Because of this feature, it is accepted that the first burial of the girl was started in this tribe.Although the Arab society before Islam was known by the atrocities of ignorance and weakness, there were people who were not completely dead and consciously dead. Even though they buried girls alive in society, some people who were disturbed by this rite that destroyed human dignity were trying to prevent ignorant and cruel fathers. The most well-known of the these was the famous poet Ferezdak, grandfather Sasaa b. Naciye.One of the main reasons for the behavior of burying girls alive before Islam was the fear of poverty. Most of them were living in the midst of starvation, and they were considering their daughters as burdens for the family. So they were burying their daughters because of poverty and hunger.One of the reasons for the murder of girls was the sense of honour. In Jahiliyya when a man marries a woman does not come to mind this sense, while marrying his own daughter to someone else sees this as a matter of dishonesty and and he says “it was more sweet to me to bury my daughter with my own hands rather than to marry my daughter. The idea of honour among the Arabs was the idea that their daughters and women would one day be in the hands of the enemy and thus would become a concern for themselves.One of the attributes of the nobles of Arabs was pride and vanity. If someone become arrogant to him and he doesn’t reply, he would be considered a coward. This arrogance dominated the movements of the people of the ignorance. In their eyes, it was so bad to marry someone who was not equal, that they were more likely to die than marrying someone. They were doing this because they had a bit of compassion for them. According to them, girls could not shoulder the heavy burden of life. There were many ways to kill the girl before Islam. But the most common of these was to push him into a hole he had dug before and to throw soil over her and bury her alive. The most commonly used method of killing girls by dumping them in the pits, though, was that they were drowned in the water or strangled. (shrink)

This book proposes an account of humility that relies on the most radical Christian sayings about humility, especially those found in Augustine and the early monastic tradition. It argues that this was the view of humility that put Christian moral thought into decisive conflict with the best Greco-Roman moral thought.

Among the different approaches in mental health activism, there is an ongoing concern with the concepts and meanings that should be brought to bear upon mental health phenomena. Aspects of Mad Pride activism resist the medicalisation of madness, and seek to introduce new, non-pathologizing narratives of psychological, emotional, and experiential states. This essay proposes a view of Mad Pride activism as engaged in no less than the creation of a new culture of madness. The revisioning and revaluing of (...) madness requires transformations in the basic concepts constitutive of current mental health narratives. This process is illustrated with the concept of self and its relation to passivity phenomena (thought insertion). The essay concludes with some of the challenges facing Mad Pride's ambition to enrich the cultural repertoire. (shrink)

The reclamation of slurs raises a host of important questions. Some are linguistic: What are the linguistic conventions governing the slur post-reclamation and how are they related to the conventions governing it pre-reclamation? What mechanisms engender the shift? Others bend toward the social: Why do a slur’s targets have a special privilege in initiating its reclamation? Is there a systematic explanation why prohibitions on out-group use of reclaimed slurs vary from slur to slur? And how does reclamation contribute to shaping (...) social identities and reversing oppressive social norms and stigma? Most analyses of slur reclamation advance a single model to answer these questions. The author argues that there are different varieties of reclamation. Two predominate, what she calls pride reclamation and insular reclamation. While many features unite pride and insular reclamation, they differ with respect to the purpose of the reclamatory act, the linguistic mechanisms reclaimers employ to execute the linguistic change, and the social and grammatical roles of the reclaimed slur. By distinguishing these two types of reclamation and offering a fine-grained characterization of their properties, the author argues that we gain deeper insight into the reasons why slurs may in principle only be ignited by the target group and why pride- but not insular-reclaimed slurs become available for use by out-group members. (shrink)

One of three basic types of desire, claims Aristotle, is thumos (‘spirit,’ ‘passion,’ ‘heart,’ ‘anger,’ ‘impulse’). The other two are epithumia (‘appetite’) and boulêsis (‘wish,’ ‘rational desire’). Yet, he never gives us an account of thumos; it has also received relatively little scholarly attention. I argue that thumos has two key features. First, it is able to cognize what I call ‘social value,’ the agent’s own perceived standing relative to others in a certain domain. In human animals, shame and honor (...) are especially important manifestations of social value. Second, thumos provides non-rational motivation to pursue what affirms the agent’s social value and avoid what denies it. Interpretations that hold thumos just is anger, or that its object is the fine (kalon), I argue, are mistaken. My account also explains the role of thumos in moral education. In a virtuous agent thumos will be affectively attuned to the correct social rankings; it will take the practically wise, the lovers of the fine, or moral exemplars, as authorities. (shrink)

Whether the sensible knave can take pride in herself is a question not merely curious but potentially devastating for Hume's moral theory. Hume assuredly classifies knavery a vice, but given his doctrine that it belongs to virtue to produce pride, then if she can take pride in herself qua knave, the knave is positioned to claim that knavery is, and ought to be recognized as, a virtue. And if this is true, then either Hume is mistaken to (...) have classified knavery as a vice or, if he is not mistaken, his moral theory yields incoherencies— the same quality being both a virtue and a vice. (shrink)

We can feel proud of a great deal many things. But pride has its limits; I can be proud of myself or of my spouse for publishing a book, but not of a complete stranger for achieving the same. These observations reflect two central features of pride: its Promiscuity and its Positionality. Many accounts struggle to accommodate both. I diagnose this struggle as a symptom of a long-standing tendency to focus on self-directed pride to the exclusion of (...) other-directed pride. Correcting for this, I develop an investment account, which smoothly handles pride’s Promiscuity, Positionality, and many other features besides. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THOMISTIC PRIDE AND LIBERAL VICE 1 PAUL J. WEITHMAN University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana L IBERALISM IS often portrayed, and sometimes portrays itself, as a moral and political view that rejects the claims of tradition. Thus liberals characteristically claim that the traditional standing of a social arrangement contributes little or nothing to its political legitimacy. Whether an arrangement is legitimate depends upon whether or not those (...) who currently live under it can understand and accept its rationale. Members of each generation must be able to examine arrangements as if they themselves were signatories of the social contract; the justification of regimes must, as it were, be susceptible of renewal in every age and to every citizen. Jefferson gave this view its most extreme expression when he claimed that each generation has the right to begin its nation's political life anew, and that national constitutions should be rewritten every two decades.2 Liberals often seem no kinder to intellectual than to political traditions. As they think political life can periodically begin anew, so they sometimes seem to think that political and moral philosophy can begin anew. Hobbes famously castigated the obscurities of scholasticism and argued that political philosophy could achieve firm footing only if the rubble of the past were swept away.3 Liberal contract theorists have followed Hobbes's lead, developing political theories that rely not at all upon classi1 Thanks to Alasdair Macintyre, David O'Connor, Michael Pakaluk, David Solomon, Eleonore Stump, and Allen Wood for helpful comments on earlier drafts. This paper is dedicated to the memory of my teacher and friend, Prof. Judith Shklar. 2 See Jefferson's famous letter to Madison of September 6, 1789 (The Portable Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson [New York: Viking, 1977], 444ff.), as well as his lesser known missive to Samuel Kercheval of July 12, 1816 (ibid., SS2ff.). 3 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 727, for an especially pungent expression of a view that runs throughout the Leviathan. 241 242 PAUL J. WEITHMAN cal and medieval moral philosophy. To take but one example of this neglect of the past, the ethical writings of scholasticism are dominated by richly detailed analyses of the virtues and vices, yet liberal writers roundly ignore these discussions. Liberals have been quick to defend their suspicions of the thought and politics of the past, but critics of liberalism have been equally quick to seize upon them. Champions of virtue ethics have been among the most vocal critics of liberalism in recent years, arguing that liberals court philosophical peril by neglecting the insights of earlier moral theories. Edmund Burke, the eighteenth-century opponent of liberalism, had an additional complaint. Burke discerned an arrogance in the liberal rejection of intellectual and political tradition. It was mere pride, Burke thought, to suppose that politics and political theory could be made transparent to the reason of every individual in the way that liberals sometimes claim.4 Burke's allegation that the liberal rejection of tradition reflects pride is ironic, for pride is a central element of one of the traditions of moral thought that liberals seem determined to reject. During a lengthy period of philosophy's history, pride was thought to be a motive of all wrong action. The biblical book of Sirach says that pride is the beginning of all evil5 and a long line of medieval moralists labored to explain how this might be so. Yet the tradition of moral thought that accorded pride so central a role now suffers from neglect at the hands of many philosophers. And pride itself is a vice that many philosophers now consider unworthy of attention. Most fail to consider it seriously as a motive for any wrong action at all. I have three aims in this paper. One is to examine pride's neglect more closely. I shall argue that pride suffers this neglect because of its centrality to a religiously based tradition of moral thought that many philosophers no longer accept. The alleged connection between pride and religion is, I shall argue, suggestive. It suggests what an account of pride would have to include 4 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on... (shrink)

In the aftermath of WW2, nationalism was regarded by many political philosophers as an afront to civilized values. Yet at the same time nationalism has been an important means by which former colonies have attained and protected their independence. Once this distinction is made, it is clear that there are different types of nationalism, used in different circumstances, and for different purposes, and many political theorists have attempted to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable forms of nationalism. In this paper, I contribute (...) to this debate by distinguishing four functions of nationalism: purification, privilege, pride, and protection. These functions can be mixed together in different ways, and I claim that purification and privilege are both highly problematic, while pride, and especially protection, are far more defensible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Looking Death Straight in the Eye:The Wisdom and Witness of the SaintsPaul Murray O.P.At the Basilica of San Clemente here in Rome, the tomb which lies directly under the high altar contains, according to received tradition, the relics of both St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch. Elsewhere, in the San Clemente complex, there is another tomb or sarcophagus, unknown to the public, whose original place may (...) well have been in the atrium of the Basilica. It now finds its place in the garden of the Irish Dominican Collegio adjoining the Basilica.This tomb, an ancient Roman sarcophagus of grey marble, was re-used in medieval times, around the year 1300, in order to house the remains of a certain Nicolaus Boniseniore.1 Nicolaus, a lawyer by profession, belonged to a prominent Sienese family which, in the late thirteenth century, were bankers to the papacy. Why I have chosen to make reference to this particular tomb is because, inscribed across its front in bold letters, is an unusually striking statement concerning death. Nicolaus who was, we are told in the inscription, "distinguished" during his life "by the glory of his knowledge of the law,"2 now speaks from the tomb, as it were, stripped of all prestige and glory, his haunting, ghostly words a warning to all those coming after him of the vanity of earthly endeavor. [End Page 923]Recognise in me, you who read this how limited are the possibilities of mankind. As I was, what you are, I was Lord of my possibilities. Now I am no more because I am dust and bones. So will you too no longer be the master of your own potential when you will be interred. The fame of the world, honours, prominent position, rank and influence, nobility, strength, pleasure, celebrity, delights and laments, high birth and wisdom, … vigour, boldness and intimidation, bruised pride, illness and everything passes except for the love of God. … Finally, I was abandoned to wretched death. Then according to the will of Christ I was shut up in this grave. Naked was enough for me, who once could not do without a big house, a wide bed, fine clothes and tableware. Without a bed I am laid naked in this marble tomb. I have no pillow, sheets, mattress or linen. I have no overgarment, not even an undershirt. To die is the destiny of all. Death admits no respect for honour; it spares neither the greatest nor the smallest. There are three things which you should know in order to live correctly: be thankful for death, pious and disdainful of worldly goods.3Few texts written in the Christian era, or indeed in any era, evoke with such compelling force the sharp, devastating impact of death, the utter and complete loss of so many treasured earthly goods and pleasures, earthly honors, powers, and privileges. But the statement itself, although composed in the Christian era and by a Christian believer—is it in any real sense Christian in spirit? Yes, we do hear sounded, it is true, a few notes of Christian piety, but these are decidedly faint and seem almost to lack conviction. What we don't hear sounded anywhere in the text is the clear note of Christian hope. Although the sarcophagus has obviously been made to serve as a Christian tomb, there survives in the statement of Niccolò an almost pagan perspective on death, a grim and unhappy sense of doom, a stark melancholy. Pagan stone, pagan marble, entombs the Christian voice.But what is it, we need to ask, that constitutes an authentic Christian understanding of death? My aim in the present paper is, while offering a few general comments on the question, to explore how, over the centuries, death has been viewed and approached by the Christian saints. Three sections comprise the work: (1) Facing Death: The Distinctive Christian Vision; (2) Scandal or Blessing: Christian Grief in the Face of Death; (3) Imagining the Unimaginable: Visions of the Afterlife. [End Page 924]Facing Death: The Distinctive Christian VisionFour centuries before Christ, around the year 441 BC, the Greek chorus in one of the plays by... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BLACK-ON-BLACK VIOLENCE: THE INTRAMEDIATION OF DESIRE AND THE SEARCH FOR A SCAPEGOAT Fred Smith Emory University René Girard's mimetic hypothesis provides a means of interpreting texts in terms of a systematic understanding ofcultural formations such as ritual, prohibition, and myth. It is based on an anthropology which accepts that most cultural texts are generated by an agency that does not appear explicitly or thematically within the texts themselves. That (...) generative agency is the scapegoat mechanism which I will discuss extensively in this essay as it concerns black-on-black violence in American society. With some modification, Girard's ideas account for the effects of the pathogenic educational environment to which black boys are exposed and which results in such violence. What we are witnessing in black-on-black violence may be understood in part as the consequence ofscapegoating which is driven by interdividual dynamics of desire analyzed in Girard's observations of mimetic behavior among humans. Mimetic desire is the starting point ofGirard's theory. Desire is mimetic in the sense that it imitates the desire of another. One's desire copies the other's desire for an object. Such desire is potentially violent because it can and often does lead to the rivalry of desires for the very same object. When mimetic desire is acquisitive, it produces violence at its most fundamental level. It is not that all mimetic desires "produce" violence, only acquisitive desire that becomes rivalrous or conflictual. I. The Triangle of Desire "Mimetic" comes from the same root as "mime" and "imitate." An acquisitive mimetic desire in Girard's theory involves the "desire to have" which imitates another person's desire for the possession or enjoyment ofan Fred Smith33 object. The object of desire may be a person or a thing; it can be a nonmaterial or metaphysical object like prestige, honor or "face" (pride). It is another who serves as the model for desiring a particular object. The greater the model's desire for the object, the greater the mimetic desire it inspires. The results are jealousy and covetousness over the possessions, positions or prestige, desired or enjoyed by the model of our desires. Desire is imitative because it is attracted to the object(s) belonging to another; furthermore, it is activated by the desire ofthe other, who may be a single person or an entire group. This imitative process requires that the subject have access to, or be able to appropriate and dispose of, the model's objects or possessions. Thus desire is triangular in its structure, being comprised ofthe subject, the other as model of desire, and the model's objects. Distance between the subject and model is an important factor in this structure. It does not necessarily denote physical space, for it can also function in terms ofpsychosocial space (i.e., race, socioeconomic position, cultural standing, etc.) (Redekop 7). Not only individuals, but society as a whole can serve as the model of desire. One also learns what is desirable from the aggregate of others that is society (Hamerton-Kelly 3). Acquisitive mimetic desire necessitates the ability of individuals to see themselves in the position ofthe model of desire. Ifthey are not able to see themselves in the place ofthe model, then the potential for the development of mimetic desire is minimal. This is why there is greater rivalry and jealously among slaves than between slave and master; among workers, rivalry is greater than between bosses and workers among siblings it is greater than between parents and children. This is the primary reason why violence is intraracial rather than interracial. II. Internal Mediation of Desire Mimetic desire is often reciprocal. Two people can be models ofdesire for each other, each one imitating the desire of the other for a common object. Acquisitive mimetic desire not only involves a desire to have, but includes the desire to be like, or even to be the other. This is why mimetic desire often evolves into love/hate relationships. An individual wants to be like the other, and simultaneously hates the other because he or she cannot be that other. The frustration of not being able to be another person or to have... (shrink)

Recent iterations in international legal thought of the debate over the transformative potential of law have tended to echo the long-standing assumption that radical movements, when they employ law-based tactics, do so in the same manner as reformist movements: they mobilise the legitimacy of law for short-term goals, only with more radical long-term goals in mind. However, movements such as the 2012 student strike in the Canadian province of Quebec demonstrate more diverse, creative engagements with law that openly mock the (...) legal system in an effort to simultaneously delegitimise the current legal order. This article argues that this movement’s approach is consistent with the notion of an ‘impudent’ use of law as politics but also extends it further to include ideas raised by this movement’s theatrical ‘over-compliance’ with law, through which the movement turned law itself into a public spectacle. The article examines instances of the state’s unprecedented mobilisation of the legal system to contain the student strike and the student strikers’ creative and subversive engagements with law in response, illustrating how the ideas thrown up by this movement can advance theoretical discussion in legal scholarship about law’s transformative potential. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary analysis presents an innovative examination of the nature of pride and humility, including all their slippery nuances and points of connection. By combining insights from visual art, literature, philosophy, religious studies, and psychology, this volume adapts a complementary rather than an oppositional approach to examine how pride and humility reinforce and inform one another. This method produces a robust, substantial, and meaningful description of these important concepts. The analysis takes into account key elements of pride (...) and humility, including self-esteem and self-confidence, human interconnectedness, power's function and limitations, and the role of fear. Shawn R. Tucker explores the many inflections of these terms, inflections that cast them by turns as positive or negative, emboldening or discouraging, and salubrious or vicious depending upon the context and manner in which they are used. (shrink)

The four-year wrangle over the ownership of what was then thought to have been the largest known meteorite, recognized near Melbourne in 1860, provides a fine-grained example of the interaction between scientific internationalism, metropolitan appetite for specimens, and colonial civic pride.

This study investigated cross-cultural differences in individual pride and collective pride between Chinese and Americans using data from text corpora. We found higher absolute frequencies of pride items in the American corpus than in the Chinese corpus. Cross-cultural differences were found for relative frequencies of different types of pride, and some of them depended on the genre of the text corpora. For both blogs and news genres, Americans showed higher frequencies of individual pride items and (...) lower frequencies of relational pride items than did their Chinese counterparts. Cross-cultural differences in national pride, however, depended on the genre: Chinese news genre included more national pride items than its American counterpart, but the opposite was true for the blog genre. We discuss the implications of these results in relation to the existing literature on cultural differences in individual pride and collective pride. (shrink)

Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, (...) according to which the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one's relation to the object of pride indicates that one's life accords with some of one's personal ideals. I conclude that the pride relation, though distinct from the relation of moral responsibility, is nonetheless a relation of philosophical interest that merits further attention. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes between two kinds of products, `symbolic' and `substantive'. While substantive products confer welfare utility in the sense of pecuniary benefits, symbolic products accord self-regarding utility. Symbolic products enter the utility function in a way which differs from substantive ones. The paper distinguishes among three kinds of symbolic products and proposes that each has a distorted form. If symbolic products result from forward-looking evaluation, they act as `prestige goods' which please admiration or, when distorted, as `vanity goods' which (...) satiate pretentiousness. When symbolic products originate from forward-looking action, they act as `pride goods' which satisfy respect or, when distorted, as `deference goods' which indulge pomposity. When symbolic products arise from backward-looking evaluation, they act as `identity goods' which enhance dignity or, when distorted, as `reification goods' which gratify reverence. (shrink)

Which is the primal sin, pride or idolatry? The Augustinian tradition highlights pride, an emphasis reinforced by theological critiques of modernity. However, the Old Testament and Romans 1 point to idolatry as the fundamental form of sin. Analysis of Augustine's account of human acts, the nature of evil, and the structure of sinful love frames a close reading of one of the most famous episodes in his Confessions, the youthful theft of pears. In this autobiographical reflection, Augustine illuminates (...) the paradox of pride. Self-love is unstable, and it resolves into the pursuit of finite goods that we wrap in the false tinsel of imagined divinity. In this way, Augustine's phenomenology of pride is consistent with the biblical consensus that idolatry is the primal expression of sin. (shrink)