Patient preference predictors (PPPs) promise to provide medical professionals with a new solution to the problem of making treatment decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients. I show that the use of PPPs faces a version of a normative problem familiar from legal scholarship: the problem of naked statistical evidence. I sketch two sorts of possible reply, vindicating and debunking, and suggest that our reply to the problem in the one domain ought to mirror our reply in the other. The conclusion (...) is thus conditional: if we think the problem of naked statistical evidence is a serious problem in the legal domain, then we should be concerned about the symmetrical problem for PPPs. (shrink)

In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pursuit of (...) which one wants to put decision theory to use. One might want to use it as a model of economic decision-making, in order to predict the behavior of corporations or of the stock market. In that case, it might be useful to interpret the technical term ‘utility’ as meaning money profit. Decision theory would then be an empirical theory. I want to look into the question of what ‘utility’ could mean, if we want decision theory to function as a theory of practical rationality. I want to know whether it makes good sense to think of practical rationality as fully or even partly accounted for by decision theory. I shall lay my cards on the table: I hope it does make good sense to think of it that way. For, I think, if Humeans are right about practical rationality, then decision theory must play a very large part in their account. And I think Humeanism has very strong attractions. (shrink)

ISBN 3110150077 (paperback) DEM 58.00 A collection of invited papers on the role of preferences and desires in practical reasoning: including rational decision making, the concept of welfare, and ethics. With a substantial introduction and a bibliographical survey. culture-specific and universal factors.

If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain information on whether the availability of an option contributes to the value that freedom has for a person’s self-expression. If preference-based freedom rankings use all-things-considered preferences to (...) evaluate whether an option contributes to a person’s self-expression, they are immune to the problem posed by adaptive preferences. (shrink)

When my family discusses how we should spend a summer holiday, we start from certain common understandings about our preferences. We prefer self-catering accommodation to hotels, and hotels to campsites. We prefer walking and looking at scenery and wildlife to big-city sightseeing and shopping. When it comes to walks, we prefer walks of six miles or so to ones which are much shorter or much longer, and prefer well-marked but uncrowded paths to ones which are either more rugged or more (...) popular. And so on. These common understandings greatly simplify the task of choosing between holiday destinations and activities, by allowing us quickly to eliminate many options. But what does it mean to say that we prefer one thing to another? (shrink)

Preference-based theories of prudential value seem to generate an absurd result when combined with commonplace platitudes about prudential rationality: it would seem that if the satisfaction of our preferences is the source (or even a source) of prudential value, then prudential rationality must be neutral (in, at least, a troubling range of cases) between taking steps to achieve the objects of one's preferences and merely engineering one's preferences to take as their object(s) that which obtains. Either way, one seems to (...) conform to the prudential demand to promote one's well-being. But this is widely held to be counterintuitive. In this article, I argue that this verdict arises only given eminently controvertible interpretations of a preference-based axiology and of the constitution of prudential reasons. (shrink)

In her Choosing Well, Chrisoula Andreou puts forth an account of instrumental rationality that is revisionary in two respects. First, it changes the goalpost or standard of instrumental rationality to include “categorial” appraisal responses, alongside preferences, which are relational. Second, her account is explicitly diachronic, applying to series of choices as well as isolated ones. Andreou takes both revisions to be necessary for dealing with problematic choice scenarios agents with disorderly preferences might find themselves in. Focusing on problem cases involving (...) cyclical preferences, I will first argue that her first revision is undermotivated once we accept the second. If we are willing to grant that there are diachronic rationality constraints, the preference-based picture can get us further than Andreou acknowledges. I will then turn to present additional grounds for rejecting the preference-based picture. However, these grounds also seem to undermine Andreou’s own appeal to categorial appraisal responses. (shrink)

Daniel M. Hausman holds that preferences in economics are total subjective comparative evaluations—subjective judgments to the effect that something is better than something else all things told—and that economists are right to employ this conception of preference. Here, I argue against both parts of Hausman’s thesis. The failure of Hausman’s account, I continue, reflects a deeper problem, that is, that preferences in economics do not need an explicit definition of the kind that he seeks. Nonetheless, Hausman’s labors were not in (...) vain: his accomplishment is that he has articulated a useful model of the theory. (shrink)

The individual physical appearances of robots are considered significant, similar to the way that those of humans are. We investigated whether users prefer robots with male or female physical appearances for use in daily communication situations and whether egalitarian gender role attitudes are related to this preference. One thousand adult men and women aged 20–60 participated in the questionnaire survey. The results of our study showed that in most situations and for most subjects, “males” was not selected and “females” or (...) “neither” was selected. Moreover, the number of respondents who chose “either” was higher than that who chose “female.” Furthermore, we examined the relationship between gender and gender preference and confirmed that the effect of gender on the gender preference for a robot weakened when the human factor was eliminated. In addition, in some situations for android-type robots and in all situations for machine-type robots, equality orientation in gender role attitudes was shown to be higher for people who were not specific about their gender preferences. It is concluded that there is no need to introduce a robot that specifies its gender. Robots with a gender-neutral appearance might be more appropriate for applications requiring complex human–robot interaction and help avoid reproducing a gender bias. (shrink)

This paper considers two competing views of the relationship between preference and desire. On what I call the “preference-first view,” preference is our most basic form of conative attitude, and desire reduces to preference. This view is widely assumed, and essentially treated as orthodoxy, among standard decision theorists, economists, and others. I argue, however, that the preference-first view has things the wrong way around. I first show that the standard motivation offered for this view—motivation underlying foundational work in decision theory (...) and economics—leaves the view with unacceptable psychological implications. I then introduce an alternative view—the “desire-first view”—on which desire is our most basic form of conative attitude, and preference reduces to desire. On the desire-first view I propose, preferences, as comparisons, are best understood as comparisons of the extents to which alternatives are desired. I show that this desire-first view is simple, ecumenical, and explanatorily powerful. (shrink)

This paper offers a general approach to ethics before considering its implications for the question of how to respond to religious preferences in healthcare, especially those of patients and healthcare workers. The first section outlines the two main components of the approach: (1) demoralizing, that is, seeking to avoid moral terminology in the discussion of reasons for action; (2) welfarism, the view that our ultimate reasons are grounded solely in the well-being of individuals. Section 2 elucidates the notion of religious (...) preferences and describes the history and importance of their protection by human rights legislation. The following section defends the ‘Preference Principle’, according to which there is a reason to satisfy any preference (in so far as that satisfaction advances well-being). Section 4 discusses the implications of this principle for religious preferences in healthcare, again seeking to bring out the special social and political importance of respect, and respect for such preferences in particular. The paper ends with a brief description of how to approach such problems from the perspective of a demoralized welfarism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a specific challenge for welfarist theories of intergenerational justice. Subjective welfarism permits and even requires that a generation, G1, inculcates cheap preferences in the next generation, G2. This would allow G1 to deplete resources instead of saving them, which seems to contradict the ideal of sustainability. The aim of the paper is to show that, even if subjective welfarism requires the cultivation of cheap preferences among future generations, it can accommodate two major objections to cheap preferences (...) engineering, the Autonomy Objection and the Fairness Objection. The paper argues that teaching autonomy-related abilities is compatible with cheap preferences engineering insofar as autonomy is understood as an end-state and not as a precondition. Furthermore, teaching autonomy-related abilities could even be required in order to improve G2’s prospects for well-being. However, since being autonomous renders G2 able to revise their initially cheap preferences, G1 should also save enough resources to enable members of G2 to do so. Therefore, cultivating cheap preferences among G2 does not allow G1 to deplete the available resources. (shrink)

Behavioural welfare economics has lately been challenged on account of its use of the satisfaction of true preferences as a normative criterion. The critique contests what is taken to be an implicit assumption in the literature, namely that true preferences are context-independent. This assumption is considered not only unjustified in the behavioural welfare economics literature but unjustifiable – true preferences are argued to be, at least sometimes, context-dependent. This article explores the implications of this ‘critique of the inner rational agent’. (...) I argue that the critique does not support a wholesale shift away from the use of true preferences as an evaluative standard in normative economics; instead, the critique implies that behavioural welfare economists need to inquire into and establish the ‘source’ of particular context-dependent choices in individuals’ decision-making. The source determines the permissibility of correcting individuals’ context-dependent choices and can, in some situations, support decisive welfare judgements. (shrink)

This thesis investigates two main issues concerning the behavior of rational agents, preference dynamics and agent diversity. -/- We take up two questions left aside by von Wright, and later also the multitude of his successors, in his seminal book Logic of Preference in 1963: reasons for preference, and changes in preference. Various notions of preference are discussed, compared and further correlated in the thesis. In particular, we concentrate on extrinsic preference. Contrary to intrinsic preference, extrinsic preference is reason-based, i.e. (...) one's preference for one option over another has a reason. A logical model is proposed and its properties are determined. Dynamics come in naturally, since reasons for the preferences can change. Logical systems and formal results regarding dynamical preference change are then presented. -/- Preference arises from comparisons between alternatives. A first option is to compare situations. Abstractly speaking, preferences are in this case between propositions, viewed as sets of possible worlds. The reasons can then be based on a `betterness' relation over possible worlds. Propositional preference arises as a lift from this primitive relation. A standard modal logical approach is taken and we use a modality for the betterness relation in the language. We then model preference change by techniques from dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), where a typical action, e.g. a suggestion or a command can change the betterness ordering of the worlds, and thereby the propositional preference. Dynamic reduction axioms are obtained to encode exactly how such a change takes place. We obtain a complete dynamic preference logic. -/- A second option is to compare objects as such. Concretely, properties of the objects often determine the preference over the objects. Properties are now the reasons. Inspired by Optimality Theory (OT), we propose a priority sequence, an ordering of properties. Various ways of getting a preference from the priority sequence are investigated, though we mostly follow the OT approach. We use a fragment of first-order logic to describe the situation. Here, on the dynamic side, it is priority change that leads to preference change. Using the DEL methodology again we propose a complete set of reduction axioms concerning the possible dynamic operations on priority sequences. -/- Not surprisingly, the above two views are closely related. After all, possible worlds can be thought of as objects! On the basis of a systematic comparison of the two views, we develop a two level perspective, in which the models themselves are structured in layers. In particular, correspondence results between the changes at the level of the possible worlds and the changes at the level of the priority sequences are proved. We end up by sketching a two-level preferential predicate logic to describe more complex circumstances in which situations and objects are compared simultaneously. -/- But we do not see this as the whole story. Preference does not live by itself, it is often intermingled with epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. One can have different intuitions about how this entanglement operates. A few options are discussed, and proposals for logical models are presented. When moving to dynamics, we now see a picture of knowledge update, belief revision and preference change taking place symbiotically, often unconsciously as in real life. -/- The resulting picture in the thesis is one of agents that process information and adjust beliefs and preferences in many different ways. There is no logically prescribed unique norm for doing this. The second part of the thesis takes this general phenomenon of diversity of agents as its focus, since it raises many issues for logical systems and the idealized agents which they normally presuppose. In reality, agents can differ across a wide spectrum of cognitive abilities and habits: in their memory capacity, observation power, inferential power, introspective ability, and revision policies when facing new information. -/- Two kinds of agents, perfect recall agents, and memory-free agents are studied thoroughly, in the setting of playing games. We show how current dynamic logics can be `parametrized' to allow for this memory diversity, with new characterizations of agent types resulting in complete dynamic-epistemic logics. The other dimension of the reality of diverse agents is that, however different they are, they often do manage to coordinate with each other successfully. While this theme has been prominent in game theory and multi-agent systems, it has received hardly any attention in logic. We analyze this interaction between different agents by looking at concrete scenarios which model their types explicitly. -/- Finally, we analyze the issue of agent diversity in its generality, discussing what dynamic logics would have to look like to become a full-fledged account of agents of different capacities and tendencies that pursue and sometimes achieve their goals in irreducibly social settings. -/- . (shrink)

Most prior studies have reported that subject-extracted relative clauses (SRCs) are easier to process than object-extracted relative clauses (ORCs). However, whether such an SRC preference is universal across different languages remains an open question. Several reports from Chinese have provided conflicting results; thus, in the present study, we conducted two self-paced reading experiments to examine the comprehension of Chinese relative clauses. The results demonstrated a clear ORC preference that Chinese ORCs were easier to comprehend than Chinese SRCs. These findings were (...) most compatible with the prediction of the integration cost account, which claims that the processing difference between SRCs and ORCs arises at the point of dependency formation. The ORC preference in Chinese poses a challenge to the universality of the SRC preference assumed by the structural distance hypothesis and highlights the values of cross-linguistic research. (shrink)

Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis mutandis, also (...) show that there are non-standard preference relations. Hence frameworks of Gert and Rabinowicz's type are either inadequate since there are cogent arguments for both non-standard value and preference relations and these frameworks deny this, or they lack support since the arguments for non-standard value relations are unconvincing. Instead, I propose a simpler framework that allows for both non-standard value and preference relations. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw attention to comparative preference claims, i.e. sentences of the form \S prefers p to q\. I show that preference claims exhibit interesting patterns, and try to develop a semantics that captures them. Then I use my account of preference to provide an analysis of desire. The resulting entry for desire ascriptions is independently motivated, and finds support from a wide range of phenomena.

Nous défendons l’application d’une préférence pure pour le présent positive au niveau social spécifique, consistant à accorder une priorité relative à la réalisation de la justice sociale au sein des générations. Cela permet selon nous de mieux concilier des exigences de justice sociale entre les générations et au sein de celles-ci. Une telle priorité est possible et souhaitable pour les vivants comme pour les individus futurs dès lors qu’elle est appliquée au sein d’un système de coopération intergénérationelle dont nous précisons (...) les modalités. (shrink)

The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.

Since Varian (Econometrica 50:945–973, 1982; Review of Economic Studies 50:90–110, 1983) made checking for consistency with revealed preference conditions more accessible to empirical researchers; researchers have often used revealed preference procedures to test their maintained hypotheses and narrow the scope of their demand studies. The tests developed by Varian are for the direct utility function, while researchers estimating demand systems often find it convenient to model consumer behavior with an indirect utility function. Unfortunately structure revealed in the direct utility function (...) does not necessarily follow for the indirect utility function. To remedy this problem, we set forth conditions for checking consumer data for consistency with revealed preference conditions for minimization and weak separability of the indirect utility function. (shrink)

The notion of preference is important in philosophy, decision theory, and many other disciplines. It is the interplay of information and preferences that provides the driving force behind what we actually do. The chapter adds a new focus and argues that preference is not static, instead, it changes dynamically when triggered by various kinds of events. We show that how a wide variety of preference changes can be modeled in logic, thereby providing the formal philosopher with a natural extension of (...) the scope of inquiry in the area of preference. (shrink)

Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for psychological similarity, for the sake (...) of love, to achieve a kind of immortality, for the genetic connection itself, to be a procreator, and to experience pregnancy. I argue that, with the possible exception of the pregnancy desire, these reasons fail to defeat a duty to adopt a child rather than create one, even assuming that we do have some leeway to favor our own interests. (shrink)

Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and can lead to misunderstandings in ethical discussion. In this paper, we use Bayesian inference to introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism in physical world models, specifically cellular automata. Even though our formalization is not immediately applicable, it is a first step in providing ethics and ultimately the question of how to “make the world better” with a formal (...) basis. (shrink)

I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...) decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn’s and Isaac Levi ’s arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, in light of Wlodek (...) Rabinowicz’s recent criticism. (shrink)

We first summarize and comment upon a 'calculus of intrinsic preferability' which we have presented in detail elsewhere. 1 Then we set forth 'the problem of supererogation' - a problem which, according to some, has presented difficulties for deontic logic. And, finally, we propose a moral or deontic interpretation of the calculus of intrinsic preferability which, we believe, enables us to solve the problem of supererogation.

Biochar is a soil—improving substrate made from phytomass pyrolysis. In Southeast Asia, its application decreases due to the long-term growth of biochar cost and thus caused further prolongation of the payback period. In the Euro-American civilization the biochar application is already almost forgotten once it has been much earlier recognized that the crop yields can be increased much faster with higher doses of nutrients and other agrochemicals. The payback period can be expected in decades. Such a long-time investment into soil (...) fertility raises also many ethical questions. The final decision combines issues of social responsibility, risk and other financial indicators as well as personal preferences and more. The attitudes of Western and Central European decision makers in the agriculture business segment were analyzed on the basis of electronic questionnaire survey and a subsequent interview through their local unions. According to the data, most of them did not know about the possibilities of a more environmentally friendly approach to soil enhancement based on the addition of a fertilizer in the form of biochar. Among others, the collected data also shows that the decision makers from Western Europe have a much different ethical approach to the land and financial indicators than the Central Europeans. (shrink)

Economists, who adopt the principle of consumer sovereignty, treat preferences as unquestioned for the purposes of their analysis. They also represent preferences for future outcomes as having value in the present. It is shown that these two characteristics of neoclassical modelling rest on similar reasoning and are essential to achieve high aggregatability of preferences and values. But the meaning and broader implications of these characteristics vary according to the arguments given to support these methodological choices. The resulting ambiguities raise questions (...) regarding economists' attitudes towards the study (by other disciplines) of preference formation and reformation. Under a strong, positivist interpretation (which is philosophically problematic), consumer sovereignty represents a rejection of any meaningful study of these subjects; under a weaker, methodological understanding, consumer sovereignty merely draws a boundary between economics and other disciplines. The weaker version is argued to be more defensible, and economists are urged to engage in interdisciplinary work that will clarify how preferences are formed, criticised and reformed. (shrink)

This article examines criticisms of cost-benefit analysis and the contingent valuation method from methodological and moral philosophical perspectives. Both perspectives argue that what should be elicited for public decisions are attitudes or values, not preferences, and that respondents should be treated as citizens and not consumers. The moral philosophical criticism argues in favour of deliberative approaches over cost-benefit analysis. The methodological perspective is here criticized for overemphasizing the importance of protest responses and anomalies and biases in contingent valuation, and for (...) failing to provide the necessary information needed to make public decisions over the allocation of scarce goods. The moral philosophical perspective is criticized for: failing to provide criteria for distinguishing between values and preferences, assuming impartiality requires expression of values and not preferences; failing to recognize the diversity of forms of expression of values, including expression of values through monetary evaluation; and assuming that cost-benefit analysis is necessarily an implementation of a utilitarian political philosophy. The article concludes by showing that deliberative decision-making mechanisms can be overly demanding on citizens, and argues for greater openness in the potential moral justifications of cost-benefit analysis. Key Words: cost-benefit analysis • values • preference aggregation • democracy • willingness to pay. (shrink)

This study examined the association between mental rotation ability and facial masculinity preference in gay and bisexual men in China. The participants (436 gay/bisexual men, 132 heterosexual men and 254 heterosexual women) completed an online Shepard and Metzler-type mental rotation task and a forced-choice preference task of ten pairs of masculinized/feminized male faces. The results revealed that mental rotation ability was significantly associated with preference for masculinized faces in both gay and bisexual men. There were no significant correlations between mental (...) rotation ability and facial masculinity preference in both heterosexual men and women. The findings imply homogamy in partner preference in gay and bisexual men in terms of masculinity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Is uncertainty about preferences rationally possible? And if so, does it matter for rational decision? It is argued that uncertainty about preferences is possible and should play the same role in rational decision-making as uncertainty about worldly facts. The paper develops this hypothesis and defends it against various objections.

ABSTRACT A widespread thesis in contemporary philosophy of language is that certain speech constitutes, rather than merely causes, harm. McGowan develops a prescriptive account of harm constitution, according to which harm-constituting speech enacts norms that prescribe harm. Ordinary verbal bigotry, she claims, is harmful in this sense. We submit that the norms enacted by ordinary racist (or otherwise bigoted) utterances are not prescriptive. In our view, ordinary verbal bigotry enacts ‘non-neutrally’ permissive norms rendering harmful behaviours locally permitted—and indeed preferred over (...) non-harmful options. We conclude by arguing that, although ordinary verbal bigotry enacts non-prescriptive norms, it can still constitute harm. (shrink)

This study investigated patient preferences for various types of physician persuasion strategies. Four types of persuasion strategies were utilized which involved combination of high and low levels of affectivity and information. In addition, patient variables, receiver apprehension and health beliefs were introduced to predict preference choices by patients. Results indicated that patients are influenced in their decision-making (preferences) by the type of persuasive strategy employed. Further, patients with different characteristics and predispositions prefer different persuasive strategies. The results of this study (...) suggest that the success of physician persuasiveness is dependent upon the type of strategy used and the type of patient being persuaded. (shrink)

Most models of rational action assume that all possible states and actions are pre-defined and that preferences change only when beliefs do. But several decision and game problems lack these features, calling for a dynamic model of preferences: preferences can change when unforeseen possibilities come to light or when there is no specifiable or measurable change in belief. We propose a formally precise dynamic model of preferences that extends an existing static model. Our axioms for updating preferences preserve consistency while (...) minimising change, like Hansson’s :1–28, 1995). But unlike prior models of preference change, ours supports default reasoning with partial preference information, which is essential to handle decision problems where the decision tree isn’t surveyable. We also show that our model avoids problems for other models of preference change discussed in Spohn. (shrink)

Consider a group of people whose preferences satisfy the axioms of one of the current versions of utility theory, such as von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944), Savage (1954), or Bolker-Jeffrey (1965). There are political and economic contexts in which it is of interest to find ways of aggregating these individual preferences into a group preference ranking. The question then arises of whether methods of aggregation exist in which the group’s preferences also satisfy the axioms of the chosen utility theory, and in which (...) at the same time the aggregation process satisfies certain plausible conditions (e.g., the Pareto conditions below). (shrink)

A new possible world semantics for deontic logic is proposed. Its intuitive basis is that prohibitive predicates (such as "wrong" and "prohibited") have the property of negativity, i.e. that what is worse than something wrong is itself wrong. The logic of prohibitive predicates is built on this property and on preference logic. Prescriptive predicates are defined in terms of prohibitive predicates, according to the wellknown formula "ought" = "wrong that not". In this preference-based deontic logic (PDL), those theorems that give (...) rise to the paradoxes of standard deontic logic (SDL) are not obtained. (E.g., O(p & q) → Op & Oq and Op → O(p v q)) are theorems of SDL but not of PDL.) The more plausible theorems of SDL, however, can be derived in PDL. (shrink)

I distinguish several doctrines that economic methodologists have found attractive, all of which have a positivist flavour. One of these is the doctrine that preference assignments in economics are just shorthand descriptions of agents' choice behaviour. Although most of these doctrines are problematic, the latter doctrine about preference assignments is a respectable one, I argue. It doesn't entail any of the problematic doctrines, and indeed it is warranted independently of them.

To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the preference (...) for x. So-revising one's preferences is rational in paradoxical choice situations like Kavka's Deterrence Paradox. I then try to meet the following objections: that this is stoicist, incoherent, bad faith; that it conflates instrumental and intrinsic value, gives wrong solutions to the problems presented by paradoxical choice situations, entails vicious regresses of value justification, falsifies value realism, makes valuing x unresponsive to x's properties, causes value conflict, conflicts with other standards of rationality, violates decision theory, counsels immorality, makes moral paradox, treats value change as voluntary, conflates first- and second-order values, is psychologically unrealistic, and wrongly presumes that paradoxical choice situations can even occur. (shrink)

Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In reply to (...) my (Rabinowicz, W. [1995], To have one's cake and eat it too: Sequential choice and expected-utility violations, The Journal of Philosophy 92: 586-620), in which I argue that the proof is invalid, Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [2000], Substitution of indifferent options at choice nodes and admissibility: A reply to Rabinowicz, Theory and Decision 48: 305–310 this issue) submits that I fail to give due consideration to one of the underlying assumptions of his derivation: it is meant to apply only to those cases in which the agent's preferences are stable throughout the sequential decision process. The purpose of this note is to clarify the notion of preference stability so as meet this objection. (shrink)

This paper presents a comparison of social kinship (patrilineage) and biological kinship (genetic relatedness) in predicting cooperative relationships in two different economic contexts in the fishing and whaling village of Lamalera, Indonesia. A previous analysis (Alvard, Human Nature 14:129–163, 2003) of boat crew affiliation data collected in the village in 1999 found that social kinship (patrilineage) was a better predictor of crew affiliation than was genetic kinship. A replication of this analysis using similar data collected in 2006 finds the same (...) pattern: lineage is a better predictor than genetic kinship of crew affiliation, and the two together explain little additional variance over that explained by lineage alone. However, an analogous test on food-sharing relationships finds the opposite pattern: biological kinship is a better predictor of food-sharing relationships than is social kinship. The difference between these two cooperative contexts is interpreted in terms of kin preferences that shape partner choice, and the relative autonomy with which individuals can seek to satisfy those preferences. Drawing on stable matching theory, it is suggested that unilineal descent may serve as a stable compromise among multiple individuals’ incongruent partner preferences, with patriliny favored over matriliny in the crew-formation context because it leads to higher mean degrees of relatedness among male cooperators. In the context of food-sharing, kin preferences can be pursued relatively autonomously, without the necessity of coordinating preferences with those of other households through the institution of lineage. (shrink)

This article extends prior conversation analytic research on the preference organization of sequence-initiating actions. Across two languages, this article examines one such action: explicitly soliciting an account for human conduct. Prior work demonstrates that this action conveys a challenging stance towards the warrantability of the accountable event/conduct. When addressees are somehow responsible for the accountable event/conduct, explicit solicitations of accounts are frequently critical of, and thus embody disaffiliation with, addressees. This article demonstrates that, when explicit solicitations of accounts embody disaffiliation, (...) they are systematically ‘withheld’ and, thus, can be characterized as ‘dispreferred’ actions. This article also examines: a) deviant cases, where account solicitations are not withheld, which is a practice for embodying aggravated disaffiliation; and b) negative cases, where account solicitations actually embody affiliation, and as such are typically treated as preferred actions and not withheld. (shrink)

Using a novel Chinese gambler conviction database to proxy the local gambling preference, we examine the impact of gambling preference on the disclosure of key audit matters (KAMs). Our findings suggest that the number of KAMs is significantly greater for firms in cities with a strong gambling preference than for firms in cities with a weak gambling preference. Our results are consistent with the view that firms located in areas with a sin culture may improve the quality of their financial (...) reports to overcome their stigmatized image. Additional analysis suggests that large audit firms, shorter audit terms, and closer audit-client distance strengthen the positive relationship between the gambling preference and the disclosure of KAMs. Namely, audit firms with a good reputation, strong independence, and information advantages play a more significant role in “destigmatization”. Finally, we show that auditors charge more audit fee and exert more audit effort towards clients located in areas with a strong gambling preference. This finding suggests that attempts by firms that are affected by a sin culture to achieve “destigmatization” by improving the quality of their financial reports are also costly. (shrink)

Risk preferences of Australian academics are elicited by analyzing the aggregate distribution of their retirement funds across available investment options. Not more than 10 % of retirement funds are invested as if their owners maximize expected utility under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion with an empirically plausible level of risk aversion. An implausibly high level of risk aversion is required to rationalize any investment into bonds when stocks are available. Not more than 36.54 % of all investments can (...) be rationalized by a model of loss averse preferences. Moreover, the levels of loss aversion typically reported in the experimental studies imply overinvestment in bonds, which is not observed in the data. Up to 67.18 % of all investments can be rationalized by rank-dependent utility or Yaari’s dual model with empirically plausible parameters. A median Australian academic behaves as if maximizing rank-dependent utility with parameter γ∈[0.76,0.79]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\gamma \in [0.76, 0.79]$$\end{document} in a Tversky and Kahneman probability weighting function. (shrink)

Philosophers working on time-biases assume that people are hedonically biased toward the future. A hedonically future-biased agent prefers pleasurable experiences to be future instead of past, and painful experiences to be past instead of future. Philosophers further predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs: people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. In addition, philosophers have predicted that future-bias is restricted to (...) first-person preferences, and that people’s third-person preferences are time-neutral. Philosophers disagree vigorously about the normative status of these preferences—i.e., they disagree about whether first-person future-bias is rationally permissible. Time-neutralists, for example, have appealed to the predicted asymmetry between first- and third-person preferences to argue for the rational impermissibility of future-bias. We empirically tested these predictions, and found that while people do prefer more past pain to less future pain, they do not prefer less future pleasure to more past pleasure. This was so in both first and third-person conditions. This suggests that future-bias is typically non-absolute, and is more easily outweighed in the case of positive events. We connect this result to the normative debate over future-bias. (shrink)

Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision (...) for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation. (shrink)

This article discusses approaches to the problem of the number of preference orderings that can be constructed from a given set of alternatives. After briefly reviewing the prevalent approach to this problem, which involves determining a partitioning of the alternatives and then a permutation of the partitions, this article explains a recursive approach and shows it to have certain advantages over the partitioning one.