Phronesis has become a buzzword in contemporary medical ethics. Yet, the use of this single term conceals a number of significant conceptual controversies based on divergent philosophical assumptions. This paper explores three of them: on phronesis as universalist or relativist, generalist or particularist, and natural/painless or painful/ambivalent. It also reveals tensions between Alasdair MacIntyre’s take on phronesis, typically drawn upon in professional ethics discourses, and Aristotle’s original concept. The paper offers these four binaries as a possible analytical (...) framework for classifying and evaluating accounts of phronesis in the medical ethics literature. It argues that to make sense of phronesis as a putative ideal in professional medical ethics—for example, with the further aim of crafting interventions to cultivate phronesis in medical ethics education—the preliminary question of which conception of phronesis is most serviceable for the aim in question needs to be answered. The paper identifies considerable lack of clarity in the current discursive field on phronesis and suggests how that shortcoming can be ameliorated. (shrink)

Phronesis is essential for good decision‐making and actions. This literature review shows how phronesis has been discussed and related to elements of the field of administration and organizations. A search in the database systems Scopus, EBSCO, Web of Science, and Scielo, based on eligibility criteria, resulted in 43 theoretical and 14 empirical works. The analysis of these studies showed the most significant empirical contributions, the most cited authors, methods, journals, and central themes addressed in studies on phronesis (...) to understand ethics in business. From a virtue ethics perspective, we discuss the major theoretical and empirical contributions, as well as the implications of a restricted understanding of phronesis when it is treated apart from other elements of the virtue ethics framework. We present a synthesis of the concepts of phronesis, based on dimensions of magnitude and amplitude of the conceptions, ranging from formal to substantive phronesis, and covering individual, organizational, or societal levels of analysis. We argue that a substantive conception of phronesis within virtue ethics may improve our understanding of ethics because it assumes the interdependence of phronesis and moral virtues, integral anthropology, and the common good. We present a future research agenda, considering the study's limitations and findings. (shrink)

This article has provided some philosophical thoughts concerning the journey of research undertakings involving human participants, with consideration given to both natural / physical and human / social science fields, and with a focus on the situation in Sierra Leone. In the process of professional engagement, researchers must seek to give serious reflective thoughts on how their engagement may affect participants and communities - this study has unravelled some thoughts on evolving perspectives. Ethical code of practice has been highlighted as (...) an important instrument in helping researchers manifest serious thoughts in their epistemic quest for pursuing knowledge, through engagement with human participants. The ethical requirement of a researcher to demonstrate intellectual virtue / prudence is a key aspect of the discourse in this article - that which enable trust to be established, and more so, the researcher's ability to exercise practical wisdom in their engagement with research communities. Keywords : Phronesis; Epistemology; Ethics; Praxis; Human Participants; Sierra Leone. (shrink)

In this paper, I examined whether evidence from the neuroscience of morality supports the standard models of phronesis, i.e., Jubilee and Aretai Centre Models. The standard models explain phronesis as a multifaceted construct based on interaction and coordination among functional components. I reviewed recent neuroscience studies focusing on brain networks associated with morality and their connectivity to examine the validity of the models. Simultaneously, I discussed whether the evidence helps the models address challenges, particularly those from the (...) class='Hi'>phronesis eliminativism. Neuroscientific evidence supported the importance of brain networks, i.e., the default mode, salience, and central executive functioning networks, in moral functioning in general. The findings favorably supported the multifaceted and integrative nature of phronesis proposed by the standard models. Finally, I considered how the two models could explain the mechanisms of phronesis more integratively based on neuroscientific findings. At the end of this paper, with the evidence, I proposed several practical ideas to promote the cultivation of phronesis, e.g., the consideration of coordination among components for moral functioning and the use of moral exemplars. (shrink)

En este artículo desplegaremos los supuestos que conducen a la rehabilitación del pensamiento de Aristóteles por parte de Gadamer, la cual tiene como eje central a la phrónesis aristotélica interpretada en vista del horizonte de la comprensión hermenéutica. Phronesis and HermeneuticsIn this article we will expound the assumptions that lead to the rehabilitation of Aristotle's thought by Gadamer, which has the Aristotelian phronesis as a core concept, interpreted in light of the horizon of hermeneutic understanding.

One of the crucial issues of modern universalistic theories of practical philosophy is the theoretical justification of normative principles and moral judgments that enables their universal validity. The problems these theories face are caused by separating rational theorizing from contexts of real life. That is the separation of theoretical justification and practice. The common for modern practical philosophy opposition between universalism and contextualism is reinterpreted today, new theories of post-metaphysical universalism appear that provide the developments of the last universalistic project (...) of discourse ethics in the context of a critical theory of the “third generation”. The purpose of this article is to present the ethical philosophy of Hannah Arendt as the original conception where the Kantian theory of judgment and the Aristotelian notion of phronesis are brought together in order to clarify the nature of ethical and moral statements. This problem, as the article highlights, lies in the understanding of subsumption of particular under universal. Universal judgments according to Arendt are justified in the Kantian theory of “enlarged mentality” as the human capacity to interact in communication and activity. The sensitivity to situations is reflected in the Aristotelian notion of phronesis. As Arendt’s justification of normative and ethical judgments is analyzed, the hermeneutic character of her theory is revealed, which is appropriate for the theory of J. Habermas and modern followers of critical theory. The article provides additional insight into the concept of “public space” as the realm which enables the overlapping of theory and practice. As proved the “public space” in the practical philosophy of Hannah Arendt becomes the realm of mutual ethical and moral thinking where judgments are oriented to the level of the human condition in general. The paper concludes by arguing that Arendt’s conception may overcome the opposition between universalism and contextualism, which is relevant in current ethical discourse. (shrink)

Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is a capacity the possession of which enables one to make good practical judgments and thus fulfill the distinctive function of human beings. Nir Eisikovits and Dan Feldman convincingly argue that this capacity may be undermined by statistical machine-learning-based AI. The critic questions: why should we worry that AI undermines phronesis? Why can’t we epistemically defer to AI, especially when it is superintelligent? Eisikovits and Feldman acknowledge such objection but do not consider it seriously. (...) In this paper, we argue that there is a way to reconcile Eisikovits and Feldman with their critic by adopting the principle of epistemic heed, according to which we should exercise our rational capacity as much as possible while heeding a superintelligence’s output whenever possible. (shrink)

This essay argues that while we have examined clinical ethics quite extensively in the literature, too little attention has been paid to the complex question of how clinical ethics is learned. Competing approaches to ethics pedagogy have relied on outmoded understandings of the way moral learning takes place in ethics. It is argued that the better approach, framed in the work of Aristotle, is the idea of phronesis, which depends on a long-term mentorship in clinical medicine for either medical (...) students or clinical ethics students. Such an approach is articulated and defended. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this essay I agree with Nicholas Burbules that ‘Phronesis’ is an ethical and political category that grounds the possibility of intercultural communication in translation from one particular context to another rather than in the presumption of one or another account of universalism. After a brief review of the development of this idea in key milestones of Western philosophy, I argue that it requires an education in dialogue across difference that can foster hope for peaceful coexistence among diverse traditions (...) and perspectives in diverse democratic societies. (shrink)

The article discusses relationships and contexts for "reason", "knowledge", and virtue in Aristotle, based on and elaborating some results from Eikeland. It positions Eikeland in relation to Moss but with a side view to Cammick, Kristjansson, and Taylor. These all seem to disagree among themselves but still agree partly in different ways with Eikeland. The text focuses on two questions: 1) the role or tasks of "reason", "knowledge", and "virtue" respectively in setting the end or goal for ethical deliberation, and (...) more generally, 2) the role of dialogue or dialectics in Aristotle's philosophy, including its role concerning question one. The author argues that phrónêsis needs to be interpreted in the context of the totality of Aristotle's philosophy, and explains how this totality is fundamentally dialectical. (shrink)

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle places the art of medicine alongside other examples of technē. According to Gadamer, however, medicine is different because in medicine the physician does not, properly speaking, produce anything. In The Enigma of Health, rather than introducing Aristotle’s intellectual virtue of phronēsis (practical wisdom) as a way of understanding medical practice, Gadamer focuses on how medicine is a technē “with a difference”. In this paper, I argue that, despite the richness of his insights, this focus prevents (...) Gadamer from reaching an adequate account of health and the practice of medicine, and I demonstrate how making phronēsis central via a phenomenological description furthers our understanding of the art of healing in important ways. The paper begins with an exploration of Gadamer’s understanding of phronēsis and technē (via Heidegger) to provide a foundation for a phenomenological analysis of the art of healing. After considering the shortcomings of Gadamer’s analyses, I introduce a working definition of “health” that both captures the spirit of Gadamer’s insights and prepares the ground for a phenomenological description. Finally, I introduce concepts from Merleau-Ponty in order to establish an adequate account of the relation between technē and phronēsis and a more nuanced understanding of experience as unfolding within the expressive trajectories forged by bodies that are subject to the weight of the past and the weight of the ideal. The art of medicine, I argue, needs to be understood as expressive behavior in the context of historically and socially situated individuals, institutions, and open trajectories of sense. (shrink)

A _phronesis_ aristotélica da _Ética Nicomaqueia_ está na base de todo pensamento de Hans-Georg Gadamer, bem como de toda a sua teoria hermenêutica, sob a forma de modelo. Mostro, mediante descrição, que ela é referência para a abordagem gadameriana dos problemas hermenêuticos da aplicação e da natureza da própria hermenêutica. Disso resulta que a _phronesis_ assume uma forma hermenêutica na medida em que contribui para a caracterização da atividade aplicativa do intérprete e para a determinação da hermenêutica filosófica como práxis, (...) as quais se encontram fundamentalmente enraizadas na finitude humana. (shrink)

The situation in which we find ourselves—of potentially catastrophic global climate change—makes it clear why we need to move beyond a phenomenological approach to time to include evolutionary, historical, material, ecological and personal perspectives. This paper distinguishes ten different ways in which the complexity of time reveals itself to contemporary reflection. These patterns or shapes of time supply interpretive resources for the temporal phronesis needed to navigate the challenge of productively inheriting our many pasts, while thinking through and practically (...) addressing the uncertain future both of our species, and indeed the planet. (shrink)

A standard thesis of contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics and some recent Heideggerian scholarship is that virtuous behavior can be performed immediately and spontaneously without engaging conscious processes of deliberative thought. It is also claimed that phronēsis either enables or is consistent with this possibility. In the Nicomachean Ethics, however, Aristotle identifies phronesis as the excellence of the calculative part of the intellect, claims that calculation and deliberation are the same and that it is the mark of the phronimos to (...) be able to deliberate well. He also insists that for an action to count as virtuous it must issue from rational choice, which he characterizes as determined by deliberation. It thus seems that any exegetically respectable attempt to explain virtuous action within an Aristotelian framework would need to integrate with some account of deliberative choice. This creates a tension in Aristotelian scholarship. In this paper, I shall formalize this tension in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims and shall examine the merits of at least one prominent interpretation of phronesis with respect to its reconciliation. (shrink)

To be human is to be in the world with others, and so what it means to be goes to the root of ethical and political life. One would have to be exceptionally obtuse not to recognize that this age, which we now share as a planetary humanity, is indeed in crisis, despite all our apparent progress if not because of it: the economic and political upheavals that threaten to throw whole regions into uproar, the shifts in climate that threaten (...) the entire globe with unparalleled disruption, the “advances” in technology that threaten to lay waste to entire cities and reduce human beings to “human resources.” Despite these ongoing or potential disasters, what Heidegger’s work challenges us to think is that the most fundamental disaster is a failure to think what it means to be human, that these other dangers can only be addressed if we confront this question first. My argument here is that Heidegger misreads a form of thinking vital to ethical–political life, phronêsis, so-called practical wisdom, because his radical historicism prevents him from seeing the intersection of principled norms with life as we find it. (shrink)

The applications of machine learning and deep learning to the natural sciences has fostered the idea that the automated nature of algorithmic analysis will gradually dispense human beings from scientific work. In this paper, I will show that this view is problematic, at least when ML is applied to biology. In particular, I will claim that ML is not independent of human beings and cannot form the basis of automated science. Computer scientists conceive their work as being a case of (...) Aristotle’s poiesis perfected by techne, which can be reduced to a number of straightforward rules and technical knowledge. I will show a number of concrete cases where at each level of computational analysis, more is required to ML than just poiesis and techne, and that the work of ML practitioners in biology needs also the cultivation of something analogous to phronesis, which cannot be automated. But even if we knew how to frame phronesis into rules, still this virtue is deeply entrenched in our biological constitution, which computers lack. Whether computers can fully perform scientific practice independently of humans is an ill-posed question. (shrink)

These are commentaries to the translation into Portuguese of Nicomachean Ethics VI, found in the same volume of Dissertatio.

This article has provided a forum for analytical discourses pertaining to two philosophical and methodological concepts (Phronesis and Hermeneutics) in a bid to addressing the key objectives set out. Dscussions emanated from the work (more so from literature review carried out) clearly shows that, there is no crystal dichotomy between the two concepts, but more so the prevalence of inter-connectedness and interpretation of situations or even texts can also be based on an expression of positive biasness towards what one (...) may perceive as being humanely justifiable, closely linked to Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy. The methodological inquiry of the study’s reliance on literature review materials and other documentations has helped greatly in unravelling an open, but more critical discourses pertaining to the two case study countries selected (Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom). (shrink)

In Eudemian Ethics 8.3, Aristotle treats a virtue that he calls kalokagathia, ‘nobility-and-goodness’. This virtue appears to be quite important, and he even identifies it with “perfect virtue” (1249a17). This makes it puzzling that the Nicomachean Ethics, a text that largely parallels the Eudemian Ethics, does not discuss kalokagathia at all. I argue that the reason for this difference has to do with the role that the intellectual virtue practical wisdom (phronêsis) plays in these treatises. The Nicomachean Ethics, I argue, (...) makes use of a more expansive conception of phronêsis than does the Eudemian Ethics. Hence, the work that is done by kalokagathia in the Eudemian Ethics -- crucially, accounting for the unity of the virtues -- is done in the Nicomachean Ethics by phronêsis. (shrink)

There are a number of well-established concepts explaining decision-making. The sociology of wise practice suggests that thinking preferences like the use of intuition form a cornerstone of administrators’ virtuous practice and phronesis is a likely candidate to explain this behaviour. This contribution uses conceptual and theoretical resources from the behavioural sciences, management science as well as philosophy to account for individual level differences of employees regarding thinking preferences in administrative professions. The analysis empirically investigates the behavioural dimension of the (...) preference for intuition vs the preference for deliberation to cast light on three different intuitive markers present among individuals who also prefer to use deliberation. We explore possible explanations for the differences and similarities of our global sample of 2227 workplace respondents who conceptually represent phronetic practitioners. The results show that many phronetic practitioners prefer the intuitive marker of unconscious thought, besides using deliberation. (shrink)

Phronesis is a fundamental term in Ancient Greek Philosophical tradition. This term is based on »wise- ruler« in Plato and »legislator- philosopher« thought in Plato. Most of Philosophers and commentators of Aristotle work relate methodical use of this term to Aristotle. This affair is the result of the manner of these two philosopher’s expression. But their ambiguity shows phronesis less importance in Plato’s intellectual tradition.Phronesis in Plato is brightness that results from good perception. But in his last (...) work, means Plato, phronesis hasn’t only divine origin, but in the meaning of Grief and Political Knowledge, is the supplement of sophia that is the highest coordination between reason and desire in spirit. Phronesis in Plato is responsible for creating governmental- philosophical rules and practical judgment through experience and council. By this, phronesis owners can merge wisdom and politics and see better than others. So, sophia and phronesis aren’t synonyms in Plato, but their conceptual application are related to each other: as phronesis owner has practical wisdom- sophia in Aristotle thought. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the crucial meta-virtue of _phronesis_ (practical wisdom) is cultivated through teaching and experience. But he remains mostly silent on the details of this developmental picture and its educational ramifications. This article focuses on the ‘taught’ element of _phronesis_ development in the context of police ethics education. I begin by piecing together the developmental trajectory that Aristotle suggests towards full virtue, up to and including _phronesis_ development. I also briefly list ten potential weaknesses of this picture. I then (...) present a reconstructed Aristotelian model of _phronesis_ and explain how the teaching element of _phronesis_ education could be executed, with an illustration from an ongoing _phronesis_ intervention for UK police-science students. However, I go on to dampen the enthusiasm about this ‘taught’ component, by explaining how relatively small the ‘zone of proximal development’ is that can be targeted by scaffolded teaching. Finally, I elicit some implications of the conclusion that most of _phronesis_ development will need to be ‘caught’ from gradually unfolding personal and professional experiences. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide an overview of various discourses relevant to developing a construct of collective _phronesis_, from a (neo)-Aristotelian perspective, with implications for professional practice in general and business practice and business ethics education in particular. Despite the proliferation of interest in practical wisdom within business ethics and more general areas of both psychology and philosophy, the focus has remained mostly on the construct at the level of individual decision-making, as in Aristotle’s _Nicomachean Ethics_. However, (...) he also made intriguing remarks about _phronesis_ at the collective level in his _Politics_: remarks that have mostly eluded elaboration. The aim of this article is practical and revisionary, rather than exegetical and deferential, with respect to Aristotle. Nevertheless, just as most of the literature on individual _phronesis_ draws on Aristotle’s exposition in the _Nicomachean Ethics_, the obvious first port of call for an analysis of collective _phronesis_ is to explore the resources handed down to us by Aristotle himself. The lion’s share of this article is, therefore, devoted to making sense of Aristotle’s somewhat unsystematic remarks and the lessons we can draw from them about collective managerial _phronesis_ and business ethics education. (shrink)

This article aims at developing a phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling, with a focus on the idea of semantic sentiment. In Section 1, we elucidate the characteristics of phronesis-oriented approach to philosophical counselling and state our reason for adopting this approach. In Section 2, we consider three visions of phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling, i.e., the Socratic vision, the Platonic vision, and the skill-based vision, and argue for the third vision. In Sections 3 and 4, we show how to practice such (...) phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling by introducing, exploring, and applying the idea of semantic sentiment. (shrink)

English summary: What does phronesis have to do with contingency? Starting from this question, the possibility of a philosophical theory of action is investigated on the basis of Rudiger Bubner's practical philosophy. Bubner himself referred back to Aristotle and his emphasis on the teleological structure of action. Actions are, therefore, oriented towards realizing some end. It follows from this understanding that the concept of action not only connects the work of philosophy in scholarly discourse and its function in the (...) orientation of life, it also makes possible a clarification of the understanding of rationality and history. Action is finally dependent on the contingent conditions of each period. Practical rationality experiences its highest development in phronesis, which can be defined as an engineering of the will, as rationality in actu. In a critical engagement with Kant's moral philosophy, Bubner developed a conceptual maxim which can be seen as the modern form of phronesis. On the quest for the legitimation of philosophy Bubner shows how a Renaissance, not rehabilitation, of practical philosophy was made possible in German Idealism up to Gadamer. German description: Was hat Phronesis mit Kontingenz zu tun? Ausgehend von dieser Frage wird im Rekurs auf Rudiger Bubners praktische Philosophie die Moglichkeit einer philosophischen Handlungstheorie untersucht. Bubner selbst rekurriert auf Aristoteles und dessen Betonung der teleologischen Struktur des Handelns. Handlungen sind demnach ausgerichtet auf ein zu verwirklichendes Gutes. Es ergeben sich aus dieser Bestimmung des Handlungsbegriffes nicht nur Bezuge zur Aufgabe der Philosophie im Wissenschaftsdiskurs und ihrer Funktion der Lebensorientierung; sie ermoglicht daruber hinaus auch eine Klarung des Verhaltnisses von Rationalitat und Geschichte. Handeln ist letztlich von den kontingenten Bedingungen der jeweiligen Zeit abhangig. Die praktische Rationalitat erfahrt ihre hochste Verwirklichung in der Phronesis, die man definieren konnte als eine Ingenieurskunst des Willens, als Rationalitat in actu. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Moralphilosophie entwickelt Bubner einen Maximenbegriff, der als moderne Form der Phronesis angesehen werden kann. Auf der Suche nach der Legitimation der Philosophie zeigt Bubner auf, wie eine Renaissance und nicht eine Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie, von der Antike, dem deutschen Idealismus bis hin zu Gadamer, moglich ist. (shrink)

Aristotle’s distinction between phronesis (practical wisdom) and episteme (theory) has been centrally influential in the development of hermeneutics. Heidegger, initiating hermeneutic phenomenology, foregrounded practical understanding as foundational (or ‘ready-to-hand’): scientific theory was but secondary (‘presented-at-hand’). Gadamer subsequently emphasised understanding as primarily practical, as an applicative achievement, within broad assumptions, ‘horizons of understanding’, a metaphor signalling explicitly/implicitly represented surroundings. How should Aristotle’s idea of practical wisdom in human affairs articulated in phenomenology’s hermeneutic thought - principally Gadamer’s scholarship - inform researcher (...) analyses? Here an account of hermeneutic philosophy, with its core conceptual formations, is presented as concerning situated understanding in practice, phronesis. Multiple instances of this behavioural research focus from psychology’s Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis then receive reflection. Interviewing proceeds from ‘horizons of expectation’ (Jauss 1982). Themes are viewed as 'horizons of understanding’ (Gadamer 1975), interviewees’ perspectives on practices. A researcher may engage in resolving ‘indeterminacy’ (Iser 1978). Participants’ reflectively recounted meaning-making phronesis practices can be structured in their analyses by locating their a priori, universally discernible aspects. Thus phronesis is constituted by generic, care (Heidegger’s Sorge) embodying activity, ‘emplaced’ or understood from tacit representational affective ‘horizons of understanding’: participant bodies can become denoted ‘equipment’ (Heidegger’s Zeug). Keywords: caring, hermeneutic phronesis, interpretative horizons of understanding, phenomenology. (shrink)

Ethical decision making in medicine has recently seen calls to move towards less prescriptive- based approaches that consider the particularities of each case. The main alternative call from the literature is for better understanding of phronesis concepts applied to decision making. A well-cited phronesis-based approach is Kaldjian’s five-stage theoretical framework: goals, concrete circumstances, virtues, deliberation and motivation to act. We build on Kaldjian’s theory after using his framework to analyse data collected from a three-year empirical study of (...) class='Hi'>phronesis and the medical community. The data are a set of narratives collected in response to asking a medical community what making ethically wise decisions means to them. We found that Kaldjian’s five concepts are present in the accounts to some extent but that one of the elements, motivation, is constructed as playing a different, though still crucial role. Rather than being an end-stage of the process as Kaldjian’s framework suggests, motivation was constructed as initiating the process and maintaining the momentum of taking a phronesis-based approach. The implications for medical ethics decision-making education are significant as motivation itself is a highly complex concept. We therefore theorise that motivation is required for leading in, continuing and completing the actions of the ethical decision taken. Appreciating the central importance of motivation through the whole of Kaldjian’s framework has implications for cultivating the virtues of phronesis and courage to take the right course of action. (shrink)

CITATION: Van Niekerk, A. A. & Nortje, N. 2013. Phronesis and an ethics of responsibility. South African Journal of Bioethics and Law, 6:28-31, doi:10.7196/SAJBL.262.

Eric Nelson has recently argued that John Rawls’ interpretation of the maxim to respect persons as ends in themselves which grants priority to our least-advantaged citizens violates the liberal commitment to neutrality towards each person’s capability to choose her or his conception of the good. This violation is revealed by the sectarian character of Martha Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, her Aristotelian extension of Rawls’ distributive ethics. I argue that Nelson advances an elitist interpretation of the non-violability of persons, in which (...) the capabilities of oneself are set in opposition to those of an other. He thus overlooks for his purposes the anti-sacrificial telos of the Rawlsian principles of justice which articulates the capabilities of oneself as another. Nelson’s elitism may itself be traced to Nussbaum’s rejection of Rawls’ distributive figuration of capability, the Aristotelian heritage of which is developed by Paul Ricoeur and which underwrites civic phronēsis on societal norms of reciprocity. (shrink)

Background: As moral action could help nurses reduce moral distress, it is necessary to carry out qualitative research to present the experiences in which nurses apply moral action. Aim: To describe and analyze the phronesis applied by nurses in the face of moral distress. Research design: The research participants were invited to participate in in-depth interviews. The research materials were based on the stories described by the research participants and recorded by means of first-person narrative. Narrative analysis was applied (...) to interpret the nurses’ phronesis. Participants: Twenty-seven nurses from Taiwan. Ethical considerations: The Institutional Review Board of the Kaohsiung Medical University Hospital in Taiwan confirmed that this study passed the research ethical review. Findings: According to the narrative analysis results, the phenomenon of moral distress contains difficulty, action, and idea transformation. The difficulty is the source of moral distress, action is the practice of moral courage, and idea transformation is the nurse’s emotional movement. Action and idea transformation are collectively called phronesis in this study. Discussion: Moral distress refers to a state of suffering caused by situations in which nurses cannot carry out their ethical intentions. Phronesis is the process through which nurses take actions and relocate the subjects and is an ethical way to find relief from moral distress. Starting with empathy and respectful attitudes arising from self-reflection, nurses may be helped to get relief from the suffering of moral distress. Conclusion: Phronesis can help nurses positively face the emotional strain of moral distress. This article puts forward a narrative method to complete the four steps of phronesis: write about the care experience, identify the difficulties in the stories, seek the possibility of action, and form a new care attitude, which could help nurses learn to reduce their moral distress. (shrink)

In terms of Aristotle's intellectual virtues, the process of clinical reasoning and the discipline of clinical medicine are often construed as techne (art), as episteme (science), or as an amalgam or composite of techne and episteme. Although dimensions of process and discipline are appropriately described in these terms, I argue that phronesis (practical reasoning) provides the most compelling paradigm, particularly of the rationality of the physician's knowing and doing in the clinical encounter with the patient. I anchor this argument, (...) moreover, in Pellegrino's philosophy of medicine as a healing relationship, oriented to the end of a right and good healing action for the individual patient. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, (...) we will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

The concept of phronesis is venerable and is experiencing a resurgence in contemporary discourses on professional life. Aristotle’s notion of phronesis involves reasoning and action based on ethical ideals oriented towards the human good. For Aristotle, humans possess the desire to do what is best for human flourishing, and to do so according to the application of virtues. Within health care, the pervasiveness of economic agendas, technological approaches and managerialism create conditions in which human relationships and moral reasoning (...) are becoming increasingly de‐valued. This creates a tension for nurses, and nursing leaders, as the desire to do what is morally right is often in conflict with contextual demands. In this paper, Aristotle’s writing on phronesis is examined with a focus on his classic conceptions of eudaimonia, the virtues, deliberation, judgement, and praxis. Building on Aristotle’s work, a number of contemporary views are explored with a focus on what various conceptualizations offer for the discipline of nursing. These expanded conceptions of phronesis include attention to: embodiment in practice; open‐mindedness including the capacity to stay curious and open to recognizing what we do not know; perceptiveness as a disposition towards insight and aesthetic understanding; and reflexivity as an ongoing process of interrogation and inquiry into ourselves and our actions. Drawing on these concepts, we discuss the affordances of phronesis as a morally informed guiding force to attend to modern‐day challenges in nursing practice and nursing leadership. (shrink)

In Book 6 of his NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Aristotle distinguishes phronesis or “practical wisdom” from poiesis or “art,” “production.” Neither deals with the universals of pure science or theoretical wisdom but rather with “things which admit of being other than they are,” “the realm of coming-to-be.” But phronesis “is itself an end,” namely “acting well”, whereas poiesis “has an end other than itself”, namely a work of art or a product. Phronesis is realized insofar as it is practiced (...) well in itself, and it involves right deliberation about goods internal to human action such as courage and justice. Poiesis is realized insofar as it produces something good beyond itself, in the making of noninternal goods such as crafts or goods imitative of action such as stories. Aristotle is here modifying Plato’s limitation of the role of the poets in his moral republic, but in a milder form that does not see the poets as actively distorting morality but rather performing a different kind of activity. Practical wisdom and poetics are both teleological practices—that is, practices aimed at some end—but the first finds its end within the practice itself, the second finally beyond it. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers have contributed to the development of the skill model of wisdom, according to which practical wisdom is practical skill. However, the model appears to be limited in its explanatory power, since there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill: A person with practical wisdom can and should deliberate about the end being pursued; by contrast, a person with a particular practical skill cannot deliberate about the end of the skill, and even if she can, she is not required to (...) do so. In this paper, I undermine these widely held asymmetries by elucidating the unnoticed nature of skill. (shrink)

There has been a growing interest in casuistry since the ground breaking work of Jonsen and Toulmin. Casuistry, in their view, offers the possibility of securing the moral agreement that policy makers desire but which has proved elusive to theory driven approaches to ethics. However, their account of casuistry is dependent upon the exercise of phronesis. As recent discussions of phronesis make clear, this requires attention not only to the particulars of the case, but also to the substantive (...) goods at stake in the case. Without agreement on these goods attention to cases is unlikely to secure the productive consensus that Jonson and Toulmin seek. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł wpisuje się w ożywioną obecnie dyskusję na temat tego, czy istnieje coś, co nazywamy mądrością praktyczną. Od początków etyki phrónesis była pojmowana jaka jedna z najważniejszych cnót. We współczesnej etyce, za sprawą sytuacjonistów – etyków silnie inspirowanych wynikami badań w obszarze psychologii społecznej – zakwestionowano istnienie cnót, a pośród nich phrónesis. Strategią przezwyciężenia sytuacjonistycznej krytyki było ujęcie cnót jako praktycznych umiejętności na poziomie eksperckim (takich jak np. wirtuozerskich umiejętności gry na instrumencie), których istnienia nikt nie kwestionuje. Autorka wykazuje (...) podobieństwa i różnice między umiejętnościami praktycznymi a cnotami. Odnosi się do ujęcia phrónesis jako specyficznej cnoty, która spełnia wiele różnych funkcji. Zastanawia się, czy strategia obrony tradycyjnie ujmowanej cnoty jako umiejętności praktycznej na poziomie eksperckim jest słuszna; czy nie jest ona jednak pewnym rodzajem trudnego do zaakceptowania redukcjonizmu. (shrink)

At least since Aristotle, phronesis (practical wisdom) and poetics (making or creating) have been understood as essentially different activities, one moral the other (in itself) non-moral. Today, if anything, this distinction is sharpened by a Romantic association of poetics with inner subjective expression. Recent revivals of Aristotelian ethics sometimes allow for poetic dimensions of ethics, but these are still separated from practical wisdom per se. Through a fresh reading of phronesis in the French hermeneutical phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur, I (...) argue that phronesis should be viewed as at least in part poetic at its very core. That is, phronesis deals with the fundamentally tragic human situation of moral incommensurability, and it responds to this by making or creating new moral meaning. Such a poetics of practical wisdom helps phronesis stand up to significant and important critiques made of it by a range of modernists and post-modernists, pointing a way forward for some important contemporary moral debates. (shrink)

Ontology has been traditionally guided by sophia, a form of knowledge directed toward that which is eternal, permanent, necessary. This tradition finds an important early expression in the philosophical ontology of Aristotle. Yet in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's intense concern to do justice to the world of finite contingency leads him to develop a mode of knowledge, phronsis, that implicitly challenges the hegemony of sophia and the economy of values on which it depends. Following in the tradition of the early (...) Heidegger's recognition of the ontological significance of Aristotle's Ethics and of Gadamer's appropriation of phronsis for hermeneutics, this article argues that an ontology guided by phronsis is preferable to one governed by sophia. Specifically, it suggests that by taking sophia as its paradigm, traditional philosophical ontology has historically been determined by a kind of knowledge that is incapable of critically considering the concrete historico-ethico-political conditions of its own deployment. This critique of sophia is accomplished by uncovering the economy of values that led Aristotle to privilege sophia over phronsis. It is intended to open up the possibility of developing an ontology of finite contingency based on phronsis. Such an ontology, because it is guided by and must remain responsible to the concrete individual with which it is engaged, would be ethical at its very core. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Intensifying Phronesis:Heidegger, Aristotle, and Rhetorical CultureDaniel L. SmithAll too well versed in the commonness of what is multiple and entangled, we are no longer capable of experiencing the strangeness that carries with it all that is simple.—Martin Heidegger, Aristotle's Metaphysics θ 1-3IntroductionIn Norms of Rhetorical Culture Thomas Farrell returns to the thought of Aristotle to develop a contemporary conception of rhetoric as a mode of practical philosophy, one (...) that foregrounds the importance of phronesis. Returning to Aristotle's work to forge contemporary conceptions of rhetoric as practical philosophy is nothing new. What is novel about Farrell's approach, however, are his thoughts on Aristotle's conception of "phainomena," or appearances. "Appearances," Farrell states, "come to us as configurations, as ensembles of objects, habitats, paths, tools, tasks, icons, and more or less recognizable characters that engage and reassure us with their... familiarity" (1993, 27). Phainomena and their stability, therefore, constitute the milieux of human life. But coupled with the stability of phainomena that lends continuity and predictability to our lives is their dynamic element of mutability, contingency, and unpredictability. Therefore phainomena can also be "ambiguous or even equivocal and incomplete," according to Farrell (27). This stable-mutable aspect of phainomena, and thus human life itself, demands that we have ways of inhabiting and responding to the worlds these phainomena constitute.Farrell cites a comment by Merleau-Ponty on Cezanne as an "apt characterization" of Aristotle's thought: Cezanne, writes Merleau-Ponty, "did not want to separate the stable things which we see and the shifting way in which they appear..." (quoted in Farrell, 27). For Farrell, Merleau-Ponty's observation concisely expresses a fundamental aspect of Aristotle's [End Page 77] thought, namely, a focus on the relation between the being of things and their dynamic modes of appearing, which are distinct but inextricably connected. Aristotle's conception of phainomena, Farrell's work suggests, offers possibilities for thinking about rhetoric as practical philosophy, a rhetoric that would be "an art of real life" (274), one that, because of the stability-contingency of real life, features the concept of phronesis.It is interesting to note that the issue of being-appearing that Farrell attributes to Aristotle sounds like a problematic of twentieth-century European phenomenology. Given Merleau-Ponty's status as one of the preeminent phenomenologists of the twentieth century, it is surprising that Farrell makes no mention of Merleau-Ponty's—or phenomenology's—interest in the dynamics of phainomena; nor does he make any explicit connections between Aristotle, rhetoric, and phenomenology. In fact, Farrell's thoughts on the connections between rhetoric and the being-appearing of phainomena are virtually eclipsed in his book when he turns to Jürgen Habermas. Farrell claims "that Habermas's project on discourse ethics, together with his practical placement of the public sphere, offers a basis for synthesizing the normative component of practical wisdom and a rhetoric goaded by emancipatory reason" (188). Farrell's interest in theorizing the enactment of "emancipatory reason" in the public sphere, through norm-governed rhetorical practices (of argumentation, deliberation, and so forth), takes precedence over theorizing the rhetoric-phainomena connection (or at the very least, does not facilitate a phenomenological consideration of rhetorical cultures and norms). This is not a criticism of Farrell, but rather the citing of an absence that opens a possibility. More specifically, because Farrell does not see, or perhaps is not interested in, the connection between his understanding of Aristotle and the problematic of phenomenology, he is not prompted to explore the possibilities that lie in bringing rhetorical studies into an encounter with phenomenology. Furthermore, given the connection Farrell makes between Aristotle and phainomena, Farrell's work suggests that it might be interesting to see what possibilities for rhetoric might exist in readings of Aristotle by phenomenologists.This essay will attempt to look into possibilities unexamined by Farrell. My aim in assuming this task, however, is not to theorize and facilitate the enactment of "emancipatory reason" in the public sphere through discourse governed by normative standards or ideals. Rather, my goal is to highlight the ways that phenomenology and phenomenological readings of Aristotle can help rhetorical scholars to examine... (shrink)

Phronesis, a popular Aristotelian concept that emphasizes deliberation and moral action, should replace the phrase ‘research‐based practice’ as the guiding light for nursing practice. Knowledge from research is still essential, of course, but is insufficient by itself for practice. In this paper, the author describes assumptions behind the apparent superiority of research‐based knowledge, and offers a critique of this position. One critique is that by automatically accepting the superiority of research‐based knowledge other types of knowledge (e.g. intuitive, ethical, personal) (...) are devalued. A second critique is that undeliberated, indiscriminate use of research findings may lead to inappropriate nursing practice.Phronesisis then described, and its application to nursing. For example,phronesisrequires that the context of the situation be considered very carefully before acting. Aristotle stated that the goal of personalphronesisis to reacheudaimonia, or genuine happiness or ‘human flourishing’. Infusing nursing practice withphronesismeans that an anthropomorphized discipline'seudaimoniawould be theeudaimoniaof patients. That is, nursing practice would be guided by a desire for patients' genuine happiness or human flourishing. The final section of the paper offers rebuttals to potential criticisms. (shrink)

"œLa phronesis como forma mentis de eticidad"Este ensayo pretende restaurar el espacio en que el pensamiento griego situ� los conceptos de virtud y de prudencia, invocando una nueva interpretaci�n sobre el problema de la �tica y la subjetividad. El autor diserta sobre la virtud de la prudencia con el uso de una hermen�utica com�n a la tradici�n cultural del Occidente europeo y que integra lo mejor de la interpretaci�n hist�rica que Croce, Heidegger o Bultmann, por ejemplo, han legado al (...) debate filos�fico. Todo esto sin perder de vista que esas interpretaciones tambi�n son la expresi�n de una subjetividad humana con un contexto hist�rico preciso, siempre contingente y nunca perfectamente asible. "œPhronesis as a forma mentis of ethicity"This essay tries to restore the space in which Greek thought placed the concepts of virtue and prudence, calling on a new interpretation of the problem of Ethics and subjectivity. The author disserts about prudence as a virtue and the use, in the European culturan tradition, of Hermeneutics, which compose the best of historical interpretation that Croce, Heidegger or Bultmann, for example, have inherited to the philosophical discussion. This debate also considers that these interpretations are the expression of a human subjectivity with a definite historical context, always contingent and never perfectly seizable. (shrink)

: How might bioethics take account of cultural diversity? Can practical wisdom of an Aristotelian sort be applied across cultures? After showing that practical wisdom involves both intellectual cleverness and moral virtue, it is argued that both these components have universality. Hence practical wisdom must be universal as well. Hellenic ethical thought neither depended on outdated theoretical notions nor limited itself to the Greek world, but was in fact developed with constant awareness of cultural differences, so it arguably works as (...) well in other times and places as when formulated. Even the eudaemonistic setting for practical wisdom is unproblematic. (shrink)

Phronesis is often described as a ‘practical wisdom’ adapted to the matters of everyday human life. Phronesis enables one to judge what is at stake in a situation and what means are required to bring about a good outcome. In medicine, phronesis tends to be called upon to deal with ethical issues and to offer a critique of clinical practice as a straightforward instrumental application of scientific knowledge. There is, however, a paucity of empirical studies of (...) class='Hi'>phronesis, including in medicine. Using a hermeneutic and phenomenological approach, this inquiry explores how phronesis is manifest in the stories of clinical practice of eleven exemplary physicians. The findings highlight five overarching themes: ethos (or character) of the physician, clinical habitus revealed in physician know-how, encountering the patient with attentiveness, modes of reasoning amidst complexity, and embodied perceptions (such as intuitions or gut feeling). The findings open a discussion about the contingent nature of clinical situations, a hermeneutic mode of clinical thinking, tacit dimensions of being and doing in clinical practice, the centrality of caring relations with patients, and the elusive quality of some aspects of practice. This study deepens understandings of the nature of phronesis within clinical settings and proposes ‘Clinical phronesis’ as a descriptor for its appearance and role in the daily practice of (exemplary) physicians. (shrink)

ABSTRACT “Lockdown!” has articulated our collective and individual fear response to the novel coronavirus. Two regnant specialized discourses fostered by the academy—science and ideology critique—could not redirect this inadequate response nor generate their own adequately broad and focused social responses. This suggests the desirability of the academy adding phronesis as a goal for its pedagogical practices.

Decision-making depends on bringing evidence together with values: decision theory for example employs probabilities and utilities; health economic decisions employ measures such as quality of life. The hypothesis guiding this chapter is that bringing evidence together with values in clinical decision-making requires an exercise of phronesis. Our aim however is not to justify our guiding hypothesis. It is rather to outline an account of phronesis that is in principle fit for the purposes of clinical decision-making if our guiding (...) hypothesis is correct. The chapter has three sections. Section 1 describes the growing gap between evidence and values in clinical decision-making: the missing link, we suggest, required to bridge this gap, is an appropriate account of phronesis. Section 2 provides an initial characterisation of the required account of phronesis via Michael Polanyi’s twin stipulation on the nature of tacit knowledge. Section 3 then fills out the required account using John McDowell’s characterisation of phronesis as a situation specific but at the same time conceptually structured form of practical discernment. A McDowellian account of phronesis, we argue, in satisfying Polanyi’s twin stipulation, provides an in-principle bridge between evidence and values. We conclude with a note on some of the further requirements if the gap is to be bridged not only in principle but in practice too. (shrink)

La recherche d’une définition de la raison droite ( orthos logos ) au livre VI de l’ Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote n’est pas une recherche des “raisons droites” ou du “raisonnement droit” que produit l’expert – il ne tente pas de caractériser (et moins encore de “définir”) le type de justification ou de délibération qu’un médecin ou un phronimos produisent avant de choisir la bonne façon de procéder. A fortiori, il ne recherche pas des règles de conduite. Il recherche plutôt (...) les propriétés qui caractérisent l’âme d’une personne qui est capable de raisonner correctement: la “raison droite” comprise comme perfection de la partie rationnelle de l’âme. Dans cet article, j’examine la description aristotélicienne de la phronēsis, la vertu de la pensée ( dianoētikē aretē ) qui a rapport à l’action, et l’ euboulia, en tant qu’elle en est l’excellence caractéristique. (shrink)