One can expect a scientific journal to fulfill the purpose of disseminating research results, spreading works and new ideas and, now more than ever, franking space for the fruitful exchange among institutions under the dictum of the knowledge’s internationalization. Honoring its commitment as an academical philosophy journal, the present issue of the Aoristo - International Journal of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Metaphysics assumes the three afore mentioned missions, with emphasis on the last one.

This article considers the personal and philosophical relationship between two philosophers, Margaret MacDonald and Gilbert Ryle. I show that a letter from MacDonald to Ryle found at Linacre Colleg...

Friendship is an important part of the good life. While many roboticists are eager to create friend-like robots, many philosophers and ethicists are concerned. They argue that robots cannot really be our friends. Robots can only fake the emotional and behavioural cues we associate with friendship. Consequently, we should resist the drive to create robot friends. In this article, I argue that the philosophical critics are wrong. Using the classic virtue-ideal of friendship, I argue that robots can (...) plausibly be considered our virtue friends - that to do so is philosophically reasonable. Furthermore, I argue that even if you do not think that robots can be our virtue friends, they can fulfil other important friendship roles, and can complement and enhance the virtue friendships between human beings. (shrink)

Friendship constitutes an integral part of human flourishing. Aristotle (1996) famously wrote, ‘For no one would choose to live without friends, but possessing all other good things’ (p. 205). Members of our respective practice communities (MacIntyre, 1984) understand and appreciate our passion for running or basketball, tennis or cycling. The friends we develop through sport, and herein I focus on running, have the potential to help us cultivate human flourishing in the Aristotelian sense. Highlighting this point, Austin (2007) writes (...) that ‘The friendships of runners often illustrate Aristotle’s understanding of this highest form of friendship, as well as friendship in its lower forms. And as we shall see, running is well suited for fostering the type of friendship that Aristotle thinks is necessary for being happy’ (p. 12). In his book, Philosophy Americana, Anderson (2006) provides an overview of the themes which pervade the academic discipline known as American philosophy. Individuals typically cited within this domain include Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, and John Dewey, among others. Examining the nature of running friendships provides a way to explicate American philosophical themes; and the themes provide a means to more fully understand and appreciate the nature of running friendships. My purpose here is to examine running friendships through the lens of the American philosophical tradition. The themes I have in mind here are: patience; commitment and immersion; risk and precipitousnes; and experience. I begin with an overview of friendship, including friendship as a form of human flourishing as well as the formation of friendship. I then transition to an examination of American philosophical themes related to running and friendship. (shrink)

Introduction: The Nature and Signif1cance of Friendship Neera Kapur Badhwar Philosophers have long recognized that friendship plays a central role in a ...

While for centuries friendship has fascinated and puzzled philosophers, they haven't always been able to fit it into their theories. The author explores friendship as something hard to deal with in the neat and tidy ways of philosophical theory - but nevertheless as one of the central goods of human experience.

"Friendship, that pervasive, everyday, and subtle matter of our most intimate personal life, has rarely been accorded its due. Michael Pakaluk has retrieved the thoughts of our greatest thinkers on the subject and collected them into a handsome and handy volume.... A splendid book!" --M. M. Wartofsky, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Baruch College, City University of New York.

Cultures other than those in Christian Europe have had important and interesting observations to make on the nature of friendship, and in this collection there ...

Aristotle and the shape of modern friendships. With John McCarthy and Matthew West.

In this lyrical and beautifully written book, Raimond Gaita tells inspirational, poignant, sometimes funny but never sentimental stories of the dogs, cats and cockatoos that lived and died within his own family. _The Philosopher's Dog_ is above all a book about our creatureliness and its place in the understanding of our humanity.

Friendship with the ancients is a set of imaginative exercises and engagements with the work of deceased authors that allows us to imagine them as friends. Authors from diverse cultures and times such as Mengzi, Niccolò Machiavelli, W.E.B Du Bois, and Clare Carlisle have engaged in it. The aim of this paper is to defend this practice, showing that friendship with the ancients is a species of philosophical friendship, which confers the unique benefits such friendships offer. It (...) is conducive to epistemic virtue, notably the related virtues of epistemic humility and of relational understanding. When we cultivate friendship with the ancients, we are not learning facts about them, but aim at understanding their views in their full scope in a way that a relationship between friends allows. (shrink)

What unites friends and distinguishes them from others? Is the preference we give to friends rationally and morally justifiable? This collection of new essays on the philosophy of friendship considers such questions.

Montaigne’s “Of friendship” is often read as a celebration of his relationship with his late friend, Étienne La Boétie. This is not wrong, but rather, incomplete. Drawing on the chapters of Montaigne’s Essays that immediately follow “Of friendship,” this essay argues that Montaigne’s chapter on friendship is part of a larger project in which he employs philosophical fictions—specifically, his “perfect friendship” with La Boétie and the “perfect society” that he depicts in “Of cannibals”—to reorient us in (...) our relationships not only with our friends, but also with our enemies. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to investigate into the ethical significance of friendship, beginning with its origins in ancient Greek philosophy. The first part is dedicated to an interpretation of Plato’s understanding of friendship as a way towards the good. The second part focuses on how Aristotle takes up the thread after Plato and elaborates on the potential of friendship to enhance the good between virtuous people. In the final parts, the paper uncovers Friedrich Nietzsche’s posthumous (...) thoughts on “an ethics of friendship”, which he traces back to ancient Greek philosophy, and it offers a concluding critical commentary on three modern thinkers, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt and Alasdair MacIntyre, who reflect, each in their own way, on the human good in an on-going dialogue with the ancient Greek philosophy of friendship. (shrink)

Selections on romantic love, agape and eros, friendship, the possibility of love, love and emotion, and caring.

"I imagine the two friends crossing the deserted streets of Paris at night and talking—about what? They speak of philosophy, intellectual matters."David M. Robinson's article "In the Golden Hour of Friendship": Transcendentalism and Utopian Desire locates a reversal in Emerson's essay "Friendship." Emerson, according to this reading, propounds and then rejects philosophy as a foundation of friendship; "Emerson enacts in this essay a quite extraordinary repudiation of his own philosophy. He first describes the desire of one individual (...) for another as an unchosen or fated condition, the initial promise of which is by nature impossible to fulfill… But Emerson then simply dismisses this iron law of existence as a... (shrink)

On Friendship – Cicero vs. John of Salisbury. On the topic of friendship, a clear filiation can be traced between Cicero and John of Salisbury. However, it is not a mere quotation, but an organic evolution of thought. For both philosophers, friendship appears as supporting social and political relations, thus making the existence of the commonwealth possible. Their views on the different characteristics of friendship are at the same time both shared and different, thus tracing a (...) development of the concept. (shrink)

In Friendship, Italian philosopher Claudia Baracchi explores the philosophical underpinnings of friendship. Tackling the issue of friendship in the era of Facebook and online social networks requires courage and even a certain impertinence. The friendship relationship involves trust, fidelity, and availability for profound sharing. Sociologists assure us this attitude was never more improbable than in our time of dramatic anthropological reconfiguration. Research on friendship cannot therefore ignore ancient thought: with unparalleled depth, Friendship examines the (...) broader implications of relationship, both emotional and political. Today, the grand socio-political structures of the world are trembling. The hold of valued paradigms that traditionally positioned individuals, determined their destinies, and assigned them their roles and reciprocal responsibilities is becoming uncertain. In these many global shifts, previously unforeseen possibilities for individual and collective becoming are unleashed. Perhaps friendship has to do with worlds that are not: that are not yet, and that should be desired all the more. Focusing on the works of Aristotle, Baracchi explores ancient reflections on friendship, in the belief that they have much to teach us about our relationships in the present day. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBringing philosophical work on friendship to bear on the growing body of critique about the state of the neoliberal academy, this paper defends academic friendship. Initially a vignette illustrates the key features of academic friendship and the multiple demands on academics to account for themselves in the neoliberal university. We locate academic friendship in the context of that neoliberal university before discussing managerialist threats to this relationship. We indicate how the performativity-driven working environment contrasts radically and (...) unfavourably with some defining features of friendship. Academic friendship, we argue, can entail generative intellectual and moral activity and growth though trusting and honest reflection on research and scholarship, and teaching and learning. Contending that it may offer an antidote to aspects of the neoliberal academy, in our concluding section academic friendship is highlighted as both a defence and a means of resistance against the worst excesses of the university in dark times. (shrink)

Philosophers have tended to construe friendship as an intimate relationship involving mutual love, and have focused their discussions on this ‘true’ form of friendship. However, everyone recognizes that we use the word ‘friend’ and its cognates to refer, non-ironically, to those with whom we share various relationships that are not terribly intimate or which do not involve mutual love. I argue that there exists no general reason to restrict our philosophical focus to ‘true’ friendships, and allege that we (...) can gain important insights if we broaden our perspective to include lesser friends. I contend that friendships, in the broad sense (encompassing both ‘true’ and lesser forms), are necessarily relationships that are the product of significant collaborative norm manipulation. And I argue that understanding friendship in this way helps explain important features, including the difference between friendships and familiar relations, the non-fungibility of friends, and why friendships are often in flux. (shrink)

Love, Friendship, and the Self presents a reexamination of our common understanding of ourselves as persons in light of the phenomena of love and friendship. It argues that the individualism that is implicit in that understanding cannot be sustained if we are to understand the kind of distinctively personal intimacy that love and friendship essentially involve. For love is a matter of identifying with someone: sharing for his sake the concerns and values that make up his identity (...) as the person he is. Moreover, in friendship the friends share not only a concern for each other but also their activity, their lives, and even potentially their selves. By providing a detailed analysis of these notions, Bennett Helm argues for an understanding of persons as essentially social. (shrink)

Various emerging technologies, from social robotics to social media, appeal to our desire for social interactions, while avoiding some of the risks and costs of face-to-face human interaction. But can they offer us real friendship? In this book, Alexis Elder outlines a theory of friendship drawing on Aristotle and contemporary work on social ontology, and then uses it to evaluate the real value of social robotics and emerging social technologies. In the first part of the book Elder develops (...) a robust and rigorous ontology of friendship: what it is, how it functions, what harms it, and how it relates to familiar ethical and philosophical questions about character, value, and well-being. In Part II she applies this ontology to emerging trends in social robotics and human-robot interaction, including robotic companions for lonely seniors, therapeutic robots used to teach social skills to children on the autism spectrum, and companionate robots currently being developed for consumer markets. Elder articulates the moral hazards presented by these robots, while at the same time acknowledging their real and measurable benefits. In the final section she shifts her focus to connections between real people, especially those enabled by social media. Arguing against critics who have charged that these new communication technologies are weakening our social connections, Elder explores ways in which text messaging, video chats, Facebook, and Snapchat are enabling us to develop, sustain, and enrich our friendship in new and meaningful ways. (shrink)

Friendship, on George Santayana’s account, is a form of human society made possible by consciousness of ideals while simultaneously rooted in the experience of embodied creatures spontaneously drawn to each other. His philosophical and autobiographical writings on friendship (particularly his friendship with Frank Russell) exemplify a practice of cultivating wisdom and suggest how we can come to understand our own actual friendships and the opportunities for self-knowledge and sanity in them.

Philosophers have not paid much attention to the impact of remote work on the nature of work and the workplace. The overall aim of this paper is to contribute to further debate over the value of remote work by focusing on one important dimension of it – the effect on collegial relationships.I distinguish two types of collegial relationships. On the one hand, there are what I call “Kantian collegial relationships”, which have been outlined in a recent account by Betzler & (...) Löschke. These are colleagues who acknowledge and respect each other as equals, and provide relationship goods in a fair and distributive manner. On the other hand, there are what I call “collegial friendships”. In contrast to Kantian colleagues, collegial friends are emotionally supportive and show appreciation for each other for who they are, not just because they are equals. Both types of collegial relationship must be taken into consideration if we want to fully understand why we value our colleagues.I then show that there are reasons to believe that remote work will have a chilling effect on collegial friendships. Remote workers must interact online, which undermines forms of self-disclosure that are necessary for intimate relationships to form, like collegial friendship. Conversely, I suggest that remote work, for exactly the same reasons, will have a positive effect on Kantian collegial relationships. The proliferation of remote work forces us to consider whether this tradeoff is acceptable. (shrink)

Philosophical interest in friendship has revived after a long eclipse. This is largely due to a renewed interest in ancient moral philosophy, in the role of emotion in morality, and in the ethical dimensions of personal relations in general. Some of the main questions raised by philosophers are the following: Is friendship only an instrumental value, i.e., only a means to other values, or also an intrinsic value - a value in its own right? Is friendship a (...) mark of psychological and moral self-sufficiency, or of deficiency? How does friendship-love differ from the unconditional love of agape, and how - if at all - is it related to justice? Can the particularist, partialist perspective of friendship be reconciled with the universalist, impartialist perspective of morality? Is friendship morally neutral, or does friendship at its best require a good character? These questions are discussed here with reference to the following philosophical traditions. (shrink)

Based on a decade of direct diplomatic engagement with the United Nations, a decade of teaching on international relations, and another decade of research and teaching on Islamic and comparative peace studies, this book offers a friendship-related academic framework that examines shared moral concepts, philosophical paradigms and political experiences that can help developing and expanding multi-disciplinary conversations between the Christian West and the Muslim East. By advancing multicultural and inter-religious discourses on friendship, this book helps promoting actual friendships (...) among diverse cultures and peoples. This book has no published parallels, so far, in the current century. Most important, it is not a monologue. Rather, it provides a model of conversations among scholars and political actors who come from diverse international and inter-religious backgrounds. The word "Islamic" should not mislead the reader to suspect that this edited volume delves only into religious discourses. On the contrary, it provides a forum for conversations both within and between religious as well as philosophical perspectives. In short, the book is a forum for friendship conversations both thematically and also in terms of disciplinary and cultural diversity. This volume presents a model for intellectual conversations about friendship. The result of the work of many prominent international scholars and diplomats over many years, it conveys at least one message clearly: friendship matters for not only our happiness but also for our survival. (shrink)

In Philosophizing the Indefensible Shmuel Nili proposes strategic political theory as a productive and respectful manner for political philosophy to engage with unreasonable political views. One objection to his proposal he considers is that strategic political theory gives ‘excessive attention' to unreasonable views. In this paper I offer a perspective on this objection which Nili does not consider and which, I believe, has important consequences for his account. The strategic theorist pays engaged and respectful attention to unreasonable views for the (...) sake of showing respect and upholding ties of civic friendship with unreasonable citizens. Yet such attention might inadvertently disrespect and damage ties of civic friendship with those disadvantaged by the indefensible policies of the unreasonable. I consider how this consideration bears on Nili’s argument for strategic theorizing based on the practical necessity to alleviate what he calls ‘the burdens of politics'. (shrink)

For Strasbourg consists of a series of essays and interviews about the city of Strasbourg and the philosophical friendships Jacques Derrida developed there over a period of some forty years. Written just months before his death, the opening essay, “The Place Name: Strasbourg,” recounts in detail, and in very moving terms, Derrida’s deep attachment to this French city on the border between France and Germany. More than just a personal narrative, however, the essay is a profound interrogation of the relationship (...) between philosophy and place, philosophy and language, and philosophy and friendship. As such, it raises a series of philosophical, political, and ethical questions that might all be placed under the aegis of what Derrida once called “philosophical nationalities and nationalism.” The other three texts included in the book are long interviews/conversations between Derrida and his two principal interlocutors in Strasbourg, Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. These interviews are significant both for the themes they focus on and for what they reveal about Derrida’s relationships to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe. Filled with sharp insights into one anothers’ work and peppered with personal anecdotes and humor, the interviews bear witness to the decades-long intellectual friendships of these three important contemporary thinkers. This collection thus stands as a reminder of and testimony to Derrida’s unique relationship to Strasbourg and to the two thinkers most closely associated with that city. (shrink)

In this article I demonstrate how Hannah Arendt both appropriates and transforms Aristotle’s view of political friendship. I argue that the brief discussion of Aristotelian political friendship in The Human Condition relies on an earlier de-materialization of Aristotle’s work on friendship. This de-materialization of Aristotle’s view of friendship allows Arendt to discuss Aristotelian friendship as a kind of ‘respect’, where ‘respect’ is a philosophical notion unavailable to Aristotle. Ultimately, for Arendt, the experience of friendship (...) opens up a space for human beings to begin to practice a distinct way of seeing one another – a ‘respect’ – that can in turn be practiced in public, making the experience of friendship an important precursor to action. (shrink)

Simon Keller and Sarah Stroud have both argued that the demands of being a good friend can conflict with the demands of standard epistemic norms. Intuitively, good friends will tend to seek favorable interpretations of their friends’ behaviors, interpretations that they would not apply to strangers; as such they seem prone to form unjustified beliefs. I argue that there is no such clash of norms. In particular, I argue that friendship does not require us to form beliefs about our (...) friends in the biased fashion suggested by Stroud and Keller. I further argue that while some slight bias in belief-formation might be permitted by friendship, any such bias would fall within the bounds of epistemic propriety. (shrink)

The story of the greatest of all philosophical friendships—and how it influenced modern thought David Hume is widely regarded as the most important philosopher ever to write in English, but during his lifetime he was attacked as “the Great Infidel” for his skeptical religious views and deemed unfit to teach the young. In contrast, Adam Smith was a revered professor of moral philosophy, and is now often hailed as the founding father of capitalism. Remarkably, the two were best friends for (...) most of their adult lives, sharing what Dennis Rasmussen calls the greatest of all philosophical friendships. The Infidel and the Professor is the first book to tell the fascinating story of the friendship of these towering Enlightenment thinkers—and how it influenced their world-changing ideas. The book follows Hume and Smith’s relationship from their first meeting in 1749 until Hume’s death in 1776. It describes how they commented on each other’s writings, supported each other’s careers and literary ambitions, and advised each other on personal matters, most notably after Hume’s quarrel with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Members of a vibrant intellectual scene in Enlightenment Scotland, Hume and Smith made many of the same friends, joined the same clubs, and were interested in many of the same subjects well beyond philosophy and economics—from psychology and history to politics and Britain’s conflict with the American colonies. The book reveals that Smith’s private religious views were considerably closer to Hume’s public ones than is usually believed. It also shows that Hume contributed more to economics—and Smith contributed more to philosophy—than is generally recognized. Vividly written, The Infidel and the Professor is a compelling account of a great friendship that had great consequences for modern thought. (shrink)

Friendship and other intimate relationships have created difficulties for moral philosophers. While morality seems to require us to remain impartial between persons, friendship seems to generate demands or obligations of partiality toward our intimates. But the difficulty can be removed once we cease to focus on categorizing reasons as moral or non-moral. This tendency to divide reasons into categories of moral vs. non-moral leads us to give those that we label ‘moral’ pride of place and to assume that (...) the category must be uniform. If we abandon these assumptions, then reasons of intimacy or friendship will no longer be so puzzling. We will then be able to see that all reasons, in the end, are importantly egocentric, and that deliberation must always proceed from an egocentric perspective. (shrink)

Contemplating friendship in Aristotle's Ethics -- Teleology, inequality and autonomy -- Moral virtue: possibilities and limits -- Justice: giving to each what is owed -- Intellectual virtue, Akrasia and political philosophy -- Citizens, friends and philosophers -- Happiness and maternal contemplation.

I intend to argue that good friendship sometimes requires epistemic irresponsibility. To put it another way, it is not always possible to be both a good friend and a diligent believer.

Today, friendship, love and sexuality are mostly viewed as private, personal and informal relations. In the mediaeval and early modern period, just like in ancient times, this was different. The classical philosophy of friendship included both friendship and love in the concept of philia. It was also linked to an argument about the virtues needed to become an excellent member of the city state. Thus, close relations were not only thought to be a matter of pleasant gatherings (...) in privacy, but just as much a matter of ethics and politics.What, then, happened to the classical ideas of close relations when they were transmitted to philosophers, clerical and monastic thinkers, state officials or other people in the medieval and early modern period? To what extent did friendship transcend the distinctions between private and public that then existed? How were close relations shaped in practice? Did dialogues with close friends help to contribute to the process of subject-formation in the Renaissance and Enlightenment? To what degree did institutions of power or individual thinkers find it necessary to caution against friendship or love and sexuality? (shrink)

When considering the value of friendship, most philosophers ignore the negatives. Most assume that humans need friends to flourish, and some argue that friendships can be good, no matter the risks entailed. This makes conversations about the value of friendship one-sided. Here, I argue that Cynics and Pessimists have an important view on friendship, despite it being ignored. They hold that: (a) friendship is unnecessary for flourishing, and (b) friendship presents ethical risks, especially to one’s (...) own self-sufficiency. I defend these views. Then I conclude with reflections on why Cynics and Pessimists actually make great friends. By helping people to focus on vulgar human nature and the flaws that humans have, they create an unpretentious basis for friendship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Greek FriendshipDavid KonstanIn this paper I examine the nomenclature and conception of friendship among the ancient Greeks. More specifically, I challenge the current consensus that the classical Greek notion of friendship was wider or more inclusive than the modern. My focus will be on the significance of the terms philos (as noun) and philia, which do not, as is commonly assumed, denote the same range of relations. (...) I shall argue that philos in the classical period denotes something very like the modern sense of "friend," while philia refers to affectionate sentiments (not objective obligations) characteristic of a wide range of relationships, not excluding friendship proper. I examine evidence drawn primarily from Aristotle, Xenophon and the Greek orators in order to exhibit the uses of the nouns philos and philia, and look also at Sophocles' Antigone, since a number of recent interpretations of this play presuppose that kin are philoi and that philia represents the objective bond among them.In his recent book on Athenian finance, Paul Millett writes: "It is true that from the viewpoint of comparative sociology, to say nothing of our own experience, the all-inclusive quality of Greek friendship is anomalous."1 Millett cites the article on "Friendship" by Odd Ramsøy for the generalization that "most other important social relationships exclude friendship," which "tends to be incompatible with such relationships as those of mother and child, lovers, and employer and employee."2 Millett goes on to observe that Greek usage, as illustrated for example by Aristotle, admits of the term philos or "friend" in respect to "parents, brothers, benefactors, fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens," as well as to "husbands and wives, fellow-voyagers, comrades-in-arms, guest-friends, and cousins," and he adds that "perhaps the clearest illustration comes from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, plotting the extension of philia both inside and outside the family circle." [End Page 71]Millett expresses with exemplary clarity and a wealth of citations a point of view shared by virtually every scholar writing these days on Greek friendship. For example, Mary Whitlock Blundell, in her study of Sophoclean ethics, classifies Greek conceptions of friendship under three main heads or circles: the family, fellow-citizens, and "the third main group of philoi" that "approximates most closely to modern conceptions of a friend."3 Barry Strauss, in his history of fourth-century Athens, writes: "Friendship was of fundamental importance in Athenian society. Second only to parent-child and kinship ties in the intensity of its obligations, friendship is central to the thought of many ancient Greek writers."4 This seems to promise a distinction between kinship and friendship, but in the next sentence Strauss continues: "Philia, as the Greeks called it, is much broader in its meaning than the English 'friendship,'" and he goes on to quote with approval N. R. E. Fisher, who asserts: "Linguistically, the most general word for what belongs to a person, in his group or on his side, is philos (noun philia), which we usually translate 'friend,' but which, when applied to persons, systematically spans both kin and non-kin, those with whom one has links of mutual aid and benevolence."5 Sally Humphreys states the matter succinctly in a footnote:" Philos can refer both to kin and to friends."6 The philosophers too are in agreement on this point. Thus, Michael Pakaluk, in the introduction to a collection of philosophical essays on friendship, observes of Aristotle's treatise: "Religious societies, familial bonds, affinities among travellers, civility among citizens, arrangements of hospitality, and tacit contractual agreements-all of these are woven into his account of friendship."7The Greeks, then, are said not to have discriminated linguistically between a wide range of associations that we, and most societies, regard as categorically distinct. Friends are assimilated to relatives, fellow citizens, and just about anyone else with whom one shares some common experience or interest. This view, however, is inexact and misleading as stated. I shall argue that in Greek usage of the classical period and later, [End Page 72] just as in English today, kin and fellow citizens were not normally spoken of as friends or philoi, and that the categories were in fact distinct and... (shrink)

We are haunted, Samuel Kimbriel suggests, by a habit of isolation buried, often imperceptibly, within our practices of understanding and relating to the world. In Friendship as Sacred Knowing, Kimbriel works through the complexities of this disposition to contest its place within contemporary philosophical thought and practice. Stories of isolation amidst the fragmentation of community are familiar in this age, as are tales of alienation provoked by the insistent indifference of the scientific cosmos. This book goes beyond such stories, (...) arguing that the crisis of loneliness in the present age is deeper yet, betokening a more fundamental incoherence within the modern personality itself. Kimbriel engages deeply with the human activity of friendship. Chapters one and two examine friendship to unearth the contours of the habit towards isolation and to reveal certain ills that have long attended it. Chapters three through seven place these isolated ways of relating to the world into critical dialogue with the tradition of late-antique and early-medieval Johannine Christianity, in which intimacy and understanding go hand in hand. This Johannine tradition drew the human activities of friendship and enquiry into such unity that understanding itself became a kind of communion. Kimbriel endorses a return to an antique and particularly Christian philosophical habit-"the befriending of wisdom.". (shrink)

Mark Vernon links the resources of the philosophical tradition with numerous illustrations from modern culture to ask what friendship is and how it relates to sex, work, politics and spirituality. Unusually, he argues that Plato and Nietzsche, as much as Aristotle and Aelred, should be put center stage. Their penetrating and occasionally tough insights are invaluable if friendship is to be a full, not merely sentimental, way of life for today.

A philosophical exploration of the meaning and significance of friendship.This book explains the persistence of friendship today in the light of the history of philosophical approaches to the subject. It considers ideals of intimacy and fusion in the context of claims that such ideals are unrealistic and even dangerous. Cicero's scepticism about friendship in the public realm is compared with the Aristotelian view of friendship as a genuine political bond, and with Derrida's development of that view (...) via an exploration of Aristotle's alleged and provocative announcement 'O my friends, there is no friend'. Tensions between love and respect, identity and difference, a focus on the self and a focus on the other are closely examined.From Aristotle to contemporary theorists, the book explores the conditions that enable the development of self-understanding in friendship, the delicate and unstable pairing of concepts like inclination and duty and distinctions between self-love, self esteem and self-concern in relations between friends.Key Features* Recognition of the variety of the term 'friend' in the history of philosophy* The treatment of the tension between identity and difference in relations between friends* Discussion of the contribution of friendship to self-understanding. (shrink)

This is the first book not only to detail the relationships neoliberalism encourages us to have but also to see how friendship can provide a bulwark of resistance to it. Written in an engaging style, it will be understandable to political theorists, philosophers, social scientists, and cultural theorists.

This paper considers the impact that the practices of friendship might have on shaping philosophical activity in the twenty-first century. To consider what it means to practise philosophy necessitates understanding the effect that the structures of the contemporary university have on philosophical enquiry. Maintaining the historic sense of the university as a place where conversations take place which aim at deepening the understanding of one’s world is increasingly difficult in universities structured by the imperatives of the neoliberal economic policies (...) of the last forty years. The model of friendship, because it is both personal and conversational, has the power to reinvigorate not just the practice of philosophy but also the understanding of the university as a place for deep learning. (shrink)

Friendship is such a unique relationship among human beings that even philosophers have considered it as a vital factor in the social life of humans. Aristotle is one such philosopher who has given a significant amount of space to friendship among the mortals. Friendship is relational in nature and thereby calls for various discourses between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. In this regard, McDowell’s idea of ‘second nature’ is significant since it adds that extra responsibility, willingness and (...) rational capacity enabling us to live in communion. However, friendship has a peculiar relation with politics as in this world one cannot deny that there will be enemies as well as friends. In this respect, Derrida situates Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political as an evolution in the politics of friendship either in the form of ‘dissolution’ or in the form of ‘upheaval’. I have tried to analyse Derrida’s views in the background of the contrast between the ‘dying sage’ and the ‘living fool’ where the discourses change between friendship and politics. Friendship and politics are not alien to Indian philosophy as well. The relationships between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, between Karṇa and Duryodhana in the Mahābhārata could be analysed from various angles. Friendship has a trans-political character which has been addressed in the paper by showing the hermeneutic of solidarity after Gadamer. This paves way for a reappraisal of the Aristotelian conception of friendship. I think that the discourses between friendship and politics bring about new insights regarding the notion of friendship itself, and it is important to recognise that difference and reciprocity may exist together without distressing the relationship and at the same time with the (dis)closure of the self. (shrink)

Using friendship studies from the perspectives of philosophy, psychology, history, classics, political science, sociology, ethology, neuroscience, semiotics and other disciplines, the volume uses the encyclopedic format to construct both a positive ontology (based on empirical evidence) of friendship, as well as discussing friendship's "negative ontology" (i.e., its uncertainties, ambivalences, unknowns, and ineffable aspects), to outline a multidisciplinary comparative approach to different philosophical models of friendship (e.g., ancient Greek, Indian, Roman, modern), and to explore the inner connection (...) between friendship and philosophy (as a way of life and a friendship with wisdom). Among the emergent categories are 1. Issues (e.g., money, mutuality, satisfaction). 2. Models (e.g., the ancient Greek, the Indian, the modern model of friendship). 3. Kinds or types of friendship (e.g., bad friends, noblest friendship, typologies). 4. Incoherence of theoretical typologies (e.g., complexity, ineffability, thisness). 5. Technical terms (e.g., bestowal, friend-shield effect, homophily). 6. Theories, accounts (e.g. Silver’s thesis, Dunbar’s number, mirror account of friendship). 7. Cases of friendships (e.g., Achilles and Patroclus, Murdoch’s friends, famous friends). 8. Philosophers on friendship (e.g., Aristotle, Kant, Weil). 9. Motifs and themes (e.g., gift, pleasure, social media). 10. Concepts (e.g., eros, presentism, tacit knowledge). 11. Proverbs (e.g., Faroese, Jamaican, Swahili proverbs). 12. Friendship studies (e.g., anthropology, history, semiotics of friendship). (shrink)

Love and Friendship in the Western Tradition comprises a collection of essays written over a 25 year period by the late Rev. Professor James McEvoy on the theme of friendship. The book traces the genesis and development of philosophical treatments of friendship from Greek philosophy, through the Middle Ages, to modern and postmodern philosophy. The collection's three major concerns are: (1) the history of philosophical discussions of friendship; (2) the role of friendship in the cultivation (...) of the philosophical life; (3) the marginalization of friendship as a theme for philosophical reflection and practice in the modern period. As the author was primarily a medievalist, a great deal of the focus of the essays is on the development of the theme of friendship in the Middle Ages (in the thought of Augustine, Aquinas, Aelred of Rievaulx, Henry of Ghent, Robert Grosseteste, etc.). However, this focus, while a value in itself, also serves to connect philosophical perspectives on friendship from before and after the middle ages. It connects to the time before inasmuch as much of the work done on friendship in the Middle Ages is anchored in interpretations of Aristotle and Plato, and it connects to the time after by providing a counterpoint to the modern paradigm of what constitutes the philosophical life. The collection combines historical with thematic approaches to scholarship on this issue and is one of the only books of its kind to do so. It is, perhaps, unique in its historical sweep and will prove to be a canonical source for further research on this topic. (shrink)