Bioassessment is the process of using living organisms to assess the ecological health of a particular ecosystem. It typically relies on identifying specific organisms that are sensitive to changes in environmental conditions. Benthic macroinvertebrates are widely used for examining the ecological status of freshwaters. However, a time-consuming process of species identification that requires high expertise represents one of the key obstacles to more precise bioassessment of aquatic ecosystems. Partial automation of this process using deep learning-based image classification is the goal (...) of an ongoing project AIAQUAMI we are participating in. One of the project goals is to develop software support for image classification with visualization and reporting. For that purpose, we developed desktop and web applications that we open-sourced as Imagelytics Suite. Both desktop and web applications rely on a convolutional neural network (CNN) to classify images and the Grad-CAM algorithm to produce heatmaps of the image areas that mostly influenced the network decision. Along with the source code of the applications, we also open-sourced scripts that can be used to train CNN on an arbitrary dataset and produce required metadata, so it can be used with Imagelytics applications. In this article, we presented technical details regarding the design of the applications and the training method that will enable their general use for image classification tasks. As a part of the evaluation, we will show a use case related to species identification of non-biting midges (Diptera: Chironomidae). (shrink)

Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 273-292, October 2020.

La structure du definiens fait l’objet de deux traitements apparemment contradictoires dans les textes aristotéliciens : certains textes avancent que l’énoncé par lequel est définie une chose ne peut pas prendre la forme d’une prédication, parce que cet énoncé doit exprimer uniquement ce qu’est la chose qui est objet de la définition et non pas lui attribuer des termes, tandis que d’autres textes, notamment dans la Métaphysique, semblent suggérer précisément l’inverse, à savoir que le definiens doit prendre la forme (...) d’une prédication. Le présent article se propose de lever cette tension apparente en prolongeant la thèse de Jacques Brunschwig selon laquelle la « prédication hylémorphique », c’est-à-dire la prédication de la forme à la matière, doit être distinguée de la prédication classique. Nous montrerons que la prédication, lorsqu’elle est hylémorphique, se distingue en ce qu’elle permet d’assurer l’unité des termes qu’elle articule – matière et forme sont en effet « une seule et même chose ». Or c’est précisément là ce qui fait défaut à la prédication classique, qui attribue toujours « une chose à une autre », et c’est ce qui lui interdit donc d’être la structure du definiens. La tension entre les textes portant sur la structure prédicative ou non du definiens peut alors être levée en affirmant que le definiens est bien une prédication, qui ne peut pas être une prédication au sens standard du terme, mais qui doit être une prédication d’une forme à une matière. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt at the investigation of the nature of polarity contrast in natural languages. Truth conditions for natural language sentences are incomplete unless they include a proper definition of the conditions under which they are false. It is argued that the tertium non datur principle of classical bivalent logical systems is empirically invalid for natural languages: falsity cannot be equated with non-truth. Lacking a direct intuition about the conditions under which a sentence is false, we need (...) an independent foundation of the concept of falsity. The solution I offer is a definition of falsity in terms of the truth of a syntactic negation of the sentence. A definition of syntactic negation is proposed for English. (shrink)

Båve has argued that act-type theories of propositions entail unwanted ambiguity of sentences such as ‘Donald loves Joan’. King has argued that act-type theories of propositions entail an unwanted abundance of propositions. I reply that a version of the act-type theory can avoid these objections. The key idea is that grammar constrains the acts that can be performed by the utterance of a sentence. I present enough of the details of this version of the act-type theory to show how it (...) can be used to respond to Båve's and King's objections. I conclude that this is a promising way to develop the act-type theory of propositions. (shrink)

Both and agree that there are universals—that qualities are universals. To say that the quality white is a universal is to say, in part, that one and the same thing is connected in some way to both Plato and Socrates and accounts for the truth of the sentences "Plato is white" and "Socrates is white." To put it another way, the term "white" in both sentences refers to the same entity. What arguments are there for such a view? Russell elegantly (...) put forth the classic argument in "On the Relations of Universals to Particulars." To deny universals is to assert that the quality attributed to Socrates is not one and the same with the quality attributed to Plato. The quality "in" each is numerically distinct and, furthermore, no one thing accounts for these distinct qualities being of the same kind. [I mention this latter point since one might, on a version of, hold that there are particular qualities as well as universal qualities. The former account for the whiteness of particular patches; the latter for such particular whitenesses being just that.] One must then hold that such particular qualities are related in some way, since they are the entities in virtue of which we truly assert that both things are white. One must then specify such a relation. The obvious point is that such a relation will either be taken as a universal or a particular instance. If a particular then the original problem recurs when we introduce a third white patch or a pair of black patches. If admitted as a universal then the view finally accepts universals, albeit relational ones. No other alternative can answer the original question—to account for Socrates and Plato having the same color. That is, no alternative acknowledging only individuals—that denies the two patches are connected, in some way, to one and the same entity—can prevent the recurrence of exactly the same kind of question we started out with. Let us consider the case of particulars. One may argue that just as universals account for the sameness of quality, something must account for the difference of two patches which, conceivably, have all their nonrelational qualities in common. This something, the ground of numerical difference, is considered to be a substratum which stands in a unique relation or connection with universals to form or constitute facts and the things we started out with, Plato and Socrates. These ordinary things are thought of as composed of a substratum and universals connected together. Facts about such things may be composed of the substratum and one universal. The facts are about the things since the same substratum is a constituent of both sorts of entities. Such substrata account for the difference of the two patches; for there being two and not one thing. These substrata, in turn, are held to be simply different. At this point one may balk. If substrata are held to be simply different, why bother with them at all? Why not hold that Socrates and Plato are composites, not classes, of universals, and that they are different composites of the same universals? They just simply differ. If substrata can simply differ, why may not composites of universals simply differ? The proponent of substrata must retort that since Plato and Socrates are composite entities they cannot simply differ but must be held to differ in a constituent. Only simple entities can simply differ. Let me call this assertion the axiom of difference. The first point to note is that it is a necessary assumption in the argument to establish the need for substrata in an adequate ontology. We must then inquire why some accept, implicitly or explicitly, such an axiom. (shrink)

ONE of the central characteristics of Plato's later metaphysics is his view that Forms can participate in other Forms. At least part of what the Sophist demonstrates is that though not every Form participates in every other, every Form participates in some Forms, and that there are some Forms in which all Forms participate. This paper considers some of the reasons for this development, and some of the issues raised by it.

Of the later dialogues of Plato, the Sophists stand out. This article highlights the concept of sophist as propounded by Plato. A didactic approach runs through the text. Socrates harps on the relation between sophist, philosopher and a statesman. Are they three different or they are the same. The basic idea that Plato wants to convey is, both features highlight some of the key enigmas of the dialogue: What is the relation between the outer and middle parts? How seriously are (...) we to take the outer part? And is there a genuine, and successful, attempt to say what the sophist is? The article focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the middle part: the late-learners' problem, and the problem of false statement. The article also discusses communion of kinds and Plato's idea of the four quartets. (shrink)

This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes discussion (...) of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts, and a number of students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realistic conception of truth and in issues in metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth, and those interested in Russell and the Tractatus. (shrink)

In this paper I try to show that semantics can explain word-to-world relations and that sentences can have meanings that determine truth-conditions. Critics like Chomsky typically maintain that only speakers denote, i.e., only speakers, by using words in one way or another, represent entities or events in the world. However, according to their view, individual acts of denotations are not explained just by virtue of speakers’ semantic knowledge. Against this view, I will hold that, in the typical cases considered, semantic (...) knowledge can account for the denotational uses of words of individual speakers. (shrink)

Mark Johnston (2016, 2017) has raised concerns that a worm-theoretic account of persistence through time is incompatible with ethical singularity: that within the life of any actual person, there is only one morally considerable being, namely that person. To deny ethical singularity is to deny a core feature of our ordinary ethical and prudential thinking. The worm theory, Johnston concludes, proves to be “disastrous … for our ordinary moral outlook”. This paper defends the worm theory from Johnston’s argument. Though I (...) agree that the worm theory must deny ethical singularity, it can nevertheless be squared with our ordinary ethical thinking by adopting a temporal counterpart analysis of temporal predication (‘x will be F’, ‘x was previously F’, etc.) for those morally considerable beings involved in a person’s life that are not the person. (shrink)

Wiggins recently proposed construing frege's 'unsaturated expressions' as containing two elements, Viz., (1) a copula and (2) a general term standing for a concept; but he argued that concepts, So understood, Were not to be identified with properties. While accepting the above division of 'unsaturated expressions', I argue, Contra wiggins, That concepts, So understood, Were precisely to be identified with properties.

In this paper I show that the problem of temporary intrinsics and a fundamental philosophical problem concerning the doctrine of the incarnation are isomorphic. To do so, I present the problem of temporary intrinsics, along with five responses to the problem. I then present the fundamental problem for Christology, which I call the problem of natural intrinsics. I present six responses to that problem, all but the last analogous to a response to the problem of temporary intrinsics. My goal is (...) not to argue that any individual response to either problem is correct. Instead, my goal is to present and defend an interesting and unnoticed similarity between two different problems, and to note how work on one problem can help with work on the other. -/- This is a penultimate manuscript, and not a final version, of a forthcoming article in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. As such, please do not cite this version; cite the official version, due out in OSPR VII in 2015. (shrink)

Husserlian Essentialism is the view, maintained byEdmundHusserl throughout his career, that necessary truths obtain because essentialist truths obtain. In this thesis I have two goals. First, to reconstruct and flesh out Husserlian Essentialism and its connections with surrounding areas of Husserl's philosophy in full detail – something which has not been done yet. Second, to assess the theoretical solidity of the view. As regards the second point, after having presented Husserlian Essentialism in the first two chapters, I raise a serious (...) problem for it in Chapter 3. In the remainder of the thesis I endeavour to solve the problem. In order to do so, I propose to amend both Husserl's theory of essence and his theory of predication. The bulk of the emendation consists in working out an account of essence and an account of predication that do not presuppose, or in any way imply, the claims that: 1) for a universal to be in the essence of an object, either the object or one of its parts must instantiate the universal; 2) for a universal to be truly predicated of an object, either the object or one of its parts must instantiate the universal. These claims, notice, apart from being what gets Husserl in trouble, are well entrenched not only in Husserl's, but in most theories of essence and predication. It is thus interesting to see what an alternative option may be – even regardless of the Husserlian setting in which I work it out. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch some arguments that underlie Hegel's chapter on judgment, and I attempt to place them within a broad tradition in the history of logic. Focusing on his analysis of simple predicative assertions or ‘positive judgments’, I first argue that Hegel supplies an instructive alternative to the classical technique of existential quantification. The main advantage of his theory lies in his treatment of the ontological implications of judgments, implications that are inadequately captured by quantification. The second concern (...) of this paper is the manner in which Hegel makes logic not only dependent on ontology generally, but also variant in regard to domains of objects. In other words, he offers a domain-specific logical theory, according to which the form of judgment or inference is specific to the subject of judgment. My third concern lies with the metaphilosophical consequences of this theory, and this includes some more familiar Hegelian themes. It is well known that Hegel frequently questioned the adequacy of the sentential form for expressing higher order truths. My reading of his theory of predication explains and contextualizes this tendency by demystifying notions like the so-called speculative proposition. (shrink)

The topic of our analysis is the argument for the existence of substances given by Bernard Bolzano in Athanasia, where he essentially employs two ontological categories: substance and adherence. Bolzano considers the real and conditioned Inbegriff of all adherences, which are wirklich and nicht selbst bestehen. He claims that the formed collection is dependent on something external and non-adherential, which therefore is a substance. Bolzano’s argumentation turns out to be structurally similar to his argument for the existence of God from (...) Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, but in each of these reasonings, we find different plausible interpretations of the key concept “Inbegriff”. The latter argumentation refers to the mereological totality of existentially conditioned objects. We propose the explication of the Bolzanian Inbegriff of all adherences using two types of predication: we consider its extension as composed of certain intensional counterparts of adherences. In our approach, we use a fragment of the theory of abstract objects formulated by E. Zalta, describing two different relations between individuals and properties: extensional exemplification and intensional encoding. We put our reconstruction in a wider context of Bolzano’s ontology, formulating the needed axioms with two primitive predicates of second order... is an adherence,... is conditioned by something real as well as the conditionally introduced first order predicate constant \ for Inbegriff of all adherential ideas. Finally, we sketch a model for our theory. (shrink)

The system of sevenfold predication of the Jainas, while an invaluable tool in expounding the Jaina doctrine of "non-onesidedness" (Anekāntavāda), has also been criticized for being unsystematic and contradictory. In particular, the fourth predication has been suggested to embrace a kind of irrationality. An analysis is provided here that makes clear the logical basis underlying the seven predications. An interpretation is also offered of the problematic fourth predication that renders the system free from contradiction, and it is suggested that this (...) interpretation best captures the positive spirit of Anekāntavāda. (shrink)

Comments on Andy Egan’s "Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties," presented at California State University Long Beach, CA 2003.

In this paper I shall attempt to enter part of the way into the microstructure of the account of truth in the Parmenidean fragment 8, and to reveal that account as a dialectical sequence of affirmation and denial involving various kinds of modal utterance. The sequence will then be put into parallel with the first four hypotheses of the second half of Plato’s Parmenides as well as with Zeno and some of the later tradition.