Cannabis sativa L. is grown and marketed under a large number of named strains. Strains are often associated with phenotypic traits of interest to consumers, such as aroma and cannabinoid content. Yet genetic inconsistencies have been noted within named strains. We asked whether genetically inconsistent samples of a commercial strain also display inconsistent aroma profiles. We genotyped 32 samples using variable microsatellite regions to determine a consensus strain genotype and identify genetic outliers for four strains. Results were used to select (...) 15 samples for olfactory testing. A genetic outlier sample was available for all but one strain. Aroma profiles were obtained by 55 sniff panelists using quantitative sensory evaluation of 40 odor descriptors. Within a strain, aroma descriptor frequencies for the genetic outlier were frequently at odds with those of the consensus samples. It appears that within-strain genetic differences are associated with differences in aroma profile. Because these differences were perceptible to untrained panelists, they may also be noticed by retail consumers. Our results could help the cannabis industry achieve better control of product consistency. (shrink)

Herein, I discuss the enduring mystery of the receptor layout in the vertebrate olfactory system. Since the awarding of the 2004 Nobel Prize to Axel and Buck for their discovery of the gene family that encodes olfactory receptors, our field has enjoyed a golden era. Despite this Renaissance, an answer to one of the most fundamental questions for any sensory system—what is the anatomical logic of its receptor array?—eludes us, still, for olfaction! Indeed, the only widely debated hypothesis, (...) finding its origins in the musing of another Nobel laureate Sir Edgar Adrian, has it that the vertebrate nose organizes its receptors according to the “sorptive” properties of their ligands. This idea, known as the “sorption” or “chromatography” hypothesis, enjoys considerable support despite being controversial. Here, I review the history of the hypothesis—its rises and falls—and discuss the latest data and future prospects for this perennial idea whose history I liken to the mythical Phoenix. (shrink)

What is the function of new neurons entering the olfactory bulb? Many insights regarding the molecular control of adult neurogenesis have been uncovered, but the purpose of new neurons entering the olfactory bulb has been difficult to ascertain. Here, studies investigating the role of adult neurogenesis in olfactory discrimination in mice are reviewed. Studies in which adult neurogenesis is affected are highlighted, with a focus on the role of environment enrichment and what happens during ageing. There (...) is evidence for a role of adult neurogenesis in fine discrimination tasks, as underscored by studies that enhance adult neurogenesis. This is also observed in ageing studies, where older mice with reduced levels of adult neurogenesis perform poorly in olfactory discrimination. Differences in methodology that could account for alternative conclusions, and the importance of specificity in methods being used to investigate the effect of adult neurogenesis in olfactory performance are emphasized. (shrink)

The shapes of neurons and glial cells dictate many important aspects of their functions. In olfactory systems, certain architectural features are characteristics of these two cell types across a wide variety of species. The accumulated evidence suggests that these common features may play fundamental roles in olfactoryinformation processing. For instance, the primary olfactory neuropil in most vertebrate and invertebrate olfactory systems is organized into discrete modules called glomeruli. Inside each glomerulus, sensory axons and CNS neurons branch and (...) synapse in patterns that are repeated across species. In many species, moreover, the glomeruli are enveloped by a thin and ordered layer of glial processes. Theglomerular arrangement reflects the processing of odor information in modules that encode the discrete molecular attributes of odorant stimuli being processed. Recent studies of the mechanisms that guide the development of olfactory neurons and glial cells have revealed complex reciprocal interactions between these two cell types, which may be necessary for the establishment of modular compartments. Collectively, the findings reviewed here suggest that specialized cellular architecture plays key functional roles in the detection, analysis, and discrimination of odors at early steps in olfactory processing. (shrink)

A number of recent studies have documented rapid changes in behavioural sensory acuity induced by aversive learning in the olfactory and auditory modalities. The effect of aversive learning on the discrimination of low-level features in the visual system of humans remains unclear. Here, we used a psychophysical staircase procedure to estimate discrimination thresholds for oriented grating stimuli, before and after differential aversive learning. We discovered that when a target grating orientation was conditioned with an aversive loud noise, (...) it subsequently led to an improvement of discrimination acuity in nearly all subjects. However, no such change was observed in a control group conditioned to an orientation shifted by ±90° from the target. Our findings cannot be explained by contextual learning or sensitisation factors. The results converge with those reported in the olfactory modality and provide further evidence that early sensory systems can be rapidly modified by recently experienced reinforcement histories. (shrink)

Quality-space theory (QST) explains the nature of the mental qualities distinctive of perceptual states by appeal to their role in perceiving. QST is typically described in terms of the mental qualities that pertain to color. Here we apply QST to the olfactory modalities. Olfaction is in various respects more complex than vision, and so provides a useful test case for QST. To determine whether QST can deal with the challenges olfaction presents, we show how a quality space (QS) could (...) be constructed relying on olfactory perceptible properties and the olfactory mental qualities then defined by appeal to that QS of olfactory perceptible properties. We also consider how to delimit the olfactory QS from other modalities. We further apply QST to the role that experience plays in refining our olfactory discriminative abilities and the occurrence of olfactory mental qualities in non-conscious olfactory states. QST is shown to be fully applicable to and useful for understanding the complex domain of olfaction. (shrink)

Anosmia, or the absence of smell, is not just a subjective experience but, as I argue in this text, an ontological affect. Anosmia in the form of deodorisation and hygienisation, is the aim for many institutions, indeed often societies as a whole, that try to direct individual affects along prefabricated targets of racial, ethnic and class discrimination, rampant consumerism and unconscious participation in atmospheric engineering. Odours consist of what I would like to call the olflow, the incessant flow of (...) odours in which human and nonhuman bodies are agents of odour generation and consumption. Odour engineering directs the olflow and reinforces olfactory discrimination. I conclude with a call against the threat of what I call ‘ontological anosmia’, namely the flattening of multiplicity of desire and the engineering of emergence as spontaneity. (shrink)

Most philosophers consider olfactory experiences to be very poor in comparison to other sense modalities. And because olfactory experiences seem to lack the spatial content necessary to object perception, philosophers tend to maintain that smell is purely sensational or abstract. I argue in this paper that the apparent poverty and spatial indeterminateness of odor experiences does not reflect the “subjective” or “abstract” nature of smell, but only that smell is not directed to particular things. According to the view (...) defended in this paper, odors are properties of stuffs. This view, motivated by several arguments grounded in the phenomenology of olfactory experience, explains in particular why odors appear to be located both in the air around our nose and in the objects from which they emanate. It also explains the power of smell in the task of discriminating chemical compounds. (shrink)

The paper analyses the olfactory figures of hate and the various kinds of discrimination based on smell. It shows how figures of hate express themselves in the olfactory form of rejecting the other who stinks. All of the categories considered to be contemptible or inferior are olfactorily devalued. The paper examines successively the nose of anti-Semitism and racism, the nose of homophobia and sexism, the olfactory social discriminations, and the fiction of the stinking enemy. One may (...) ask why this theme of the other’s bad smell so thoroughly permeates the discourses of rejection. One of the reasons is doubtlessly related to the uncontrollable nature of smell, which invades space and intimacy, and betrays your identity. Eyes can be turned away or be deceived, but the nose knows. It is supposed to sniff out otherness and perceive invisible differences despite all efforts to hide them. (shrink)

Recent “connectionist” models provide a new explanatory alternative to the digital computer as a model for brain function. Evidence from our EEG research on the olfactory bulb suggests that the brain may indeed use computational mechanisms like those found in connectionist models. In the present paper we discuss our data and develop a model to describe the neural dynamics responsible for odor recognition and discrimination. The results indicate the existence of sensory- and motor-specific information in the spatial dimension (...) of EEG activity and call for new physiological metaphors and techniques of analysis. Special emphasis is placed in our model on chaotic neural activity. We hypothesize that chaotic behavior serves as the essential ground state for the neural perceptual apparatus, and we propose a mechanism for acquiring new forms of patterned activity corresponding to new learned odors. Finally, some of the implications of our neural model for behavioral theories are briefly discussed. Our research, in concert with the connectionist work, encourages a reevaluation of explanatory models that are based only on the digital computer metaphor. (shrink)

Animals use their chemosensory systems to detect and discriminate among chemical cues in the environment. Remarkable progress has recently been made in our knowledge of the molecular and cellular basis of chemosensory perception in insects, based largely on studies in Drosophila. This progress has been possible due to the identification of gene families for olfactory and gustatory receptors, the use of electro‐physiological recording techniques on sensory neurons, the multitude of genetic manipulations that are available in this species, and insights (...) from several insect model systems. Recent studies show that the superfamily of chemoreceptor proteins represent the essential elements in chemosensory coding, endowing chemosensory neurons with their abilities to respond to specific sets of odorants, tastants or pheromones. Investigating how insects detect chemicals in their environment can show us how receptor protein structures relate to ligand binding, how nervous systems process complex information, and how chemosensory systems and genes evolve. BioEssays 28:23–34, 2006. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The skeptic says that “knowledge” is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that ‘knowledge” is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about “knowledge”? And what implications do these hypotheses about “knowledge” have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about “knowledge”, but that both hypotheses about “knowledge” have deeply anti‐skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.

The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML algorithms (HMLA), a very important and urgent task. However, while the debate on fairness in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) and in HMLA has grown significantly over the last decade, the very concept of fairness as an ethical value has not yet been sufficiently (...) explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap and address the AI ethics principle of fairness from a conceptual standpoint, drawing insights from accounts of fairness elaborated in moral philosophy and using them to conceptualise fairness as an ethical value and to redefine fairness in HMLA accordingly. To achieve our goal, following a first section aimed at clarifying the background, methodology and structure of the paper, in the second section, we provide an overview of the discussion of the AI ethics principle of fairness in HMLA and show that the concept of fairness underlying this debate is framed in purely distributive terms and overlaps with non-discrimination, which is defined in turn as the absence of biases. After showing that this framing is inadequate, in the third section, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness and argue that fairness ought to be conceived of as an ethical value. Following a clarification of the relationship between fairness and non-discrimination, we show that the two do not overlap and that fairness requires much more than just non-discrimination. Moreover, we highlight that fairness not only has a distributive but also a socio-relational dimension. Finally, we pinpoint the constitutive components of fairness. In doing so, we base our arguments on a renewed reflection on the concept of respect, which goes beyond the idea of equal respect to include respect for individual persons. In the fourth section, we analyse the implications of our conceptual redefinition of fairness as an ethical value in the discussion of fairness in HMLA. Here, we claim that fairness requires more than non-discrimination and the absence of biases as well as more than just distribution; it needs to ensure that HMLA respects persons both as persons and as particular individuals. Finally, in the fifth section, we sketch some broader implications and show how our inquiry can contribute to making HMLA and, more generally, AI promote the social good and a fairer society. (shrink)

Age-based rationing remains highly controversial. This question has been paramount during the Covid-19 pandemic. Analyzing the practices, proposals, and guidelines applied or put forward during the current pandemic, three kinds of age-based rationing are identified: an age-based cut-off, age as a tiebreaker, and indirect age rationing, where age matters to the extent that it affects prognosis. Where age is allowed to play a role in terms of who gets treated, it is justified either because this is believed to maximize benefits (...) from scarce resources or because it is believed to be in accordance with the value of fairness understood as (a) fair innings, where less priority is given to those who have lived a full life or (b) an egalitarian concern for the worse off. By critically assessing prominent frameworks and practices for pandemic rationing, this article considers the balance the three kinds of age-based rationing strike between maximizing benefits and fairness. It evaluates whether elements in the proposals are, in fact, contrary to the justifications of these measures. Such shortcomings are highlighted, and it is proposed to adjust prominent proposals to care for the worse off more appropriately and better consider whether the acquired benefits befalls the young or the old. (shrink)

This book provides a general theory of discrimination law as practised in liberal democratic jurisdictions. Rejecting accounts that place the value of equality at the heart of the law, it argues that discrimination law protects individual autonomy. Applying the theory, the book tackles the central legal problems in applying discrimination laws.

In this article I critically examine a standard feature in conceptions of discrimination: the group-criterion, specifically the idea that there is a limited and definablegroup of traits that can form the basis of discrimination. I review two types of argument for the criterion. One focuses on inherently relevant groups and relies ultimately on luck-egalitarian principles; the other focuses on contextually relevant groups and relies ultimately on the badness of outcomes. I conclude that as neither type of argument is (...) convincing, the criterion is morally arbitrary, and as such untenable. Finally, I suggest both some of the conceptual and some of the practical implications of abandoning the criterion. (shrink)

The chapter unfolds in the following sections. The first section exam- ines the reasons for claiming that olfactory perception is spatially unstruc- tured and our experience of smells has an abstract structure. The second section elucidates the further arguments that olfaction cannot generate figure-ground segregation. The third section assesses the conclusion that olfactory perception and experience cannot solve the MPP. Following the overview of the many problems inherent to distal olfactory percep- tion, MST will be introduced as (...) an alternative perspective that allows for figure-ground segregation and perceiving multiple olfactory objects within an array. The chapter then concludes by replying to the shared argument that olfactory distal perception does not have the requisite res- olution to resolve the many properties problem. (shrink)

I develop a theory of (mental) reference according to which there are two ways of referring to an object. One can refer to an object by relying on a previous instance of successful reference to that (or some other) object. I call this type of reference 'dependent reference'. Alternatively, one can refer to an object 'independently'. A referential attempt is independent if and only if it is not dependent. I argue that these two types of reference differ as they adhere (...) to different norms. While it may be possible to think about an object without the ability to uniquely individuate it if one thinks about it dependently, the same may not hold true in the case of independent thought. At least, the classic arguments that attempt to demonstrate the possibility of thinking about something without the ability to uniquely individuate it are irrelevant to independent reference. Furthermore, not all reference could be dependent. -/- Along the way, I do a few other things as well. (shrink)

The article analyses the concept of indirect discrimination, arguing first that existing conceptualisations are unsatisfactory and second that it is best understood as equal treatment that is disadvantageous to the discriminatees because of their group-membership. I explore four ways of further refining the definition, arguing that only an added condition of moral wrongness is at once plausible and helpful, but that it entails a number of new problems that may outweigh its benefits. Finally, I suggest that the moral wrongness (...) of indirect discrimination is best accounted for in terms of the harm it does to discriminatees, and sketch three ways in which it may do so. I conclude that the analysis provides both a clearer understanding of the concept of indirect discrimination as well as indirect support for a harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, while suggesting that our moral obligations qua non-discrimination may be more extensive than is frequently assumed. (shrink)

Many legal, social, and medical theorists and practitioners, as well as lay people, seem to be concerned with the harmfulness of discriminative practices. However, the philosophical literature on the moral wrongness of discrimination, with a few exceptions, does not focus on harm. In this paper, I examine, and improve, a recent account of wrongful discrimination, which divides into a definition of group discrimination, and a characterisation of its moral wrong-making feature in terms of harm. The resulting account (...) analyses the wrongness of discrimination in terms of intrapersonal comparisons of the discriminatee’s actual, and relevantly counterfactual, well-being levels. I show that the account faces problems from counterfactuals, which can be traced back specifically to the orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, welfarist - concept of harm. I argue that non-counterfactual and non-comparative harm concepts face problems of their own, and don’t fit easily with our best understanding of discrimination; hence they are unsuitable to replace the orthodox concept here. I then propose a non-orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, hybrid - concept of harm, which relies on counterfactual comparisons of ways of being treated. I suggest how such a concept can help us handle the problems from counterfactuals, at least for my account of discrimination. I also show that there are similar proposals in other harm-related debates. An upshot of the paper is thus to corroborate the case for a non-orthodox, hybrid concept of harm, which seems better able to fulfil its functional roles in a variety of contexts. (shrink)

Australia, Canada, and New Zealand currently apply health requirements to prospective immigrants, denying residency to those with health conditions that are likely to impose an “excessive demand” on their publicly funded health and social service programs. In this paper, I investigate the charge that such policies are wrongfully discriminatory against persons with disabilities. I first provide a freedom-based account of the wrongness of discrimination according to which discrimination is wrong when and because it involves disadvantaging people in the (...) exercise of their freedom on the basis of morally arbitrary features of their identity. Discrimination is permissible, I suggest, when it is necessary to advance a valuable exercise of the discriminating agent’s freedom. I then apply this account to the case of social cost health requirements. Against critics of these requirements, I argue that it is sometimes permissible for states to discriminate against prospective immigrants with disabilities. States may do so, I suggest, when such discriminatory treatment is necessary to prevent an increase in rates of mortality and/or morbidity amongst citizens. Alongside critics of social cost health requirements however, I argue that existing policies are likely a form of wrongful discrimination insofar as they are too broad to satisfy this standard. (shrink)

In this paper, my aim is to develop a phenomenological understanding of discrimination from the perspective of the discriminator. Since early existential phenomenology, the phenomenon of discrimination has received a great deal of attention. While much of this work has focused on the experience of the discriminatee, recent scholarship has begun to reflect on the intentional structures on the side of the discriminator. In a contribution to this trend, I argue that our sense of what is (ab)normal plays (...) a constitutively significant role in the reiteration and reinforcement of harmful discriminatory practices. More specifically, I argue that Husserl's distinction between two forms of normality, namely, concordance-normality [Einstimmigkeit] and optimal-normality [Optimalität], is an important tool for illuminating otherwise overlooked aspects of the discriminator's experience. I achieve this by demonstrating how these two notions of normality play distinct constitutive roles when comparing deliberate acts of discrimination committed with malintent, compared with more primordial, habitual, and prereflective expectations which are already discriminatory in nucleo. I argue that at the heart of discriminatory practices there is a naïve, normalizing attempt to stabilize concordance at the expense of critical self-reflection, normative revisions, and enriched horizons of expectation. In doing so, this paper provides a novel and important contribution to philosophical discussions surrounding discrimination. (shrink)

The article explores one prominent account of what makes discrimination morally bad (when it is) – the disrespect-based account. The article first reviews and clarifies the account, arguing that it is most charitably understood as the claim that discrimination is morally bad when the discriminator gives lower weight to reasons grounded in the moral status of the discriminatee(s) in her decision-making. It then presents three challenges to the account, and reviews a recent argument in defense of it. The (...) first challenge is the fact that intuitions that might support the disrespect-based account can also be explained by reference to the fact that disrespect reflects poorly on the moral character of the discriminator. The second challenge is that there are cases where disrespectful discrimination is not intuitively worse than non-disrespectful discrimination. The third challenge is that the disrespect-based account has difficulties explaining our intuitions about cases of “doing right for the wrong reasons”. Finally, pace a recent argument in its defense, cases of harmless and apparently morally bad discrimination are plausibly best explained by other factors than disrespect. In the light of this analysis, the article concludes that the disrespect-based account should be abandoned. (shrink)

Our concern in this paper lies with a common argument from racial discrimination to realism about races: some people are discriminated against for being members of a particular race (i.e., racial discrimination exists), so some people must be members of that race (i.e., races exist). Error theorists have long responded that we can explain racial discrimination in terms of racial attitudes alone, so we need not explain it in terms of race itself. But to date there has (...) been little detailed discussion of whether it is better to explain racial discrimination in terms of race or in terms of racial attitudes alone. Our goal is to offer a novel and detailed argument in defense of explaining racial discrimination in terms of racial attitudes alone, by attending to the neglected phenomenon of misperception discrimination, which involves differential treatment due to misperceived race. We argue that the discriminatory action in misperception cases must be explained in the same way as cases where (according to the realist) the victim’s race is accurately perceived. Thus, the victim’s actual race cannot provide the best explanation. The main upshot of our argument is that explanatory arguments from racial discrimination to realism about race fail. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to examine the concept of discrimination from an ethical viewpoint. In a preliminary part, I will point out which aspects of the subject matter I will focus on and which I will leave aside (II). On the basis of the Aristotelian principle “treat like cases alike”, I will continue with a very formal definition, according to which discrimination can be understood as acting in a way that implies that like cases are not treated (...) alike. This leads to the difficult question of which cases are to be considered as “alike”, or which traits can serve as morally valid reasons for identifying cases as “unlike” (III). I will argue that this question cannot be answered independently from the specific circumstances and the normative premises referred to for describing these circumstances. My conclusion is that the concept of discrimination derives its “moral strength” solely from these normative premises. As a consequence, the use of the con- cept of discrimination can often be misleading since it falsely presupposes that there is agreement about the underlying normative premises (IV). Finally, I will illustrate the argumentation using “genetic discrimination” in connection with insurance contracts as an example (V). (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ‘Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application’, Mary Kate McGowan argues that some racist speech in public places should be made unlawful in the United States for the same reason that sexist behaviour in the workplace is already legally actionable—namely, to protect individuals from a hostile discriminatory environment. While McGowan may be correct that some public racist speech may constitute an act of discrimination in some morally significant sense, I present several reasons (...) for doubting that such speech constitutes a hostile discriminatory environment in the relevant legal sense. (shrink)

Anthony Daniels tackles the complex relation between good and bad art on the one hand and good and bad ideas on the other. He contrasts authors or artists whom he considers good with those he considers bad, and tries to explain why his opinion is not merely a matter of individual taste but is based upon reason as well. He argues judgment and discrimination (between good and bad, beautiful and ugly) are intrinsic to any conceivable human existence, indeed to (...) thought itself, and that the pretense that they are avoidable, that one can indefinitely suspend judgment, are merely a means by which bad or false judgments are smuggled into public life. (shrink)

Unaccompanied refugee youth, who as children fled their countries to seek asylum in a foreign country without the company of an adult legal caretaker are described as being in a vulnerable situation. Many of them struggle with mental reactions to traumatic events experienced pre-migration, and to the daily hassles they face after being granted asylum and residence. Despite continuous high levels of mental health problems URY demonstrate remarkable agency and social mobility in the years after being granted asylum in their (...) destination countries. A sense of subjective well-being may enable resilient outcomes in people exposed to past or ongoing adversities. To fill the gap in the research literature about positive psychological outcomes among URY, the overall aim of this study was to explore the longitudinal associations between SWB and two taxing acculturation hassles: perceived discrimination and ethnic identity crisis. Three annual waves of self-report questionnaire data were collected from a population-based sample of URY; n = 581, Mage = 20.01, Mlength of stay = 4.63, 82 % male, mainly from Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka. The longitudinal associations between SWB, perceived discrimination and ethnic identity crisis across time were analyzed using auto-regressive cross-lagged modeling. The results revealed that perceived discrimination, but not ethnic identity crisis, negatively predicted subsequent levels of SWB. More importantly, high levels of SWB at one timepoint predicted decreases in both discrimination and ethnic identity crisis at subsequent timepoints. Further, increases in SWB from one timepoint to the next was associated with significant co-occurring decreases in both discrimination and ethnic identity crisis, and vice versa. Despite the negative effect of perceived discrimination on SWB, promoting SWB in URY can protect them from future hazards of acculturation hassles in complex ways. We underscore the need for more research on SWB among URY and other refugee youth. We further discuss the potential of SWB to foster resilient outcomes in young refugees and suggest that interventions to strengthen SWB among them should consider their transnational and multicultural realities and experiences. (shrink)

A common response to claims of bias, harassment, or discrimination is to say that these claims are made in bad faith. Claimants are supposedly not motivated by a credible or even sincere belief that unfair or unequal treatment has occurred, but simply seek to illicitly gain public sympathy or private reward. Characterizing discrimination claims as systematically made in bad faith enables them to be screened and dismissed prior to engaging with them on their merits. This retort preserves the (...) dominant group’s self-image as unprejudiced and innocent without having to risk critical analysis of the claim’s substance. (shrink)

Due to the technology of machine learning, new breakthroughs are currently being achieved with constant regularity. By using machine learning techniques, computer applications can be developed and used to solve tasks that have hitherto been assumed not to be solvable by computers. If these achievements consider applications that collect and process personal data, this is typically perceived as a threat to information privacy. This paper aims to discuss applications from both fields of personality and image analysis. These applications are often (...) criticized by reference to the protection of privacy. This paper critically questions this approach. Instead of solely using the concept of privacy to address the risks of machine learning, it is increasingly necessary to consider and implement ethical anti-discrimination concepts, too. In many ways, informational privacy requires individual information control. However, not least because of machine learning technologies, information control has become obsolete. Hence, societies need stronger anti-discrimination tenets to counteract the risks of machine learning. (shrink)

Cost-effectiveness analysis is the standard analytical tool for evaluating the aggregate health benefits of treatments, interventions, or health programs. It works by comparing the ratio of costs and benefits of different alternatives. The lower the ratio, the more effective the treatment, intervention, or program. The use of cost-effectiveness analysis can ensure that scarce health care resources are allocated in a way that maximizes the satisfaction of health needs. According to a common objection, however, the use of cost-effectiveness analysis for setting (...) priorities in the allocation of health care resources may lead to unfair discrimination against people with disabilities.The aim of the first part of this .. (shrink)