Like asteroids, hundred-year floods and pandemic disease, thermonuclear war is a low-frequency, high-impact threat. In the long run, catastrophe is inevitable if nothing is done − yet each successive government and generation may fail to address it. Drawing on risk perception research, this paper argues that psychological biases cause the threat of nuclear war to receive less attention than it deserves. Nuclear deterrence is, moreover, a ‘front-loaded good’: its benefits accrue disproportionately to proximate generations, whereas much of the (...) expected cost will be borne in the distant future. Recent surveys indicate that the US and Russian publics assign a surprisingly high likelihood to nuclear war. Nevertheless, earlier research suggests that it is probably not believed to be just around the corner. This, along with the absence of easy solutions, encourages governments and publics to give priority to more pressing concerns. The danger is that the pattern will continue clear up to the point that nuclear war arrives. (shrink)

On the 70th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the world remains marked by violent conflict and the possibility of nuclear war. This seems an apt moment to ask whether the bombings have left a trace in our thinking. This article thus explores how particular articulations of their memory or, alternatively, failures to articulate such a memory, conjure up our world: how they represent and account for violence and how, if at all, they assign specific significance to (...) nuclear weapons. Reading two very different texts, Jacques Derrida’s ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’ and Kamila Shamsie’s Burnt Shadows, alongside each other, the article shows how remembering finds itself at the impossible limit between the conceptual and the particular, in the space of politics. It argues that the violence that continues to form an everyday part of our world can only be challenged or even understood by thinking at this (impossible) limit where no answer can be generated in the abstract and decisions are necessary. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 Reviews 187 NUCLEAR WAR AND WORLD CITIZENSHIP Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa [email protected] Robert Hinde and Joseph Rotblat. War No More: Eliminating Conflict in the Nuclear Age. London and Sterling, Va.: Pluto P., 2003. Pp. x, 228. £40.00; us$50.00; isbn 0745321925 (hb). £11.99; us$17.95 (pb). ast year marked the 50th anniversary of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto, (...) Lwhich sought to put the world on guard against the hydrogen bomb’s dangers. The last surviving signatory to the manifesto was Joseph Rotblat, who died on 31 August 2005. In 1995, Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. During World War ii, Joseph Rotblat participated in the Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb. An Encyclopaedia Britannica article on his Nobel prize explains that “Although he was uncomfortable about participating in the creation of an atomic bomb, Rotblat initially believed that the weapon would be used only to deter a German threat. After learning in 1944 that it would be used to contain the Soviet Union, a World War ii ally, he left the project….” Upon returning to England in 1945, Rotblat left defence work for medical research. He served as founding secretary-general and later as president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which began in 1957 and at which key scientists and others from different countries could confer about the peril of nuclear weapons facing the world. As a medical physicist at London University’s St. Bartholomew’s Hospital Medical College (1950–76), Rotblat directed attention toward the biological hazards of nuclear radiation and the severity of fallout from atmospheric testing. He worked closely with Russell in the 1950s and early ’60s and still visited him in his last years. (See his “Personal Reminiscences”, Russell, 18 [1998]: 5–24.) The book’s co-author, Robert Hinde, is the author of numerous books and articles in psychology. The book addresses the planet’s current state in terms of weapons of mass destruction. It features many tables and charts on matters ranging from the varying levels of the super-powers’ nuclear warhead stockpiles to the principal nuclear arms control treaties to estimates of military deaths in individual wars during the last 60 years. Since this book is an earnest endeavour to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction, many of its most fundamental prescriptions sound basic, even _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 188 Reviews somewhat banal. To be sure, the authors acknowledge that “Any attempt to discuss ways of preventing war must address very basic issues, and in so doing lays itself open to accusations of mushy idealism” (pp. 214–15). In War No More the authors opt to err in the direction of moral truisms as a small price to pay if there is a chance of contributing to a discussion eventually compelling the world’s political leaders to heed such moral considerations. In the prevention of conflict, “Often the success of such efforts may be unknown to the wider world just because the criterion of success is simply that nothing happens” (p. 198). Hinde and Rotblat urge their readers to understand the absolute need to abolish war if humanity is to endure in this nuclear age. Their position is that “the very possession of nuclear weapons is immoral. Their enormous destructive power, inflicted on civilians even more than on the military, would make their use unforgiveable” (p. 139). The authors expressly credit Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein with having taken the initiative for international action on this front (p. 189). And as was the view of Russell and Einstein 50 years earlier, Hinde and Rotblat proclaim in their book that “The only solution is international agreement on the total abolition of nuclear weapons” (p. 139). Hinde and Rotblat concede the ease with which people can be pessimistic about the prospects of abolishing war. However, the formidable challenge posed by such a task is deemed “no excuse for inaction”. They cite historic instances in which humanity has... (shrink)

This paper proceeds from a sense of dissatisfaction with much of current moral argument about defence policy, in particular the role of nuclear weapons. Discussions of the moral issues tend to divide into two distinct kinds of writing: on the one hand, impassioned calls to action based on and allied with equally impassioned moral exhortations; and on the other hand, usually in academic contexts, meticulous analyses and comparisons of aspects of nuclear policy with paradigm cases of acknowledged moral (...) categories or requirements, with the object of showing by analogy with these that the particular aspect of policy under discussion is or is not morally wrong. My unease is caused by the fact that, while it is difficult not to respond to the impassioned style of argument, as one recognizes in it a practical and moral urgency which our situation seems to demand, nevertheless it plainly appeals only to those already convinced of its conclusions. The unconverted tend to regard it with suspicion or disdain, for in contrast to the analytical style, which manifestly seeks to compel the intellect, the impassioned style seems to make its effect by stirring the emotions as much as if not instead of by compelling the intellect. On the other hand the analytical style can seem curiously irrelevant, even trivial, in relation to the issue. For instance, it has been argued that since: nuclear war is a moral disaster; deterrence is threatening or intending to wage nuclear war; it is wrong to threaten or intend to do something wrong; therefore: deterrence is wrong, and should be abandoned. It is hard to believe that defenders of deterrence as the cornerstone of defence policy are going to be persuaded by such an argument to abandon their advocation of it, if only because the argument totally ignores the object of deterrence. (shrink)

This edited collection of original essays by prominent Russell scholars focuses on the philosopher's positions on the key issues of nuclear war, peace, and ...

In January 2023, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the hands of the Doomsday Clock forward to 90 s before midnight.

Since the appearance of private property and the state, the attention of thinkers of many generations has been focused without interruption on questions of war and peace. Most, however, have been unable to explain these sociohistorical phenomena. A truly scientific theory of war and peace has been established only by the founders of Marxism-Leninism.

ABSTRACT This paper is about the problem of the moral responsibility resting on any person to form rational beliefs about, and moral attitudes towards, the deterrent threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which still lies behind the graduated nuclear response strategies now more fashionably discussed by military experts. The problem is to decide what kinds of reasons there are, and how to arrive in the light of them at determinate conclusions about deterrence and unilateral disarmament. Consequential arguments would be (...) powerful, if only they were determinate; but not only do they not point conclusively to one strategy rather than another, there is not even sufficient reason for accepting one rather than another of the competing optimising criteria by which the strategies might be assessed. So the reasons of other kinds against forming a conditional intention to retaliate with a massive second strike could be conclusive, if retaliation itself could do no (consequential) good, and if, as is claimed, the conditional intention could not be simulated. To form such an intention is held to be contrary to core values of a humane, rationalist culture. To assent to a nuclear retaliatory strike would do violence to the moral nature of anyone participating in such a culture, and to form an intention to make (or condone) such a strike would be a corruption of such a nature. So too would condoning the fostering of such an intention in others, as a way of making the retaliatory intention credible. The author accordingly considers this argument against MAD, and for unilateral nuclear disarmament, sufficient, given the inadequacy of the consequential arguments, while acknowledging that this might involve great sacrifice. The paper concludes, however, by considering whether anyone can reject nuclear deterrence who also believes that resistance to Nazism in 1939 was justified, given the then prevailing belief that the war might be massively destructive. The author holds that there is no inconsistency in both supporting resistance to evil, even at risk of total destruction, and in refusing to form or condone a conditional intention to do equivalent but pointless evil in order to make a threat credible. (shrink)

Nations possessing nuclear weapons have seen them as useful for many purposes. These include classic nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear deterrence, the fighting of a nuclear war ‘if deterrence fails,’ and a ‘diplomatic’ use in which the weapons are seen as implements of coercive political power. Concerning all these uses profound ethical questions arise. It is the last use which will be the focus of attention in this paper.I have chosen this subject partly because I believe that (...) it has received insufficient attention from those reflecting on nuclear policies from an ethical point of view. Discussions tend to focus on the use, threat to use, or intention to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack. The retention of nuclear weapons for such a purpose is far easier to rationalize than is the development of such weapons for extended deterrence, nuclear ‘diplomacy,’ or the actual waging of a nuclear war. Historically, nuclear weapons have been held by nuclear states for all these purposes. In fact, there are natural relations between the functions. When a power possesses nuclear weapons, the ultimate token of military power in the modern world, it is natural that it will seek to use them for purposes less restricted than the sole one of deterring nuclear war. Hence there is a natural development from classic deterrence to extended deterrence and the coercive use of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of national interest. There is also a natural connection between classic deterrence and the development and deployment of nuclear weapons for the purpose of fighting and ‘prevailing’ in a nuclear war. An opposing state is to be prevented from attacking by the belief that an attack would be followed by retaliation. That requires that a nuclear state indicate the will and capacity to retaliate-that is, to use these weapons in a real war if necessary. (shrink)

The just war tradition stands as the moral and prudential alternative to both pacifism and realism. It forms the only reasonable ethical basis for the understanding of state initiated force. As applied to questions of nuclear deterrence, just war theory is incompatible with Mutual Assured Destruction and with the threat of MAD. Just war theory entails a move toward counterforce with discriminate targeting of military capabilities and away from city targeting. This is now becoming possible technically and is morally (...) indicated. The counterforce option is realistic in that nuclear disarmament is an extremely remote possibility and alternate strategies such as bluff ore not workable. A counterforce strategy would be both discriminate and proportional as well as being in accord with political realism. (shrink)

Deterrence means threatening to retaliate against an attack in order to deter it in the first place. The central problem with a policy of deterrence is that the threat of retaliation may not be credible if retaliation leads to a worse outcome - perhaps a nuclear holocaust - than a side would suffer from absorbing a limited first strike and not retaliating. - The optimality of deterrence is analyzed by means of a Deterrence Game based on Chicken, in which (...) each player chooses a probability (or level) of preemption, and of retaliation if preempted. The Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, in this game are compared with those in a Star Wars Game, in which the preemption and retaliation levels are constrained by the defensive capabilities of each side. Unlike threats in the Deterrence Game, which can always stabilize the cooperative outcome, mutual preemption emerges as an equilibrium in the Star Wars Game, underscoring the problem - particularly if defensive capabilities are unbalanced - that deterrence will be subverted by the development of Star Wars. (shrink)

I defend just war theory against pacifist, conventionalist, collectivist and feminist challenges that have been recently directed against it. I go on to apply just war theory to the use and threat to use nuclear weapons concluding that under present conditions the possession but not the threat to use a limited nuclear force is morally justified.

The world witnessed a major historical event in 1947 when subcontinent, which was governed as a one unit from Khyber to Burma since almost last one thousand years, partitioned by the ruling British Empire resulting into two states namely India and Pakistan. The major reason behind partition of the subcontinent was the religious and cultural differences between the Hindus and Muslims. This difference made them hostile towards each other and India having superiority in all aspects, compelled Pakistan to become a (...) security state right after its inception. To expand its superiority over the whole region, the Indian nuclear program started in 1944, even before its independence. India conducted first nuclear tests in 1974 and continued expanding its nuclear program. This forced Pakistan to work seriously on its nuclear program with a fast pace. India announced its formal entry to the nuclear weapons club in May 1998 with 5 nuclear tests at Pokhran, Pakistan, having nuclear capability at that time, replied back in merely two weeks with 6 nuclear tests and became the 7th nation in the world and first Islamic country to join the nuclear countries club. The lives of over a billion people are at mercy of the two nuclear powers state heads, especially India having an extremist government poses a serious threat to the peace of subcontinent which needs great attention especially from the global community otherwise a nuclear Armageddon could be expected. (shrink)

This article grapples with the justifiability of nuclear deterrence in the aftermath of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Disillusioned about the failed promise of nuclear disarmament, as well as other ethical issues inherent to nuclear weapons, Pope Francis has attached the immorality label not just to the use of the Bomb but also to its very possession. This step, which his predecessors hesitated to take during the Cold War and the quarter of a century after the (...) fall of the Berlin Wall, has received considerable attention. However, these assessments precede the war against Ukraine. Given that the regime of Vladimir Putin has repeatedly made nuclear threats in the context of this war, and a Cold War 2.0 of sorts has returned, there is reason to reappraise Francis's argument on nuclear weapons for a post-2022 era. I argue with regret that in light of the contemporary security environment it would be a sign of irresponsible statecraft to abandon the nuclear deterrent unilaterally. At the same time, I hold that a renewed and genuine effort needs to be made not just to avoid nuclear war but to create a culture that one day will lead to complete nuclear disarmament. (shrink)

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine constitutes a poignant reminder of the enduring relevance and potential devastation associated with nuclear weapons. For decades, the possibility of such catastrophic conflict has not seemed so imminent as in the current world affairs. -/- This contribution presents a comprehensive analysis of nuclear strategy for the 21st century. By examining the evolving geostrategic landscape the talk illuminates key concepts such as nuclear posture, credible deterrence, first & second strike capabilities, flexible response, EMP (...) , variable yield, counterforce & countervalue, limited war and escalation dominance, thereby providing a nuanced understanding of the delicate balance of power in the nuclear arena in modern conflicts. Furthermore, it concentrates on the era that started with the war in Ukraine, offering insights into how recent geopolitical developments influence nuclear doctrines. -/- Through conceivable real-world scenarios, we gain perspective on the multifaceted challenges posed by newer technologies and potential escalation dynamics involving global nuclear actors. -/- Such scenarios include: -/- 1. A non-weaponised or sub-critical test within Russia to intimidate opponents into understanding Russia’s resolve and capabilities. Prior norms have restricted testing since 2000, apart from North Korea. In case of a full surface test, Russia could detonate in uninhabited areas within its own vast territory with minimal fallout. While clarifying military strength, demonstrations risk hardening resistance without incentivising surrender. -/- 2. Coercive atomic threat to compel Ukraine or its supporters to make concessions. By leveraging the spectre of nuclear warfare, Russia could expect to achieve its objectives through intimidation and fear. However, the effectiveness of such a strategy is questionable, as it may provoke a strong international response and further galvanise support for Ukraine. -/- 3. Demonstration detonation over/under the Black Sea to signal resolve without targeting Ukraine itself; possibly amidst negotiations to gain diplomatic leverage, whilst limiting human casualties to zero or causing a mild, non-destructive tsunami. -/- 4. Ukraine could decide to launch a pre-emptive strike on Russian nuclear facilities or weapons, fearing an imminent attack. Such an action would have a high risk of failure and might even provoke a nuclear retaliation from Russia. It could also lead to a broader conflict, as neighbouring countries might feel compelled to intervene. -/- 5. Limited tactical strike against Ukrainian military or infrastructure to weaken capacity and morale. Russia’s 2000+ non-strategic arsenal could target positions using short-range missiles with 0.3 – 5 kiloton yields. Objectives like crippling Kharkiv defences might create no-go zones hindering advances. However, Ukraine might maintain drone and cyber offensive capabilities regardless. -/- 6. Electromagnetic Pulse attack designed to disable critical infrastructure in Ukraine and NATO countries without radioactive fallout. This aims to hinder the war effort and economy without provoking the same conventional military response as a blast. However, an EMP attack affecting NATO shall still be considered an act of war warranting retaliation. -/- 7. A weapon could be deployed accidentally or without proper authorisation. This could occur due to a technical malfunction, miscommunication, human error, or the actions of rogue elements. The consequences of such an event could be catastrophic, leading to a rapid escalation of the conflict and potentially triggering a global crisis. -/- 8. Sub-strategic offensive targeting NATO in the European theatre, so as to fracture allied resolve, against arms routes in Poland, Baltic stockpiles, British naval bases, American troop concentrations in Germany etc. Putin may perceive defeat or deposition as an existential threat, viewing such an option as self-preservation despite adverse consequences. -/- . (shrink)

First published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Scott Sagan asked me to revisit Nuclear Ethics, a book I published in 1986, in light of current developments in world affairs. In doing so, I found that much had changed but the basic usability paradox of nuclear deterrence remains the same. As do the ethical dilemmas. To deter, there must be some prospect of use, but easy usability could produce highly immoral consequences. Some risk is unavoidable and the moral task is how best to lower it. (...) class='Hi'>Nuclear weapons pose moral problems but nuclear use is the greater evil. Abolition may be a worthy long-term goal, but it is unlikely in the short-term relations among the nine states now possessing nuclear weapons. Drawing on just war theory, I examine the three dimensions of intentions, means, and consequences to outline a ten-point agenda for just deterrence that seeks to lower risks of nuclear war. The world has changed since the book was published but the basic moral dilemmas remain the same. (shrink)