In what follows, I will concentrate on the type of temporality which structures Wittgenstein's method of a perspicuous representation, or of a synoptic overview (übersichtliche Darstellung). I will argue that the temporal order which applies to (giving) a perspicuous representation is best to be described as retroactivity, deferred action or afterwardness (Nachträglichkeit), a concept which calls into question the ordinary conception of time as a linear and irreversible process as well as of a clear break between (...) present and past. First, I will turn to Sigmund Freud and the way he developed the concept of Nachträglichkeit or retroactivity in some of his case-studies. The basic idea here is that the meaning or content of a past experience is constituted by repeating it in a different or disguised way. I will then argue that the relation between a perspicuous representation and what is made perspicuous is best interpreted as a relation of Nachträglichkeit. This interpretation also accounts for the involvement of the subject in the object made perspicuous—as it is stressed by Wittgenstein and illustrated by his discursive method. (shrink)

Deciding what role perspicuous representations play in Wittgenstein’s philosophy matters, not only for determining what one thinks of the contributions of this great figure of twentieth century philosophy but also for recognising the ‘live options’ for conducting philosophical enquiries full stop. It is not surprising, given this importance, that perspicuous representations is the topic of the opening chapter of Gordon Baker’s posthumous collection of essays on philosophical method. In that contribution he offers grounds for thinking that the relevant (...) passage in which the notion is explicitly mentioned (cited above) should be read as promoting a strongly therapeutic approach to philosophy: he exposes ‘this possibility’ in the modest hope of persuading receptive readers to explore it further for themselves (see Baker 2004, 46). I endorse some of Baker’s central insights about understanding and use of perspicuous representations but I firmly reject his conclusions about the end of philosophy. Specifically, I agree with him that Wittgenstein set his face against the very idea of philosophical ‘theorising’, but I deny that this led him (or ought to lead anyone) to promote a purely therapeutic philosophy. In the first three sections, I supply reasons for preferring an account of Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy that emphasises its clarificatory ambitions. In doing so, I say something about: (i) what I take perspicuous representations to be and how they function; (ii) what motivates Baker’s reading and its implications; and (iii) how perspicuous and other forms of representations have been misused in attempts at so-called philosophical theorising. I conclude by proposing that in steering clear of both theory and extreme therapy, it is possible to prosecute a positive philosophy – one that employs perspicuous representations to bring ‘relevant connections’ to light for the purposes of enabling us to understand and reflect on aspects of various domains of human being. (shrink)

Reflection names the central activity of Western philosophical practice; the mirror and its attendant metaphors of reflection are omnipresent in the self-image of Western philosophy and in metaphilosophical reflection on reflection. But the physical experiences of being reflected by glass mirrors have been inadequately theorized contributors to those metaphors, and this has implications not only for the self-image and the self of philosophy but also for metaphilosophical practice. This article begins to rethink the metaphor of reflection anew. Paying attention to (...) the history of the glass mirror in Europe reveals and challenges the modern emergence of clear ontological distinctions between disembodied subjects and the objects of their knowledge, and suggests a compelling terrain of metaphilosophical analysis. On the reading offered by the article, the inherent complexity of the relationship between selves and their mirror images, a complexity mediated by social location, historical situation, and particular projects, points to significant spaces of unknowing, of indeterminacy, and of ontological ambiguity. (shrink)

비트겐슈타인은 우리의 문법에는 일목요연성이 결여되어 있으며, 우리의 몰이해의 주요 원천은 우리가 우리의 낱말들의 사용을 일목요연하게 보지 못한다는 데 있다고 말한다. 비트겐슈타인에 의하면 일목요연한 묘사가 이해를 성립시키는데, 이해는 중간 고리들을 발견하거나 발명하여 연관들을 보는 데 있다. 따라서 일목요연한 묘사란 개념은 그의 철학적 탐구에서 근본적인 의미가 있다. 일목요연한 묘사는 비트겐슈타인이 말한 철학적 기술에 상응하는 것이다. 기술은 설명, 과학적 설명과 대비해서 말해진 것이다. 일목요연한 묘사는 또한 정확성, 엄밀성과 대비해서 말해진 것이다. 그것은 표면 아래에 놓여 있는 어떤 것을 발견하기 위해 현상들을 침투하는 것이 아니라 (...) 중간 고리들을 발견하거나 발명하여 연관을 보는 데 있다. 비트겐슈타인에 의하면 낱말은 우리의 나머지 행위들로 인해 그 뜻을 얻는다. 따라서 일목요연한 묘사는 언어와 그 언어가 뒤얽혀 있는 활동들의 전체와의 연관을 본다는 데 있다. 그것은 서로 겹치고 교차하는 유사성들의 복잡한 그물을 보는 것이다. 이를 위해서는 우리가 언어놀이를 배운 방식, 훈련받은 방식을 상기해야 하고, 낱말들을 형이상학적 사용으로부터 일상적인 사용으로 다시 돌려보내야 한다. 그렇기 때문에 그것은 새의 눈으로 개관하는 것이 아니라 세목들을 주시하는 것이고, 일어나고 있는 것을 가까이에서 고찰하는 일이다. 그것은 자료들을 그것들 서로의 관계에서 보고 하나의 일반적 그림 속에 총괄하는 일이다. 그럼으로써 우리는 그 단순성과 일상성으로 인하여 우리에게 숨겨져 있었던, 언제나 우리 눈앞에 있기 때문에 우리가 깨달을 수 없었던 가장 중요한 사물들의 측면들을 보게 된다. 그럼으로써 철학적 문제들이 완전히 사라진다. 따라서 비트겐슈타인이 얻고자 애쓰는 일목요연한 묘사, 완전한 명료성은 우리의 언어 사용 방식에 대한 완전한 일람표의 작성이 아니라 철학을 조용히 쉬게 해주는 것이다. (shrink)

This paper discusses Gordon Baker’s interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, in particular his interpretation of the notion of Wittgensteinian philosophical conceptions and the notions of non-exclusivity, local incompatibility, non-additivity and global pluralism which Baker uses to characterize Wittgensteinian conceptions. On the basis of this discussion, and a critique of certain features of Baker’s interpretation of Wittgensteinian conceptions, I introduce the notion of a multidimensional logical description of language use, explaining how this notion, which Baker’s interpretation excludes, constitutes and important element (...) of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical method of clarification and perspicuous representation. I conclude by explaining how Baker’s problematic notions of local incompatibility and non-additivity, if they are seen in the light of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of certain views of the completeness of philosophical or logical accounts, nevertheless point in the right direction. (shrink)

This chapter shows that the combination of mathematical and chemical thinking in particular, as evidenced by Charles Sanders Peirce’s chemical training at Harvard, formed a solid conceptual basis for his account of diagrams. The connection between the Lawrence school and the chemical tradition established by Justus von Liebig in Giessen is of crucial importance to understand the context of Peirce’s own chemistry training. A completely different picture emerges if one pays greater attention to the nature of the chemistry curriculum in (...) Harvard at the time, and in particular to the pedagogical innovations introduced by Peirce’s chemistry teacher, Josiah Parsons Cooke. Historians of science have investigated the rise of institutional scientific laboratories from a range of perspectives. The chapter concludes with some suggestions for further investigation into the role of chemistry in Peirce’s philosophical system more broadly and the potential this new avenue of inquiry might have for the direction of Peirce scholarship. (shrink)

The focus is on two texts by Wittgenstein where ‘forms of life’ constitute the pivot of an extended argument: ‘Cause and Effect’ and the discussion of colour concepts in ‘Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology’. The author argues that forms of life are above all Wittgenstein's response to the question what it is to analyse a concept. The remark that forms of life are ‘given’ and must be ‘accepted’ is a natural corollary of Wittgenstein’s antireductionism and his idea of philosophy (...) as a descriptive enterprise. Wittgenstein is, however, not offering forms of life as the ultimate foundation of our statements about causation or colour. He shifts the focus to the questioning activity itself. Our inquiries and descriptions imply conceptions of how to look and what to accept as verification. Forms of life are given, not because they cannot be analysed further, but because the investigation will take them as given. Comparisons are made, on the one hand, with G.H. von Wright’s interventionist account of the concept of causation and, on the other hand, with the two currently dominant interpretations of ‘forms of life’: the ‘linguistic community’ view and the ‘naturalist’ view. (shrink)

Gordon Baker in his last decade published a series of papers (now collected inBaker 2004), which are revolutionary in their proposals for understanding of later Wittgenstein. Taking our lead from the first of those papers, on “perspicuous presentations,” we offer new criticisms of ‘elucidatory’ readers of later Wittgenstein, such as Peter Hacker: we argue that their readings fail to connect with the radically therapeutic intent of the ‘perspicuous presentation’ concept, as an achievement‐term, rather than a kind of ‘objective’ (...) mapping of a ‘conceptual landscape.’Baker's Wittgenstein, far from being a ‘language policeman’ of the kind that often fails to influence mainstream philosophy, offers an alternative to the latent scientism of Wittgenstein's influential ‘elucidatory’ readers. (shrink)

The task of this paper is to exhibit Wittgenstein’s method of perspicuous presentation as aiming at a distinctive kind of self-knowledge. Three influential readings of Wittgenstein’s concept of perspicuous presentation – Hacker’s, Baker’s and Sluga’s – are examined. All of them present what Wittgenstein calls the “unsurveyablity of our grammar” as a result of the “complexity” of our language. Contrary to this, a fundamental difference between matter-of-factual complexity and the unsurveyability of grammar is pointed out. What perspicuous (...) presentations are designed to deal with, isn’t, accordingly, occasioned by the complexity of our language but by an unnoticed assimilation of our own activities as speaking beings to matter-of-factual affairs. In response to this, perspicuous presentations help us to fully appropriate our activities as speakers in virtue of achieving a transparent understanding of the use of “our words”. It thus provides us with a distinctive kind of grammatical self-knowledge. (shrink)

I demonstrate that analogies, both explicit and implicit, between Wittgenstein’s discussion of rituals, aesthetics, and psychoanalysis (and, indeed, his own philosophical methodology) suggest that he entertained the idea that Freud’s psychoanalytic project, when understood correctly—that is, as a descriptive project rather than an explanatory-hypothetical one—provides a “surveyable representation” (übersichtliche Darstellung) of certain psychological facts (as opposed to psychological concepts). The consequences of this account are that it offers an explanation of Wittgenstein’s admiration for and self-perceived affinity to Freud, as (...) well as of his apparent “know-nothing approach” to empirical psychology. (shrink)

Perspicuous representation, Wittgenstein offers, is not another methodology, but it consists in seeing the connections. The Wittgensteinian perspicuous representation is therapeutic. The method he suggests for philosophy is the same method he suggests for social sciences. In both of these cases, he tries to get us to see the confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing and theorizing. In both of these disciplines he warns us not to advance explanatory, metaphysical theories. In this paper, I connect (...) this concern with Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer. In criticizing Frazer, Wittgenstein adopts the important part of Spengler’s view. Nonetheless, there are differences between Wittgenstein’s views and those of Spengler; this paper aims to show similarities as well as these differences. The first part of the paper briefly summarizes Frazer’s views. The second part focuses on Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer concerning science and technology. The third part gives an account of his critique regarding method of social sciences and philosophy. The last part concentrates on Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer pertaining to the tolerance towards alternative forms of life. Key Words: context-free vacuum • evolutionary explanation • incommensurability • methodology of social sciences • perspicuous representation • science • technology • tolerance • totem and taboo. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar in the Middle Period. The paper examines the thesis that grammar is not responsible for reality. It investigates the role that rules play in this context and how they determine meaning. Special focus shall be put on arbitrary rules. Therefore, we shall develop a thesis of vagueness with special emphasis on perspicuous representation.

I demonstrate that analogies, both explicit and implicit, between Wittgenstein’s discussions of rituals, aesthetics, and aspect-perception, have important payoffs in terms of understanding his notion of a “surveyable representation” (übersichtliche Darstellung) as it applies to phenomena that are not exclusively grammatical in nature. In particular, I argue that a surveyable representation of certain anthropological and aesthetic facts allows us to see, qua form of aspect-perception, internal relations and formal connections, so that the inner nature of a ritual or (...) the solution of an aesthetic puzzle is exhibited. This particular form of seeing both explains why Wittgenstein thought that hypothetical explanations about the origins of a ritual are irrelevant to appreciating its meaning and elucidates his understanding of rituals, which involves seeing “internal relations” and “formal connections.” The upshots of the account for work in anthropology are discussed. (shrink)

The work reported here is of two sorts. One the one hand, we attempt to consolidate a lot of recent work on situation theory into a workable version, one that researchers can use and add to in ways that might be suitable for various applications. On the other, we attempt to solve a representational problem with situation theory: how can we represent complicated situation-theoretic objects in a way that is perspicuous. Our way in to the latter problem comes from (...) an on-going project aimed at bringing insights from Discourse Representation Theory and Situation Theory to bear on one another. In terms of this project, this paper represents a rather modest contribution. Our goal is to design a language for representing situationtheoretic objects that is based on Kamp's discourse representation structures. This was where we started but we found that working on the notation and its semantics led us to clari cations of various aspects of situation theory. A major part of the clari cation in the theory comes from our use of the work on parameters and abstraError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapction by Aczel and Lunnon AL]. (shrink)

This study aims to propose a rational reconstruction of the theory-core ofWittgenstein's Tractatus, in order to bring into prominence its theoreticaland philosophical sources, its epistemological nature and metaphysical significance.The main idea of my approach is that when we take due account of the scientific andphilosophical context of the Tractatus, we see that its central philosophicalinnovation is a new form of metaphysics, namely a structural theory of representation.``I am not interested in constructing a building,so much as in having a (...) class='Hi'>perspicuous view of the foundation of possible buildings.''. (shrink)

Recent books by Paul Johnston, D. Z. Phillips, Philip Shields, and B. R. Tilghman all depict Wittgenstein as centrally concerned with ethics, but they range from representing his main works as expressing and advocating a particular religious-ethical outlook to arguing that his work has no ethical content but aims primarily to clarify such logical distinctions as that between ethical and empirical judgments. All four books raise the question about the moral philosopher's proper role, and each suggests a rather different answer. (...) Via the discussion of these books, I argue that Wittgenstein's stress on diversity in the ways of human life, his notion of conceptual grammar, the idea of a perspicuous representation, his lifelong involvement with art and his suggestions about its connection with morality, and his preoccupation with aspect-seeing-all suggest new possibilities of rehabilitating the historically recurrent idea that the philosopher may be a moral sage. (shrink)

Some philosophers, like Kripke, Williamson, Hawthorne, and Turri, have offered examples of claims that are allegedly contingent and a priori justifiable. If any of these examples is genuine, this would upend the traditional epistemological classification on which (a) all and only a priori justifiable claims are necessary and (b) all and only a posteriori ones are contingent. I argue here that these examples are not genuine. This conclusion is not new, but the strategy pursued here is to formalize these muchdiscussed (...) examples in symbolic logics. Once formalized, a perspicuous representation of their logical form will bring into sharp relief that these examples are not both contingent and a priori. Two takeaways are (1) that the traditional epistemological classification remains plausible and (2) that one’s proposed examples of contingent a priori claims should be supported by a formalization in one’s preferred background symbolic logic. (shrink)

This paper is a study in contrasts. In the first part, I describe one prominent set of approaches to representing the ethical: those of analytic philosophy and the experimental moral psychology inspired by it. I argue that what is missing in this approach is a perspicuous representation of the ethical. The term “perspicuous representation” is drawn from the work of Wittgenstein, where it means a way of representing phenomena that reveals the inner connections between their parts (...) or aspects and makes apparent their meaning for us. Arriving at perspicuous representations is fundamental to Wittgenstein’s interpretative/philosophical methodology. In Philosophical Investigations he says, “The concept of a perspicuous... (shrink)

This paper investigates forms of metaphysical vertigo that can appear when contrasts between humans and animals are challenged. Distinguishing three forms of vertigo and four ways of differentiating humans and animals, the paper attempts to achieve a perspicuous representation of what could be termed “the difficulty of being humans when we are animals”; or alternatively, “the difficulty of being animals when we are humans”.

Poetry and philosophy have had a close but uneasy relationship in the western tradition. Both share an eschewal of the discovery of novel facts, but are somewhat opposed in that discovery is a central aim of poetry, but not at all the aim of philosophy. Through a close reading of W.H. Auden’s ‘In Memory of W.B. Yeats’ and a versification of part of G.E. Moore’s ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, I argue that what poetry shows corresponds, in a broadly symbolist (...) sense, to Wittgenstein’s understanding of the miraculous nature of the world. In this regard, poetry can offer philosophy clarity, in the form of its tonal architecture, value, and ethics, and may also constitute a perspicuous representation. Poetry remains in a perpetual mode of potential, as well as being possessed of a vatic autonomy. (shrink)

This paper introduces two languages and associated logics designed to afford perspicuous representations of a range of natural language arguments involving adverbs and the like: first-order logic with basic adverbs (FOL-BA) and first-order logic with scoped adverbs (FOL-SA). The guiding logical idea is that an adverb can come between a term and the rest of the statement it is a part of, resulting in a logically stronger statement. I explain various interesting challenges that arise in the attempt to implement (...) the guiding idea, and provide solutions for some but not all of them. I conclude by outlining some directions for further research. (shrink)

Článek rozvíjí ideu Wittgensteinovy filosofické gramatiky a na příkladě její aplikace v hudbě ukazuje, jak Wittgenstein využívá pojmu "přehledného znázornění" ve vymezení filosofie jako něčeho, co nemůže být smysluplně vyřčeno. The paper elaborates on Wittgenstein’s idea of philosophical grammar by transposing it to the field of music and demonstrating how the concept of “perspicuous representation” can be used in delimiting philosophy as something that cannot be meaningfully said.

The paper aims at a perspicuous representation of Isaac Levi's pragmatist epistemology, spanning from the 1967 classic "Gambling with Truth" to his 2004 book on "Mild Contraction". Based on a formal framework for Levi's notion of inquiry, I analyse his decision-theoretic approach with truth and information as basic cognitive values, and with Shackle measures as emerging structures. Both cognitive values figure prominently in Levi's model of inductive belief expansion, but only the value of information is employed in his (...) model of belief contraction. I argue that the former model is more successful than the latter. (shrink)

The later Wittgenstein famously holds that an understanding which tries to run up against the limits of language bumps itself and results in nothing but plain nonsense. Therefore, the task of philosophy cannot be to create an ‘ideal’ language so as to produce a ‘real’ understanding in the first place; its aim must be to remove particular misunderstandings by clarifying the use of our ordinary language. Accordingly, Wittgenstein opposes both the sublime terms of traditional philosophy and the formal frameworks of (...) modern logics---and adheres to a pointedly casual, colloquial style in his own philosophizing. However, there seems to lurk a certain inconsistency in Wittgenstein’s ordinary language approach: his philosophical remarks frequently remain enigmatic, and many of the terms Wittgenstein coins appear to be highly technical. Thus, one might wonder whether his verdicts on the limits of language and on philosophical jargons might not be turned against his own practice. The present essay probes the extent to which the contravening tendencies in Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy might be reconciled. Section 2 sketches Wittgenstein’s general approach to philosophy and tracks the special role that the language of everyday life occupies therein. Section 3 reconstructs Wittgenstein’s preferred method for philosophy, which he calls perspicuous representation, and argues that this method implements an aesthetic conception of philosophy and a poetic approach to philosophical language, in which philosophical insights are not explicitly stated, but mediated through well-worded and creatively composed descriptions. Section 4 discusses how Wittgenstein’s philosophical poetics relates to artificial terminologies and grammars in philosophy and science. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of the concept ‘student active forms of learning’. It aims not at conclusions, but at a perspicuous representation—a map for future navigation and understanding of the concept. From the perspective of philosophy of education, I characterize and discuss issues relating to student active learning in the paper. The context for my discussion is higher education. Further, I contrast student active learning to a form of learning that is allegedly passive, the lecture, which traditionally (...) is the main form of learning in higher education. I proceed by assessing arguments in favor of the two forms by way of a philosophical analysis, a main component of which is transparent exposition. Positive conclusions are not the main concern, but rather to demonstrate possibilities. Still, two results of the discussions in the paper are noteworthy: ‘student active learning’ is a weak construct, it being too general or even contradictory; the lecture is not passive, and a student-centered education, consequently, should not be construed as a dismissal of lecturing. (shrink)

Attempts to describe the essential features of the Western philosophical tradition can often be characterized as ‘boundary work’, that is, the attempt to create, promote, attack, or reinforce specific notions of the ‘philosophical’ in order to demarcate it as a field of intellectual inquiry. During the last century, the dominant tendency has been to delineate the discipline in terms of formal methods, techniques, and concepts and a given set of standard problems and alternative available solutions. One vital feature of the (...) philosophical tradition that has played a certain rather subterranean but nonetheless indispensable role, which I will discuss in this article, is that of repeatedly and stringently calling into question the conditions of its own possibility. The Cartesian tradition shares with the anti-philosophers the insight that this questioning itself is and has always been a problem, perhaps the deepest problem, for philosophy. The idea that one has the right, even the responsibility, to pose questions that are non-standard, not comme il faut, perhaps even taboo, lay at the very heart of notions such as ‘the pursuit of truth’, ‘vita contemplativa’, and ‘philosophy as work on oneself’. On what grounds can one possibly assert such a right? In the Western tradition, it has most often been associated with a form of genuine doubt founded in deep engagement with some subject matter, i.e. the notion that one has a ‘problem’ demanding that one take responsibility for one’s beliefs and thoughts, both morally and logically. It seems to me that the meaning of this most basic attitude is something that each generation must rediscover for itself; indeed, recreate for itself in a new environment and under new conditions. Thus, the blindness of the past, in this self-understanding of philosophy, need not bind or blind us in the future. To the contrary, the European intellectual tradition can be seen as providing a series of perspicuous representations of intermittently faltering and flourishing attempts at asserting the viability of the idea of human freedom as essentially bound up with the pursuit of truth. As such, it is of necessity open to perpetual revision. (shrink)

James Tully: To Think and Act Differently collects classic, contemporary, and previously unpublished examples of public philosophy in action from across James Tully's four decades of scholarship. The book provides readers with a perspicuous representation of public philosophy as an ongoing experiment with reconstructing the practice of political theory as a democratizing and diversifying dialogue between scholars and citizens. This volume offers an overview of this participatory mode of political philosophy and political change by reconstructing the arc of (...) Tully's intellectual trajectory in contexts, illuminating moments of clarification and transformation, and the ways it continues to shed new insights into the challenges of citizenship in the present. Topics discussed include approaches to the history of political though, constitutionalism, democratic theory, comparative political theory, intercultural dialogue and translation; Indigenous political thought; settler colonialism and empire; climate change and sustainability; modernity; nonviolence; and mutual aid. It will be of interest to scholars of political philosophy, political theory, constitutional law, Indigenous studies, intellectual history, and ecological humanities. It will be of interest to scholars of political philosophy, political theory, constitutional law, Indigenous studies, intellectual history, and ecological humanities. (shrink)

Recent books by Paul Johnston, D. Z. Phillips, Philip Shields, and B. R. Tilghman all depict Wittgenstein as centrally concerned with ethics, but they range from representing his main works as expressing and advocating a particular religious-ethical outlook (Shields) to arguing that his work has no ethical content but aims primarily to clarify such logical distinctions as that between ethical and empirical judgments (Johnston). All four books raise the question about the moral philosopher's proper role, and each suggests a rather (...) different answer. Via the discussion of these books, I argue that Wittgenstein's stress on diversity in the ways of human life, his notion of conceptual grammar, the idea of a perspicuous representation, his lifelong involvement with art and his suggestions about its connection with morality, and his preoccupation with aspect-seeing-all suggest new possibilities of rehabilitating the historically recurrent idea that the philosopher may be a moral sage. (shrink)

Dworkin claimed that hypothetical agreements are not binding and, thus, that the argument from the Original Position in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice does not justify or ground the principles of justice. I argue that the Original Position is neither foundational nor in need of a “deep theory”, as claims Dworkin; it is only a means of clarification, a sort of “perspicuous representation” of our judgments concerning justice. I also argue that the natural duty of justice works as (...) a non-hypothetical justification for why the principles are binding. This because the natural duty of justice does not depend on agreements to hold and, as such, makes any principle of justice binding. (shrink)

What is the method that Wittgenstein claimed to have discovered in the early 1930s? By common agreement, it is one of providing perspicuous representations of the grammar of words. Richard Gilmore proposes to explain how this method works, what its point is, and why Wittgenstein thought it was such a powerful tool.

This is an excellent collection of fifteen essays on the state of analytic philosophy, past, present, and future, with contributions from such philosophers as Peter Hacker, Hilary Putnam, and Jaakko Hintikka. The editors have divided the collection into four parts. Part 1, “Introduction,” consists of an outstanding overview of analytic philosophy by Hacker, “Analytic philosophy: what, whence, and whither?” For the “what,” Hacker describes seven characteristic marks of analytic philosophy. As for “whence,” Hacker gives us a typical synoptic historical view, (...) from Moore and Russell to post-war Oxford and the later Wittgenstein. As for the “whither,” Hacker argues that as analytic philosophy has won most of its battles, it is now, due to Quine, characterized by scientism, but this need not mean the demise of philosophy. Two complementary tasks remain to analytic philosophy: the critical task of rectifying conceptual confusion; and the descriptive task of providing a “perspicuous representation of our conceptual schema”. (shrink)

U ovom radu izlaze se kratak pregled Vincovog poimanja drustvenih nauka kao neodvojivih od filozofije i Vitgenstajnovog uticaja na ovakvo shvatanje. Autor ukazuje da su brojne primedbe kriticara za subjektivizam i relativizam uzrokovane nedovoljnom razradom i generalizacijama koje nalazimo u ranim Vincovim tekstovima, a koji su bili predmet njegove samokritike u kasnijem periodu. Osim tematizovanja standardno prihvacenog znacaja Vitgenstajnovih pojmova jezickih igara, zivotnih formi i sledjenja pravila po drustvenu teoriju, u tekstu se naglasava znacaj manje tematizovanih koncepata preglednog prikaza i (...) aspektnog sagledavanja po Vincovo poimanje mogucnosti razumevanja drugih kultura. (shrink)

Segundo Sir James George Frazer (1854-1941), a mente humana evolve desde a magia, passando pela religião, até à ciência. Para Wittgenstein, magia e ritual constituent urn elemento essencial do homem, o qual não pode ser abolido mediante qualquer progresso da ciência. Acções rituals não se baseiam na crença Mediante a sua firmeza, a fé religiosa difere da crença numa hipótese. O fenómeno religioso resiste a toda e qualquer explcação. Quando ordenamos os factos numa representação abrangente, caímos na conta da comum (...) disposição que conecta os seres humanos da moderna civilização ocidental com os assim chamados primitivos. Gragas aos ritos, o ser humano entra em relação com a natureza, especialmente com os fenómenos da morte, do nascimento, e da vida sexual, numa atitude de surpresa, de admiração e de adoração. O artigo mostra porque é que os seres humanos que fazem parte da civilização ocidental necessitam de aprender o que e a admiração e a adoração das culturas primitivas. /// According to Sir James George Frazer (1854-1941), human mind develops from magic via religion to science. For Wittgenstein, magic and rite are an essential traite of human nature that cannot be abolished by any progress of science. Ritual actions are not based on belief By its firmness, religious faith differs from believing a hypothesis. The religious phenomenon resists any explanation. When we order the facts in a perspicuous representation, we see the common disposition that connects human beings of modern western civilization with the primitives. Rites express the attitude of astonishment, admiration, and worship to the phenomena of nature, first of all to death, birth, and sexual life. Men and women of modern western civilization have to learn admiration and worship from primitive cultures. (shrink)

It is nearly impossible to open a textbook on Newtonian mechanics without encountering the concept of inertial frames: the frames that are privileged by the theory’s dynamics. In this paper, I argue that extant definitions of inertial frames are unsatisfactory. I criticise two common definitions of inertial frames: law-based definitions, according to which inertial frames are simply those in which the laws are true, and structure-based definitions, according to which inertial frames are those that are ‘adapted’ to spatiotemporal structure. I (...) then offer a new, symmetry-based definition of inertial frames. This definition offers a non-conventional way of specifying the dynamically privileged frames. The result clarifies the foundations of Newtonian mechanics and accounts for the empirical success of coordinate-dependent formulations of it. (shrink)

비트겐슈타인은 자신의 철학적 탐구에서 일목요연한 묘사가 근본적으로 중요하다고 말 한다. 해커는 일목요연한 묘사를 규칙의 상세화로 본다. 반면에 베이커는 일목요연한 묘사 가 철학적 질병에 빠진 사람들을 치료하는 행위로 본다. 이리하여 비트겐슈타인의 문법적 탐구는 해커에서는 해명이 되고, 베이커에서는 치료가 된다. 그러나 둘 다 비트겐슈타인이 철학적 문제를 해결하기 위해 언어의 사용을 일목요연하게 묘사한다는 데, 따라서 일목요 연한 묘사가 비트겐슈타인의 철학적 활동의 핵심이라는 데에는 일치하고 있다. 본 논문은 일목요연한 묘사에 대한 이들의 해석을 비판하고 비트겐슈타인의 일목요연한 묘사를 그가 말한 언어 투쟁으로 해석하고자 한다. 비트겐슈타인에 의하면 (...) 철학적 문제는 우리의 언어 형식들에 대한 오해에 의해서 발생한다. 따라서 철학의 과제는 철학적 불안들이 사라지도 록 표현을 형성하는 것인데, 그러한 표현을 형성하는 것이 바로 일목요연한 묘사이다. 비 트겐슈타인에 의하면 철학적 문제는 우리의 언어가 하는 작업에 대한 통찰에 의해서 풀리 는데, 그러한 통찰을 얻기 위해서는 그 작업을 오해하려는 충동에 대항하여야 한다. 도대 체 지금 이 놀이가 행해져야 하는가, 그리고 어느 것이 올바른 놀이인가고 물을 수 있어야 한다. 우리 언어의 작업을 오해하려는 충동, 표현의 형식들이 우리에게 행사하는 마력은 우리의 언어 속에 각인되어 있는 오래된 그림들 또는 신화이며, 그것을 벗어나기 위해서는 언어에 대한 본능적 반항 속에 사람들에게서만 가능하다. 따라서 철학은 우리의 언어 수단 에 의해 우리의 오성에 걸린 마법에 대한 투쟁이다. 철학은 언어 투쟁이며, 그 투쟁의 무 기는 언어이고, 투쟁의 대상은 오성의 마법이며, 투쟁 방법은 일목요연한 묘사이다. (shrink)

The concept of übersichtliche Darstellung is of fundamental significance for Wittgenstein . Hacker translates übersichtliche Darstellung as ‘surveyable representation’ and equates it with the tabulation of grammar. He asks what surveyability means, whether examples can be found in Wittgenstein’s work, and why this method characterizes the form of account he gives. Ultimately, however, Hacker is unable to answer these questions and he attributes this failure to Wittgenstein. This paper argues that it is Hacker’s interpretation that fails, and presents an (...) alternate understanding of übersichtliche Darstellung ; one that enables us to answer Hacker’s questions in a manner consistent with Wittgenstein’s philosophical practices. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE. (shrink)

Frege and many following him, such as Dummett, Geach, Stenius and Hare, have envisaged a role for illocutionary force indicators in a logically perpspicuous notation. Davidson has denied that such expressions are even possible on the ground that any putative force indicator would be used by actors and jokers to heighten the drama of their performances. Davidson infers from this objection a Thesis of the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning: symbolic representation necessarily breaks any close tie with extra-linguistic purpose. A (...) modified version of Frege's ideal is here propounded according to which all expression is a force indicator just in case it indicates force in any speech act in which it occurs. It is shown that attainment of such an ideal would not have deprived Frege of what he desired of a perspicuous notation. In elaborating this ideal we also espouse an illocutionary conception of validity and argue that the ideal is one to which English conforms: parenthetical speech act verbs in the first person present indicative active are force indicators in the modified sense. But the mere possibility of force indicators in the modified sense is enough to show Davidson's Autonomy Thesis to be at best at half-truth. (shrink)

The concepts ‚Übersicht‘ (survey), ‚Übersichtlichkeit‘ (surveyability) and ‚Übersichtliche Darstellung‘ (surveyable representation) play a central role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. As Peter Hacker already noticed in 1972, an adequate English translation of these terms has “given Wittgenstein’s translators much trouble. They have chosen to translate it non-systematically in conformity with the demands of English style, thereby partially obscuring the significance and pervasiveness of the concept in Wittgenstein’s work, e. g. ‘command a clear view’ (Übersehen PI, § 122); ‘perspicious representation’ (...) (Übersichtliche Darstellung PI, § 122); ‘synoptic account’ (Übersichtliche Darstellung Z, § 273); ‘Survey’ (Übersicht Z, § 273); ‘synoptic view’ (Übersichtlichkeit Z, § 464); ‘perspicuity’ (Übersichtlichkeit RFM, p. 45);² ‘capable of being taken in’ (Übersehbar RFM, p. 81)3.” (Hacker 1972: 113 f. fn. 3) Since then other translations have been added to Hacker’s list, i.e. ‘surview’ for ‘Übersicht’ (Hacker’s own choice) and ‘overview’ for ‘übersehen’ (cf. PI 2009: 122). In his discussion of the notion ‚Übersichtliche Darstellung’ Alois Pichler suggests that “synopsis” and “synoptic view” might be the best translations for what Wittgenstein had in mind using the terms ‚Übersicht’ and ‚Übersichtliche Darstellung’ (cf. Pichler 2004: 181). Recently the problem of how to adequately translate the German words in question into English is also discussed by Mathieu Marion (cf. Marion 2011: 138 f. fn. 4). In what follows I shall argue - like Marion, but probably for different reasons - that the terms ‘survey’ (Übersicht), ‘surveyability’ (Übersichtlichkeit) and ‘surveyable representation’ (übersichtliche Darstellung) most adequately represent what Wittgenstein had in mind. As might become clear only this consistency in wording allows to grasp the connections in meaning Wittgenstein implicitly hints at, wherever he uses the terms ‘Übersicht’ and ‘Übersichtlichkeit’ in different parts of his ‘Nachlass’ and different periods of his philosophical development. (shrink)

We develop the method of iterated ultrapower representation to provide a unified and perspicuous approach for building automorphisms of countable recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic . In particular, we use this method to prove Theorem A below, which confirms a long-standing conjecture of James Schmerl.Theorem AIf is a countable recursively saturated model of in which is a strong cut, then for any there is an automorphism j of such that the fixed point set of j is isomorphic (...) to .We also fine-tune a number of classical results. One of our typical results in this direction is Theorem B below, which generalizes a theorem of Kaye–Kossak–Kotlarski .Theorem BSuppose is a countable recursively saturated model of in which is a strong cut. There is a group embedding from into such that for each that is fixed point free, moves every undefinable element of. (shrink)

We propose that children employ specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate “causal map” of the world: an abstract, coherent, learned representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously understood in terms of the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or “Bayes nets”. Children’s causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learning causal Bayes nets and for predicting with them. Experimental results suggest that 2- to 4-year-old (...) children construct new causal maps and that their learning is consistent with the Bayes net formalism. (shrink)

We seem to have strong intuitions that many visual representations -- such as descriptions, depictions and diagrams -- can be classified into different types. But how should we understand the differences between these representational types? On a standard view, the answer is assumed to lie in the presence or absence of a single property. I argue first that this assumption is undermotivated, and offer a particular two-property analysis, which can be used both to differentiate the various types and to understand (...) better what factors affect changes in classification. This in turn can also be used to capture a core idea of perspicuity, and to ground an argument for the general perspicuity of diagrams as a representational type. Finally, I suggest that two complementary and independently plausible theories bearing on the nature of diagrammatic representation can be located within the suggested two-property approach. (shrink)