Reading is an affective and reflective relationship with a text, whether it is a new, groundbreaking monograph or one of those books that keeps getting pulled off the shelf year after year. Unlike traditional reviews, the pieces in this section may veer off in new directions as critical reading becomes an extended occurrence of thinking, being, and creation. The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, by Giorgio Agamben.Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013.

We examine the impact of family firms’ historical ownership on corporate fraud. Our results show that restructured family firms from state-owned enterprises are more likely to violate and commit more fraud than entrepreneurial family firms. This finding is robust to the difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation, an instrument variables regression, fixed effects research design, and propensity score matching (PSM) approach analysis. Mechanism analysis shows that restructured family firms result in lower financial performance, high labor redundancy, inefficient investments, and cash volatility. Therefore, restructured (...) family firms have a stronger incentive to conceal these problems through corporate fraud. Furthermore, the effects of family firms’ historical ownership on corporate fraud are weakened for a more extended period after SOE ownership reform and the restructuring approach adopted by equity takeover. (shrink)

What is a rule, if it appears to become confused with life? And what is a human life, if, in every one of its gestures, of its words, and of its silences, it cannot be distinguished from the rule? It is to these questions that Agamben's new book turns by means of an impassioned reading of the fascinating and massive phenomenon of Western monasticism from Pachomius to St. Francis. The book reconstructs in detail the life of the (...) monks with their obsessive attention to temporal articulation and to the Rule, to ascetic techniques and to liturgy. But Agamben's thesis is that the true novelty of monasticism lies not in the confusion between life and norm, but in the discovery of a new dimension, in which "life" as such, perhaps for the first time, is affirmed in its autonomy, and in which the claim of the "highest poverty" and "use" challenges the law in ways that we must still grapple with today. How can we think a form-of-life, that is, a human life released from the grip of law, and a use of bodies and of the world that never becomes an appropriation? How can we think life as something not subject to ownership but only for common use? (shrink)

:This essay explores the meaning and normative significance of Locke’s depiction of individuals as proprietors of their own person. I begin by reconsidering the long-standing puzzle concerning Locke’s simultaneous endorsement of divine proprietorship and self-ownership. Befuddlement vanishes, I contend, once we reject concurrent ownership in the same object: while God fully owns our lives, humans are initially sole proprietors of their own person. Locke employs two conceptions of “personhood”: as expressing legal independence vis-à-vis humans and moral accountability vis-à-vis (...) God. Humans own their person in the first sense. As original proprietors of their own person, individuals are entitled to subject themselves to self-chosen authorities, thereby incurring obligations of obedience. But they may not choose just any authority. Divine ownership of human life delimits personal self-ownership by restricting the ways in which humans can dispose of their persons: we cannot possibly consensually subject ourselves to absolute and arbitrary power. Locke’s rights-forfeiture theory for crime makes slavery and despotism nonetheless potentially rightful conditions. I argue that, paradoxically, divine dominium of human life underpins both the impermissibility of voluntary enslavement and the justifiability of penal slavery. My analysis helps explain why modern Lockean theories of self-ownership that reject Locke’s theological premises have adopted an ambiguous stance toward despotic rule. (shrink)

Questions concerning the moral status of embryos, the validity of new technologies for human reproduction, ownership of one's own genes, gene patenting, privacy and discrimination have all been raised and debated. Although debate is healthy, it is only useful if all participants understand the fundamental biological principles underlying human life, human genes and human parenthood. Many people believe that science can play no role in determining when human life begins. I argue that this false assumption is based (...) on a failure to separate different contradictory meanings of the term 'human life'. In actuality, science has provided great insight into when and how human life and human beings come into existence. I argue as well that, contrary to our intuitive feelings, there is no physical connection between any father and his son; shared genes represent shared information and nothing more. Nevertheless, the feeling of a physical connection between parent and child is very real and instinctive, no matter how false it may be. These new understandings have profound ramifications for the way we treat issues surrounding human reproduction, including both abortion and assisted reproductive technologies. (shrink)

1. Among the most striking features of the political arrangements on this planet is its division into sovereign states.1 To be sure, in recent times, globalization has woven together the fates of communities and individuals in distant parts of the world in complex ways. It is partly for this reason that now hardly anyone champions a notion of sovereignty that would entirely discount a state’s liability the effects that its actions would have on foreign nationals. Still, state sovereignty persists as (...) a political fact. The number of states has increased enormously due to upheavals of the 20th century, and there is nothing in principle morally wrong with the existence of states - or so we will assume.2 What must be explored, then, are the limits of normatively plausible sovereignty. How bad does a government have to be for outsiders to be allowed to interfere? What responsibilities does a country incur because of its contribution to global warming? What obligations arise through trading? In this paper, we explore another pertinent question: to what extent is a country allowed to influence who lives on its territory by regulating immigration? The angle from which we approach this question continues to be neglected even now that questions of global justice are receiving much attention. Immigration amounts to a change in political relationships as immigrants alter their standing within one community and acquire a status elsewhere. Yet it also amounts to an alteration in physical relationship, since they acquire a relationship to a territory, making a life for themselves with the resources offered by a part of the earth.3 We base our exploration of.. (shrink)

Questions concerning the moral status of embryos, the validity of new technologies for human reproduction, ownership of one's own genes, gene patenting, privacy and discrimination have all been raised and debated. Although debate is healthy, it is only useful if all participants understand the fundamental biological principles underlying human life, human genes and human parenthood. Many people believe that science can play no role in determining when human life begins. I argue that this false assumption is based (...) on a failure to separate different contradictory meanings of the term ‘human life’. In actuality, science has provided great insight into when and how human life and human beings come into existence. I argue as well that, contrary to our intuitive feelings, there is no physical connection between any father and his son; shared genes represent shared information and nothing more. Nevertheless, the feeling of a physical connection between parent and child is very real and instinctive, no matter how false it may be. These new understandings have profound ramifications for the way we treat issues surrounding human reproduction, including both abortion and assisted reproductive technologies. (shrink)

The purpose of this analysis is to widen and clarify the debate which arose during the last years around granting patents (and other ownership rights) upon different methods and mechanisms of manipulating and engineering life. In doing so, I draw a limited, prima facie argument against many sorts of entitlements or granting rights to those capable of manipulating life at its core level. The general tendency nowadays is to put pressure on the institutional setting in order to (...) accept and promote the manipulation of life as a novel discovery and invention, i.e. to grant patents. I will argue why this is not only socially risky, but also morally doubtful. (shrink)

Contemporary versions of natural rights libertarianism trace their locus classicus to Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. But although there have been many criticisms of the version of political libertarianism put forward by Nozick, many of these fail objections to meet basic methodological desiderata. Thus, Nozick’s libertarianism deserves to be re-examined. In this paper I develop a new argument which meets these desiderata. Specifically, I argue that the libertarian conception of self-ownership, the view’s foundation, implies what I call the (...) Asymmetrical Value Claim: a dubious claim about the importance of choice relative to other valuable capacities. I argue that this misunderstands what is really valuable in life, and show how it causes libertarianism to generate counterintuitive public policy recommendations. (shrink)

Death is the destiny we all share, and this will not change. Yet the way we die, which had remained the same for many generations, has changed drastically in a relatively short time for those in developed countries with access to healthcare. For generations, if people were lucky enough to reach old age, not having died in infancy or childhood, in childbirth, in war, or by accident, they would take to bed, surrounded by loved ones who cared for them, and (...) fade into death. Most likely, they would have seen their parents and grandparents die the same way, and so this manner of dying would be familiar: it was part of the natural cycle of life. Now less than 25 per cent of Americans die at home, having reached much older ages than people would have dreamed of in past generations, often after surviving many illnesses and even diseases that would have been terminal for their grandparents. We are fortunate to live (and die) today, supported by myriad scientific, medical, and technological advancements, however we also face new problems as a result of the new way in which we die. We can no longer anticipate a peaceful waning at home with family. We know our lives will likely end in hospitals likely after we have endured grueling treatments to prolong life. We have to decide what decisions we want our loved ones, or care-givers, to make when we cannot choose for ourselves. We have to think about whether in any circumstances we would seek physician-assisted death. We know we face other questions as well, but we may not even know where to start. In the face of these decisions, we can feel daunted and afraid. The best remedy is information and planning. In this book, Gregory Eastwood - a physician who has cared for dying patients, served as an ethics consultant, and taught end of life issues to medical and other health profession students - draws from his substantial experience with patients and families to provide the information that will help us think clearly about the choices and issues we will face at the end of our own lives, and when faced with the deaths of our loved ones. With sensitivity and profound insight, Eastwood guides us through all the important questions about death and dying in straightforward, clear language, enhanced by real-life stories. Throughout, he shows us how we can take ownership of the way we want to die, when we must die, and feel more in control as death approaches. (shrink)

Life satisfaction is a research hotspot in positive psychology in recent years. This study uses overseas students as subjects and attempts to examine the effect of place attachment and student life satisfaction on Mainland Chinese students’ word-of-mouth recommendations and their Ambassador Behavioral intention. A survey was systematically conducted in six institutions in Macao. The results of 312 valid data indicate that place dependence has a positive influence on place identity; place identity and place dependence have a positive influence (...) on student life satisfaction; student life satisfaction mediates the influence of the two dimensions of place attachment on WOM and AB intention. Recommendations are provided to improve overseas students’ life satisfaction in the study places. It helps to improve their sense of ownership and actively participate in the construction of the study places. (shrink)

Pinter’s play The Caretaker explores interpersonal tensions relating to terminal illness. This paper interrogates notions of care, suffering, ownership, dignity and the consequences of active intervention and inaction in two key sections of the play: Aston’s monologue concerning his own brutal treatment (active intervention) and Davies’s final rejection by the brothers who fail to provide accommodation and care (inaction). This interprofessional analysis combines theatrical and clinical perspectives to create insights which can enhance empathy improve decision-making in end of (...) class='Hi'>life care and can inform the education of healthcare professionals. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that the capacity to “take ownership” is a fundamental feature of human life to which people may be well or poorly disposed. Although we commonly exhort others to “take ownership” in their work, education, or other projects, there has been very little conceptual or philosophical analysis of the concept. To my knowledge, no one has conceived of it as a virtue. This dissertation offers a full conceptual account of what the virtue is, its related (...) vices, and how the virtue is related to neighboring concepts like responsibility and stewardship. It also offers some practical ethical guidance for people who wish to cultivate the virtue in themselves. Chapter Two offers an account of the psychology of “taking ownership.” I argue that taking ownership is best understood as a species of psychological attachment, whereby one conceives of a project under the aspect of “mine” or “ours.” Chapter Three extends this account by developing it further into an account of my proposed virtue – “taking-ownership.” This virtue is a character trait that disposes one well to forming these psychological attachments. I argue that the virtue is also situated between a set of related vices, those of “over-investment” and “over-possessiveness” on the one hand, and a “lack of ownership” on the other. This chapter also provides rich descriptions of the characteristic feelings and actions that constitute being well and poorly disposed to taking ownership. Although Chapter three illuminates many of the good-making feature of taking-ownership, chapter four takes up the issue in more explicit fashion. There I provide further justification for the claim that the character trait is good, why the character trait is good, and I address the worry that people may take ownership in bad or evil projects. Chapter five responds to three other possible objections for considering this character trait a virtue. Chapter six concludes the dissertation by considering the ways in which one might attempt to cultivate the virtue of taking-ownership personally. There I emphasize the role that habits of “attention” might play in the development of the virtue. I also provide some idea for directions on future research. (shrink)

I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over (...) cognitive accounts, that cognitive accounts are plausible given that much of our mental activity has unnoticed effects on our mental life, and that certain illusory experiences of body ownership sometimes described as thought-independent may be best explained as imaginative perceptual experiences. (shrink)

A pilot study examined the relationship in daily life between companion animal guardianship and peoples' laughter. The study divided participants into 4 mutually exclusive groups: dog owners, cat owners, people who owned both dogs and cats, and people who owned neither. For one day, participants recorded in "laughter" logs the frequency and source of their laughter and the presence of others when laughing. Dog owners and people who owned both dogs and cats reported laughing more frequently than cat owners, (...) as did people who owned neither. The most frequent source of laughter was spontaneous laughter resulting from a situation. People who owned both dogs and cats reported most frequent spontaneous laughter resulting from an incident involving a pet. Dog owners reported less; cat owners, the least. Dog owners and people who owned both dogs and cats reported laughing more frequently in the presence of their pets than did cat owners. Findings suggest a complex relationship between pet ownership and laughter. Dogs may serve as friends with whom to laugh or their behaviors may provide a greater source of laughter. (shrink)

Almost everyone agrees that gun ownership is part of the complex fabric of values and traditions that comprise American society. All sides in the gun ownership debate understand that firearms are embedded deeply in America’s society and culture. But whereas for some the right to own guns is a non-negotiable promise guaranteed constitutionally, for others it is far more an element of the American experience than is desirable. This essay examines three arguments which have not usually received full (...) treatment in analytical debates, but which may help us to reframe the sharp polarization that now characterizes the discourse. The first relies on distinctively American ideals of liberty, property rights, and the right of protection from the state. The second considers the implications of American liberty and property across contemporary culture. The final argument captures a somewhat more obscure aspiration in American life: the freedom which can be enjoyed only when society has achieved the public good of safety from deadly firearms. (shrink)

In arguments in support of capitalism, the following propositions are sometimes advanced or presupposed: the best life for the individual is one of consumption, understood in a broad sense that includes aesthetic pleasures and entertainment as well as consumption of goods in the ordinary sense; consumption is to be valued because it promotes happiness or welfare, which is the ultimate good; since there are not enough opportunities for consumption to provide satiation for everybody, some principles of distributive justice must (...) be chosen to decide who gets what; the total to be distributed has first to be produced. What is produced depends, among other things, on the motivation and information of the producers. The theory of justice must take account of the fact that different principles of distribution have different effects on motivation and information; economic theory tells us that the motivational and informational consequences of private ownership of the means of production are superior to those of the various forms of collective ownerships. In the traditional controversy over the relative merits of capitalism and economic systems, the focus has been on proposition. In this paper, I consider instead propositions and. Before one can even begin to discuss how values are to be allocated, one must consider what they are – what it is that ought to be valued. I shall argue that at the center of Marxism is a specific conception of the good life as one of active self-realization, rather than passive consumption. (shrink)

From psychotherapist and TikTok personality Dr. Annie Zimmerman comes a toolkit to transform yourself and your relationships, with advice on how to heal past trauma, build sustainable connections, and take ownership of your mental health. Every day, psychotherapist Dr. Annie Zimmerman meets clients in her private London practice who are struggling with their lives. They're committed to achieving personal growth, making changes--but they're struck at the question stage. They ask: Why can't I sleep? Why do I keep going back (...) to a bad relationship? Why did I lose my temper? What is wrong with me? Here's the answer: nothing is wrong with them. It's just that they're asking themselves the wrong questions. In Your Pocket Therapist, Dr. Zimmerman helps readers delve into their past to identify old, unhelpful patterns and teach them how to unlock the present. The book combines practical tools with anecdotes gleaned from the therapy room, distilling complex psychological concepts with her signature warmth and empathy. Her belief--galvanized by her hundreds of thousands of followers--is that if we learn to understand the roots of our suffering, we can bring about meaningful--and permanent--change in our lives. It comes down to learning how to ask the right questions. A brilliant, necessary toolkit for those who want to break free from past patterns and embrace a life of abundant self-awareness and connection, Your Pocket Therapist is an absolute must-read in the field of psychology. (shrink)

This article sets out a new conception of ‘property as an asset of resilience’. Building on Fineman’s emphasis on ‘webs’ of resilience, and applying insights from Actor-Network Theory and Resilient Property Theory, we examine how the rhetorical claims asserted by owners and non-owners, individually and collectively, and the ways that law recognizes and endorses those claims, affect the production of property-as-resilience. Applying Fineman’s framework, we argue that the ‘embodiment’ and ‘embeddedness’ of human vulnerability is revealed by the necessary and inevitable (...) relationship we have with land, housing and place. Everyone—including homeless people—must ‘be’ somewhere (embodiment); however, it is our ability to access ‘assets of resilience’ through our social embeddedness in institutional structures and relationships that mitigates (or not) our experience and life opportunities. In this article we analyze the nature of real property as an asset of resilience, the consequences of exclusionary concepts of ownership for how resilience is allocated, and the implications for how we think and talk about ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ in property theories and property law. We consider the roles that states perform in the allocation of property as an asset of resilience: both directly, through the protection and enforcement of private property rights and official narratives about the nature of private property; and indirectly, as owners leverage the hinterland of privilege extended to ‘ownership’ and owners to deepen their own networks of resilience. (shrink)

According to a renowned left-libertarian, Michael Otsuka, a libertarian right of self-ownership can be so robust that one need not sacrifice the use of one's mind and body to help others. In this article, I demonstrate that Otsuka's way of reconciling this robust conception of self-ownership with equality is not appealing and, at best, would provide limited guidance in the face of real-life uncertainty.

AI systems are bringing an augmentation of human capabilities to shape the world. They may also drag a replacement of human conscience in large chunks of life. AI systems can be designed to leave moral control in human hands, to obstruct or diminish that moral control, or even to prevent it, replacing human morality with pre-packaged or developed ‘solutions’ by the ‘intelligent’ machine itself. Artificial Intelligent systems (AIS) are increasingly being used in multiple applications and receiving more attention from (...) the public and private organisations. The purpose of this article is to offer a mapping of the technological architectures that support AIS, under the specific focus of the moral agency. Through a literature research and reflection process, the following areas are covered: a brief introduction and review of the literature on the topic of moral agency; an analysis using the BDI logic model (Bratman 1987); an elemental review of artificial ‘reasoning’ architectures in AIS; the influence of the data input and the data quality; AI systems’ positioning in decision support and decision making scenarios; and finally, some conclusions are offered about regarding the potential loss of moral control by humans due to AIS. This article contributes to the field of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence by providing a discussion for developers and researchers to understand how and under what circumstances the ‘human subject’ may, totally or partially, lose moral control and ownership over AI technologies. The topic is relevant because AIS often are not single machines but complex networks of machines that feed information and decisions into each other and to human operators. The detailed traceability of input-process-output at each node of the network is essential for it to remain within the field of moral agency. Moral agency is then at the basis of our system of legal responsibility, and social approval is unlikely to be obtained for entrusting important functions to complex systems under which no moral agency can be identified. (shrink)

This study focuses on learning effects between firms connected by common ownership. We explore the learning effects in a certain setting that how decision-makers in focal firms learn from punishments for fraudulent disclosure in their co-owned firms. Baseline results show that punishments for fraudulent disclosure in co-owned firms reduce information disclosure fraud in focal firms. The effects still exist after excluding other potential channels of learning. In mechanism analyses, similarities between focal firms and their co-owned firms and influential common (...) shareholders enhance the learning effects. Further, after the events in co-owned firms, there is improvement in internal control in focal firms, which contributes to the reduction of fraudulent disclosure. Additionally, empirical results mitigate the concern that the reduction of fraud is not driven by the learning argued in this paper but decision-makers alternatively conducting more other unethical behaviors such as real earnings management. In sum, empirical results support the existence of learning effects. As common ownership is an important but highly underexplored linkage between firms, future research can study learning effects between firms connected by common ownership in other suitable settings. (shrink)

To understand private property, it is generally assumed, we must recognize the contribution objects make to human life. On the prevailing view, ownership is valuable only insofar as its subject matter is of value. In the order of valuation, objects come first, owning them comes second. But despite its air of obviousness, the assumption does not suit our ordinary concept of ownership. Ownership can be valuable quite apart from the value of the owned object, and it (...) can be the source of an object’s value as well as derive from the latter its own value. At its core, our ordinary concept of ownership does not describe a normative but an ontological relationship to objects, analogous to our relationship to our bodies, and best revealed by attending to our self-referential use of first person pronouns, personal and possessive. The result is a non-reductive and non-consequentialist account of property, or, more accurately, of the idea of ownership. (shrink)

Doctors have been placed in an anomalous position by abortion laws which sanction the termination of a fetus while in a woman's womb, yet call it murder when a physician attempts to end the life of a fetus which has somehow survived such a procedure. This predicament, the doctors' dilemma, can be resolved by adopting a strategy which posits the right to ownership of one's own body for human beings. Such an approach will generate a consistent policy prescription, (...) one that sanctions the right of all pregnant women to abortions, yet grants the fetus, after it becomes viable as a potentially independent person, a right to its own body. The doctors' dilemma is surmounted, then, by requiring that abortions of viable fetuses be performed in a manner that will produce a live delivery. Hence, infanticide and termination of viable fetuses are proscribed. (shrink)

There has been growing global interest in livestock animal welfare. Previous research into attitudes towards animal welfare has focused on Europe and the United States, with comparatively little focus on Australia, which is an important location due to the prominent position of agriculture economically and culturally. In this article, we present results from qualitative research on how Australian meat consumers conceptualise sheep and beef cattle welfare. The study was conducted in two capital cities (Melbourne, Victoria and Adelaide, South Australia) and (...) a much smaller rural centre (Toowoomba, Queensland) using focus groups (involving 40.9% of participants) and mall-intercept interviews (59.1% of participants), totalling 66 participants. Qualitative analysis highlights that participants had clear ideas of what it means for an animal to live a ‘good life’ and experience a ‘good death,’ with their beliefs strongly tied to their expectations and cultural understandings of what Australian agriculture ‘should be.’ In response to open-ended questions, participants expressed attitudes that relied on romanticised visions of the ‘rural idyll’ as seen in frequent discussions about what is ‘normal’ for sheep meat and beef production, and relatedly, what count as ‘natural behaviours.’ Many participants rejected anything associated with the ‘other,’ classifying it as not ‘normal’: we argue that which is not considered normal, including intensive production, foreign ownership, and halal slaughter practices, appear to place participants’ conceptualizations of an animal’s ‘good death,’ and in turn the potential for a ‘good life,’ at risk. (shrink)

Exploiting the regulatory change in China’s Environmental Protection Law in 2015 as a plausibly exogenous shock to the stringency of pollution control, we evaluate the joint role of state ownership and environmental regulation in shaping firms’ environment-friendly (green) investments. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) make significantly more green investments than non-SOEs in response to the regulatory change. We propose and empirically analyze four potential mechanisms that may drive this result: (i) environment-related government subsidies granted (...) to SOEs, (ii) political promotion incentives of SOEs’ top management, (iii) government administrative intervention, and (iv) SOEs’ concern for social welfare. We find strong support for the last mechanism whereby SOEs undertake greater green investments due to their greater concern for social welfare, as evidenced by the fact that SOEs making greater charitable donations and those controlled by local governments (and thus more bonded with local communities) make greater green investments. Consistent with this interpretation, we show that regions where SOEs have a greater economic influence improved their air quality to a greater extent after 2015 than regions where non-SOEs are more dominant. In sum, we demonstrate that state ownership and environmental regulation complement one another in motivating corporate green investment. Our results highlight the important implications for the effectiveness and interplay of different government tools in addressing environmental issues. (shrink)

This study examines if, how, and when workplace spirituality promotes employee ethical voice. Specifically, it tests a mediated moderation model with psychological ownership as a mediator of the relationship between workplace spirituality and ethical voice, and moral identity internalization as a moderator of this indirect relationship. The hypothesized model was tested on two different samples from the IT (Study 1) and Hotel industry (Study 2). Study 1 adopted a cross-sectional time-lagged design to test the proposed hypotheses while Study 2 (...) used a more robust longitudinal cross-lagged design to validate the results of Study 1. The conceptual model was tested using structural equation modeling (SEM) and the results established a direct as well as an indirect effect of workplace spirituality on ethical voice via psychological ownership. However, moral identity internalization failed to moderate the effect of workplace spirituality on ethical voice through psychological ownership in both studies. The results established that workplace spirituality stimulates ethical voice through psychological ownership irrespective of the moral identity of employees. The study identifies workplace spirituality as a novel and significant predictor of ethical voice in organizations and advances the understanding of the psychological processes and contingencies of this relationship. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Material property has traditionally been conceived of as separable from its owner and thus alienable in an exchange. So it seems that you could sell your watch or even your kidney because it can be removed from your wrist or abdomen and transferred to another. However, if we are each identical to a living human animal, self‐ownership is impossible for self‐separation is impossible. We thus cannot sell our parts if we don't own the whole that they compose. It would (...) be incoherent to own all of your body's parts but not the whole body; and it would be arbitrary to own some but not all of your removable parts. These metaphysical obstacles to organ sales do not apply to the selling of the organs of the deceased. The human being goes out of existence at death and is not identical to the body's remains. Any objections to selling the organs of the deceased must instead be due to dignity rather than metaphysical or conceptual considerations. But the remains lack the intrinsic dignity of the human being, instead possessing, at best, relational dignity. Relational dignity would not provide sufficient reason to prohibit life‐saving sales. (shrink)

We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988 ). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical (...) and epistemic rationality, building on Williamson’s ( 2002 ) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa ( 2007, 2011, 2015, 2021 ), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman ( 2000, 2009 ). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

Dog ownership is believed to benefit owner wellbeing but, contrary to popular belief, there is limited evidence to suggest that simply owning a dog is associated with improved mental health. This mixed-methods study investigates whether dog owners with stronger relationships with their dogs experience better mental health. Participants completed an online survey. Owners’ health was measured using the validated PROMIS questions regarding depression, anxiety, emotional support, and companionship. The dog–owner relationship was measured using the validated MDORS scale, which has (...) three subscales: interaction, emotional closeness, and perceived costs. Univariable and multivariable linear regression analyses were conducted, adjusting for confounding factors. Additionally, positive and negative impacts of dog ownership on mental wellbeing were coded from open questions using thematic analysis. A stronger dog–owner relationship was associated with greater feelings of emotional support and companionship but poorer mental health in terms of anxiety or depression. However, the perceived costs subscale was consistently associated with better mental health outcomes. Direction of causality cannot be inferred as people with poor mental health may acquire dogs to help relieve symptoms, which qualitative analysis supported. Key themes included positive impacts on owner wellbeing and happiness through providing purpose, companionship and self-acceptance, pleasure and distraction, as well as lessening emotional pain and suffering and reducing risk behaviors. However, negative impacts of a strong relationship include anticipatory grief over loss of the dog, and concerns regarding the burden of responsibility and ability to meet dog’s needs. Perceived ability to adequately meet dog’s needs promoted personal growth and positive relationships with others, whereas perceived inability led to feelings of guilt, or anger/frustration, and reduced autonomy and sense of environmental mastery. Dog ownership contributes to both hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing in multiple ways, including supporting owners through periods of poor mental health and providing purpose. However, the burden of responsibility and owner and dog characteristics can create challenges, and owners may benefit from support in caring for their dogs and reducing problematic behaviors. (shrink)

In this editorial essay, we argue that Generative Artificial Intelligence programs (GenAI) draw on what we term a “hypercommons”, involving collectively produced inputs and labour that are largely invisible or untraceable. We argue that automatizing the exploitation of common inputs, in ways that remix and reconfigure them, can lead to a crisis of academic authorship in which the moral agency involved in scholarly production is increasingly eroded. We discuss the relationship between the hypercommons and authorship in terms of moral agency (...) and the ethics of academic production, speculating on different responses to the crisis of authorship as posed by GenAI. (shrink)

Eastern Orthodox Christianity carries forward a moral tradition from the earliest Christian period, in the belief that scriptural and patristic teaching remains applicable to the contemporary economic sphere of life. The Church Fathers focused on the ownership of property and the ethical acquisition of wealth and its use; they stressed special concern for the poor and disadvantaged. Carried forward through the Byzantine and modern eras, these early Christian understandings now can be applied through a basic and elementary natural (...) law morality to business activities. The Orthodox approach embodies traditional virtue and character ethics as well. The essay concludes by applying these Orthodox approaches to two current issues: the charging of interest and internet ethics. (shrink)

Locke's defense of private property rights includes what is called a proviso— "the Lockean proviso"—and some have argued that in terms of it the right to private property can have various exceptions and it may not even be unjust to redistribute wealth that is privately owned. I argue that this cannot be right because it would imply that one's right to life could also have various exceptions, so anyone's life (and labor) could be subject to conscription if some (...) would need it badly enough. Since this could amount to enslavement and involuntary servitude, it would be morally and legally unacceptable. Key Words: rights • John Locke • Lockean proviso • scarcity. (shrink)

It is often assumed that pet ownership improves peoples’ wellbeing, but evidence of this pet effect has been mixed. We extended past research on pet personality, the pet effect, and value congruence to examine whether people perceive their pets to have humanlike values and if owner-pet values similarity has a positive effect on owners’ life satisfaction. In a large and diverse sample of Australian dog and cat owners, we find that people imbue their dogs and cats with humanlike (...) values in a way that reflects the theoretical circular structure of values. Importantly, perceptions of the values of dogs and cats differed in that dogs were perceived to prioritize more social-focus values, whereas cats were perceived to prioritize more personal-focus values. Additionally, we find that similarity in the values profile of dog owners and their dogs is positively associated with life satisfaction, but this was not the case for cats. However, when we examined associations between individual values similarity and life satisfaction, our results suggest a more complex and nuanced picture of both direct and indirect similarity effects. (shrink)

It is a central tenet of most contemporary theories of justice that the badly-off have a right to some of the resources of the well-off. In this paper, I take as my starting point two principles of justice, to wit, the principle of sufficiency, whereby individuals have a right to the material resources they need in order to lead a decent life, and the principle of autonomy, whereby once everybody has such a life, individuals should be allowed to (...) pursue their conception of the good, and to enjoy the fruits of their labour in pursuit of such conception. I also endorse the value of fairness, whereby the right person or institution makes the decision as to whether to bring about justice.I show that justice and fairness can be satisfied only if we all enjoy a combination of private and collective rights over the world. In making that case, I shall argue that the set of ownership rights I advocate differs from readily available conceptions of restricted private ownership in two important respects. First, it is such that in some circumstances, two individuals or more can have control rights over the same property at the same time, not, as is standardly the case in legal systems, by contracting with one another (through gifts and joint purchase), but simply on grounds of justice. Second, it allows that, if necessary, property-owners be expropriated from their property without compensation. (shrink)

This paper clarifies some of the longstanding difficulties in negotiating Do Not Resuscitate Orders by reframing the source of the dilemmas as not residing with either the patient or the physician but with their relationship. The recommendations are low cost and low-tech ways of making major improvements to the care and quality of life of the most ill patients in hospital. With impending physician-assisted death legislation there is an urgency to find more efficient and beneficial ways for clinicians and (...) patients to address resuscitation issues at the bedside. Paradigmatic shifts in the nature of the patient-physician relationship will need to be encouraged by the larger community. These encouraged shifts address the concepts of passive/inferior patient – active/superior physician, patient ownership of and access to all their health care information, and treating the patient as a major participant in the delivery of health care. These recommended changes will not in themselves make any patient, physician or other healthcare provider more humane and open in the patient’s final days. The goal, instead, is to have changes to the context of the discussion provide an encouraging environment for more open communication and a balanced relationship among participants with the patient being the most important. (shrink)

A basic problem of daily life is determining who owns what. One way that people may solve this problem is by relying on a ‘first possession’ heuristic, according to which the first person who possesses an object is its owner, even if others subsequently possess the object. We investigated preschoolers’ use of this heuristic in five experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, 3- and 4-year-olds inferred that an object was owned by the character who possessed it first, even though (...) another character subsequently possessed it. Two-year-olds also showed this bias, but only when the object was placed between the characters when children were asked about ownership. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that children’s bias to select the first possessor results from a tendency to select the character first associated with the object. Experiment 4 showed that 3- and 4-year-olds have difficulty disregarding the first possession heuristic, even when provided with evidence that the character who first possessed an object is not its owner. But Experiment 5 found that children can disregard the heuristic in at least some situations. These five experiments suggest that the first possession heuristic guides children’s ownership inferences. The findings provide the first evidence that preschoolers can infer who owns what, when not explicitly told, and when not reasoning about objects with which they are personally acquainted. (shrink)

This study examines the impact of non-executive employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) on corporate environmental engagement. We show that granting ESOPs to non-executive employees promotes greater corporate ecological engagement from the perspectives of environmental protection expenditures, environmental information disclosure quality, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings. ESOPs unite members in a common interest, empowering them to put pressure on management to reduce carbon emissions, which benefits their physical wellbeing and increases their residual interest in long-term corporate wealth. Further, (...) our analysis reveals that companies investing in environmental protection forgo short-term profit as a consequence of high initial costs, while increasing long-term firm value. These positive effects are attributable to ESOP schemes with higher employee subscription rates, those granted to a larger number of non-executive employees, and those with longer validity periods of ownership, whose incentive effect is sufficiently powerful to offset the free-rider problem. In addition, the impact of ESOPs is more pronounced in companies with greater media exposure, those confronting intense labor market competition, and those in heavily polluting industries. Fundamentally, our study provides novel evidence of the incentive effect of ESOPs on corporate environmental engagement and of stakeholder dynamics driving the implementation of carbon reduction strategies. (shrink)

This thesis lies in the overlap of environmental political theory and environmental ethics. More specifically, it focuses on the intersection between distributive ecological justice (justice to nature), and environmental justice (distributing environmental goods between humans). Against the backdrop of the current sixth extinction crisis, I address the question of what constitutes a just usage of ecological space. I define ecological space as encompassing environmental resources, benefits provided by ecosystems and physical spaces and when considering its just usage I not only (...) take into account claims to ecological space held by other humans but also the demands of justice with regards to nonhuman living beings such as animals and plants. In order to address my overall research question, I look at three areas of inquiry in particular. My first area of concern is questions around how environmental justice can be made compatible with a theory of ecological justice. Here I defend a specific definition of ecological space and provide a critique of theories of justice that are based on the view that humanity has an original ownership of the Earth. Secondly, I defend a biocentric approach to distributive ecological justice based on all living beings constituting together a community of fate, and I additionally clarify the relationship between justice and biodiversity loss. Lastly, considering that the current situation of life on Earth does not resemble the circumstance of moderate scarcity where all needs could theoretically be met (as usually assumed by the most influential theories of justice), I inquire into how demands of environmental and ecological justice differ in different circumstances of scarcity, and what could be considered a just compromise between these two domains of justice. I then apply these last considerations to the Half-Earth proposal for creating large protected areas for nonhuman species, which has been advocated by E. O. Wilson and other ecologists as a means to slow the current rate of anthropogenic species extinctions. In essence, the Half-Earth proposal might be ambitious, but I argue there are good reasons to consider it as one building block of a (distributively) just future for life on Earth. (shrink)

Disillusioned with college, Everett takes a position teaching philosophy to kids at an innovative summer enrichment academy on an island off the New England coast. The academy is run by fellow student Juniper’s Aunt Laura, and at Laura’s recommendation, Everett uses as his curriculum an exploration of the concept of happiness as described by ten of history’s most significant philosophers. This idea is sparked by a collection of readings saved by Laura’s grandmother, a teacher who originally owned the mansion in (...) which the academy is housed. But along with those readings is a set of clues that lead to a rare historic work by an ancient Greek philosopher—a codex—that is hidden in the mansion. So Everett sets to work preparing the readings for his students while simultaneously solving the clues with Juniper to find the codex. -/- What Everett doesn’t know, however, is that he and Juniper are not the only ones on the hunt for the codex, and the stakes are high. The book is extremely valuable, and there are plenty of people who would like to get their hands on the money it would bring at auction, including the people who are funding Laura’s academy. The question of rightful ownership and the mystery of the codex’s location deepen as Everett and Juniper solve the riddles to find the keys that will open whatever safe contains the ancient text. And all the while, Everett finds himself falling for Juniper. -/- He’s also working through the collection of philosophical readings about happiness, taking each one in turn and presenting it in clear, concise, modern English to his students, who are eager to discover how to lead a happy life. Everett is equally eager to make the same discovery, and he carefully considers each philosopher’s thinking on the matter, applying the concepts to his own life in an effort to understand them in the context of a young person in the real world struggling to figure out what he wants to do with his future. -/- As Everett gains clarity on what he wants out of life, however, the mystery of the codex takes a dark turn, and everything he thought he knew is turned upside down. Who will end up with the codex? What will happen to the academy? And will Everett be able to take everything that he has learned—both the good and the bad—to build a life for himself that will bring him the most happiness? -/- There is an accompanying guidebook for this novel. (shrink)

A second reason for this neglect is the form in which Descartes was led or compelled to present his soul doctrine in the Meditations. In some complex manner the Meditations is both a medieval, scholastic-Aristotelian writing, as well as the acknowledged founding writing of modern philosophy. It is traditional as "first philosophy" or speculative metaphysics of substance, and as Christian apologetics concerned with the salvation of the infidel. In accordance with both, the soul is a separate, immaterial substance with an (...) immortal destiny unprejudiced by the fate of the body. On the other hand, the Meditations is novel or modern as quest for indubitable "foundations" of the edifice of the sciences. The goal of the edifice of science is however stated only in the non-apologetic or more secular writings: the "mastery and ownership of nature," or "the enjoyment of the fruits of the earth in this life without pain," or such a wisdom as depends on knowing that "the mind depends acutely on the temperament, and the disposition of the organs of the body...". It is tempting to distinguish two Cartesian soul doctrines, the separate and immortal soul of the apologetic Meditations, and a secular soul articulated mainly outside the Meditations and especially in the Passions of the Soul, where Descartes speaks "as a physicist," addresses "the whole nature of man", never mentions any doctrine of substance, and remains utterly unperplexed about the interaction of mind and body. While such a gross distinction proves to be not without a certain homely truth, it leads us away from the Meditations, the classic document of the discovery of the modern soul doctrine. (shrink)

Hegel, in his work _Philosophy of Right_, defines ownership through three elements: acquisition by occupation, use, and transfer. To own something involves mere acquisition and encompasses its appropriate use and potential transfer to others. Subsequently, the final aspect mentioned was the concept of infinite judgement. The acts of owning and transferring to others are diametrically opposed, and Hegel’s unique logic forcibly connects these opposing concepts. This form of infinite judgement was advocated by the young Hegel during the era of (...) _Phenomenology of Spirit_. There, he stated, “Spirit is a bone”. However, when he later wrote _Science of Logic_ or _Encyclopedia_, the formulation of infinite judgement changed to “Spirit is not something that is bone”. This shift was influenced by Kant. In _Logic_, the discourse advances into syllogism, inferential theory, leading to “Spirit is a bone for such-and-such reasons”. In essence, Hegel binarily connected spirit and bone in his youth and introduced a mediating term in this connection later in his life, establishing inferential links. However, the notion of forcibly connecting opposing concepts remains. Therefore, the statement “Ownership is transfer” represents an infinite judgement while simultaneously signifying syllogism that “I truly own this object if I can transfer it to others”. This contributes to the reasoning that “I and objects can be connected through the intermediary of others”, progressing to the inference that “I and others can be connected through objects”, thereby laying the foundation for society. (shrink)

This article examines whether the charitable giving amount and likelihood of firm response to catastrophic events relate to firms’ ownership type using a unique dataset of listed firms in China, where state ownership is still prevalent. Based on the data of Chinese firms’ response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, we find that the extent of corporate contributions for state-owned firms following this disaster is less than that for private firms. State-owned firms are also less likely to respond in␣this (...) disaster compared to private firms. The results also␣reveal that firm size, profitability, geography, cash resource available, and leverage affect firms’ philanthropic disaster response behavior in China. (shrink)

This research aims to examine the specific risk of companies and their effectiveness in various stages of the company life cycle on state and nonstate ownership. For this purpose, the specific risk was estimated using Fama and French three-factor models, and the research objective was examined by considering the data panel model during the period 2015 to 2020 in a statistical sample consisting of 136 companies active in the Tehran Stock Exchange. For this purpose, the main contribution of (...) research is evaluation of the effect of specific risk in different stages of the life cycle of companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange. Therefore, the main valuable advantage to helping stock managers is assessing the impact of government ownership and nongovernment ownership on the specific risk of companies at different stages of the life cycle. Also, presenting a model to show the effects of dependent and independent variables in order to evaluate the impact of government and nongovernment ownership. The research results confirmed that the specific risk of the company in the stages of introduction, growth, and decline is higher compared to the stages of maturity and stagnation of the life cycle of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Because the coefficients of virtual variables related to the life cycle stages of the company are estimated to be significant. Also, the finding confirmed that government ownership significantly affects the relationship between firm risk and life cycle stages in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Because, the coefficient of variable state ownership is negative and significant, indicating a lower specific risk in state-owned companies than in nonstate-owned companies. (shrink)

Liberal egalitarian political philosophers have often argued that private property is a legal convention dependent on the state and that complaints about taxation from entitlement theorists are therefore based on a conceptual mistake. But our capacity to grasp and use property concepts seems too embedded in human nature for this to be correct. This essay argues that many standard arguments that property is constitutively a legal convention fail, but that the opposition between conventionalists and natural rights theorists is outmoded. In (...) doing this, the essay draws on recent literature in evolutionary biology and psychology. Even though modern property in a complex society involves legal conventions, those conventions should be sensitive to our natural dispositions concerning ownership. (shrink)

The conception of property at the basis of Hegel’s conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of “possessive individualism.” It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the (...) nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the “true right” that life possesses against the “formal” and “abstract right” of property. Ultimately, Hegel’s account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right. (shrink)

A collection of articles on the the principles of social justice from an Australian Catholic perspective. Contents: Forward (Archbishop Philip Wilson), Introduction (James Franklin), The right to life (James Franklin), The right to serve and worship God in public and private (John Sharpe), The right to religious formation (Richard Rymarz), The right to personal liberty under just law (Michael Casey), The right to equal protection of just law regardless of sex, nationality, colour or creed (Sam Gregg), The right to (...) freedom of expression (Damian Grace), The right to choose and freely maintain a state of life, married or single, lay or religious (Marita Winters), The right to education (Anthony Cleary), The right to petition government for the redress of grievances (Paul Russell), The right to a nationality (Andrew Hamilton), The right to have access to the means of livelihood, by migration when necessary (Brenda Hubber), The right of association and peaceful assembly (Michael Hogan), The right to work and choose one's occupation (Ian Blandthorn), The right to personal ownership, use and disposal of property subject to the right of others (Brian Coman), The right to a living wage (Garrick Small), The right to collective bargaining (Keith Harvey), The right to associate by industries and professions to obtain economic justice (Henrik Jurisevic), The right to assistance from society, if necessary from the State, in distress of persons and family (Catherine Althaus), Afterword (James Franklin). (shrink)

This paper investigates Hegel’s thesis that we are, in our practical relation to the world, inherently committed to certain aspects of idealistic metaphysics. For Hegel, our practical attitude is fundamentally at odds with a naïve realism that would take the world to consist ultimately of self-contained, self-sufficient individuals whose relations to one another are fundamentally external to their identities. Hegel contends that our practical attitude is premised upon an overcoming of this mutual externality, and especially the externality which is supposed (...) to hold between individual agent and world. It is shown that his argument hinges on conceiving of external things as inadequately individuated, as compared to living agents, and that it is precisely this ontological deficiency that conditions and motivates our action. Hegel’s discussions of morality and property ownership are appealed to in order to illustrate how we might better understand the nature and practical role of this purported deficiency. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nature and Freedom, Purity and Impurity in Reconsidering the Life of PowerJames Garrison (bio)My book Reconsidering the Life of Power: Ritual, Body, and Art in Critical Theory and Chinese Philosophy is not so much about providing a systematic account of what it means to be a self-monitoring, self-regulating subject, the branches of which might resolve down to some single root, despite its clear debt to Judith Butler's (...) 1997 The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection.1 My book is instead more self-consciously rhizomatic in the [End Page 833] manner of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.2 Describing my rhizomatic approach in this book, Joseph Harroff observes in his preceding article that:Instead of thinking about thinking as being conducive to the construction of totalizing systems, final vocabularies, or epistemic closure, Garrison connects our embodied reflection in the interstices of habit to the always changing life of power—that is, the conditions for the possibility of becoming a thinking, feeling, body-subject—to the dynamic and amorphous nature of the multitudinous processes by which we are constantly being rendered subjectival in daily life by forces working relatively synchronically in the present as "subjectivation" and relatively diachronically in cultural traditions as so many forms of "subjectality"3This is a very nuanced way of saying that my efforts to present subject life as being (1) relational, (2) bodily, (3) discursive, and (4) ritually philosophy. Indeed, thoughmpelled have led to a book that sprawls.4 This sprawl is thus like that of a rhizome (think of ginger), not proceeding from a single source of growth with a single, clear arche. Do I revel in the imprecision? Yes, but only when it is justified by the investigation itself. And in the case of this inquiry—which spans what Judith Butler captures regarding ritual performativity by drawing on figures like Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, and Foucault and the complex approaches to ritual seen in classical and contemporary Rú 儒 philosophy (Confucianism)—the rhizomatic approach very much is.With my book having hopefully earned its own rhizomatic badge of honor, my response to the thoughtful questions posed by Kelly Coble and Joseph Harroff likewise takes up this spirit and cuts its own course through what has been presented in their articles. Hence, I will proceed in a non-linear fashion that draws links between ideas capriciously and unapologetically.That said, my way of looking at Reconsidering the Life of Power and what I immodestly call its insights is far from the only perspective. I hold a copyright on the book (fact check: ctually, it's SUNY Press), but in the marketplace of ideas, I hold no monopoly, even over what I have authored. Therefore, while I feel a degree of ownership over the ideas presented here, I am delighted to see my thinking challenged and extended by people like Kelly Coble and Joseph Harroff in this forum and by others (like Michael J. Ardoline in the article "Building a Way: Becoming Active in One's Own Subjectivation through Deleuze and Xunzi" from the journal Philosophies),5 all of whom see so much present in the text beyond what I, even in its conception, was able.To wit, Joseph Harroff's characterization of my efforts to reclaim and redefine the term "liberal arts" captures so much of what I tried to convey so much more succinctly and with so much more in the way of provocative connection to a wealth of texts of a decidedly European lineage on the connection between freedom, the arts, and self-cultivation.6 However, as he well identifies, whereas classical European conceptions of liberal arts tend to [End Page 834] be more about self-cultivation of an atomic individual, what I am offering is more about finding freedom while taking the "self" in question to be deeply and constitutively relational along the lines that he very effectively links to the pragmatism of John Dewey and also in Rú, philosophy. Indeed, though not much of this specific pragmatist thread made it directly into this book, the influence of Roger T. Ames from my time at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa pervades Reconsidering the Life... (shrink)