Can there be mathematical explanations of physical phenomena? In this paper, I suggest an affirmative answer to this question. I outline a strategy to reconstruct several typical examples of such explanations, and I show that they fit a common model. The model reveals that the role of mathematics is explicatory. Isolating this role may help to re-focus the current debate on the more specific question as to whether this explicatory role is, as proposed here, also an explanatory one.

THIS ARTICLE IS A DISCUSSION OF THE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA THAT HAVE BEEN OFFERED FOR MIRACLE. (EDITED).

For an ‘explanation' of physical facts by laws of nature, we have to establish a relation between physical facts and laws of nature. It is an open question, whether the laws of nature govern the facts with necessity or whether the laws are related to the facts merely by supervenience. In addition, it is not quite clear, whether the known laws of physics describe only artificially simplified cases, e.g. isolated situations, or whether the laws of physics actually grasp (...) real facts. Known solutions of these problems refer to situations where laws of classical physics are applied to phenomena of classical physics. However, if the same laws were applied to matter of facts of the domain of modern physics, then in many cases there would be no ‘explanation' in the sense mentioned. These new problems can be treated either by additional ‘interpretations' of the theories in question, or by a radical change of the ontological preconditions of classical physics. (shrink)

Batterman raises a number of concerns for the inferential conception of the applicability of mathematics advocated by Bueno and Colyvan. Here, we distinguish the various concerns, and indicate how they can be assuaged by paying attention to the nature of the mappings involved and emphasizing the significance of interpretation in this context. We also indicate how this conception can accommodate the examples that Batterman draws upon in his critique. Our conclusion is that ‘asymptotic reasoning’ can be straightforwardly accommodated within the (...) inferential conception. 1 Introduction2 Immersion, Inference and Partial Structures3 Idealization and Surplus Structure4 Renormalization and the Stability of Mathematical Representations5 Explanation and Eliminability6 Requirements for Explanation7 Interpretation and Idealization8 Explanation, Empirical Regularities and the Inferential Conception9 Conclusion. (shrink)

The increase of our knowledge of nature and the multiplicity of phenomena to be studied and investigated has led to specialization in pure and applied science and in practical work. In many instances the individual branches of science became isolated from each other to a considerable degree.The establishment of the closest ties between the individual lines of knowledge, theoretical as well as practical, is one of the important aims of scientific thought. The analysis of the nature of the factors, (...) used for the quantitative expression of physical processes, shows that many of them have a striking similarity as far as energy is concerned. Such similarity, and even identity, leads one to the conclusion that the concept of energy can serve as the basis for the unified interpretation of physical and, possibly, other phenomena of nature. This paper, which deals with physical processes, is an attempt toward such unification. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an intermediate position between the ‘bare mathematical results’ view and the ‘transmission’ view of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena (MEPPs). I argue that, in MEPPs, it is not enough to deduce the explanandum from the generalizations cited in the explanans. Rather, we must add information regarding why those generalizations obtain. However, I also argue that it is not necessary to provide explanatory proofs of the mathematical theorems that represent those generalizations. I illustrate this (...) with the bridges of Königsberg case. -/- . (shrink)

The methodology of physics is discussed. The limitations of the empirical method are exposed, and it is argued that these limitations are related to our sensory input. The limitations of mathematics and of the representation of physical theories by mathematical models are also examined. An alternative methodology, the establishing of physical models on neuropsychology, is suggested and demonstrated. A cognitive psychological model of the genesis and the termination of time is explored.

Many explanations in science make use of mathematics. But are there cases where the mathematical component of a scientific explanation is explanatory in its own right? This issue of mathematical explanations in science has been for the most part neglected. I argue that there are genuine mathematical explanations in science, and present in some detail an example of such an explanation, taken from evolutionary biology, involving periodical cicadas. I also indicate how the answer to my title question impacts on broader (...) issues in the philosophy of mathematics; in particular it may help platonists respond to a recent challenge by Joseph Melia concerning the force of the Indispensability Argument. (shrink)

Can mathematics contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena? One way to try to answer this question is by getting involved in the recent philosophical dispute about the existence of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. If there is such a thing, given the relation between explanation and understanding, we can say that there is an affirmative answer to our question. But what if we do not agree that mathematics can play an explanatory role in science? Can (...) we still consider that the above question can have an affirmative answer? My main aim here is to give an account that takes mathematics, in some of the cases discussed in the literature, as contributing to our understanding of physical phenomena despite not being explanatory. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics are related to one another through the so-called "thermodynamic limit'' in which, roughly speaking the number of particles becomes infinite. At critical points (places of physical discontinuity) this limit fails to be regular. As a result, the "reduction'' of Thermodynamics to Statistical Mechanics fails to hold at such critical phases. This fact is key to understanding an argument due to Craig Callender to the effect that the thermodynamic limit leads to mistakes in Statistical Mechanics. I (...) discuss this argument and argue that the conclusion is misguided. In addition, I discuss an analogous example where a genuine physical discontinuity---the breaking of drops---requires the use of infinite idealizations. (shrink)

Depending on different positions in the debate on scientific realism, there are various accounts of the phenomena of physics. For scientific realists like Bogen and Woodward, phenomena are matters of fact in nature, i.e., the effects explained and predicted by physical theories. For empiricists like van Fraassen, the phenomena of physics are the appearances observed or perceived by sensory experience. Constructivists, however, regard the phenomena of physics as artificial structures generated by experimental and mathematical methods. (...) My paper investigates the historical background of these different meanings of phenomenon in the traditions of physics and philosophy. In particular, I discuss Newton’s account of the phenomena and Bohr’s view of quantum phenomena, their relation to the philosophical discussion, and to data and evidence in current particle physics and quantum optics. (shrink)

In 1974 perfect crystal interferometry has been developed and immediately afterwards the 4π-symmetry of spinor wave-functions has been verified. The new method opened a new access to the observation of intrinsic quantum phenomena. Spin-superposition, quantum state reconstruction and quantum beat effects are examples of such investigations. In this connection efforts have been made to separate and measure various dynamical and geometrical phases. Non-cyclic and non-adiabatic topological phases have been identified and their stability against various fluctuations and dissipative forces has (...) been investigated by means of ultra-cold neutrons. An entanglement between different degrees of freedom of a single neutron system demonstrated the contextuality feature of quantum mechanics. In its continuation this yields to Kochen-Specker theorem like investigations providing a new basis for information processing and for the understanding of quantum physics in general. All investigations show the equivalence of various phase spaces and show how physical phenomena are correlated by quantum laws. Some curiosa occurred during the experiments and some epistemological aspects will be discussed as well. (shrink)

There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physical justifications do look explanatory. In this article, I defend the idea that physical justifications can and do explain mathematical facts. 1 Physical Arguments for Mathematical Truths2 Preview3 Mathematical Facts4 Purity5 (...) Doubts about Purity: I6 Doubts about Purity: II7 How Physical Arguments Might Explain: I8 How Physical Arguments Might Explain: II9 Conclusion. (shrink)

The existence of various physical phenomena stems from the concept called asymptotic emergence, that is, they seem to be exclusively reserved for certain limiting theories. Important examples are spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) and phase transitions: these would only occur in the classical or thermodynamic limit of underlying finite quantum systems, since for finite quantum systems, due to the uniqueness of the relevant states, such phenomena are excluded by Theory. In Nature, however, finite quantum systems describing real materials (...) clearly exhibit such effects. In this paper we discuss these apparently “paradoxical” phenomena and outline various ideas and mechanisms that encompass both theory and reality, from physical and mathematical points of view. (shrink)

Duhem's 1908 essay questions the relation between physical theory and metaphysics and, more specifically, between astronomy and physics–an issue still of importance today. He critiques the answers given by Greek thought, Arabic science, medieval Christian scholasticism, and, finally, the astronomers of the Renaissance.

The topic of this essay concerns the interest that the conception of nature in Schelling has aroused in the philosophical culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I propose to examine the retrieval of the philosophy of the nature of Schelling from the history of philosophy and history of science standpoints. Therefore, my paper will be divided into three parts. In particular, I will start by examining the state of the art on the reevaluation of Schelling in the context of (...) the contemporary philosophy of science; then I will pass by analyzing the relationship between Schelling’s thought and the quantum physics according to Slavoj Žižek and Karen Barad approach; finally, I will conclude by going back to the Kantian source of this branch of study. (shrink)

A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in (...) the recent literature. My answer to the question of this paper is negative. As I will argue, there are serious problems with the main reasons for believing in the first place that it is possible to have physical understanding of mathematical facts. (shrink)

It is argued that the evolution of fundamental microphysics throughout the twentieth century is characterised by two interrelated developments. On the one hand, the experimental signatures which confirm theoretical statements are moving towards the fringes of the phenomenal world and, at the same time, leave increasingly wide spaces for entirely theoretical reasoning with little or no empirical interference. On the other hand, assessments of limitations to scientific underdetermination gain importance within the theoretical process.

How can be interchangeable with mirroring, which is an automatic response that, from a first-person perspective, enters awareness only after the act? The correspondence between perception of another's action and execution of one's similar action may be an example of a general perception-motor interface that maps perception onto behaviour or disposition towards action, without the need for simulation.

Newton's methodology emphasized propositions "inferred from phenomena." These rest on systematic dependencies that make phenomena measure theoretical parameters. We consider the inferences supporting Newton's inductive argument that gravitation is proportional to inertial mass. We argue that the support provided by these systematic dependencies is much stronger than that provided by bootstrap confirmation; this kind of support thus avoids some of the major objections against bootstrapping. Finally we examine how contemporary testing of equivalence principles exemplifies this Newtonian methodological theme.

This paper highlights the significance of sensory studies and psychophysical investigations of the relations between psychic and physical phenomena for our understanding of the development of the physics discipline, by examining aspects of research on sense perception, physiology, esthetics, and psychology in the work of Gustav Theodor Fechner, Hermann von Helmholtz, Wilhelm Wundt, and Ernst Mach between 1860 and 1871. It complements previous approaches oriented around research on vision, Fechner’s psychophysics, or the founding of experimental psychology, by charting (...) Mach’s engagement with psychophysical experiments in particular. Examining Mach’s study of the senses and esthetics, his changing attitudes toward the mechanical worldview and atomism, and his articulation of comparative understandings of sensual, geometrical, and physical spaces helps set Mach’s emerging epistemological views in the context of his teaching and research. Mach complemented an analytic strategy focused on parallel psychic and physical dimensions of sensation, with a synthetic comparative approach – building analogies between the retina, the individual, and social life, and moving between abstract and sensual spaces. An examination of the broadly based critique that Mach articulated in his 1871 lecture on the conservation of work shows how his historical approach helped Mach cast what he now saw as a narrowly limiting emphasis on mechanics as a phase yet to be overcome. (shrink)

When we examine the history of astronomy up to the end of the seventeenth century by considering the relation between mathematical astronomy and natural philosophy, it has been argued that there were two groups of philosophers and astronomers: instrumentalists and realists. However, this classification is deficient when we consider attitudes toward the explanatory power of mathematics in determining astronomical theories. I offer the solution of dividing realists into two subcategories—mathematical realists and physical realists. Mathematical realists include those who thought (...) mathematics could provide the real motions of celestial bodies. The physical realists, who include Ibn Rushd (Averroës), believed mathematics could not provide us with the real structure of the heavens. To avoid contradictions between the physical and mathematical models, the physical realists held that a mathematical model of the heavens should be designed by considering physics. I argue, in this article, that Francis Bacon can be considered a physical realist. (shrink)

Abstract.I chart the considerable changes in the status and conception of the Lenz-Ising model from 1920 to 1950 in terms of three phases: In the early 1920s, Lenz and Ising introduced the model in the field of ferromagnetism. Based on an exact derivation, Ising concluded that it is incapable of displaying ferromagnetic behavior, a result he erroneously extended to three dimensions. In the next phase, Lenz and Ising’s contemporaries rejected the model as a representation of ferromagnetic materials because of its (...) conflict with the new quantum mechanics. In the third phase, from the early 1930s to the early 1940s, the model was revived as a model of cooperative phenomena. I provide more detail on this history than the earlier accounts of Brush (1967) and Hoddeson, Schubert, Heims, and Baym (1992) and question some of their conclusions. Moreover, my account differs from these in its focus on the development of the model in its capacity as a model. It examines three aspects of this development: (1) the attitudes on the degree of physical realism of the Lenz-Ising model in its representation of physical phenomena; (2) the various reasons for studying and using it; and (3) the effect of the change in its theoretical basis during the transition from the old to the new quantum mechanics. A major theme of my study is that even though the Lenz-Ising model is not fully realistic, it is more useful than more realistic models because of its mathematical tractability. I argue that this point of view, important for the modern conception of the model, is novel and that its emergence, while perhaps not a consequence of its study, is coincident with the third phase of its development. (shrink)

The concept of similar systems arose in physics, and appears to have originated with Newton in the seventeenth century. This chapter provides a critical history of the concept of physically similar systems, the twentieth century concept into which it developed. The concept was used in the nineteenth century in various fields of engineering, theoretical physics and theoretical and experimental hydrodynamics. In 1914, it was articulated in terms of ideas developed in the eighteenth century and used in nineteenth century mathematics and (...) mechanics: equations, functions and dimensional analysis. The terminology physically similar systems was proposed for this new characterization of similar systems by the physicist Edgar Buckingham. Related work by Vaschy, Bertrand, and Riabouchinsky had appeared by then. The concept is very powerful in studying physical phenomena both theoretically and experimentally. As it is not currently part of the core curricula of STEM disciplines or philosophy of science, it is not as well known as it ought to be. (shrink)

This book offers fresh perspective on the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of physics which opens new avenues for discussion among physicists, "standard" philosophers of physics and philosophers with phenomenological leanings. Much has been written on the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19th and early 20th century, and on the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. This book is about the under-explored role of phenomenology in the development and the philosophical interpretation of (...) 20th century physics. Part 1 examines questions about the origins and value of phenomenological approaches to physics. Does the work of classical phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger contain elements of systematic value to both the practice and our philosophical understanding of physics? How did classical phenomenology influence “standard” philosophy of science in the Anglo-American and other traditions? Part 2 probes questions on the role of phenomenology in the philosophies of physics and science: - Can phenomenology help to solve “Wigner’s puzzle”, the problem of the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics in describing, explaining and predicting empirical phenomena? - Does phenomenology allow better understanding of the principle of gauge invariance at the core of the standard model of contemporary particle physics? - Does the phenomenological notion of “Lifeworld” stand in opposition to the “scientific metaphysics” movement, or is there potential for dialogue? Part 3 examines the measurement problem. Is the solution outlined by Fritz London and Edmond Bauer merely a re-statement of von Neumann’s view, or should it be regarded as a distinctively phenomenological take on the measurement problem? Is phenomenology a serious contender in continuing discussions of foundational questions of quantum mechanics? Can other interpretational frameworks such as quantum Bayesianism benefit from implementing phenomenological notions such as constitution or horizonal intentionality? (shrink)

Quantum physics is often perceived as a weird and abstract theory, which physicists must use in order to make correct predictions. But many recent experiments have shown that the weirdness of the theory simply mirrors the weirdness of phenomena: it is Nature itself, and not only our description of it, that behaves in an astonishing way. This book selects those, among these typical quantum phenomena, whose rigorous description requires neither the formalism, nor an important background in physics.

Modern physics asks: how do the objects exist? This kind of question inevitably touches upon philosophy; to be precise, it involves metaphysics that traditionally deals with these problems. There are grounds to assume that a quantum object in a certain sense does not exist until it is registered. Thus, one of the conclusions says, “Photon is a photon if it is a registered photon”. This is a paraphrase of well-known Wheeler’s words about the essence of quantum phenomenon. These effects cannot (...) be understood if we come from the assumption that all existing (‘real’) and quantum objects in particular, is only being of the actual. To explain quantum mechanics phenomena we need to realize that there exists another modus of being. Quantum mechanics refers to some sort oftranscendence. Such conclusion is based not only on the analysis of the testing of Aspeckt’s experiments. The whole structure of quantum mechanics confirms it. The revision of the New European paradigm leads to the return of such conception of existence that brings us to the traditional metaphysical understanding of the being and implies its study on several levels of existence. The conclusion of this kind leads to a serious correction of the philosophical model of the world built by modern natural science. (shrink)

The idea at the core of the New Mechanical account of explanation can be summarized in the claim that explaining means showing ‘how things work’. This simple motto hints at three basic features of Mechanistic Explanation (ME): ME is an explanation-how, that implies the description of the processes underlying the phenomenon to be explained and of the entities that engage in such processes. These three elements trace a fundamental contrast with the view inherited from Hume and later from strict logical (...) empiricism (see Creath 2017), focused on epistemic and formal features of science and according to which issues concerning the kind of entities and processes that lie within a theory’s domain are extraneous to science and belong instead to ontology or metaphysics. Philosophers belonging to the new mechanical philosophy believe that the received view of scientific explanation (Hempel 2001), pivoting on the notion of law of nature, overshadows this insight. Since its origin in the 17th century, mechanical philosophy aimed to explain natural phenomena by reducing them to mechanisms. Traditional attempts to define the concept of mechanism involved the identification of a limited set of fundamental elements as, for instance, contact action, action at a distance, inertial motion (see e.g. Hesse 2005), and, more recently, transmission of a mark, or of a conserved quantity (see Frisch, this volume). The new mechanical philosophy rejects this austere characterization of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation and aim at providing a novel, philosophically rigorous explication of the concept of mechanism and of its role in scientific explanation and practice. ME has been adopted with profit in philosophy of special sciences (for instance in biomedical sciences, e.g. in the explanation of chemical transmission at synapses ((Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000), MDC henceforth); but also in social sciences, e.g. the three kinds of social mechanisms in Coleman’s analysis of Max Weber’s account of the role of the Protestant ethic in the growth of capitalism (Hedström and Swedberg 1998)), where exceptionless regularities are rarely ever found. In physics, it is generally possible to formulate explanations in law-based form, with the result that the plurality of explanatory forms might be overlooked. This should not come as a surprise, given that physics was the main inspiration for logical empiricists, and, in particular, Newtonian physics was a template for Hempel’s formulation of the covering law model. However, this situation is unfortunate, since, we will argue, knowing how things work is often part of the explanation of physical phenomena. In this chapter, we provide an introduction to the basic features of ME, with specific focus on its application to physics (section 1). The main part of the chapter is devoted to the defence of two theses: on the one hand, some domains of physics are not compatible with mechanistic reasoning and explanation (section 2); on the other hand, a comprehensive account of explanation in physics can’t dispense with ME (section 3). (shrink)

One of the distinctive features of George Smith’s work on celestial mechanics is his emphasis on the role of what he calls “second-order phenomena” in the production of high-quality evidence. On Smith’s view, these gaps between theoretical predictions and observations can, under certain circumstances, be a source of evidence far stronger than that achievable through the hypothetico-deductive method. The practice of examining gaps between predictions and observations for the purposes of discovery and testing is commonplace in certain sciences such (...) as seismology, and has played an important role in their development. I use the term reasoning from residuals as a general term for this practice. I think it is worth investigating examples of this set of practices from the history of science, in order to understand the different ways in which reasoning from residuals is done, under what situations it is done, and how it contributes to the growth of knowledge in certain sciences. (shrink)

The topic of this thesis is how different phenomena, commonly regarded as "psychological" or "mental", are or can be apprehended in the first person. The aim is to show that a number of influential texts of contemporary philosophy display a particular type of oversight on this topic. The texts in question display, I argue, an insufficient appreciation of the case for holding that "non-qualitative" psychological phenomena are apprehended in an exclusive way in the first person. To make this (...) case, I begin by isolating a limited class of phenomena. The class, which is called the class of 'occurrent psychological doings', includes performances such as searching for a flower and adding two numbers. In chapter 2, I submit a case for holding that it is logically necessary that if an agent is performing an occurrent psychological doing, then he has a certain apprehension of what he is doing. This claim is called The First-Person Thesis'. In chapter 3, I submit a case for holding that the type of apprehension mentioned in The First-Person Thesis is logically exclusive: it is an apprehension which an agent who is doing so-and-so can have of the fact that he is doing so-and-so but which it is logically impossible for someone else to have of this fact. This claim is called 'The Exclusiveness Thesis'. In chapters 4 and 5, the two theses are used in critical discussions of some influential texts of contemporary philosophy. In chapter 4,1 examine two arguments of Wittgenstein's to the effect that one may perform some selected actions without having a particular type of "experience", or "sensation". I try to show that these arguments, while valid, have rather limited implications. I use The First-Person Thesis to illustrate the limited scope of these implications. I then try to show that the limited significance of the arguments has often been obscured by commentators of Wittgenstein. In chapter 5, I examine a position commonly held in contemporary philosophy of mind, and often associated with Nagel. The position is that "qualitative" phenomena such as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations are, because of the appearances they present in the first person, particularly difficult to explain in physical terms. An implication of this view is the claim that other phenomena do not present appearances to subjects in the allegedly problematic way that "qualitative" phenomena do. The First-Person Thesis and The Exclusiveness Thesis are used to argue that this position, as exemplified in the writings of McGinn and Chalmers, involve controversial assumptions for which insufficient justification is provided. (shrink)

A physical theory intends to provide us with a picture of a certain domain of physical phenomena. We have become accustomed to deal rather with physical pictures than with phenomena themselves. This is indispensable, even if the number of phenomena contained in the picture is so large that we cannot have them in mind all at the same time or if the phenomena are not directly accessible to our senses and cannot be studied (...) without the help of a set of very complicated apparatus. (shrink)

This paper draws attention to an increasingly common method of using computer simulations to establish evidential standards in physics. By simulating an actual detection procedure on a computer, physicists produce patterns of data (‘signatures’) that are expected to be observed if a sought-after phenomenon is present. Claims to detect the phenomenon are evaluated by comparing such simulated signatures with actual data. Here I provide a justification for this practice by showing how computer simulations establish the reliability of detection procedures. I (...) argue that this use of computer simulation undermines two fundamental tenets of the Bogen–Woodward account of evidential reasoning. Contrary to Bogen and Woodward’s view, computer-simulated signatures rely on ‘downward’ inferences from phenomena to data. Furthermore, these simulations establish the reliability of experimental setups without physically interacting with the apparatus. I illustrate my claims with a study of the recent detection of the superfluid-to-Mott-insulator phase transition in ultracold atomic gases. (shrink)

The book investigates distinctions between independent individuality and interactive relationality in physical phenomena. This is a common topic for investigation in modern physics and philosophy of science, and the topic is explored using contemporary research in those disciplines. Additionally, it is common for Buddhism to focus on relationships, and it proposes that independent individual things do not exist. In the context of physical reality, I take this Buddhist view as a hypothesis and examine it critically. We evaluate (...) its arguments and find them generally to be problematic when evaluated against modern standards for logic and physics. However, its fundamental principle—emptiness, or shunyata—is still worthy of being tested. -/- Contrary to many books on Buddhism and science, this one takes a very positive view of science. Yet, this depends on how we define ‘science’. Hence, the book begins with an examination of that topic, informed by philosophy of science and the author’s experience and training as physicist and philosopher. While we discuss, explain and justify many standard views of science, and present the standard elements of science, physics and physics theories, the book argues extensively for one perspective: pluralism in a synthesis of the author’s design. -/- I will show shunyata to be quite consistent with the knowledge framework of Physics Pluralism. When we test Buddhist emptiness against the results of physics—interpreting both within that knowledge framework—we discover the relevance, importance, and some truth in the relationality ideas of shunyata. -/- Robert Alan Paul has studied physics, had a career as a physicist, and both studied and practiced Tibetan Buddhism. He holds a bachelor’s degree in physics, and separate master’s degrees in philosophy; philosophy of science & mathematics; and physics (abd). He holds an interdisciplinary Ph.D. in four disciplines: philosophy of science, Western analytic metaphysics, Buddhist philosophy, and physics. His Ph.D. dissertation was the foundation of this book. (shrink)