In this article, I sort through some of the confusion surrounding what constitutes the controversial notion of a “good death” for children. I distinguish, first, between metaphysical and practical disagreements about the notion of a good death, and, second, between accounts of a good death that minimally and maximally promote the dying child’s interests. I propose a narrowed account of the dying child’s interests, because they differ from the interests of non-dying children. Importantly, this account (...) illustrates how disagreements at the end of a child’s life are sometimes the result of a shift from a future to a present-oriented understanding of the child’s interests on the part of some stakeholders but not others, and sometimes the result of a values-based disagreement about how different interests should be weighted. This brings into sharper focus the questions of for whom, and in what way, a child’s death might be considered good. (shrink)

Included in William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, ed. Stanley Tweyman (Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1974 [1724]). Editor: Stanley Tweyman .

Political philosophers often grapple with the issue of the legitimacy of state coercion. Aristotle, a perfectionist, opines that all men hold an objective account of the good life. As regards legitimacy, he entails that state policies are justified only when all its members comprehend the value that has been identified in accordance with the true notion of good. Aristotle argues that the state should facilitate the encouragement of objectively valuable notions of the good. Ronald Dworkin, a (...) neutralist, proposes a specific model of the good life so that one can live well. He holds that certain elements of the ethical conception lead to various notions of the good and, in matters of legitimacy, the state should be neutral towards the notion of good. This is so because A cannot make B’s life better by way of the coercive means of the state. This paper throws light on Aristotle’s and Dworkin’s dialogues on the moral foundations of legitimacy (conceived during their notion of the good life). Therefore, I argue that, in contrast to perfectionism, Dworkin justifies his liberal principle of legitimacy through the idea of state neutrality. But, eventually, Dworkin’s arguments overlook his ethical foundation or admissible towards perfectionism, which is emaciated enough to offer any justification for the principle of legitimacy. (shrink)

For both G. E. Moore and Bernard Lonergan, the question of the good provides a fundamental heuristic indicating its irreducible and thus transcending nature. In Lonergan’s later work, the focus is primarily on the good as manifest in intentional responses to values. But the fundamental metaphysics of the good is never absent from this perspective, and it re-appears explicitly in some later writing. Moore’s anti-reductionist metaethics played a central role in the debates to follow in analytical philosophy (...) in the decades after the appearance of Principia Ethica. In this article, I explore possible convergences between these two avenues of speculation, which in their way both witness to the abiding significance of the scholastic notion of the good as a transcendental. It is argued that the wider purview offered by Lonergan’s analysis of the good, sought in questions as implying metaphysical and theological dimensions, assists in rendering cogent the objectives to which Moore’s question of the good points. (shrink)

A careful analysis of the relevant passages. The good is both a cause and a quality; as a quality, it is used only in reference to moveable things. Aristotle's treatment here is seen to differ from that in the Ethics.--W. L. M.

In the Ethics, Spinoza famously wrote, “we do not seek or desire anything, because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor it, will it, seek it and desire it.” This passage is widely recognized as asserting some of Spinoza's most important claims about the good, but the precise meaning of the passage is unclear, as interpreters have offered a wide variety of interpretations, often without noting (...) (or even noticing) their disagreements. The central interpretive question is what the key passage has to say about the relationship between desires and judgments of the good. At stake in this question is not just how we understand Spinoza's theory of the good—and by extension, much of his ethical theory – but also how we understand the reception of the scholastic Aristotelian notion that desiring something involves perceiving or thinking it to be good, the “guise of the good thesis”. This paper offers an interpretation of the passage that emphasizes differences between Spinoza and a Hobbesian view of judging the good. Rather, I show – perhaps surprisingly – that Spinoza is closer to the scholastic-Aristotelian tradition. (shrink)

When Nishida Kitarô wrote Studies of the Good, he was a high school teacher in Kanazawa far from Tokyo, the center of Japanese scholarship. While he was praised for his intellectual effort, there was no substantive agreement about the content of his ideas. Critics disagreed with the way he conceived of reality and of truth as contained in reality. Taken together, I believe that the responses to Nishida's early work give us a window on the state of Japanese philosophy (...) in the early twentieth century. In what follows, I give evidence for the existence of such a debate about the nature of truth and reality. After a sketch of Nishida's position, I outline the positions of two other contemporary thinkers: Katô Hiroyuki and Takahashi Satomi. With respect to Nishida, they offer markedly different takes on the question of universal truth: Katô favors an antireligious, scientific positivism while Takahashi accepts an existentialist notion of radical human finitude, in which human access to any certainty is denied. I conclude that one is confronted with a lively debate by Japanese philosophers inside Japan about the definition of truth and consequently about the nature of reality. (shrink)

Generally, the topic of Hobbes's ethics that has received little attention is the "good"1, probably because the critical viewpoint has almost always been from politics and social philosophy; their focus is the justification of rules, obligation, the relationship between natural law and civil law and so on. This paper intends to consider different approaches to the theme of "good" given in the complete works of Hobbes, and not just the politically focused works, to explain the apparent contradictions.

The notion of loop seems to be ubiquitous in the study of organisms, the human mind and symbolic systems. With the possible exception of quantum-mechanical approaches, the treatments of consciousness we are acquainted with crucially appeal to the concept of loop. The uses of loops in this context fall within two broad classes. In the first one, loops are used to express the control of the organism’s interaction with the environment; in the second one, they are used to express (...) self-reference. Both classes are tied with investigations which aim at accounting for symbolic capabilities, and ultimately for subjectivity. Neurophysiological research detects loops in the animal nervous system since its very inception (e.g., all the work on the reflex arc). Recently, Gray proposed a model purporting to explain the mechanism supporting the contents of consciousness in the human CNS, in ways that are practically indistinguishable from models formulated within the cybernetical point of view. Both types of models apply loops in strikingly similar ways. While there is no conclusive evidence that loops are necessary to support consciousness, they are nonetheless as good a candidate as today can be found for inclusion in the list of essential ingredients for subjectivity to arise. In the first two sections we discuss the above mentioned uses by means of significant examples. In the third section, we compare Gray’s recent model to MacKay’s early cybernetical model of a selfobserving system, in the setting of a broader discussion on loops for consciousness. (shrink)

According to the Doctrine of the Guise of the Good, actions are taken to be good by their agents. Kieran Setiya, however, has formulated a new objection to the DGG based on the distinction between the notions of normative reasons and motivating reasons. Only the latter, Setiya claims, is required for intentional agency. However, I will argue that Setiya’s objection fails because it rests on the implausible assumption that motivating reasons are determined solely in terms of the content (...) of the belief involved in answering the ‘why’ question. But the basis, or origin, of a belief is crucially important in determining whether the content of a belief can constitute a motivating reason for action. However, I will argue that the failure of Setiya’s argument reveals an important but neglected facts about the DGG, namely, that it presupposes the view that beliefs (or our dispositions to judge) about normative reasons play a role in one’s knowledge of what one is doing when one acts for a reason. Moreover, my discussion will make it clear that the DGG has a better chance of being true if it is formulated in terms of disposition to judge, rather than belief. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze notions of common good and of the state in late 19th century British social liberalism and their relation to collective action of the citizens. The author shows that British social liberals argued for a type of state that uses top down strategy to encourage collective action in order to transform individuals into a socially responsible groups, i.e. good citizens. The paper focuses on philosophical works of F. H. Bradley, ethics of (...) T. H. Green and political philosophy of B. Bosanquet, analyzing their efforts to reconceptualize ideas of classical liberalism and utilitarian doctrine of the individual, society and the state in light of emerging influence of leftist social movements. The author argues that the works of British social liberals are a foundation of the state and society which will dominate liberalism in the second half of 20th century, i.e. the idea of the welfare state. (shrink)

The debate between Jurgen Habermas and Charles Taylor is reflective of the enduring conflict between liberal philosophy with its emphasis upon freedom, equality, and legal rights, and Aristotelianism with its accent upon the cultivation of virtue, personal responsibility and shared notions of the Good. Though grounded in opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum, both men remain critical of the burgeoning effects of instrumental rationality and the social atomization and anomie it continues to generate; both understand the extent to which (...) the self is a social construct and the role of interpersonal intersubjectivity in the development of their individual and collective identities; both argue for the centrality of certain goods in maintaining a minimal degree of social cohesion; and both affirm that the crucial feature of human life is communication and its dialogical character. ;To overcome the adverse manifestations of our positivistic ethos with its over-reliance upon purposive-instrumental reason, each has responded with a countervailing notion of rationality---"phronesis" or Aristotelian practical reason for Taylor and "communicative reason" for Habermas. Each's choice of reason has led to profound differences in their respective notions of the self as well as fundamental incongruities in their moral and political philosophies. In the interest of preserving the autonomy and integrity of the individual while yet affirming universal justice, Habermas argues for the formalism of a "proceduralistic" ethics. Taylor, on the other hand, advocates a "substantialist" one, a communal ethics that arises from out of people's deepest moral intuitions; an ethics bound up with historical values and ideals that stresses the cultivation of virtue and shared notions of the common good. ;I argue that although Habermas's "communicative action" with its focus upon intersubjective communication helps to bridge the competing philosophies of communitarianism and classical liberalism, a basic incommensurability still persists. However, rather than being mutually exclusive, there needs to be a creative, dialectical tension maintained between them whereby each continues to inform and influence the other. In this way, a postmodern ethics rooted in dialogue and communication can be constructed which maintains people's integrity and autonomy while similarly addressing their multiple needs and concerns, but also an ethics grounded in one's deepest moral intuitions which remains sensitive to the concrete, historical, and particularistic distinctions which differentiate their identities. (shrink)

"The notion of sustainability is interdisciplinary, requiring more than multidisciplinary research, and normative, requiring ongoing discussion about ethical priorities." "Hence, the authors of this anthology recommend improved interdisciplinary collaboration and intensified public discussion about sustainability. By such admittedly fallible procedures we should try, again and again, to avoid or rectify instances of unsustainability." "Further, the authors argue in favour of reduced material consumption, an ideal of 'good life', and gradualistic obligations toward non-human beings."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by (...) Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

I argue for an epistemic conception of voting, a conception on which the purpose of the ballot is at least in some cases to identify which of several policy proposals will best promote the public good. To support this view I first briefly investigate several notions of the kind of public good that public policy should promote. Then I examine the probability logic of voting as embodied in two very robust versions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem and some (...) related results. These theorems show that if the number of voters or legislators is sufficiently large and the average of their individual propensities to select the better of two policy proposals is a little above random chance, and if each person votes his or her own best judgment (rather than in alliance with a block or faction), then the majority is extremely likely to select the better alternative. Here ‘better alternative’ means that policy or law that will best promote the public good. I also explicate a Convincing Majorities Theorem, which shows the extent to which the majority vote should provide evidence that the better policy has been selected. Finally, I show how to extend all of these results to judgments among multiple alternatives through the kind of sequential balloting typical of the legislative amendment process. (shrink)

Kairos – which is a measure just as much as a value – is an intentional creation of consciousness, and one that respects the nature of the real. Furthermore it is an effective means for existence to grasp the meaning and the importance of the way in which the latter acts upon the world, since it makes the distinction between modes of “coming towards” and “going away from”. Even as consciousness follows the slow but sure ripening of the situations it (...) is committed to, and even as a fixes in advance the minimal and optimal instant whereafter these situations are at risk of disintegrating, it proceeds to draw nearer to that instant, which thenceforward has the status of an objective datum able to link objective realty. It follows that the categories of not yet and never again are no mere abstractions, but a good rendering of the structure of the activity of existence. The kairic attitude is one, which is deeply rooted in human realty. This being so, whenever we want to set up an authentic image of the activity of consciousness, viewed in all its possible aspects, we necessarily have the right to replace a static system, the traditional temporal categories, with a dynamic one, the kairos categories. (shrink)

Notions of research quality are contextual in many respects: they vary between fields of research, between review contexts and between policy contexts. Yet, the role of these co-existing notions in research, and in research policy, is poorly understood. In this paper we offer a novel framework to study and understand research quality across three key dimensions. First, we distinguish between quality notions that originate in research fields and in research policy spaces. Second, drawing on existing studies, we identify three attributes (...) considered important for ‘good research’: its originality/novelty, plausibility/reliability, and value or usefulness. Third, we identify five different sites where notions of research quality emerge, are contested and institutionalised: researchers themselves, knowledge communities, research organisations, funding agencies and national policy arenas. We argue that the framework helps us understand processes and mechanisms through which ‘good research’ is recognised as well as tensions arising from the co-existence of conflicting quality notions. (shrink)

At the center of the various transformations and advancements inmodern society is man. It is man by whom and for whom these transformations and advancements are made. But one negative factoraccompanying these transformations is the violence or the degradation of the human person and his dignity, more alarming is the violence committed by man against his fellow man. Today, there is so much violence in the world, everyday we hear about killings, kidnappings, rapes, abortion, terrorist attacks, hunger, wars and many (...) other acts of violence. It is ironic that, while the human person is the very victim of this violence, it is also the human person who is the perpetrator of such violence, man is simultaneously the victim and the culprit. Man indeed is a paradox, for while he is bestowed with dignity and good nature, he is also capable of doing evil and inflicting harm against others. This violent tendency happens because man fails to acknowledge the very dignity of his nature which is rooted in his fundamental relation with God and extended to his fellow human beings. Man is by nature good, but he is also capable of doing evil things. The Catholic Church through its teachings and writings have always emphasized the value of the person, while at the same time acknowledging the fact that he is as much capable of degrading himself. The Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, “Gaudium et Spes” acknowledges the many divergent and contradicting opinions of man about himself, one of which “exalts man as the absolute measure of all things and debases himself to the point of despair. The result is doubt and anxiety.”. (shrink)

The notion of ubuntu and communalism is of great importance in anAfrican educational discourse, as well as inAfrican Philosophy of Education and in Africanphilosophical discourse. Ubuntu is aphilosophy that promotes the common good ofsociety and includes humanness as an essentialelement of human growth.

This paper discusses conventional and Islamic concepts of distributivejustice, and develops propositions for the establishment of firms deemed to bemoral firms from Islamic perspective. Generally, distributive justice impliesthat goods should be distributed among members of the community accordingto their standing in society. In the Islamic scenario, however, the positive andthe normative aspects work simultaneously. The management of a firm seeksnot only to earn profit in this world but also to get reward in the life-hereafter.Thus, it is duty of a firm (...) to serve the community and look after its shareholders,employees and consumers. This paper also postulates that in a cooperativecum-competitive environment, firms have the same responsibilities as othermembers of the society. Hence, it is the duty of the firm to maintain distributivejustice among its stakeholders. It is also suggested that in the framework of theShariʽah, if there are any imperfections in the market, it is the responsibilityof the state to remove them. This paper also discusses the social and moralresponsibilities of the firms which claim that their products are Shariʽahcompliant. (shrink)

The study of Hegel’s ethical thought has focused traditionally on the Phenomenology, the early writing or his Philosophy of Right but has mostly ignored the treatment of the idea of the good in the Science of Logic. This paper is an attempt at a close reading of Hegel’s exposition in light of the methodological and foundational claims of speculative logic. It identifies several points of equivocation, in particular the notion of a reversal of the logical movement of the (...) Concept back to the subjective standpoint, and the focus on goal and action which replace the proper logical explication of the notion of the good. The paper tries to assess the meaning and consequences of what we see as points of weakness in Hegel’s exposition and formulate questions for further discussion on a hitherto neglected subject. (shrink)

The Good Life and the Greater Good in a Global Context brings together scholars working in the fields of the humanities and social sciences who critically examine the notion of the "good life," understood in all of its dimensions--material, psychological, moral, emotional, and spiritual--and in relation to the greater good. In so doing, the authors provide interdisciplinary insights into what the good life means today and how a viable vision of it can be achieved (...) to benefit not just individuals but our interdependent world as well. (shrink)

Jesus of Nazareth, like Socrates, left nothing behind written by himself. Yet, the records of his teaching indicate a rich interest in dialogic pedagogy, reflected in his use of the parable, primarily an oral genre, as a dialogic provocation. Working at the interface of pedagogy, theology and philosophy, this article explores the parable of the Good Samaritan from the perspective of dialogic pedagogy. It employs an analytical approach termed diacognition, developed from the notions of dialogue, position and cognition, to (...) analyse the moves within the parable and the teaching situation in which it is located. The article explores how Jesus engages the dialogue of and around the parable to position and reposition his interlocutor, provoking a re-cognition of what it means to love one’s neighbour. It concludes by reflecting on the implications of this analysis for the relation of meaning to knowing and doing. (shrink)

Historians of science have described various cases of disciplines influencing one another. Such exchanges across disciplinary boundaries often signal innovation, intellectual change, and breakthroughs. A satisfactory framework from which the historical phenomenon of epistemic transfer between disciplines can be studied systematically, however, has not yet been proposed. This essay introduces the notion of “cognitive goods,” a tool of knowledge making that can be transferred across disciplinary boundaries. Cognitive goods include, for example, methods, concepts, and instruments. The essay proposes to (...) study historical interactions between disciplines as instances of the “flow” of cognitive goods. The notion of cognitive goods may serve as a springboard for a systematic analysis of flows occurring throughout the history of the disciplines. Such an analysis could be instrumental for an integrated historiography of knowledge, including the humanities and the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

The rise in ethical and social responsibility awareness in contemporary businesses has led to assumptions that the associated behaviours would enable competitive advantage to be attained as a firm distinguishes itself from its competitors through such practices. This paper reports on a study conducted on the prevalence of such practices among entrepreneurial ventures in an emerging economy (Malaysia), and the effect of such practices on both financial and non-financial performance. A sequential inter-method mixing design was employed in which during stage (...) 1, a series of semi-structured interviews with ten Malaysian SME founder-owners were conducted. Stage 2 involved a survey in which a total of 212 usable questionnaires were received. The results of the first phase of the research (qualitative) found evidence that entrepreneurial ventures in Malaysia do generally engage in both ethical and socially responsible practices. The subsequent model testing using SEM, however, revealed that while ethical practices were positively associated with venture performance, socially responsible practices were not. This may indicate that while entrepreneurial ventures in emerging economies like Malaysia become quickly aware of the more serious consequences of not adopting ethical practices, the concern for social issues may still be lacking, i.e., in terms of motivations, they may be closer to the profitable end of the philanthropy versus profitability spectrum. While the findings may be equivocal, we believe that the paper makes the following two significant contributions: (1) it provides an empirical test of the importance of ethical and socially responsible practices to entrepreneurial venture performance and (2) it furthers understanding of how and why this may be different in an emerging economy context. (shrink)

Various organizational factors reported in the hitherto literature affect individual behaviour within a company. In this paper, we conduct a literature review thereof, and propose a notion of the “Organizational Moral Structure” defined as a comprehensive framework of interrelated organizational factors that condition, incite or influence good or bad moral behaviour of individuals within the organization. Drawing from a wide bibliographical review and our own reflection on recent business scandals, we identify seven constituents of the “Organizational Moral Structure”: (...) 1) leader’s values and character, 2) vision and exercise of power, 3) corporate control systems, 4) internal network of influence, 5) organizational culture, 6) internal and competitive pressures, and 7) external influences. The “Organizational Moral Structure” is proposed as a reflective framework for humanistic management and as an invitation to further research in this field. We provide recommendations on how a manager oriented towards humanistic management can use the OMS to secure and promote well-being and dignity of company’s employees. (shrink)

Ce texte a pour objet de comparer différentes lectures phénoménologiques de la théorie cartésienne de la connaissance, en montrant comment celle-ci est mobilisée pour répondre à certaines inquiétudes contemporaines. En premier lieu, nous pouvons constater une tension intéressante entre le modèle d’un « monde crépusculaire » de la science cartésienne développé par Jean-Luc Marion et celui d’un « monde de lumière » décrit par Emmanuel Levinas dans De l’existence à l’existant. Alors que le premier traduit l’emprise métaphysique d’une volonté de (...) puissance égologique, le second rend possible dans une certaine mesure la liberté d’un arrachement à l’être. Toutefois, ces deux modèles se rejoignent sur un point fondamental, à savoir le caractère à la fois égologique et carcéral du monde de l’objectivité. En outre, ces deux interprétations ne permettent pas de rendre justice à l’idée cartésienne que Dieu nous a donné une « bonne nature », du point de vue de la lumière naturelle, mais aussi des passions. C’est pourquoi nous proposons dans ce travail une lecture phénoménologique de Descartes qui prenne davantage en considération cette idée de « bonne nature ». Cette lecture devra prendre en compte la sensibilité humaniste de Descartes tout en respectant les enjeux contemporains liés à la phénoménologie. Cet autre modèle propose de repenser la métaphysique de l’objectivité à partir de notions et de perspectives qui ne renvoient pas à la solitude de l’ego, mais plutôt au cadre humaniste de la civilité, tout en respectant la valeur humaine du savoir. (shrink)

The notion of Dignity of Creatures has been voted into the Swiss Federal Constitution by a plebiscite. Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber have given an expert opinion for the Swiss government to clarify the notion of Dignity of Creatures. According to them, by voting this notion into the Swiss constitution, the Swiss have chosen for a limited biocentric approach towards biotechnology. In such an approach genetic engineering of non-human beings is only allowed insofar that their (...) own good is not impaired. It is, however, not clear when the good of a non-human being is impaired. I defend the position that – even if we confine ourselves to animals – their good goes beyond their well being. (shrink)

The meaning of the rehabilitation of the concept of happiness is decoded by means of the analysis of representative French ethical conceptions: the ethics of happiness of Robert Misrahi and the philosophy of hopelessness and bliss of André Comte-Sponville. It is important to take into account, that beside the conceptions follo_wing the eudaimonic tradition, there are also approaches, which revive the forgotten concept of happiness as an autonomous goodness by thematizing its opposite - the total evil. This approach is exemplified (...) by the philosophy of total evil of Marcel Conche. What all these conceptions have in common is not only their closely related intellectual sources, but also their shared methodological presuppositions. (shrink)

Who is a native signer? Since around 95% of deaf infants are born into a hearing family, deaf signers are exposed to a sign language at various moments of their life, and not only from birth. Moreover, the linguistic input they are exposed to is not always a fully fledged natural sign language. In this situation, is the notion of native signer as someone exposed to language from birth of any use? We review the results of the first large-scale (...) cross-linguistic investigation on the effects of age of exposure to sign language. This research involved about 45 Deaf adult signers in each of three sign languages (Catalan Sign Language, French Sign Language, and Italian Sign Language). Across the three languages, participants were divided into three groups – those exposed from birth, those between 1 and 5 years of age, and those exposed between 6 and 15 years of age – and received a battery of tests designed for each language targeting various aspects of morphosyntactic competence. In particular, the tests focused on both those morphosyntactic phenomena that are known from the spoken language literature to be good detectors of language impairment or delay (i.e.,wh-interrogatives and relative clauses) and on morphosyntactic phenomena that are sign language specific (i.e., role shift and directional verbs). The results showed a clear effect of being native, with significant differences across languages and tests between signers exposed to sign language from birth and those exposed in the 1st years of life. This confirms the life-long importance of language exposure from birth and the reliability of the notion of “nativeness”, at least for syntax. On the other hand, while in most domains the differences observed between populations might be differences in performance, for some specific constructions, signers belonging to the three groups may have different grammars. This latter finding challenges the generalized use of native signers’ grammar as the baseline for language description and language assessment. (shrink)

This paper examines the increasing trend by nursing scholars such as Patricia Benner to conceptualize ethics as a contextual and embodied ‘way of knowing’, embedded in nursing expertise. The intellectual origins of this development and its debt to neo‐Aristotelian thinkers such as philosopher Charles Taylor are discussed. It will be argued that rather than revealing a truth about ethical expertise, the emergence of the ‘expert’ nurse as a moral and ethical category is the result of the elaboration of neo‐Thomist discourses (...) in the educational and professional shaping of nurses. These discourses act on and are enacted by the individual nurse through his or her participation in specific ethical exercises that result in the constitution of the desired subjectivity – or ‘expertise’. Central to this shaping are particular notions of ‘the good’ and its relationship to knowledge, skill and practice. Critiques of these neo‐Aristotelian perspectives are discussed and applied to the notion of moral expertise in nursing, and the claims made by its proponents concerning the ‘ethical’ distinction between experienced and expert nurses. Finally, a call is made for a more pluralistic approach to ethics. (shrink)

This essay argues for three theses. The first is that the notion of agent-neutral value, or more accurately, the promotion of agent-neutral values, is what truly defines consequentialism as a type of moral theory. A state of affairs is of agent-neutral value if it is capable of generating reasons for action for everybody. The second is that the existence of agent-neutral value has never been proven, and no known account of this notion has made clear what kind of (...) things these are. In particular, I argue that both the non-moral approach and the moral approach to make good the claim about the existence of agent-neutral values are unable to deliver the desired results. The third thesis is that moral philosophy should exorcise the notion of agent-neutral value, not only because we do not know what type of things these are, but also because we do not need this notion in order to have good moral philosophy. I offer, basically, two arguments here. One is that when the justificatory issue is properly formulated, the so-called 'agent-relative rules' appear to be justifiable. The other is that the duty of beneficence can be accounted for on grounds other than that of agent-neutral value. (shrink)

A review article: In his recent book The Good in the Right Robert Audi presents one of the most complete contemporary arguments for moral intuitionism. By clearing-out of unnecessary and out-of-date posits and commitments of traditional intuitionist accounts he manages to establish a moderate (and in a sense also minimal) version of intuitionism that can be further developed metaethically (e.g. Kantian intuitionism, value-based intuitionism) as well as normatively (e.g. by varying the list of prima facie duties). Central posits of (...) his study of moral intuitionism are various epistemological commitments, as, for instance, the nature of self-evident moral judgments, intuition and moral knowledge. He usefully distinguishes between two uses/notions of intuitionism in moral philosophy, the epistemological one and the overall one. Epistemological intuitionism is a position claiming that the basic moral beliefs and principles could be known non-inferentially and are justified through their understanding or intuitions. Overall moral intuitionism is built upon three basic features: (a) moral pluralism: there is an irreducible plurality of basic moral commitments (principles, prima facie duties); (b) each of the principles aims to a different kind of ground for action that underlies e.g. the prima facie duty in question and is epistemically accessible to ordinary moral agents; and (c) each moral principle is in some sense intuitively known by those who adequately understand it. (Audi 2004, 21) W. D. Ross's ethics is a paradigm case of the latter position, while other prominent representatives of either epistemological or overall intuitionism are H. Sidgwick, G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, C. D. Broad, and A. C. Ewing. (shrink)

The new introduction to the second edition of Habits of the Heart is a very helpful reminder of the main points of the first edition. Moreover, it is very useful in situating, indeed resituating the book’s concerns, given the lapse of time since the book’s first appearance. It provides new insights made possible by second thoughts, as well as by the questions and criticisms of others. The problem of individualism and the slackening, not to say refusal, of traditional communal ties, (...) has accelerated in American society since the first writing. We find phenomena such as middle class ‘cocooning,’ as well as an often low grade civil war, let us say the culture wars. There is a widespread disquiet — to the left, to the right, in the anxious middle — about the future direction of society. One thing is noted from the beginning as common across the divisions, namely, a certain view of the economy. Correspondingly, the authors themselves seem more insistent on issues of class than they were previously: “the festering secret that Americans would rather not face.”I will confine myself to two points: first, the issue of economy in terms of more basic metaphysical assumptions in the whole notion of ‘use.’ I will suggest some connections between serviceable disposability and the culture of autonomy, and between these and the equivocal relation to the other that besets the identification of freedom with autonomy. I work towards the question: must not our communal relations to others be placed in a deeply ambivalent position, if economic relations are dominated by serviceable disposability and freedom as autonomy is idolized?Second, I want to remark on how far we dwell in an ethos of will to power of which use and autonomy serve as masks. I must summon to our discussion the roaming, uninterred ghost of Nietzsche. Whence comes the spell that spoils our taste for the good? Whence comes this, this blandness of the good? The issue of nihilism and religion cannot be buried. Is this issue even more urgent than Bellah and his collaborators, in their essential decency, acknowledge? (shrink)

Autism is typically framed as stemming from empathy deficits as well as more general cognitive and sensory issues. In turn it is further associated with other purported harms: ranging from psychological suffering to diminished moral agency. Given such associations, in the philosophical literature, autism is widely taken to hinder the possibility of both thriving and attaining personhood. Indeed, this purported stifling of thriving personhood can be taken as the core harm associated with autism as such. In direct contrast to this (...) dominant view, the key aim of this thesis is to raise reasonable doubt as to the validity of this exclusion, by establishing that there is no decisive reason to accept the notion that autism is inherently harmful. This builds on arguments made by autistic self-advocates who argue in favour of de-medicalising and instead politicising autistic disablement and distress. However, the originality of this thesis lies in three key factors. First: it focuses more specifically on the purported impossibility of thriving autistic personhood, since I take this more fundamental matter to underlie all the other issues relating to these wider debates. Second: I use a negativist methodology. That is, instead of, say, arguing that autistic individuals can be useful to society or have positive attributes, my aim is to raise reasonable doubt regarding the core assumption underlying the dominant framing of autism as a pathology: namely, that autism and thriving personhood are inherently at odds. Third, I draw on methodologies developed by feminist philosophers and critical theorists in order to further our understanding of autism and the ethical issues surrounding it with more nuance than I have found in the existing literature. In sum: after a critical analysis of the concept of autism, and then further analysis of the relationship between autism and the harms it is associated with, I conclude that we have no decisive reason to think that being autistic, in and of itself, is at odds with either thriving or personhood. This chimes with the notion that autism is best framed as a difference, disabled by society rather than medical pathology, raises important problems for both ethical and psychiatric theory, and has significant implications for autism policy and practice. (shrink)

who would have thought that all four of the excellent commentators on Metaphysics of Goodness would have liked and approved its systematic character? Just when I thought I was the last systematic philosopher! The readers of The Pluralist might prepare for discussions of my system now. Nathaniel Barrett would like me to use Whitehead’s notion of intensity rather than Leibniz’s notion of density of being. Lisa Landoe Hedrick would like me to hew closer to Whitehead’s notion of (...) the location of possibilities than I do. Robert Smid would like me to give evil a permanent place in my system rather than turn out to be merely negative. Tyler Tritten would like me to admit that the Ultimate might be personal rather than... (shrink)

This chapter argues against a new and perhaps more benign way of classifying Nietzsche as a political conservative. It also adds to the argument that even though Nietzsche is seen as more leftist than he appears, he is not an egalitarian. It does so by making an extended and detailed case against Julian Young’s claim that the flourishing of the community is Nietzsche’s highest value. The final section suggests that Nietzsche’s view might nevertheless be able to accommodate richer notions of (...) community value than is commonly supposed—one that, in important respects, is similar to the value that he attributes to the exceptional individual. (shrink)

Understanding the notion of human being in Taylor’s theory of modern society includes the understanding of external components that define it – a moral framework and a social community – and the understanding of internal components – the capacities, mainly the component of the strong evaluation, that enable it to be oriented towards the highest values. A human being understood as a self, a person, a subject, an identity, overshadows, however, their multidimensionality through the exclusivity of the dimension of (...) moral good as the main reference to their self-evaluation. The paper elaborates Taylor’s moral ontology, the relationship between the self and the good, and the foundation for the creation a modern identity as the synonym for a modern human being in their positioning related to the highest moral values. (shrink)

Aristotle takes his ethics to be an inquiry into the ultimate good of human life. In the course of his criticism of Plato and Eudoxus, Aristotle formulates two general conditions on the concept of the ultimate good. Firstly, the ultimate good has to be something prakton. The primary sense of prakton is not, as it is often taken to be, of something that is "realizable" in human action, but of something that is, or can be, aimed at (...) in human action. Secondly, in addition to being based on an appropriate moral psychology and theory of action, an adequate ethical theory has to be non-reductivist--it has to give its due weight to the plurality and variety of the goodness of particular intrinsic goods. I examine why Aristotle's criticism of Eudoxus' hedonism as a reductive ethical theory is ineffective, and point out some deficiencies in Aristotle's own account of pleasure. ;Aristotle takes the view that every desire--whether rational or non-rational--is for something that appears good to the agent. This view is compared with what seems to be the currently accepted view, that some of our desires do not involve a valuation of any sort. Although I do not claim that the current view is wrong, I do argue that Aristotle's position may provide an alternative, and plausible, way of thinking about the nature of human motivation. I discuss next Aristotle's concept of telos. A telos has a dual character: it is something an action is aimed at, and also something attained in human action. Although Aristotle's ethics is not teleological, outcomes are important for the ethical evaluation of actions. In order to explicate how outcomes matter, I introduce the concepts of an Aristotelian outcome and of a good Aristotelian outcome. The notion of a third actualization is introduced to throw some light on the sort of success in the conduct of life which Aristotle takes eudaimonia to be. ;Finally, I provide an account of Aristotle's theory of practical reason. I argue that his ethical theory demands a very wide interpretation of the concept of deliberation. An analysis of Aristotle's concept of choice is given, and an attempt made to specify the conditions under which an action counts as chosen. Deliberation is ethical if it is guided by the deliberator's conception of eudaimonia. I explicate briefly what it is for a person to have such a conception, what such a conception is like, and in what way a person can be thought to be guided by it. Finally, the concept of practical reason is linked with the concept of the ultimate good. I propose an interpretation of the three conditions Aristotle imposes on the ultimate good in EN I.7--finality, self-sufficiency and choiceworthiness which requires that we initially construe the concepts of finality and of self-sufficiency in a narrow sense, and take the concept of finality as a comparative notion. The three conditions can then be regarded as specifying how deliberation ought to be conducted if it is to lead to eudaimonia. (shrink)

This paper develops an interpretation of what is essential to kant's doctrine of the highest good, Which defends it while also explaining why it is often rejected. While it is commonly viewed as a theological ideal in which happiness is proportioned to virtue, The paper gives an account in which neither feature appears. The highest good is best understood as a state of affairs to be achieved through human agency, Containing the moral perfection of all individuals and the (...) satisfaction of their permissible ends-I.E., One in which all act from the moral law and in doing so achieve their intended ends. The paper shows that the texts contain two distinct conceptions not distinguished by kant-Both a theological and a secular (political) notion. The standard objections apply to the theological, But the secular conception is consistent with kant's conception of moral conduct. Moreover, That the highest good is introduced as an end to be constructed out of the moral law indicates that the secular version is the essential notion. (shrink)

In this fascinating and bold discussion, a renowned neurobiologist serves as guide to the most complex physical object in the living world: the human brain. Taking into account the newest brain research—morphological, physiological, chemical, genetic—and placing these findings in the context of psychology, philosophy, art, and literature, Changeux ventures into the unexplored territories where these diverse disciplines intersect. Changeux's book draws on Plato's notion that the Good, the True, and the Beautiful are celestial essences or ideas, independent but (...) so intertwined as to be inseparable. Placing these essences within the characteristic features of the human brain's neuronal organization, the author addresses unsolved questions in neuroscience today. With imagination and deep insight, Changeux illuminates the evolution of the brain and deciphers what new developments in neuroscience may portend for the future of humanity. (shrink)

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis (...) - the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues. (shrink)

Obiora F. Ike’s impressive amount of research texts on ethics can be found on Globethics.net Library. In general, there is no need to search for a justification of a life work and commitment to values, when a person reaches beyond a certain level of experience in life, in any field of professional work, even more in spiritual and ethical development. In the following lines I shall focus on the value of the common good for a person who not only (...) had precise notions about a philosophical and theological concept, but taught by the example, believing integrity matters and integral development can be a life-long mission and altruistic commitment, even if life can be either simple or complicate. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of Thomas Aquinas’s and Godfrey of Fontaines’s moral philosophies. In this study, I conduct a detailed analysis of two Aristotelian commitments concerning the character virtues, namely, The Plurality of the Character Virtues and The Connection of the Character Virtues. Both Aquinas and Godfrey think that there are many distinct character virtues, however, one cannot possess these character virtues in separation from each other. In Chapter I, it is established that Aquinas believes in the plurality of (...) the character virtues not because of a specific account of the human soul, but because he is committed to a plurality in what he calls “the notion of goodness.” In Chapter II, it is argued that Aquinas’s account of virtuous action requires that there be a likeness between a person and their actions in terms of the notion of goodness explored in Chapter I. Chapters III through V lay out my account of how to reconstruct both Aquinas’s and Godfrey’s arguments for The Connection of the Character Virtues. The focus here lies on finding an interpretation that provides a valid argument for the connection of the character virtues. I argue that we ought to focus on a dependence between prudence and the character virtues. A central problem for this analysis is how to account for prudence as a unified virtue. On this issue, Godfrey provides an explicit argument that conceives of prudence as unified because prudence strikes a balance between the character virtues. Chapter VI investigates whether different groups, such as men and women, possess different types of character virtues. Godfrey offers a novel argument for the impossibility of male- and female-specific virtues. Finally, Chapter VII explores the question of how we should understand Godfrey’s account of prudence itself. I show that his discussion emphasizes the variable nature of ethics and that he endorses a view that has certain affinities with ethical particularism. (shrink)