Though the realm of biology has long been under the philosophical rule of the mechanistic magisterium, recent years have seen a surprisingly steady rise in the usurping prowess of process ontology. According to its proponents, theoretical advances in the contemporary science of evo-devo have afforded that ontology a particularly powerful claim to the throne: in that increasingly empirically confirmed discipline, emergently autonomous, higher-order entities are the reigning explanantia. If we are to accept the election of evo-devo as our best conceptualisation (...) of the biological realm with metaphysical rigour, must we depose our mechanistic ontology for failing to properly “carve at the joints” of organisms? In this paper, I challenge the legitimacy of that claim: not only can the theoretical benefits offered by a process ontology be had without it, they cannot be sufficiently grounded without the metaphysical underpinning of the very mechanisms which processes purport to replace. The biological realm, I argue, remains one best understood as under the governance of mechanistic principles. (shrink)

There is a venerable philosophical tradition that views human beings as intrinsically rational, though even the most ardent defender of this view would admit that under certain circumstances people’s decisions and thought processes can be very irrational indeed. When people are extremely tired, or drunk, or in the grip of rage, they sometimes reason and act in ways that no account of rationality would condone. About thirty years ago, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman and a number of other psychologists began reporting (...) findings suggesting much deeper problems with the traditional idea that human beings are intrinsically rational animals. What these studies demonstrated is that even under quite ordinary circumstances where fatigue, drugs and strong emotions are not factors, people reason and make judgments in ways that systematically violate familiar canons of rationality on a wide array of problems. Those first surprising studies sparked the growth of a major research tradition whose impact has been felt in economics, political theory, medicine and other areas far removed from cognitive science. In Section 2, we will sketch a few of the better known experimental findings in this area. We’ve chosen these particular findings because they will play a role at a later stage of the paper. For readers who would like a deeper and more systematic account of the fascinating and disquieting research on reasoning and judgment, there are now several excellent texts and anthologies available. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

This chapter defends the positive thesis which constitutes its title. It argues first, that the mind has been shaped by natural selection; and second, that the result of that shaping process is a modular mental architecture. The arguments presented are all broadly empirical in character, drawing on evidence provided by biologists, neuroscientists and psychologists (evolutionary, cognitive, and developmental), as well as by researchers in artificial intelligence. Yet the conclusion is at odds with the manifest image of ourselves provided both by (...) introspection and by common-sense psychology. The chapter concludes by sketching how a modular architecture might be developed to account for the patently unconstrained character of human thought, which has served as an assumption in a number of recent philosophical attacks on mental modularity. (shrink)

The meaning that expressions take on particular occasions often depends on the context in ways which seem to transcend its direct effect on context-sensitive parameters. ‘Truth-conditional pragmatics’ is the project of trying to model such semantic flexibility within a compositional truth-conditional framework. Most proposals proceed by radically ‘freeing up’ the compositional operations of language. I argue, however, that the resulting theories are too unconstrained, and predict flexibility in cases where it is not observed. These accounts fall into this position because (...) they rarely, if ever, take advantage of the rich information made available by lexical items. I hold, instead, that lexical items encode both extension and non-extension determining information. Under certain conditions, the non-extension determining information of an expression e can enter into the compositional processes that determine the meaning of more complex expressions which contain e. This paper presents and motivates a set of type-driven compositional operations that can access non-extension determining information and introduce bits of it into the meaning of complex expressions. The resulting multidimensional semantics has the tools to deal with key cases of semantic flexibility in appropriately constrained ways, making it a promising framework to pursue the project of truth-conditional pragmatics. (shrink)

Visual modules can be viewed as expressions of a marked analytic attitude in the study of vision. In vision psychology, this attitude is accompanied by hypotheses that characterize how visual modules are thought to operate in perceptual processes. Our thesis here is that there are what we call “intrinsic reasons” for the presence of such hypotheses in a vision theory, that is, reasons of a deductive kind, which are imposed by the partiality of the basic terms in the (...) definition of a module, and by peculiar characteristics of those terms. Specifically, we discuss three hypotheses of functional attributes: successive stages in the action of modules, residual indeterminacy of their effects, and the role of prior constraints. For each of the three, we indicate its occurrence in perceptual psychology, explain corresponding intrinsic reasons, and illustrate such reasons with examples. (shrink)

Although the developmental arguments in the Quartz & Sejnowski target article may have intrinsic merit, they do not warrant the authors' conclusion that innate modular architectures are absent or minimal, and that neocortical evolution is simply a progression toward more flexible representational structures. Modular architectures can develop and evolve in tandem with sub-cortical specialisation. I present comparative evidence for the co-evolution of specific thalamic and cortical visual pathways.

We investigate the processes underlying the feeling of control over one’s actions . Sense of agency may depend on internal motoric signals, and general inferences about external events. We used priming to modulate the sense of agency for voluntary and involuntary movements, by modifying the content of conscious thought prior to moving. Trials began with the presentation of one of two supraliminal primes, which corresponded to the effect of a voluntary action participants subsequently made. The perceived interval between movement and (...) effect was used as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Primes modulated perceived intervals for both voluntary and involuntary movements, but the modulation was greatest for involuntary movements. A second experiment showed that this modulation depended on prime–movement contiguity. We propose that sense of agency is based on a combination of internal motoric signals and external sensory evidence about the source of actions and effects. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe objective of this module is to inform you on issues of concern for Research Ethics Committee members and investigators during the review process. The many guidelines on research ethics, including those from the South African Department of Health and the World Health Organisation, will be referred to extensively to educate you on the requirements of Research Ethics Committees. The evolution of the review process in South Africa will be detailed.

Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of modularity, (...) and hence, according to Segal (1997), it should be understood as involving an extra module. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia involves a breakdown in modularity. After outlining how both theories can explain the manifestation of the nine alleged properties of modularity in synaesthesia, I discuss the two concepts of function which initially motivate the respective theories. I argue that only a teleological concept of function is properly able to adjudicate between the two theories. The upshot is a further application of so-called externalist considerations to mental phenomena. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe objective of this module is to familiarise you with the concept of informed consent, its ethical basis, its elements, and typical problems that are encountered even by the most well intentioned researchers when trying to achieve genuine informed consent.

Public “upstream engagement” and other approaches to the social control of technology are currently receiving international attention in policy discourses around emerging technologies such as nanotechnology. To the extent that such approaches hold implications for research and development (R&D) activities, the distinct participation of scientists and engineers is required. The capacity of technoscientists to broaden the influences on R&D activities, however, implies that they conduct R&D differently. This article discusses the possibility for more reflexive participation by scientists and engineers in (...) the internal governance of technology development. It reviews various historical attempts to govern technoscience and introduces the concept of midstream modulation, through which scientists and engineers, ideally in concert with others, bring societal considerations to bear on their work. (shrink)

A challenge to scrutinize the intimate unity of the aesthetical and the ethical levels of the human beingness in Friedrich Schiller's theoretical writings makes the present essay's content. We approach a basic idea unfolding the creed of the eminent artist and philosopher in the great power of 'beauty' to activate and to enrich the value of 'humanness'. By articulating a conceptual apparatus modulated on the sensitive-rational becoming of human being, our attempt focuses on the meaningfulness of the 'moral living' through (...) the 'art's experience', highlighting a peculiar state, designed by Schiller as "the most sublime humanity". The call for a philosophy of 'beauty' - including the moral dimension - remains a valuable learning to be disclosed, especially in times of spiritual disarray - as the present-days have many similarities with those of the end of the 18th century. (shrink)

In this paper we develop the elementary theory of modules in the category Sh of sheaves over right-sided idempotent quantales. The main ingredient is the construction of a logic sound for Sh . As an application we prove that in Sh , a finitely generated projective module is free , a result that is relevant to the study of representation of non-commutative C ∗ -algebras.

From generalized quantifiers we move to modulated logic. So with this motivation we show ways for the construction of some modal logics. With the translations between logics we show some inter-relations between modal logics. Finally, we introduce some opportune concepts for a type of classification of deontic logic.

Using the description of the Ziegler spectrum we characterise modules with various stability-theoretic properties (ω-stability, superstability, categoricity) over certain classes of finite-dimensional algebras. We also show that, for modules over the algebras we consider, having few types is equivalent to being ω-stable.

While research to improve memory or counter decay caused by neurodegenerative diseases has a fairly long history, scientific attempts to erase memories are very recent. The use of non-invasive brain stimulation for memory modulation represents a new and promising application for the treatment of certain disorders [such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ]. However, numerous ethical issues are related to memory intervention. In particular, the possibility of using forms of non-invasive brain stimulation requires to distinguish treatment interventions from the enhancement of (...) the healthy. Furthermore, a range of important societal and legal concerns arise when manipulating memories. In this short contribution, we address some of the most significant ethical, social, and legal implications surrounding the application of memory-modulation techniques and offer a series of reflections and considerations, which we hope can be of use to guide -and perhaps regulate- their potential, future implementation in society. (shrink)

But as for most genes, they are not the units of interest once we get to the network level: it is the whole conspiracy we care about. Biologists, more precisely evolutionary biologists, and not only psychologists and philosophers also speak of modularity. However the way in which this theoretical construct functions in their discipline is relatively different from the role it obtains in evolutionary psychology and cognitive science. Rather than postulating modules to explain particular traits of organisms, such as (...) the specificity of input systems or limitations of human reasoning abilities, biologists originally simply assume that some form of modularity constitutes a precondition of evolution. They argue that, in order for natural selection to fine tune organisms to their environment, different traits must be able to evolve independently from one another. This implies modularity in one form or another. Organisms will only be able to adapt if they do not come all in one piece, so to speak. It must therefore be possible for changes to occur in one characteristic of an animal without those changes having repercussions throughout the whole organism. (shrink)

Inhibition, associated with self-efficacy, enables people to control thought and action and inhibit disturbing stimulus and impulsion and has certain evolutionary significance. This study analyzed the neural correlates of inhibition modulated by self-efficacy. Self-efficacy was assessed by using the survey adapted from the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire. Fifty college students divided into low and high self-efficacy groups participated in the experiments. Their ability to conduct inhibitory control was studied through Go/No-Go tasks. During the tasks, we recorded students’ brain activity, (...) focusing on N2 and P3 components in the event-related potential. Larger No-Go N2 amplitudes for the high self-efficacy group were found compared with the low self-efficacy group. Conflict detection as represented by N2 was modulated by self-efficacy, whereas conflict inhibition as represented by P3 was not modulated by self-efficacy. The highly self-efficacious students were more capable of detecting conflicts but not necessarily more capable of inhibiting action given that conflict was detected. Taken together, these findings offer neurophysiological evidence of the important regulatory role of self-efficacy in inhibitory control ability development. (shrink)

A theoretical divide exists on the study of the adapted psychological mechanisms underlying human culture. It has been said for instance that we evolved a brain for all seasons and that this is opposed to the framework of the modularity of mind. We approach the nature of these explanatory differences based on what we judge to be a misunderstanding with respect to the evolution of domain-specific modules. We underline the fact that the input-domain of a module and its ecological (...) function should not be conflated. We propose a more generous way of considering how evolutionary functions in mental architecture account for the possibility of general adaptations for cultural cognition. We show that modularity happens to be a good tool to research and decompose mechanisms with plastic functions such as in some forms of social learning. The idea of "modules for all seasons" is so vindicated. Existe una divisoria teórica en el estudio de los mecanismos psicológicos biológicamente adaptados que subyacen a la cultura humana. Se ha dicho, por un lado, que hemos evolucionado un cerebro para todas las estaciones, lo que se opone, por el otro, al marco de la modularidad de la mente. Consideramos la naturaleza de estas diferencias explicativas sobre la base de lo que nos parece un error de comprensión acerca de la evolución de módulos específicos de dominio. Subrayamos el hecho de que el dominio de entrada de un módulo y su función ecológica no deben ser confundidos. Proponemos una manera más generosa de considerar cómo las funciones evolutivas de la arquitectura mental pueden dar cuenta de la posibilidad de adaptaciones generales a la cognición cultural. Mostramos que la modularidad resulta ser un buen instrumento para investigar y descomponer mecanismos con funciones plásticas, como las que encontramos en algunas formas de aprendizaje social. De este modo, se defiende la idea de "módulos para todas las estaciones". (shrink)

(2013). Evolutionary modules and Bayesian facilitation: The role of general cognitive resources. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 27-53. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.713177.

Hypnosis is considered a unique tool capable of modulating cognitive processes. The extent to which hypnotic suggestions intervenes is still under debate. This study was designed to provide a new insight into this issue, by focusing on an unintentional emotional process: attentional bias. In Experiment 1, highly suggestible participants performed three sessions of an emotional Stroop task where hypnotic suggestions aiming to increase and decrease emotional reactivity towards emotional stimuli were administered within an intra-individual design. Compared to a baseline condition (...) (without hypnotic suggestion), a significant increase in attentional bias was found when a hypnotic suggestion to increase emotional reactivity was administered. In contrast, the bias was eliminated when a suggestion to decrease emotional reactivity was administered. Experiment 2 investigated the effect of session repetition on attentional bias across three successive experimental sessions without hypnosis, and showed that the emotional Stroop effect did not vary across sessions. Hence, session repetition could not account for part of the modulation of attentional bias in Experiment 1. Taken together, the results suggest that specific hypnotic suggestions can influence elicitation of unintentional emotional processing. The implications are discussed regarding the locus of intervention of hypnotic suggestion in cognitive and emotional processes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This module is designed to sensitise you to the special needs of participants who belong to populations that are more vulner.

The second messenger molecules cAMP and Ca2+ regulate a large number of eukaryotic cellular events. cAMP acts on protein kinases and Ca2+ works through a ubiquitous calcium‐binding protein, calmodulin. The two systems are not independent, however, but interact in several important fashions. These interactions, and, in particular, the modulation of the cAMP signal by two Ca2+/calmodulin‐regulated proteins, cyclic nucleotide phosphodiesterase and calcineurin, are described here.

ABSTRACTThis module examines ethical debates about the level of care that should be provided to human research participants. Particular attention is placed on the question of what should be considered an ethically acceptable control arm. You will also learn what relevant international and domestic regulatory documents say about standards of care.

Previous research on emotion-induced blindness (EIB) argues emotional distractors capture attention in a bottom-up manner due to their physical and emotional salience. However, recent research has shown it is controversial whether EIB will be modulated by top-down factors. The present study further investigated whether the magnitude of EIB would be modulated by top-down factors, specifically the emotional relevance between tasks and distractors. Participants were divided into two groups having the same targets except for different task instructions. The orientation judgment group (...) was asked to judge the orientation of the target (an emotionally irrelevant task), and the emotion judgment group was required to judge the emotional valence of the target (an emotionally relevant task). It was found the emotional relevance between tasks and distractors has no modulation on the magnitudes of EIB in two groups when targets and distractors are from different categories (Experiment 1), but a modulation when they are from the same category (Experiment 2). Consequently, we contend top-down task relevance modulates the EIB effect and distractors’ priority is regulated by the emotional relevance between tasks and distractors. The current study holds attentional capture by stimulus-driven is unconditional in EIB, while attentional capture by goal-driven requires certain conditions. (shrink)