This article discusses the theological implications of Adorno’s writings on Beckett by specifically examining their constellative motifs of death, reconciliation and redemption. It addresses not only their content but also their form, suggesting a mutually stimulating relationship between the two as based both on a negative-dialectical approach and an inverse-theological trajectory. Focusing on Adorno’s discussion of Beckett’s oeuvre as a “metaphysical entity,” I argue that Adorno’s reading of Beckett is peculiar because it is inextricably tied to his own critical-theological (...) venture. The essay claims that Adorno’s reflections on Beckett contour, at their most basic level, meditations on theology in the age of its impossibility. (shrink)

Cet article montre que l’anthropologie religieuse est le point aveugle du marxisme. Il renvoie dos-à-dos l’athéisme communiste et les théologies de la révolution en les saisissant comme deux faces d’une même hégémonie biblique s’exerçant sur le langage des luttes d’émancipation. Il analyse ensuite la façon dont la construction croisée des concepts de religion et d’aliénation limite la critique du capitalisme et de l’État. La critique terrestre devrait donc être refondée si l’anthropologie qui la soutenait s’écroule.

Living inside the text : canon and creation -- A strange bridge: connecting the image and the idol -- The liturgy of creation in the cosmic temple -- The image of God on the temple walls -- Turning the imago Dei upside down: idolatry and the prophetic stance -- Inverting the inversion: idols and the perfect image in the New Testament -- The rise of suspicion: the religious criticism of religion -- Significance and security in a new key.

For a world mired in catastrophe, nothing could be more urgent than the question of survival. In this theoretically and methodologically groundbreaking book, Adam Y. Stern calls for a critical reevaluation of survival as a contemporary regime of representation. In Survival, Stern asks what texts, what institutions, and what traditions have made survival a recognizable element of our current political vocabulary. The book begins by suggesting that the interpretive key lies in the discursive prominence of "Jewish survival." Yet the Jewish (...) example, he argues, is less a marker of Jewish history than an index of Christianity's impact on the modern, secular, political imagination. With this inversion, the book repositions Jewish survival as the supplemental effect and mask of a more capacious political theology of Christian survival. The argument proceeds by taking major moments in twentieth-century philosophy, theology, and political theory as occasions for collecting the scattered elements of survival's theological-political archive. Through readings of canonical texts by secular and Jewish thinkers—Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Franz Rosenzweig, and Sigmund Freud—Stern shows that survival belongs to a history of debates about the sovereignty and subjection of Christ's body. Interrogating survival as a rhetorical formation, the book intervenes in discussions about biopolitics, secularism, political theology, and the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In many cultures and societies, there has been, at least intuitively, some connection between what is believed to be sacred and divine and the highest ideals of the good, justice, and the right. Moral beliefs and values are often sensed to have ultimate importance, as somehow holy, and thus the examination of those beliefs, values, and sensibilities would be a proper starting point for natural theology. The inverse is also true: reflection on and the experience of evil and (...) viciousness have provoked many to explore the negation of the holy and divine, namely, the demonic, in order to avert moral scepticism and despair that evil might prevail. This chapter, which examines an approach to natural theology undertaken with respect to morality, begins by clarifying what is meant by approaching natural theology through ethics. It then discusses ethical approaches to natural theology, theistic ethics, ethical theism, aspiration and ethics, and mediating theology, and concludes with prospects for future thought. (shrink)

The object of Theological Ethics as presented by Hans Ulrich is immediately the content of the experience of God; reflectively it is God himself turned towards us; doubly reflected on, it is the inversion of our understanding of the good or conversion. The concept of an object may be traced to the discussion of the sciences from Schleiermacher to Barth. Three questions are put to it: (i) Does it assimilate the study too much to descriptive reason, as opposed to practical (...) reason? (ii) Does it narrow the study's range of interests so as to exclude the created world? (iii) Does it result in an idealised `creaturely man', wholly determined by his end and dissociated from the empirical man who may confront us as a neighbour? (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a possible a/theological response to what Nietzsche called the ‘death of God’—or Hölderlin’s and Heidegger’s ‘flight of the gods’—through a juxtaposition of the Christian-Pauline concept of kenōsis and the ancient Greek-Platonic notion of chōra, and by taking Nishida Kitarō’s appropriations of these concepts as a clue and starting point. Nishida refers to chōra in 1926 to initiate his philosophy of place and then makes reference to kenōsis in 1945 in his final work that culminates—without necessarily (...) completing—his oeuvre. What he had thereby accomplished is an inversion of Platonism resulting in the collapse of the transcendent/immanent—idea/genesis and by implication the Heaven/Earth—dichotomy. I then unpack the ethical implication of this kenotic chōra Nishida has left us with. It suggests from us a certain response to the desacralization or secularization of the world. I shall build upon this suggestion and unfold its implications by drawing from a variety of sources, starting with Nishida but including others, such as Meister Eckhart, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Gianni Vattimo, Reiner Schürmann, Mark Taylor, Jürgen Moltmann, and other philosophical and theological sources. (shrink)

The idea of creaturely life has, in recent years, emerged as an important and illuminating category of literary and philosophical critique. In this paper I seek to contribute to this contemporary discourse by examining the references to the creaturely found in the writings of T.W. Adorno. Whilst much attention has been paid to Walter Benjamin’s reflections on creatureliness, Adorno, a thinker with whom Benjamin is often associated, has received comparatively little in this regard. I begin to redress this lacuna by (...) developing a reading of key passages of Dialectic of Enlightenment which orients itself towards Adorno’s remarks concerning the ‘inverse theology’ which he sees as grounding both his own, and Benjamin’s, thought. In placing theological core of Adorno’s philosophy in the foreground of my analysis, I argue that the notion of the creature, which I claim signifies a redemptive perspective on human existence, can be read as an important, if somewhat overlooked, concept in the normative framework of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. (shrink)

The subject of the study is the mystical experience as a kind of altered states of consciousness. The purpose of the article is to solve at the conceptual level the problem of distinguishing genuine mystical experience and various kinds of surrogate states with quasi-mystical content. The theoretical basis for solving this problem was the study of the panorama of moments of divergence and convergence of discourses of the humanities and natural sciences, as well as theology. In the course of (...) the conducted research, the infra-personal processes going on in the vector of the dissolving and spreading "I" were revealed. They correspond to both mystical (dissolution in the Deity, in emptiness, in cosmic consciousness, etc.) and clinical states (confused or floating consciousness). The authors also consider in detail the ultrapersonal processes occurring within the framework of the dissemination of personal consciousness and which correspond to both mystical (the scattering of reality into many spirits, souls, astral projections and quasi-persona) and clinical conditions (schizophrenic type disorders). The novelty of the article lies in revealing the diverse directions of inauthentic mystical experience based on the systematic study of altered states of consciousness, as well as in determining the range in which an outlet to authentic forms of mystical experience can open. It has been established that in the spectrum of infra-personal and ultra-personal states there is such a feature of mystical and occult practices with the prefix "neo" as the achievement of mystical states according to the "accelerated course" programs. However, due to the inversion of the view characteristic of modern consciousness, in the ideology of neo-mysticism, destructive processes are often perceived as a new, higher stage in the evolution of mankind. With this interpretation, conditions arise for the perception of science as a "new religion", as well as the desire to find in scientific concepts a support for modern occultism and neo-mysticism. (shrink)

In his 2012 work, Faith of the Faithless, the philosopher Simon Critchley presented an ‘atheistic’ formulation of faith as an ‘experiment’ in ‘political theology.’ This work, as part of the so-called ‘turn to religion’ in continental political philosophy, gave an account of what Critchley had formerly articulated as ‘atheistic transcendence.’ Tracing the genesis of the latter and then linking to his notion of the supreme fiction, the paper seeks to account for Critchley’s ‘a/theological’ shift. Through a close reading, the (...) paper argues that Critchley’s ‘faith of the faithless’ depends on the Christian hermeneutic tradition – or radical theology – for its articulation. Finally, using John D. Caputo’s radical theology as the principal proponent in this regard, the paper demonstrates a necessary symmetry with Critchley’s faith of the faithless. Such a claim leads to the conclusion that while symmetrical, Critchley and Caputo are also inversely related. That is: a Critchlean radical politics nourished by radical theology opens up the possibility for a Caputoian radical political theology nourished by Critchlean radical politics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mystery on the Move:Aquinas’s Theological Method as Transforming WisdomGilles Mongeau, S.J.CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES to the thought of Thomas Aquinas have begun to recover its character as a “wisdom practice” aimed at the transformation of persons and sociocultural situations.1 The wise person helps others move along a path through the mysteries of faith toward a wisely ordered life for themselves in a justly ordered society. The starting point of this essay (...) is the supposition that Aquinas’s theological method in the Summa theologiae, rooted in the practice of the three arts of language (grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric) is itself a wisdom practice that proposes an ordered series of exercises that must be performed by the student, leading him or her to a greater participation in divine wisdom. I will show that Aquinas’s use of the tools of rhetoric, particularly the enthymemes known as arguments of fittingness, are a set of practical instructions that facilitate an affective response to divine mystery in order to enable a judgment by connaturality. [End Page 285] Thus, we can learn from Aquinas how fruitfully to order affect and reason in the exercise of the theological craft.The essay proceeds in three parts. First, a thought experiment will help us understand (a) how a medieval text works as a guide to performance, and (b) how intellect and affect interact in both artistic performance and aesthetic appreciation. Second, I will trace the role of affect and reason in knowledge for Aquinas, specifically in knowledge of the beautiful, of the good, and of divine mysteries. Third, I will show how Aquinas’s use of rhetorical enthymemes, specifically the argument of fittingness, promotes an affectively founded judgment whose fruit is true knowledge of the divine mysteries.I. A Thought ExperimentThe image below reproduces the sheet music for “O nuit d’amour,” a duet for tenor and soprano between Faust and Marguerite in Gounod’s opera Faust. A person with absolutely no training in music, looking at this page, will be able to glean only a small amount of information from it: the content of the text itself; the fact—indicated by the names “Faust” and “Marg.” listed above the score—that there are two singers; possibly, if he or she is enterprising and looks up a translation of “andante,” the fact that this piece of music is sung at a walking pace, moderately slow and mellow. But he or she is unlikely to be able to sing the duet without memorizing it from a performance he or she hears.Now, someone with singing experience in a choir, though without training in solfège, will be able to get a bit more information from the page: he or she will likely be able to recognize the time signature and the sequence and value of the notes and rests, as well as the ascending and descending patterns of the melody, so that given solid accompaniment and competent direction, and enough practice time, he or she could sing the duet. But this performance will not rely so much on the sheet music as it will rely on the external supports, and the nuances of the performance will be minimal. [End Page 286] Click for larger view View full resolutionFinally, two singers with training in solfège will be able to notice a number of things about the duet: first, that it is in D flat major, but that Faust’s part shades at bars five and six into B flat minor, adding a mysteriously ambiguous quality to his declaration of love; second, that Marguerite’s part remains always in a major key, though it shifts between D flat major and G flat major, adding a kind of temporary “lift” at key points in [End Page 287] her melody; that some of the chords in the accompaniment, at key points in the duet, are not played in their root positions, but in their second or third inversions, thus transforming the quality of the sound; they will also note instructions for holding notes. All of this information will allow a well-trained singer to sight-sing the duet and supply the necessary nuances from the... (shrink)

As virtuous leadership appears to be under severe pressure in all areas of life, it is the aim of this article to determine whether this biblical axiom holds suitable and valuable guidelines to counter contemporary leadership traps and assist leaders not to succumb to ambitious leadership cravings. The article determines whether the biblical axiom, the first shall be last and the last shall be first, holds the capacity to invert the corrupt pressure-cooker drives for both religious and secular leadership ambitions. (...) It examines the biblical and ethical wisdom of this teaching as well as the authoritative relevance it holds for leadership formation and practice. It determines whether a biblically infused value system still contains the moral capacity that contributes to the observance of resonant and ethical leadership capable of reversing pervasive situations of corrupt and incompetent leadership. In addition, the article contemplates the Christian weight of this biblical axiom to place those who are last, first in the service of leadership. In the same vein, it examines some of the ‘leadership traps’ experienced by persons who occupy lay, clerical, professional and secular positions. It endeavours to offer reflective biblical, moral and spiritual solutions that arise from the spirituality offered by Matthew 20:16 to current leadership demises.Contribution: The theme of the Leadership conference where this article was presented was the biblical verse: ‘The first shall be last and the last shall be first’. The article focuses directly on the implications of the biblical axiom and relate, as well as, translate it to leadership difficulties as experienced today. (shrink)

The kind of phenomenology that can be useful to theology will be a hermeneutical phenomenology, one that takes us beyond the Cartesian/Husserlian ideal of presuppositionless intuition. It will also be a phenomenology of inverse intentionality, one in which the constituting subject is constituted by the look and the voice of another. In light of these suggestions, the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion is defended against three critiques, namely that it compromises the boundary between phenomenology and theology, that the (...) theology it serves is a bad one to boot, and that it has an inadequate account of the subject. At the heart of this defense is Marion's clear distinction between phenomenology as a description of possible experience, and theology as the claim that a certain kind of experience, namely revelation or epiphany, is not merely actual but veridical. Phenomenology says, If revelation occurs it will be in the form of a saturated phenomenon. Theology says, for example, the burning bush was an epiphany, or Jesus Christ is a revelation. The attentive reader should have no trouble distinguishing Marion's phenomenological analyses, which should be persuasive to believer and unbeliever alike, from his theological claims. Marion's account of the subject falls under the heading of inverse intentionality, and there are hints that vision is aufgehoben in the voice. The seer is first of all the one seen, but above all the one addressed, called forth into response-able being. (shrink)

Theodor W.Adorno was one of the towering intellectuals of the twentieth century. His contributions cover such a myriad of fields, including the sociology of culture, social theory, the philosophy of music, ethics, art and aesthetics, film, ideology, the critique of modernity and musical composition, that it is difficult to assimilate the sheer range and profundity of his achievement. His celebrated friendship with Walter Benjamin has produced some of the most moving and insightful correspondence on the origins and objects of the (...) Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. This unprecedented collection, devised and assembled by one of Europe's rising social theorists, distills the best from published assessments and responses to Adorno's oeuvre. The collection is divided into 4 volumes: Volume 1: Philosophy, Ethics and Critical Theory Part 1: Negative Dialectics Included here are contributions on the concept of totality in the writings of Adorno and Lukacs; Adorno and Bourgeois Philosophy; the relationship between Adorno and Kierkegaard; Adorno's Critique of Idealism; Adorno and Linguistics; Adono and Habermas. Part 2: Ethics and Redemption This is comprised of contributions on Adorno and Truth; Adorno's Inverse Theology; and Adorno and the Ineffable Part 3: Critical Theory, Ideology Critique and Social Science Included here are contributions on Adorno's relation to the Positivist Dispute; the Popper-Adorno Controversy; Adorno and Empirical Research; and Hermeneutics and Critical Theory. Volume 2: Aesthetic Theory Part 1: Art and Politics in 'Aesthetic Theory' This includes material on the De-Aestheticization of Art; Adorno, Utopia and Mimesis; Adorno and autonomous art; Adorno and Dialectics; Adorno, Marxism and Art; Art and Criticism in Adorno's Aesthetics; Adorno's concept of the Avant-Garde. Part 2: Philosophy of Music This includes contributions on Adorno's music and social criticism; Adorno and nostalgia; Adorno, Heidegger and the meaning of music; Adorno and Wagner. Part 3: On Jazz The material included here addresses questions of Adorno and Popular Music; Adorno's encounter with jazz; Adorno, Jazz and Society; and the reasons for Adorno's apparent hatred of jazz. Volume 3: Social Theory & The Critique of Modernity Part 1: On 'The Dialectic of Enlightenment' Included here are chapters on the dialectic of enlightenment and post-functionalist thought; dialectic of enlightenment as genealogy critique; the relationship between the dialectic of enlightenment, modernity and postmodernity; Adorno's critique of progress; Adorno and theories of subjectivity; and the dialectic of enlightenment and rationality. Part 2: Anti-Semitism This consists of material on Adorno and Horkheimer; and Adorno and Public Sphere Part 3: Popular Culture and Capitalism Included here are contributions on Adorno and Sport; Adorno's alleged left-wing elitism; Adorno's critique of astrology and the Occult; Benjamin and Adorno on Disney; Adorno, Totalitarianism and the Welfare State; and Adorno and Mass Society. Volume 4: Cultural Theory and the Postmodern Challenge Part 1: 'Damaged Life': Exile in America This section includes Leo Lowenthal's insightful recollections of Adorno; Adorno and the primal history of subjectivity; Adorno and Los Angeles; Adorno's relation to American culture; and Adorno's exile in England. Part 2: Film Theory This section includes chapters on Adorno and the Culture Industry; Benjamin, Adorno and Contemporary Film Theory; Adorno, Aesthetics and the Social. Part 3: Wellmer and Adorno Included here are papers on Aesthetic, Psychic and Social Synthesis in Adorno and Wellmer; and New German Aesthetic Theory after Adorno. Part 4: Jameson on Adorno Included here are papers on Jameson, Adorno and the persistence of the Utopian; and a Marxism for Postmodernism Part 5: Modernism and Postmodernism This section contains papers on Adorno, Foucault and the Modern Intellectual; Adorno, Foucault and Two forms of the Critique of Modernity; Adorno and the Habermas-Lyotard Debate; Adorno, Postmodernism and Edward Said; Adorno, Heidegger and Postmodernism; Adorno and the Decline of the Modern Age; The literary process of modernism; Adorno, Tradition and the Postmodern Part 5: The Feminist Response Included here are contributions on Adorno and Judith Butler; Adorno, Art Theory and Feminist Practice; and Gender in the writings of Adorno and Horkheimer. The collection comes with a superb Introduction to Adorno by Gerard Delanty which elucidates the main contributions of this penetrating and enduring thinker. Comprehensive and consistently illuminating, the collection includes the thought on Adorno from some of the most distinguished commentators on social theory. Included here are selections from the writings of Susan Buck-Morss, Martin Jay, Agnes Heller; David Frisby; Johann Arnason; Richard Wolin; Andrew Bowie; Robert Hulnot-Kentor; Leo Lowenthal; Richard Rorty Axel Honneth; Albrecht Wellmer; and Jurgen Habermas. The result is a peerless research resource allowing readers to delve into all aspects of Adorno's extraordinary accomplishments in social thought, philosophy and cultural criticism. It will be required reading for students of the Frankfurt School, Marxism, Critical Theory, Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics and Social Theory. (shrink)

이 연구는 카프카의 단편 〈가장의 걱정(Die Sorge des Hausvaters)〉에 대한 아도르노의 철학적 해석을 사물화의 양가성 문제를 중심으로 다룬다. 아도르노는 벤야민에게 보낸 1934년 편지에서 이 단편에 등장하는 수수께끼같은 형상인 오드라데크를 두고 “사물적으로 전도된 삶에서 자연의 연관관계로부터의 탈출이 약속되어 있다”고 쓴다. 아도르노가 보기에 카프카는 사물화된 세계에서의 소외를 타협 없이 보여주고 있으며, 바로 이를 통해서만 구원의 전망이 열린다. 이러한 전도의 전도는 결코 필연성에 따라 보증되어 있지 않지만, 사물화의 경험은 결코 마르크스-루카치 전통에서 이야기되듯 부정적이지만은 않다. 아도르노는 오히려 사물에 대한 경계, 적대적 태도 속에서 인간성과 (...) 사물성 사이의 경직된 대립이 전제되어 있음을 지적한다. 그는 사물화가 도리어 인간과 사물간의 새로운 관계를 개시할 수도 있다는 것, 왜냐하면 거기서 사물은 인간이 부여한 가치 즉 유용성에서 해방된 것으로 나타나기 때문이라는 것을 간파한다. 이로써 아도르노는 사물화와 물신, 이차적 자연 개념 등의 비판적 사용에 경도된 기존 마르크스 전통을 뛰어넘는 통찰을 전개해 나아간다. (shrink)

'almost every branch of modern science can trace phases of its origin in his writings... in the broad field of science Boyle made a greater number and variety of discoveries than one man is ever likely to make again' - John Fulton, Boyle's bibliographer Robert Boyle (1627-91) was one of the most influential scientists and philosophers of the seventeenth century. The founder of modern chemistry, he headed the movement that turned it from an occult science into a subject well-grounded in (...) experiment, sound methodology and observation. His pioneering experiments on the properties of gases and his mechanistic theory of matter are the forerunners of the modern theories of chemical elements and atomic theory. He is best known for founding the renowned Boyle Lectures and for Boyle's Law that states that the pressure and volume of a gas are inversely proportional. A founding fellow of the Royal Society, three consecutive kings of England conversed familiarly with him. Philosophically, he wrote with sophistication on atheism, atomism, epistemology, miracles and natural laws. He influenced Berkeley, Spinoza, Henry More and especially John Locke, who relied on Boyle's theory of primary and secondary qualities in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Boyle's circle of correspondents included Newton, Locke, Aubrey, Oldenburg and Hartlib, and his influence on both British and European scholars was enormous. He also took a lead part in examining the relation of science to theology. This is the standard edition of Boyle's works and the only complete collection currently available. First published in 1772, it brings together his many and varied writings in one comprehensive, fully-indexed source. Covering his work in chemistry, philosophy and theology, it includes a Life of Boyle by Thomas Birch. The Thoemmes reprint of the second and best English edition features a new introduction by Peter Alexander, one of the world authorities on Boyle. --includes a Life of Boyle by Thomas Birch --features letters to and from Boyle --this rare edition is the only complete collected edition currently available and the standard text to which literature on Boyle refers --engraved frontispieces and several fold-out illustrations. (shrink)

Ce livre, resté inédit pendant plus de quarante ans, est issu des réflexions qu'ont inspirées à l'auteur, d'une part certaines affirmations de René Guénon et de Frihjof Schuon sur les carences supposées de la théologie et de la métaphysique chrétiennes au regard de ce qui est à penser dans le christianisme, d'autre part la tendance inverse des théologiens contemporains à dévaluer le discours doctrinal, lequel s'adresse à l'intelligence, au profit d'une foi purement existentielle et antidoctrinale qui ne peut plus (...) s'investir que dans le domaine de la morale et, singulièrement, de la morale sociale et politique. C'est pourquoi il lui a paru nécessaire d'abord de reprendre le problème général des rapports de la métaphysique sacrée — ou traditionnelle — et de la religion, ensuite de l'examiner plus particulièrement dans le cas du christianisme. Il espère ainsi montrer la richesse et la profondeur de la tradition métaphysique et théologique du christianisme, en même temps peut-être qu'éclairer certains points que la métaphysique sacrée elle-même n'a pas mis en évidence jusqu'ici. En résumé : il n'y a pas d'autre réponse au criticisme théologique des anti-doctrinaux que celle de l'intellectualité sacrée ; mais cette perspective peut dévier vers l'universalité abstraite du discours ; à quelles conditions ce risque peut-il être évité? Telle est la question à laquelle l'auteur s'est efforcé de répondre. (shrink)

A l'énigme proposée par l'expérience de la vie, il y a deux réponses possibles : "tout est absurde" ou "c'est un mystère".... Jean Guitton constate : "Pour chacun, absurde et mystère sont les deux pôles inverses entre lesquels oscille la pensée humaine. Quand chacun s'examine en profondeur, il écoute cette double voix. Mais, l'oscillation étant rejetée, pour moi l'absurdité de l'absurde me conduit vers le mystère.".

Juergensmeyer's interviews of ex-fighters—Muslims in Iraq and Mindanao, Sikhs in Punjab—illustrate how stubbornly they refuse to conform to Western narratives about “religious violence.” Among the Sikhs, “almost none of the militants surveyed... were said to be noticeably religious”; in ISIS, “many in the movement were attracted not by the ideology or the ideals, but by the excitement of being involved in an alternative culture, one of largely male militancy.” For the Moros in Mindanao, likewise, Islamic theology is one factor (...) among many, and one of relatively minor importance for the majority. These are all, nevertheless, treated as exemplars of religious violence, as Juergensmeyer puzzles through how to end it. His final chapter is called “How Imagined Wars End,” though we have been informed in the first chapter that “every war is an imagined war.” War is an “alternative reality,” “an inversion of ordinary reality where differences are negotiated through civil discourse.” Religion—whatever that is; no definition is offered—is also an alternative reality, one based on fear of one's own death. When these two alternative realities are joined, and “religion is thought to be war, and war religion,” the result is “cosmic war,” which is the worst. The book seeks to understand how cosmic war fades into more mundane conflict (and eventually peace).The internal factors that bring cosmic war to an end—fighters lose faith in their movement when it loses battles, when there is infighting, when new alternatives offer hope—and the external factors—a strong military or police response, concessions by the government, gestures of respect from opponents—do not seem different from the factors that bring all wars to an end. Juergensmeyer never convincingly distinguishes cosmic from other kinds of war. But the book exudes a bias toward the status quo, such that the violence of armed anticolonial movements is of a fundamentally different order than the everyday violence of established governments. It is hard to resist the conclusion that cosmic wars are simply wars that we “secular” Westerners find distasteful. We puzzle over cosmic religious violence to assure ourselves that our “ordinary” violence does not really count as violence. (shrink)

Le regard théologique sur la question du mal a progressé en Occident grâce à la lecture des Noms divins de Denys, et à l'analyse scientifique de Thomas d'Aquin. Il est cependant intéressant de souligner le nouvel ordre et les rectifications que Thomas d'Aquin apporte à la pensée de Denys dont il est tributaire. Imprégné de la philosophie néoplatonicienne, Denys apparaît dans son ouvrage comme faisant une théologie de l'amour et du Bien. Le Bien y est non seulement objet d'amour, mais (...) il appelle un ordre et une vie. Le mal ne peut être situé que par rapport à l'opération vitale défaillante. Par rapport à Denys, Thomas d'Aquin opère une inversion de pensée. Son apport propre est de dépasser les deux positions de Denys selon qui le mal n'a pas de cause propre, le Bien étant fin de tous les maux. Le mal, qui reste accidentel pour Thomas, est aussi le fruit d'une relation déséquilibrée. Conséquence du péché en tant que mal de peine, tout est-il résolu par là quant au problème du mal ? Par delà saint Thomas, n'y a-t-il pas demande aujourd'hui d'un regard lucide sur la relation réciproque, c'est-à-dire le rôle inhibiteur que joue souvent l'excès de souffrance dans la relation à Dieu ? Theology's attitude to the question of evil has progressed in the West, thanks to the study of Dionysius' Divine Names and the scientific analysis of Thomas Aquinas. It is, nevertheless, interesting to underline the new method and rectifications that Thomas Aquinas brings to the thought of Dionysius, upon which he depends. Dionysius, impregnated with neo-Platonic philosophy, seems to elaborate a theology of love and the Good in his work. He sees the Good as not only the object of love, but calling for an order and a life. Evil can only be situated in terms of a vital operation that is faulted. In comparison with Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas operates an inversion of thought. His own contribution is to go beyond the two positions of Dionysius, according to whom evil does not have its own cause, the Good being the end of all evils. Evil, which remains accidental for Thomas, is also the fruit of an unbalanced relation. The consequence of sin in terms of the evil of pain does this resolve all the problems concerning evil ? Beyond St. Thomas, isn’t there a need today of a clear perspective about reciprocal relation, the inhibiting role that the excess of suffering often plays in the relation to God ? (shrink)

In this contribution, the author argues that there are in our European tradition two fundamental conceptions of politics since the French Revolution. We can call them the politics as the art of co-existence, and the politics of dénouement. Both conceptions also have a very different stance towards the traditional religions: for the first one mentioned freedom of religion is constitutive, for the second one religion must serve the state or can even be made redundant. Paradigmatic in this respect was the (...) communist treatment of religion as a relic of the past that will disappear when historic reason makes our society transparant . Here politics transforms in a quasi-eschatological political religion. In the twientieth century neo-marxist philosophers say farewell to this kind of politics and begin to rediscover religious inheritances and theological motives. Today two other positions towards religions are noticeable: the utilitaristic reductionist treatment of religion as a need , and ‘Enlightment fundamentalism’ which continues the rationalist communist conception of religion as a relic of the past. The author criticises both tendencies, and defends a ‘politics without dénouement’ which correspondents to a ‘religion without guarantee’. In closing the author argues that the recent populist politics either dream of a new alliance between religion and/or ‘culture’ and the state, or – in a strange inversion of the multicultural ideals of the nineties – promote a purely polemical identity against an ‘alien’ religion, i.c. Islam. Here the author claims that both tendencies fail to recognize the real nature of the new problems. (shrink)

D'un philosophe comme de l'autre, on peut dire qu'ils sont tous deux, dans l'horizon contemporain, des penseurs de l'amour. Tous deux s'inscrivent en faux contre la réduction de ce dernier à la sexualité, mais, tout autant, contre sa réduction inverse, plus ancienne, à une forme de mystique éthérée de type platonico-chrétien qui a pu se formuler sous le terme d'agapè. Nous nous proposons dans cette contribution d'étudier la pensée de J.-L. Marion en adoptant l'hypothèse d'une « unité théo-phénoménologique » (...) de son questionnement. Nous faisons usage du terme « théo-phénoménologie » en référence à l'approche de l'œuvre du philosophe et théologien grec Christos Yannaras, et souhaitons ce faisant rendre justice à l'avancée de J.-L. Marion en situant son geste philosophique singulier à la lumière de la théologie orthodoxe du Christianisme grec oriental telle qu'elle est elle-même renouvelée philosophiquement par C. Yannaras. Jean-Luc Marion and Christos Yannaras are both well-known as contemporary love-thinkers. Both refuse the reduction of love to sexuality as much as its older opposite reduction to a form of platonic christian mystics sometimes named agapè. In the following contribution I wish to examine Jean-Luc Marion's approach while making the hypothesis of its « theo-phenomenological » unity. Since the expression « theo-phenomenology » is used in reference to the work of the contemporary Greek philosopher and theologian Christos Yannaras, I aim at doing justice to Marion's philosophical thrust by putting his conception of love in the light of the Orthodox theology of the Eastern Church as it is nowadays philosophically renewed by Yannaras. (shrink)

Suffering On the one hand is the existential problem that leads us to ask on why it exists, and on the other hand is a philosophical and theological question that challenges divine justice or even the existence of God. Hence, religious thinkers have addressed the nature of suffering, kinds, causes and consequences of it. In this paper we will show that sufferings in Rumi’s view are the inverse-horseshoes, He sees the true grace at the exterior wrath, and recognizes true (...) pain at the specious grace. He believes that “fundamental true suffering” is the separation from increate beloved Neglecting which, will result in other kinds that have been nominated “secondary true sufferings” in here; and other life difficulties that are “suffer-liked graces” are nominated “virtual sufferings”, here we will discuss about the results of these sufferings from Rumi’s view. In his viewpoint we’ll see that the faith is the best human reaction to pains and sufferings, with the gifted insight of which, believers will be able to make suffering meaningful and acceptable. According to Rumi, it is just through the awareness of the real suffering that we can pass through the endless path of faith. In this way of curse the worldly sufferings won’t be removed or denied, but will be meaningful and tolerable - or perhaps sweetness - for lover believers. Rumi believed that passionate faith would be the best answer to life sufferings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Missing the Cross?Types of the Passion in Early Christian ArtS. Mark Heim (bio)René Girard has frequently contended that the core of his best known theories is already contained in the Bible, that in the end he is "only a kind of exegete" (Girard and Treguer 1994, 196). To those who object that the Bible had to wait two thousand years to be read as he reads it, he protests (...) that this is a gross exaggeration: "three quarters of what I say can be found in Saint Augustine" (196). In the introduction to I See Satan Fall like Lightning, Girard puts it like this:The Passion accounts reveal a phenomenon that unbeknownst to us generates all human cultures and still warps our human vision in favor of all sorts of exclusions and scapegoating. If this analysis is true, the explanatory power of Jesus's death is much greater than we realize, and Paul's exalted idea of the cross as the source of all knowledge is anthropologically sound.(2001, 3)In other words, Girard's insight comes only in the train of revelation. The revelation in the biblical sources was not perfectly grasped in the religious traditions that flowed from them, and was frequently betrayed through the construction of sacrificial theologies. But Girard insists that its power was in significant measure perceived and effective from the beginning. His view of the meaning of the passion cannot be correct if he is the first one to see it. So it is no minor matter to ask whether in fact early Christians saw the connection of the cross with scapegoating that is so central for Girard.One point that appears to tell against Girard's case is the absence of images of the cross and crucifixion in the first four Christian centuries. A brutal realism about this specific event is the keystone of Girard's understanding of the passion narratives. The fact that the sight is literally hidden from view throughout this formative Christian period hardly appears consistent with his claims.There is a notable early Christian work of art, the so-called Brescia Casket (see fig. 1), that sheds some important light on the general question of the [End Page 183] representation of the passion and, even more dramatically, upon its interpretation in Girardian terms. The casket indicates that the widespread use of Old Testament types as representations of Christ, and specifically as representations of his passion, may partly explain the absence of literal depiction of the crucifixion. And the particular types involved fit extremely well with Girard's outlook. This essay draws out the connection—so far unremarked—between this significant work of early Christian art and Girard's reading of the passion. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1.Brescia Casket. Ivory, late fourth century.Christ's passion and death were described in stark terms in the gospels and recounted explicitly from the beginning in the church's liturgy, teaching, and preaching. On this plane, there is no question of the centrality of the cross. Yet no literal depictions of the crucifixion survive in art from the first four Christian centuries. There is no entirely satisfactory explanation of why the cross would figure so centrally in Christian faith and worship, but be visually absent. Representations of Jesus in early Christian art most often display a healer, wonderworker, or teacher. In fact, the early centuries offer an odd inversion in creed and art. Early creeds focus on Jesus's beginnings and endings, "skipping right from 'born of the Virgin Mary' to 'suffered under Pontius Pilate,' with no mention of Jesus's life and work, while the art appears to take an opposite tack" (Jensen 2000, 131–32). Perhaps the frequent Christian use [End Page 184] of images of anchors and ship's masts, or of the chi-rho sign, served as their image of the cross. Perhaps the reality the scriptures described was too gruesome to easily picture, too readily ridiculed by outsiders, or too awesome and mysterious to present directly. Perhaps, in a persecuted and at times martyred church, such a sign would be realistically terrifying to many and dangerously seductive to some.That the... (shrink)

This chapter considers the problem of divine hiddenness as an issue potentially if not explicitly addressed by the prominent 20th century proponent of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupāda (1896-1977). In a four-part argument, Prabhupāda’s identifying Kṛṣṇa as the perfect teacher, particularly in his role as Arjuna’s teacher in the Bhagavad-Gītā, enables consideration of how the divine hiddenness issue is resolvable, particularly by framing awareness of God’s existence and understanding of divine attributes as an educational process encapsulated by the (...) word “yoga”. This approach further enables appreciation of the bhakti-yoga perspective—in its celebration of divine absence—as an inversion of divine hiddenness as a philosophical problem into a theological solution to the adept’s acute sense of divine absence, even while perceiving evidence of God’s existence at every turn. (shrink)

This article makes both a more general and a more specific argument, and while the latter relies upon the former, the inverse does not apply. The more general argument proposes that empirical disciplines such as sociology are better suited to the production of ethical knowledge than more characteristically abstract and legalistic disciplines such as philosophy and theology. The more specific argument, which is made through a critique of Bauman’s Levinasian articulation of ethics, proposes what it calls ‘pragmatic humanism’ (...) as a viable alternative model for sociological ethics to follow. This model rejects the abstract notion of some innate and universally distributed moral impulse, and instead turns to acknowledgement of the precariousness of life as a strategic resource in the construction, rather than revelation, of ethical solidarity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:104 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY thus cast into the depths of skepticism. Because of his acquaintance with the skeptical literature Chilling-worth rejected the first alternative. Arguments concerning the fallibility of the senses and reason and the complexity of reality itself were too strong to be ignored. However, he was also unwilling to accept the second alternative. He developed instead a middle position. In his Religion of Protestants (London, 16S8) he (...) develops a position based on an appeal to common-sense and a doctrine of levels os evidence and certainty. Theological problems are to be solved in the same manner as problems of ordinary men in ordinary situations. Any claim to revelation, for example, is to be evaluated as any other problem, by examining the adequacy of the testimony and the reliability of witnesses. Hence the sense of mystery, of the revealedness of revelation is lost. Depending on whether one has good or poor evidence for a proposition one can be more or le~ certain of it. In most cases, one's certainty of religious propositions is of the same sort as that of the carpenter or pilot in their respective trades-not absolute certainty but certainty enough to assure good practical results. Hence religious belief is adequate if it serves to turn one from vice to virtue. Since religious truth is no longer unique, either with respect to evidence or certainty, it is available to all who are honest in their pursuit of it. Thus the epistemological justification for the democratization of religion of which Lichtenstein makes so much is provided a generation before More published his major works. My criticism of the book, then, is not that Lichtenstein attributes the de-emphasis of reason, loss of mystery, etc., of eighteenth-century thought solely to, More (though since he writes primarily on only one man one sometimes gets that impression) but that his account of the milieu from which More springs and of which he is only a part is inadequate. But for all that the book is well worth reading. HENRY G. VAN LEEUWs Hanover College Pascal. By Jean Steinmann. New edition revised and enlarged. ([Brus~ls]: Desclge De Brouwer [1962]. Pp. 378, illus. Bfr. 240.) Sorte de testament spirituel du critique tragiquement et prgmaturgment disparu, la seconde 6~dition du Pascal de Steinmann constitue sans doute la synth~se la plus agrgable et commode qui existe actuellement de la vie, de roeuvre et de la rgputation de Pascal. Entre les nombreux auteurs qui ont successivement attirg la plume rive et fgconde de Steinmann, Pascal est, en effet un de ceux avec qui il avait le plus de familiaritg. Ecrivain, th~logien, mais surtout exegete, Steinmann a d'ailleurs su mieux que presque tous ses pr~d~cesseurs, caractgriser la sensibilitg biblique de Pascal et en souligner l'importance. Inversement, il marque le caract~re peu philosophique de l'Apologi'e et voit (~t notre sens avec raison) la principale originalitg de son auteur dans le fair qu'il a cherch~ ~ mener au christianisme par la psychologie et par l'histoire, non par la metaphysique. Le chapitre le plus neuf de Steinmann est enfin celui que traite de l'histoire posthume de Pascal, sorte de bibliographie comrfientge qui sera certainment fort utile ~t celui qui abordera l'immense litt~rature publige ~ son sujet. Une rgaction en pattie l~gitime contre le clichg romantique de l'"inquigtude pascalienne " entra~ne Steinmann ~t trop insister apr~s B~guin, sur un,dogmatisme" (p. 308) d'ailleurs rattach6 ~ l'h6r6dit~ paternelle dont nous doutons qu'elle aft 6t6 dominante dans ]e cas de Pascal. On regrette aussi l'ignorance de l'article d'Et. Gilson sur "ab~tir" BOOK REVIEWS t05 (p. 254), des insuflisances au sujet du p~ht~ originel (p. 253), l'aflirmation erron~e du caract~re spontan~ de la confession au P. Beurrier (p. 207 n.) et surtout le lapsus Pinthard pour Pinthereau (pp. 363, $78). A c6t~ du petit Pascal de Jean Mesnard, cla~ique dans les universitY, le present ouvrage n'en contribuera pas moins ~ r~pondre dans un tr~s large cercle une connaissance de l'auteur des Pens~es enrichie par la sympathie. JZAN... (shrink)

La théologie fondamentale a-t-elle vraiment atteint son « identité scientifique » ? Ayant pris la relève de l'apologétique tradiitonnelle, on est en droit d'exiger d'elle une seule méthode qui ordonnerait tout son discours. Grâce à l'apport de L’Action, on sait qu'en déterminant la façon dont la pensée rejoint la réalité comme son objet, la méthode décide de ce qui est pensable. En référence au schéma tripartite , l'auteur rappelle que Blondel proposait pour le renouvellement de l'apologétique, l'inversion du schéma. Ainsi, (...) l'Église devait-elle devenir le premier objet de la démonstration. Une relecture de L'Action, et notamment du troisième chapitre, permet de saisir la nécessité de ce renversement, ce qui amène l'auteur à conclure que le véritable point de départ du discours ne se trouve pas dans le « il y a quelque chose » du début, mais dans le « C'est » final, dans le fait de l'unique événement du salut. Has fundamental theology really attained its « scientific identity ? » Having taken up the challenge of traditional apologetics, one has the fight to demand a unique method that puts order into all its discourse. Thanks to the help of Action, we know that in determining the fashion by which thought rejoins reality as its object, the method determines that which is thinkable. In reference to the tripartite schema , the author recalls that Blondel proposes the inversion of the schema for the renewal of apologetics. Thus, the Church ought to become the first object of the demonstration. A rereading of Action, and especially the third chapter, helps us to grasp the necessity of the reversal. This leads the author to conclude that the discourse’s true point of departure is not found in the « there is something » of the beginning, but in the final « It is », in the fact of the unique event of salvation. (shrink)

La volonté présente du christianisme de nouer un dialogue fraternel avec le judaïsme pose au premier le problème de reconnaître exactement l'identité du second, et d'interpréter correctement la judaïté de Jésus et la notion de « texte commun », présupposées à la base de cette rencontre. La religion de Jésus n'était pas encore ce qui allait devenir, après l’instauration du rabbinisme, la religion des juifs actuels, fondée sur la rédaction d'une Torah orale. Le judaïsme moderne et le christianisme sont à (...) la fois en rupture et en continuité herméneutique avec l'Ancien Testament, mais ils ne le lisent pas avec la même clé d'interprétation, le second le lisant à partir de son « accomplissement » dans le Nouveau, le premier en fonction de son « ouverture » à une autre nouveauté, qui sera le Talmud. L'idée d'un « patrimoine commun » aux juifs et aux chrétiens est née, dans un premier temps, de l'idéologie des Lumières, créatrice d’une culture commune, «judéo-chrétienne », au prix d'une lecture « scientifique » et désacralisante de la Bible. Dans un second temps, l'Holocauste, qui détournait les juifs, orthodoxes ou sionistes, de cet « héritage commun », conduisait inversement de nombreux chrétiens à le revendiquer, dans un aveu de culpabilité à l'égard de l'antisémitisme, mais aussi dans la méconnaissnce de la différence inéluctable du peuple juif. L'idéologie du « commun » peut être un facteur de fermeture là où elle ne se vérifie pas ou d'assimilation indue là où elle efface la singularité de l'un et de l'autre. On peut espérer du dialogue entre juifs et chrétiens qu’il suscite une authentique théologie de la rencontre.Today, the desire of Christianity to engage in a fraternal dialogue with Judaism poses the problem of encountering precisely the identity of the latter, and of interpreting correctly the Judaism of Jesus and the notion of « common text » which is presupposed at the basis of this encounter. The religion of Jesus was not yet that which it was to become after the installation of rabbinism, the religion of present day Jews, which was founded on the composition of an oral Torah. Modern Judaism and Christianity are, at the same time, in rupture and hermeneutic continuity with the Old Testament. But they do not read it with the same key of interpretation : Christianity’s reading sees its « accomplishment » in the New Testament, Judaism in function of its « opening » to another newness, which will be the Talmud. The idea of a « common patrimony » for Jews and Christians was born, in the first instance, of the ideology of the Enlightenment, creator of a common culture, « Judeo-Christian », at the price of a « scientific» and profane reading of the Bible. In a second stage, the Holocaust, which turned Orthodox and Zionist Jews away from this « common heritage », inversely led numerous Christians to vindicate it in an acknowledgment of culpability as regards anti-Semitism, but also in ignoring the ineluctable difference of the Jewish people. The ideology of the « common » can be a factor of closing dialogue when it is not verified or of undue assimilation when it wipes out the singularity of each one. One can hope for a dialogue between Jews and Christians that promotes an authentic theology of encounter. (shrink)

Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi is one of the most important Ash'ari theologist in the 15th century North Africa. It is known that he wrote in most of the theological sciences which mainly in theology and mysticism. The fact that logic science is also included among these sciences, reflects the level of development in terms of "istidlal". Senûsî's booklet named "Umm al-berahin” was written with the purpose of proving the belief that "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is (...) his messenger" is the source of all faith. In addition to the inferences about Allah and His attributes he also explained the attributes that must be found in the messengers based on the word "Muhammad is His messenger" and also tried to prove these features, which are considered to be truthfulness, rescript and notification, with various arguments. According to Sanusi, who defends the opinion that belief to the Hereafter, other prophets, angels, sacred books were entering this context, this is because the Prophet brought religion as a means to attest to all this. He based his inferences about the messengers adjectives on the inverse analogy in "Umm al-barahin". Besides, he used "inference by using miracle", "arrangement two original according to a result", "chained analogy", "arrangement according to two original results" and "abbreviated analogy" forms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Guide to Personal Knowledge: The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi: Tacit Knowledge, Emergence and the Fiduciary Program by Dániel Paksi and Mihály HéderAlessio TartaroPAKSI, Dániel and Mihály Héder. Guide to Personal Knowledge: The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi: Tacit Knowledge, Emergence and the Fiduciary Program. Wilmington, Del.: Vernon Press, 2022. xxiii + 209 pp. Cloth, $65.00Famous for the concept of "tacit knowledge," Polanyi is a figure who looms over twentieth-century (...) philosophy without ever establishing himself as one of its major protagonists. Yet, Polanyi tackled central problems in twentieth-century Western philosophy and offered [End Page 358] insightful and original analyses thereof. In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi articulates ideas about metaphysics, mathematics, evolution, philosophy and sociology of science, epistemology, philosophy of language, political theory, theology, and more. The richness of the contents, but also their deep unity, make Polanyi's work a unique piece in the philosophical landscape of his time, full of fruitful insights that are still relevant nowadays.Guide to Personal Knowledge, written by two of the leading experts on Polanyi's philosophy, deserves the merit of providing an accessible introduction to this complex work. The book is divided into thirteen chapters, each corresponding to the respective chapter of Personal Knowledge. In each chapter, Paksi and Héder clearly explain Polanyi's main ideas, presenting them in the same order as they appear in Personal Knowledge. The chapters are introduced by a "Goals of the chapter" section that provides a series of key points, where the authors summarize Polanyi's objectives in the corresponding chapter of Personal Knowledge.The Guide is interspersed with many direct quotations from Personal Knowledge that allow the reader to link the Guide to the original text. The use of figures and tables illuminates even the most complex concepts, such as "tacit integration" and the difference between "random and ordered systems." The Guide is enriched by twenty-five boxes that provide information on ideas, authors, and concepts directly or indirectly referenced by Polanyi in Personal Knowledge. These boxes are a valuable supplement. In some cases, they offer insight into contemporary events, theories, and scholars to which Polanyi alludes but that he does not elaborate on, for example, about the role of the Michelson-Morley experiments in Einstein's development of the theory of relativity. In other cases, boxes develop a comparison between Polanyi's ideas and related philosophical figures, such as Thomas Kuhn and Samuel Alexander. Thanks to the boxes, the reader gains a richer and more complete view of Polanyi's thought.In the preface, Paksi and Héder preliminarily introduce some key concepts for understanding Polanyi's work, including "objectivity," "trust" and "fiduciary program," "tacit knowledge," "intellectual passions," "deceptive substitution," "moral inversion," "operational principles," "logic of achievement," and "emergence." Their analysis always proves faithful to Polanyi's thought, and the authors show how these concepts are interrelated and constitute the pillars of Personal Knowledge's argumentative structure. Other equally crucial concepts in Polanyi's work, for example, "commitment," "indwelling," "tradition," "conviviality," "anthropogenesis," "ultrabiology," are not introduced in the preface, but they are explored in depth in the respective chapters.The thirteen chapters of the book recapitulate in detail the main thematic segments of Personal Knowledge. The critique of objectivism and positivist views of science is explained and analyzed in chapters 1 to 4. This critique is articulated on several levels. Polanyi first criticizes [End Page 359] objectivism because it attempts to remove the personal element from scientific knowledge in order to pursue ever higher degrees of formalism, neutrality, and impersonality. Polanyi asserts, however, that the personal element is irreducible, and then proceeds to demonstrate how it operates: in the evaluation of probability statements (chapter 2), in the appreciation of ordered patterns (chapter 3), and in the practice of skills (chapter 4). The ineliminability of the personal element shows that objectivism is false. Paksi and Héder brilliantly retrace the train of thought that leads Polanyi to this conclusion.The second theme that runs across Personal Knowledge concerns the tacit foundation of human intellectual abilities and, consequently, of science and society. In chapter 6, the authors follow Polanyi's disparate arguments about animal intelligence, human... (shrink)

The article searches to retract the theme of the inversion of theology in anthropology in Ludwig Feuerbach, achieving the context of the philosophical tradition to create another vision in what sense it is correct to comprehend what the 19th century philosopher is not an atheist and also does not reduce to serving as a little point between two great authors: Hegel and Marx. Focusing on the an important question on the history of the philosophy, in those who looked deeply (...) to the man, that claims a lot to find spur,sense or peace, if in font of emptiness, of pain, produced by uncertainty, scarcity, anguish, impotency and suffering, can be realized all of this density that brought on the Feuerbach's philosophical work, which will be so much understood by inserting it in the context of discussions, tied on the field of our presenting world, because the problem that it is concerned there is the central themes of the philosophy leading to meditations on God, religion, theology, and everything that will be related to it in theoretical and practical life. Reviewing the structure and functioning of religion and the religious events as such, to the beyond that can be judge an atheist by the way. (shrink)

An acceptable empiricist account of laws of nature would havesignificant implications for a number of philosophical projects. For example, such an account may vitiate argumentsthat the fundamental constants of nature are divinelydesigned so that laws produce a life permittinguniverse. On an empiricist account, laws do not produce the universe but are designed by us to systematize theevents of a universe which does in fact contain life; so any ``fine tuning'' of natural law has a naturalistic explanation.But there are problems for (...) the empiricist project. This paper develops a ``perspectival'' version of the Humean bestsystem approach and argues that this version solves the standard problems faced by the empiricist project.Furthermore, the paper argues, this version is best able to answer the proponents of divine design while leaving scientificlaw a suitably objective matter.[I]t is possible tocondense the enormous mass of results to a large extent – that is to find laws which summarize...Richard Feynman It has become fashionable in some circles to argue thatscience is ultimately a sham, that we scientists read order into nature, not out of nature, and that the laws of physicsare our laws, not nature's. I believe this is arrant nonsense. You would be hard-pressed to convince a physicist thatNewton's inverse square law of gravitation is a purely cultural concoction. The laws of physics, I submit, reallyexist in the world out there, and the job of the scientist is to uncover them, not invent them. True, at any giventime, the laws you find in the textbooks are tentative and approximate, but they mirror, albeit imperfectly, a reallyexisting order in the physical world. Of course, many scientists do not recognize that in accepting the reality of anorder in nature-the existence of laws `out there' – they are adopting a theological world view. P. C. W. Davies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Shadows of Being: Encounters with Heidegger in Political Theory and Historical Reflection by Jeffery Andrew BarashRylie JohnsonBARASH, Jeffery Andrew. Shadows of Being: Encounters with Heidegger in Political Theory and Historical Reflection. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2022. 260 pp. Paper, $42.00ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF*Composed of a series of unique yet thematically connected chapters, Jeffrey Andrew Barash's latest book carefully addresses the relationship between Martin Heidegger's thought and political theory and (...) how these are connected through the thematization of historical narrative. In light of the publication of the controversial Black Notebooks, Barash's book serves as a significant contribution to debates regarding Heidegger's political engagement with National Socialism. However, rather than simply rehash this engagement, Barash takes a critical approach, arguing that Heidegger's historical narrative, that is, the history of Being, buttressed a "political mythology" and "fatalism" that absolved human beings of historical, ethical, and political responsibility. Thus, through a confrontation with Heidegger, Barash demonstrates the danger of denying human agency in the future course of history, since "fatalism only makes more probable the outcome it claims to foresee."While invested in explicating the political and ethical implications of Heidegger's thought, Barash is critically oriented around demonstrating a presupposition within the Seinsfrage, or the question of being that motivated Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger presupposed that reraising the question of being was the fundamental task of philosophy, one that rendered "subordinate" other forms of historical reflection. Consequently, Barash argues that Heidegger established a "strategy of interpretation" that privileged his own standpoint in the history of Western thought and allowed him to set aside contrary ethical, political, and historical interpretations. Ultimately, this resulted in the formulation of the myth of the history of Being that placed Heidegger himself at the culminating point of Western history. The essays that compose Barash's book address the various implications of Heidegger's presupposition.The book is separated into two parts. The first consists of direct interpretations of Heidegger's thought and is composed of six chapters. The second addresses the critical reception of that thought, reflected in such figures as Hannah Arendt and Emanuel Levinas, and is composed of chapters seven through ten. [End Page 541]Chapter 1 focuses on Heidegger's broad legacy today, which according to Barash is threefold: the prevalence of historical deconstruction, his complicity with "Germanic ideology," and his criticisms of Western scientific rationality, all of which Heidegger rendered into an effect of metaphysics and the forgetting of the Seinsfrage. Chapter 2 discusses Heidegger's metaphysics of memory, showing that his inversion of the traditional eternal view of memory in favor of one grounded in mortality obscured other forms of "collective remembrance." Through a reading of St. Paul and Spinoza, chapter 3 investigates Heidegger's presupposition by revealing that the radical separation of the ontological from the ontic matters of theology, politics, and ethics is in fact an ontic decision of the "ethical order." Chapter 4 extensively discusses Heidegger's understanding of race and its relationship to Nazi orthodoxy. Highlighting that Heidegger was certainly critical of biological racism, Barash nevertheless shows that Heidegger articulated a "metaphysical" racism at the level of the history of Being. Chapter 5 reflects on Heidegger's Being-historical interpretation of World War II. Barash shows Heidegger's fatalism whereby the war was not a matter of human choices but was "attributed to an abandonment of Being." Chapter 7 closes part 1 by discussing the status of mythology in Heidegger's thought. Criticizing mythology as a form of historical production, Heidegger nonetheless creates his own myth: the history of Being. This mythological dimension is perhaps the most problematic aspect of Heidegger's thought.In the second part, Barash changes the trajectory of his arguments, addressing the critical reception of Heidegger's legacy by other philosophers. In chapter 7, Barash discusses the influence of Heidegger on Hannah Arendt's view of the public world, a world that theoretically rests on Heidegger's Dasein. But while Heidegger failed to adequately grapple with the public, Arendt radicalized it, showing that political reflection served as the basis for the philosophical problem of truth. Chapter 8 reflects upon the influence that the... (shrink)

My focus in this paper concerns the demonic from the perspective of Augustine and Aquinas. Much of their views on demons coincide with certain elements of the popular view, but a good bit also diverges in some interesting and important ways. In fact, their philosophical theology is essentially bound up with their overall demonology. I show that the aim of the demonic is to bring about conversion through temptation, and this “possession” is nothing but the person coming to be (...) like demons in rejecting God. Described thusly, we can see the Devil and his demonic minions as having an inverse or perverse role in relation to that of Christ and his disciples (broadly construed) for philosophical theologians like Augustine and Aquinas. (shrink)

The Soul is considered, both for religions and philosophy, to be the immaterial aspect or essence of a human being, conferring individuality and humanity, often considered to be synonymous with the mind or the self. For most theologies, the Soul is further defined as that part of the individual, which partakes of divinity and transcends the body in different explanations. But, regardless of the philosophical background in which a specific theology gives the transcendence of the soul as the source (...) of its everlasting essence – often considered to survive the death of the body –, it is always appraised as a higher existence for which all should fight for. In this regard, all religious beliefs assert that there are many unseen battles aiming to take hold of the human soul, either between divinity and evil, or between worlds, or even between the body and the soul itself. These unseen battles over the human soul raging in the whole world made it the central item of the entire universe, both for the visible and the unseen worlds, an item of which whoever takes possession will also become the ruler of the universe. Through this philosophy, the value of the soul became abysmal, incommensurable, and without resemblance. The point for making such a broad overview of the soul in religious beliefs is the question of whether we can build an interfaith discourse based on the religions’ most debated and valuable issue, soul? Regardless of the variety of religious beliefs on what seems to be the soul, there is always a residual consideration in them that makes the soul more important than the body. This universal impression is due to another belief or instead need of believing that above and beyond this seen, palpable, finite life and the world should exist another one, infinite, transcendent, and available all the same after here. This variety stretches from the minimum impact that soul has on the body, as being the superior essence that inhabitants and enlivens the matter, to the highest impact in which soul has nothing to do with matter[1] and is only ephemeral linked to it, but its existence is not at all limited, defined or depended on the matter [2], or even placed to the extreme, as the very life of the matter thus this seen universe is merely a thought in the soul/mind [3]. In this extensive variety of soul overviews, the emphasis of the soul’s importance gives an inverse significance to the body/matter, from being everything that matters to a thin, dwindle item that has no existence at all outside consciousness. (shrink)

It was William Blake's insight that the Christian churches, by inverting the Incarnation and the dialectical vision of Paul, have repressed the body, divided God from creation, substituted judgment for grace, and repudiated imagination, compassion, and the original apocalyptic faith of early Christianity. Blake's prophetic poetry thus contributes to the renewal of Christian ethics by a process of subversion and negation of Christian moral, ecclesiastical, and theological traditions, which are recognized precisely as inversions of Jesus, and therefore as instances of (...) the forms of evil that God-in-Christ overcomes through Incarnation, reversing the Fall. Blake's great epic poems, particularly Milton (1804–08) and Jerusalem (1804–20), embody his heterodox representation of the final coincidence of Christ and Satan through which, at last, all things are made new. (shrink)

Il n'y aura pas de retour du Christ, la guerre des religions continue. Après tant de philosophies réduites au débat du grec et du juif, de Platon et de Levinas, quelle place reconnaître au christianisme, gnose comprise, et comment l'arracher au dernier fond religieux et philosophique dont il a tenté de libérer es sujets humains? Après tant d'appels au meurtre de Dieu, à la mort du christianisme, tant de sommations d'athéisme, tant de haines religieuses enfin, quelle pensée universelle du monde (...) est encore possible pour la dernière fois, moins tapageuse que l'athéologie et moins obscurantiste que la théologie, qui ne lie plus le sort de l'Homme, soit par refus soit par identification, à celui des religions? Posant l'axiome inverse de celui des religions qu'entérinent encore les philosophies, l'Homme comme être sans-religion, mais comme Étranger ou Messie affrontant clandestinement les religions auxquelles il est condamné par l'histoire et le monde, quelle pratique est-il en son pouvoir de mener pour transformer ce destin? La solution est dans la découverte d'une foi ou d'une messianité immanente, strictement humaine, qui sous-vient au monde ou subvertit les religions. De là cette théologie clandestine destinée aux Étrangers ou aux Messies que nous sommes et qui se fonde sur notre indifférence comprise de manière non-nihiliste, comme humaine ou "radicale", aux religions. Comme toujours il s'agit avec cette confession de foi du non-philosophe d'un manuel théorique, d'une pratique de la théorie théologique en faveur d'un Verbe tout de messianité."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The article explores the manifesto of the Moscow Anthropological School, emphasizing the primacy of hallucinations in anthropogenesis. The current predicament of modern humanity urges the anticipation of something genuine and substantial. However, the essence of philosophy does not always align with the prevailing “spirit of the times.” Its mission is to pursue autopoiesis, scrutinizing society for its inherent flaws that impede progress. From this viewpoint, F.I. Girenok’s hallucinatory theory is entirely pertinent and justified. The narrative of civilization is typically portrayed (...) as a chronicle of discoveries and triumphs of rationality over irrationality. The history of fears and misconceptions, which not only persist from the past but also resurface, is less well-documented. Therefore, the program of the Moscow Anthropological School is far from being peripheral; on the contrary, it holds significant relevance. It furthers the tradition of inversion anthropology, initially established by N.Ya. Danilevsky, the first Russian critic of Darwinism. This anthropological tradition was particularly advanced by the concept of B.F. Porshnev and the research of contemporary authors like Yu.M. Boroday and V.A. Podoroga. Each, in their unique way, contributed to the critique of evolutionism and reductionism. F.I. Girenok’s concept evokes schizoanalysis, albeit devoid of Marxist influence, unlike G. Deleuze. All these aspects warrant a comprehensive philosophical discourse on the manifesto. Meanwhile, reports and discussions concerning F.I. Girenok’s theory revealed that not all participants are readily prepared to tread the path suggested by the founder of this theory, confining themselves to theological explorations instead. This, as per the author of the article, inherently signifies that hallucinatory and messianic anthropologies are complementary to each other. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to reveal with an overall approach, how the psycho-social background, starting from woman image in first periods and reach modern day, is embraced by outstanding theorists of modern psychology, and also how these collected works are reflected in their definitions of woman. If it is considered that woman has been discussed with reflections against and not from primary sources throughout history, it can be seen that the most essential roots of woman narrations can be (...) found in oral culture and the parts of written texts are made over symbol, metaphor, proposition and story. However myths (stories) that take place in oral and partly written culture about primitive man, are sacred tales, they will also present data regarding human image. Therefore with a limited effort of human being to understand the infinite, it can be understood what human being think, feel and how they interpret rather than gods/goddesses ontology. From this point of view, this article that consists of two parts, first of all will mention especially about perception of Goddess in those reflected to image of God, maintaining its efficiency in conscious or unconscious as a system of symbols intrinsic to human nature and cultural code background and then the woman image will be roughly discussed with a descriptive style over the world of mythology, psychology and faith. In the second part, it will be examined in detail how all the written and oral information about understanding woman by modern anthropologists are interpreted with the perspective of modern psychology specific to theorists such as Freud, Jung and Fromm. Eventually, it will be emphasized that past and future are integrated with information, experience and feelings with an active relationship; perception and approach of woman have stayed up to date in time continually; mythology, psychology and religion are important factors within this matter.Summary: Human being has also used historical, temporal and spatial attributions for God. Infinite human being has expressed their thoughts about the finite God by analogy. Despite the dominance of male gender in the images of God in these analogies which are the products of human experience, female Gods that is to say Goddesses are not few. The matter of how the image of goddess come to the fore in a distinctly male-dominant society is a noteworthy matter. The narration of Earth Mother over female symbol in myths in which the harmony is constantly secured within the inner and exterior world and mention about living in harmony with the universe is an important data in order to understand female characteristics attributed to God. Human being has also used historical, temporal and spatial attributions for God. Infinite human being has expressed their thoughts about the finite God by analogy.The woman subject is influenced by transferred life experience within the historical process, and it is an undeniable fact that ancient “woman perception” has reflections to the present day. Within the history of humanity, striking definitions about woman can be seen in sacred statements in symbol language. Therefore, it is proper to examine primarily the image of sacred and then examine female meaning that is charged on that image. The aim of this study can be summed up with two themes: a) try to understand the general framework of reflections of the present image of woman, style of narration and comprehension in psychological, sociological, and religious terms by getting help from myths which mention about ancient image of God, although there is centuries old difference between those stories and us, b) reveal the image of woman in Freud, Jung, and Fromm’s approach which establishes a bond between mythology that is a system of symbols special to human nature and human psychology and discuss this subject by using psychology of religion.When reviewed ancient Far East and Middle East myths and also Ancient Greek mythology, it can be seen that gods are not cloistered supernatural beings who do not have abstract personalities and also do not lead a wholly metaphysic life. The crucial issue here is; the reality that Gods and Goddesses are shown as a model to both man and woman. Psychologists who examine religion in terms of psychology state that first outcomes about the image of God come up not with behavior but with emotion. The attributions of gender, related to the emotion in question are cited during the transfer of those emotions as well. Therefore; philosophers, culture and religion historians, theologians, anthropologists, archaeologists, psychologists, and sociologists have contributed to this transfer when they discuss the cult of God or Goddess throughout the history. It is interesting that the usage of the term of God maintains while the usage of the term of Goddess decreases. Civilization historians claim that the appearance of divine religions particularly quickens the course of transition from goddess to god. According to them, during this period in which there is a transfer from polytheist image of God to monotheist image of God, the quantitative change in the perception of God comes with a qualitative change. According to Fromm, during this power gathering period, there has been a transfer from mother and feminine (woman) centered religion to father and masculine (man) centered religious experience/ God image. According to him, in the second stage of humanity development, “the children of Earth Mother turn into the children of divine father”, there is a transition from unconditional love of mother to authoritarian sympathy of father, from an image of supplemental and surrounding Goddess to authoritarian image of God who makes requests by his nature, lays down principles and laws, and supports the power and search for a successor to deliver the power.The perception of women who led to Prophet Adam deviated from the truth and expelled from heaven is spread around especially the regions of one-God religions. This has strengthened the idea that divine religions have a negative view towards women. Including Islam, the reason of all divine religions’ encountering with claims that they have a negative approach against woman stem from applying to that religions’ human resources rather than essential religious sources which are existing or lost earliest forms.Oedipus complex is an important thesis of Freud which explains the development of religion and morals; establish the base of his psychology, and in fact, important in terms of his making connection with difference of kinds and flow or non-flow of request and needs while explaining human behaviors. According to Freud who points to sexuality and aggression which are the most powerful two instinct in the biology of male or female; the first three or five years of a newly born human- this is the period in which the basic part of personality is formed- the definition of self is extremely influenced by his/her gender (in both biological and sociocultural terms). Freud who put forward father-son conflict in the struggle to survive between Zeus and his sons in Moses and Monotheism (1998c) and Totem and Taboo (1998a), makes an explanation about the origin of religion and humanity over two male characters. Jung pays attention to goddess image as much as the image of god and do not approach this situation only as a polytheism or sociocultural explanation or childish appearances of a primitive mind. He accepts goddesses as a reflection of archetypes in human. Male has a feminine side, female has a masculine side, and a unity occurs when both complete each other. According to Fromm, a taxonomy referring to woman and man is primarily a sociology-based approach rather than a biology-based one. Fromm (1995) thinks that the whole depiction shows individuals’ own desire and needs, that is to say, their psychology rather than a theology. Transition from mother (woman) centered religion to father (man) centered religious experience and God image is essentially one of the most important breaking/inversion points of human being, not humanity. As a result, it can be said that it is an important point to clearly understand the story of mankind to examine that intense freshness at hand and centeredness of quantitative and qualitative changes of divine or God image of ancient societies come down after psychological, sociological, religious, economic, political, and cultural changes. (shrink)

Discusses Stoic ethics and cosmology in Lucan. Argues that Lucan's Cato embodies a perverted, distorted form of Stoicism that corresponds to the inversion of Stoic cosmology and theology generally. All those forms of inversion serve to create alienation and a dystopian world view.

In 1866 J.C. Maxwell thought he had discovered a Maxwellian demon—though not under that description, of course [1]. He thought that the temperature of a gas under gravity would vary inversely with the height of the column. From this he saw that it would then be possible to obtain energy for work from a cooling gas, a clear violation of Thompson’s statement of the second law of thermodynamics. This upsetting conclusion made him worry that “there remains as far as I (...) can see a collision between Dynamics and thermodynamics.” Later, he derived the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution law that made the temperature the same throughout the column. However, he continued to think about the relationship between dynamics and thermodynamics, and in 1867, he sent Tait a note with a puzzle for him to ponder. The puzzle was his famous “neat-fingered being” who could make a hot system hotter and a cold system colder without any work being done. Thompson in 1874 christened this being a “demon”; Maxwell unsuccessfully tried to rename it “valve.” However named, the demon’s point was to “show that the second law of thermodynamics has only a statistical validity.” Since that time a large physics literature has arisen that asks a question similar to that asked in theology, namely, does the devil exist? Beginning with Popper, philosophers examining the literature on Maxwell’s demon are typically surprised—even horrified [2,3,4,5,6,7]. As a philosopher speaking at a physics conference exactly 100 yrs after Popper’s birth, I want to explain why this is so. The organizers of this conference instructed me to offend everyone, believers and non-believers in demons. Thus my talk, apart from an agnostic middle section, contains a section offending those who believe they have exorcized the demon and a section offending those who summon demons. Throughout the central idea will be to clearly distinguish the various second laws and the various demons.. (shrink)

continent. 2.3 (2012): 218–223 Vijay Prashad. Arab Spring, Libyan Winter . Oakland: AK Press. 2012. 271pp, pbk. $14.95 ISBN-13: 978-1849351126. Nearly a decade ago, I sat in a class entitled, quite simply, “Corporations,” taught by Vijay Prashad at Trinity College. Over the course of the semester, I was amazed at the extent of Prashad’s knowledge, and the complexity and erudition of his style. He has since authored a number of classic books that have gained recognition throughout the world. The Darker (...) Nations , a peoples’ history of the Third World, sent defibrillating shockwaves through an academic world that had almost forgotten the epic scope and historic dignity of the non-aligned movement and post-colonial struggles. In his recent, award-winning work, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter , Prashad delves into his capacious knowledge of the Third World to excavate the discourses and narratives surrounding the upheavals of 2011. “Revolutions have no specific timetable,” states Prashad in the opening line of this exciting and provocative look at contemporary events. Instantly, an atmosphere of suspense emerges. The reader is alerted to the problem of history. Does the making of history then involve a suspension of historical time, or is it a continuous narrative structure into which events must eventually be integrated? Arab Spring, Libyan Winter shows that the answer to the question, “How is history made?” lies just as easily in the asking. The first half of the book works through the events that transpired to bring about the explosive popular uprisings of Arab Spring: Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. But the events are not put together in a cohesive, chronological fashion. Using an uncommonly gripping style more akin to the folk-story motif of the djeli than to traditionally Orientalist academia, Prashad suspends a given situation, points out its components, and traces back the characters and genealogies that define each link before resuming a narrative. Every moment is an end to itself, and an origin of something different. Thus, the making of history becomes the suspension of its own progress, it’s catastrophic 'stability,' in a process of differentiation through inclusion. Empirically, one might suggest that history is a condition of time, and by extension, of the subject, but history is also an eminent producer of the Subject and her concept of time through memory and narrative. Hence, history is often overdetermined by a dominant narrative of the sovereign. The apparently chaotic composition of Prashad’s historicity is, then, an interstitial morphology of resistance. It illustrates that the time to act for the revolutionary lies in the gaps within the dominant historical realities. It points out the sorties of signifiers constituting nothing in the obliterated ruins of history. Through such illuminations, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter breaks through “the surface of history” to elaborate revolution’s snapping synapses, exploding interruptions and breaches, connecting flows. Messianic Politics It is tempting to think, 'History is either singular, or it is diffuse. It is either one coherent factual narrative, or it is comprised of the aletheia of the multitude.' Yet the reader finds Prashad examining the structure of history on multiple levels. For Prashad, world history is shaped by geographically defined political movements, such as communism or national liberation, with historical agents like the working class for the former and the nationalist militant for the latter. Religion, however, is another matter: “Religion has an unshakable eschatology which a post-utopian secular politics lacks.” Within the telos of religion, there appears on the horizon the image of Benjamin’s thoughts on messianic time—time as “a small fissure in the continuous catastrophe,” a break with history, may contain an ultimate redemption of the human beyond the political power struggle. Succoring the split between geo-political and utopian-religious (messianic) time in the context of Arab Spring, Prashad indicates that the base of “the deep desire and commitment to some form of democracy” is forged by the affinity between eschatological Islamist politics with the People. To think about the Subject of messianic time in the context of the lack of a “coherent timetable” for emancipatory politics, it is perhaps best to return to the modern tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr., whose prefigurative blending of liberation theology and emancipatory politics became most important during his works of 1963, the climactic year of “The Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” the March on Washington, and the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church. In “The Letter,” King states the point bluntly: Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was “well timed” in view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word “wait!” It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has almost always meant ‘Never.” We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that “justice too long delayed is justice denied.” The timing of rebellious action must not be a part of history. It must change history. The kairos appears spontaneous and untimely in its convulsive, shocking presence, yet it is, deeper still, a path, a longue durée , forged through diligent and rigorous praxis. King put a finer point on the path of historic liberation in his declaration in his 1963 speech at Western Michigan University: “[T]ime is neutral.... Somewhere along the way we must see that time will never solve the problem alone but that we must help time. Somewhere we must see that human progress never rolls in on the wheels on inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and the persistent work of dedicated individuals who are willing to be co-workers with God. Without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the insurgent and primitive forces of irrational emotionalism and social stagnation. We must always help time and realize that the time is always right to do right.” Time, then, exists in “the neutral,” while action must turn to the kairos , not only of taking time, but taking the right time. By turning our relation to time into kairos , we move time from its context within history to a duration between histories—the longue dure?e of Messianic time. The implementation of neutrality in this context suggests a broad space of time to extend through the valley of positive and negative. In Roland Barthes’s lectures from 1978, the neutral takes place in this minimal distance of non-conflict that exists outside of two extremes. It is, in the words of Maurice Blanchot, “the non-general, the non-generic, as well as the non-specific.” For Blanchot, the neutrality of time permeates life as death, impassive and beyond control; such is the neutrality of messianic time, which permeates the charge of history, changing the "I" into the "one." The neutrality of time therefore implicates history in a case against extremism, showing that the work of the radical is not to tend to any particular side, but to have the time to navigate through the terrible terrain of history by altering its course, its patterns and rhythms of movement, connection, sociality. Hence, one does not simply “make history,” one alters the course of history in accordance to “the right time.” The historical path toward emerging power is transmitted as a gesture to the outside of history, against history; a gesture as simple as reaching out. Thus a counterhistory, to use Foucault’s term, is brought forward as the guide of time past a point of no return, a Rubicon, the point where the normal path of history falls to the past. The subject, who must be the only true agent of history, facilitates time through helpfulness, and both the Subject and her history become decentered in relation to one another. Yet history negates the neutrality of time. As Barthes discloses, although the neutral is the “thought and practice of the nonconflictual, it is nevertheless bound to assertion, to conflict, in order to make itself heard.” Engaged with history, time is charged with a destiny, and becomes an opposition. As Prashad insists, “For Arab lands, the events of early 2011 were not the inauguration of a new history, but the continuation of an unfinished struggle that is a hundred years old.” The emergence of the Subject during Arab Spring did not conceive of a new history, but changed the path of history toward a different destiny. “Historical grievances combined with inflationary pressures now met with the subjective sense that victory might be at hand—this was not simply a protest to scream into the wind, but a protest to actually remove autocrats from their positions of authority. The facts of resistance had given way to the expectation of revolutionary change.” The negativity of this charge toward “revolutionary destiny” rendered control, as a positive force, seriously lacking. The lack of control lies in the problem that the Subject is not totally detemporalized or timeless, but untimely in her presence. The Subject is untimely, because her work is visionary, and it is only through such visionary work that the Rubicon can be crossed. Still, the crossing of this border is haunted by anxiety over an impending disaster that lays in wait. It is only through the form of what Benjamin calls divine violence, captivated not with the justice of the means, but the ends—the transformation of history—that a revelation of history’s traumatic foundations can be liberated, and patterns and rhythms of time developed throughout obscured traditions awakened. In this situation, the Subject appears to be outside of right, but setting the state to rights. Because her position is correct, in-so-far as the rebelling subject rebels due to a lack of recognition, her representation appears outside of the norm, which is mistaken as right. Therefore, such visionary work must be carried out through obscured traditions, underground, away from the surveillance of empire. Explaining his method from the start along the lines of Marx’s metaphor of the mole, Prashad insists, “It is the burrowing that is essential, not simply the emergence onto the surface of history.” Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a book on uncharted networks of time, spread out over the 252 pages like an elaborate spider’s web of passages intertwining with and overwhelming the machinery of the state. Although untimely, Arab Spring was not a flash in the pan, or a Facebook or Twitter revolution. Prashad notes that the government’s suspension of these tools led to further radicalism by furthering communications through face-to-face encounters. In existential terms, Arab Spring might be thought of as a revolution of Being over techne , an uprising of the unchartable, infinite potential of the Other. The name of this Other is found in Chance. The faith of the revolution lies in the proper decentering of the subject, its giving to the Other of time, for only with respect to time does history actually appear on the horizon of the subject, rather than as an imposition. This time of historical agency appears as a moment when anything can happen—a revolutionary truth event where everything comes into question while being realized in its Otherness as a community of the people begins anew in the streets amidst discourse, friendship, reconfigurations of hegemony, and a becoming of a constituent power. Throwing a wrench into the gears of the “cobwebbed tradition” of Orientalism, the decentering of history in Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a defining quality of its impassioned revolutionary cry. But perhaps the most paradigmatic points of the book emerge from the unexpected voices. To make the connection between the particular manifestations of revolutionary demands to the general historic terms of revolution, Prashad quotes an anonymous young Egyptian in Tahrir Square, who reminds us, “[T]he French Revolution took a very long time so the people could eventually get their rights.” Far from timelessness, the historicization of Arab Spring must exist precisely within the most uncanny appearance of time, as something that does not appear to come from the natural state of time as we know it, but in arriving has completely transformed the way that we understand time. Strange Monsters Revolution is never as simple as a revolt from below against a rusting structure of elites trying to remain in power. As with the French Revolution, Arab Spring consisted of complex familial ties, outside interests, and religious factions fighting alongside, often in awkward juxtaposition to, liberals, working class parties, farmers, and students. It is perhaps because of this historically difficult and incongruous composition that the Arabic word for revolution is thawra , referring to the image of the bull, or thawr , which has religious significance as a pagan deity for the Ancient Semitic tribes and Cartheginians. If Daniel Guérin was correct in saying, “Anarchism and Marxism drink from the same spring,” then it is quite a different oasis that drove the thirsty beast of revolution through what Prashad calls, “the Libyan labyrinth.” Recalling Bataille’s Acéphale, the intestinal labyrinth gains significance as the mode of metabolism and rumination in which, “(the Acephale) has lost himself, loses me with him, and in which I discover myself as him, in other words, as a monster.” Unraveling the discourse of the revolution, the flows of power and hegemony—from Qaddafi’s nationalist coup in 1969 to the wars with Chad from 1978 to 1987, the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s to, finally, the War on Terror—we find that the metabolic process of Libyan Winter ends in the production of oil. In a process of what Prashad calls “involution,” Qaddafi’s bellicose policies, along with his attempts to nationalize Islam together with oil, mutated the source of his power, turning his house against itself. Already a divided nation, with its two major cities on opposite geographic sides of the country, Libya became split between two opposed political powers—liberal reformists and staunch nationalists—as Qaddafi’s political disengagement manifested through what can only be described in psychoanalytic terms as a recursive passage a l’act (mysteriously calling Wikipedia “Kleenex,” declaring that opponents drank hallucinogens with their instant coffee, and so on). Prashad declares, “The mercurial style that Qaddafi adopted was not about his personality alone, but also a leader’s natural response to a system that relied upon power brokers whose own loyalty… did not have any ideological commitment to the system.” As in the case of other nations during Arab Spring, the true expression of revolt was an outward exposition of what had inwardly been happening in microcosmic societies throughout the realm—from indigenous tribes to political parties, for a century, the people, partly motivated by (and in resistance to) economic impositions of development, had been changing the traditional social compositions and participating in what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls, “the relative autonomy of the movement from the leaders.” It was this empowerment of political reconfigurations taking place under the context of new democratic assemblages that shocked the elites and evoked such a powerful response. Unlike Qaddafi’s awkward policy choices and rants, real acts of power from the West were clear and decisive. Prashad sets the stages of war and diplomacy, far removed from the deserts, mountains, and cities that forged the backdrop of popular politics. Taking place under the now-classic architecture of the “four pillars” of US interests—oil, the War on Terror, Israel, and the circumvention of Iranian hegemony—we find elites rubbing elbows in “Heliopolist cocktail parties and hushed conferences in Kasr al-Ittihadiya” as well as the Concorde-Lafayette hotel in Paris, which provides the setting for a meeting of anti-Qaddafi figures consolidating their power. These scenes are buttressed with the careful portraiture of key historical actors. As Prashad brings the stage of history to life, we find the diplomats and liberals like Frank Wisner, whose career has brought him from Enron in the late 1990s to the Obama Administration, under the aegis of which he was meeting with Mubarak about military support during Arab Spring. We spy the provocateurs, for instance, gauche cavalier , Bernard Henri-Levy, who telephones Sarkozy from Benghazi about the need for more NATO air strikes. We follow the rebel military establishment as it suffers mysterious deaths and even more mysterious assents (like that of apparent CIA cohort, Khalifa Hifter). In each of these intriguing characters, we find different representations of the security state biopolitique: an oil-injected reification that drives Arab Spring from the resentment of rising food prices to the brink of implosion in Libyan Winter. Reminiscent of the scenes of Cold War soirées represented in old Bond films, the aristocratic fight for oil against democracy that was Libyan Winter presents a harsh truth that the new global crisis is simply the continuation of the old history: the global exploitation of capitalism waged against the imagination of the people. As Benjamin laments, “The labyrinth is the right path for the person who always arrives early enough at his destination. This destination is the marketplace.” Yet, “(t)he labyrinth is the habitat of… a humanity (a class) which does not want to know where its destiny is taking it.” Thus, the labyrinth leads, like the desert, only further into itself. As Blanchot explains, “The desert is even less certain than the world; it is never anything but the approach to the desert.” Only the visionary can take time out of the involution toward oblivion. It is here, in this approach to and escape from history, that we find ourselves within Benjamin’s Golgotha, Blanchot’s desert: A space of indeterminate uncertainty where we become familiar only with our own exile. Blanchot writes, “For the moderated and moderate man, the room, the desert, and the world are strictly determined places. For the man of the desert and the labyrinth, devoted to the error of a journey necessarily a little longer than his life, the same space will be truly infinite, even if he knows that it is not, all the more so since he knows it.” The desert, as allegory, provides an eschatology, a mortality in the destiny of Arab Spring. But any allegory of nature might lead to a labyrinthine eschatology (for example, in Bachelard, the forest presents "a limitless world"); the prescience of the untimely is always an uncanny acceptance of the infinite within the finite—the outside of what is understood. Transgenerational and occupied with the image of the future, the untimely makes otherness its home as it proceeds toward liberation. In the work of helping time navigate this dangerous passage of history, Prashad illustrates that the more violent break with history may have occurred in the peaceable struggles of Tahrir Square, and not in the military clashes of Qaddafi with his former Generals who defected to the CIA and NATO countries. It might be possible to suggest, then, that in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the historical subject of the people was drawn together in a Dionysian dance of different rhythms in the marvelous realm of the ancients, while we fear that the case of Libya suggests an Apollonian future where time, itself, may lay dying under the machinic hand of history. The properly Nietzschean inversion would follow: time is dead, for history has killed it. Yet, if time is dead, struck down in Golgotha, exposed in the desert, mauled by the thawra , it is only in the present sense that it is rendered impossible outside of the context into which the untimely has thrown us. Thus, if history becomes an art of revolution, life as being-towards-death (death as the provocation of the neutrality of time) becomes what Benjamin calls “the allegory of resurrection” through the glorious ruins of history. Prashad ends his work with a rousing finale: “The time of the impossible has presented itself. In Egypt, where the appetite for the possibilities of the future are greatest, the people continue to assert themselves into Tahrir Square and other places, pushing to reinvigorate a Revolution that must not die… For them the slogan is simple: Down with the Present. Long live the Future. May it be so.&rdquo. (shrink)

Nietzsche is a silent interlocutor in Francis Fukuyama’s polemic The End of History and the Last Man (1992). But Fukuyama, I argue, ignores the rationale behind Nietzsche’s critique of the liberal worldview and misinterprets his call for the revaluation of all values. By exploring the relations between the end of history, the last man and the need for revaluation, this chapter aims to reconstruct the relevant aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of liberalism, which challenges the political vision of The End of (...) History. I contend that Nietzsche’s exposure of the conceptual and value inversions as central yet perilous sources of legitimacy in modern ‘industrial civilization’ continues to resonate today and deserves critical attention. (shrink)

Event synopsis: Professor Susan James inverses Leo Strauss’ reading of Spinoza. Whereas Strauss emphasized the hidden subtext of Spinoza’s arguments, James revives the explicit debates of his time within which Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise was situated. But this is not a simple historical reconstruction. James’ close reading of the Treatise offers a radically new perspective on Spinoza’s revolutionary book – a reading that presents startling new perspective on the political, metaphysical and theological implications of the book. Given the importance of Spinoza’s (...) political writings in contemporary radical democratic approaches to the state, James intervention has the potential to reshape the way we think of a Spinozan politics. (shrink)

Why do people in South Africa fight over statues – even to the extent of tying themselves to a mere bust? Using insights, especially from Jan Assmann, the study develops the argument that material culture (such as images and statues) provides the social energy that drives the manner in which history is told, that is, historiography; they provide the ‘silent objects’ with the power to control the public discourse and collective identity. Statues encapsulate all we need to know, inversely, concerning (...) public discourse, particularly, concerning issues pertaining to control, power and class. From this perspective, those who vandalise them may be regarded as contesting public discourse identity and historiography. Insights from this discussion provide parallel discussions, especially, in Galatians where Paul contrasts the image of Abraham with that of Moses – choosing Abraham as the public image that best represents the identity complexity, cosmopolitan and heterogeneous nature that characterises the Hellenistic context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Critical Piety: Our Urgent Need to Recover an Ancient VirtueMary Nickel (bio)But, you see, if you eats these dinners and don’t cook ’em, if you wears these clothes and don’t buy or iron them, then you might start thinking that the good fairy or some spirit did all that. They asked a little white girl in this family I used to work for who made her cake at one (...) of her little tea parties. She said she made it and then she hid her face and said the good fairies made it. Well, you are looking at that good fairy. Black folks don’t have no time to be thinking like that. If I thought like that, I’d burn cakes and scorch skirts. But when you don’t have anything else to do, you can think like that. It’s bad for your mind, though.—Rosa Wakefield1There has been a lamentable trend, in the age since the Great Awakenings, to use the word “piety” as a synonym for “devoutness.” Piety, to the contemporary ear, conjures a sense of personal religious feeling and practice. For example, Saba Mahmood’s distinguished text, Politics of Piety, has as its theme the individual agency of women in Islamic societies. Meanwhile, untold books in the field of religious studies simply use “piety” as a stand-in for “religion.”2 This use of the term is not limited to the academic study of religion; recently, one liberation theologian has even demanded that we move, in the words of the title of his book, Beyond Piety.3 The thesis of that book rests on the premise that piety is altogether private, and insufficiently materially productive.4 [End Page 5]According to the ancients, though, piety is neither of these things. Piety, for Cicero, motivates the pious to “render kind offices and loving service to one’s kin and country.”5 As such, the ancient virtue of piety is fundamentally public, insofar as it pertains to one’s public tribute to her kin and fellow citizens. Furthermore, piety is productive, insofar as it motivates the pious to accomplish good things on behalf of her kin and fellow citizens. The ancient virtue therefore involves the near inverse of what the modern term suggests today.6 Where contemporary uses of the word “piety” are often preceded by the word “personal,” the ancients would have been bewildered by such a formulation.This essay does not dare try to account for how the ancient virtue of piety disintegrated to the point of becoming a matter of private religious practice. For those who are interested in that topic, many historians (and non-historians) offer various narratives to explain that trajectory.7 However, I will refrain from so doing. Instead, in what follows, I seek to illuminate the ancient virtue of piety, and show why we need so urgently to recover it. Piety, the ancients believed, is the virtuous act of acknowledging those things that make our lives possible.Furthermore, I will also update the ancient virtue, so to speak, to situate it in our modern context. That requires three substantial interventions. First, I show that piety must be comprehensive and even prospective. That is: not only ought we to be grateful for those who have made our lives possible up to and including the present moment, but we ought also to be grateful for those whose future work will sustain our continued wellbeing. Second, I show that piety must not only be symbolic or expressive, but also material. However, I do [End Page 6] not intend to neglect the importance of expressive piety. Third, I concentrate on the appropriate means for acknowledging those sources of our being that are not altogether (or at all) commendable. Finally, I offer some reflections on what this meditation on piety might tell us about contemporary American society, including two policy proposals regarding public education and paid family leave.I. Piety, Ancient and ModernPremodern Piety. It can take some effort to comprehend what pietas meant to the ancients, especially given the modern connotations associated with its contemporary English cognate. It takes even more to grasp how central this virtue... (shrink)

This article observes that both the similar and the dissimilar are of ethical importance in discourse on human identity. There is a need for a common humanity and to guard against domination in the name of difference – precisely by recognising the otherness of the other. This also applies to reflections on what it means to be human in the age of the human, namely the Anthropocene. A survey is offered of how this tension between the similar and the dissimilar (...) plays itself out in the work of five theorists, namely Dipesh Chakrabarty, Clive Hamilton, Dona Harraway, Michel Serres and Kathryn Yusoff. On this basis, six tentative conclusions are offered: Despite the appropriate ethical emphasis on difference and otherness, the quest for the universal in the particular cannot be readily abandoned. Such a sensitivity for the universal in the particular needs to be extended to a recognition of the way in which an integrated earth system functions. The ethical emphasis on difference and otherness should be extended to non-human animals. Human dignity and the ‘integrity of creation’ are not necessarily inversely proportioned. Relations may well have an ontological priority over individuals. Identity need not be constituted by the distant past or the immediate presence as if continuity over time forms a guarantee for a sense of identity.Contribution: This article explores a core question in discourse on the Anthropocene, namely ‘What does it mean to be human in the age of humans?’ It compares the views on human identity of five theorists, namely Dipesh Chakrabarty, Clive Hamilton, Dona Harraway, Michel Serres and Kathryn Yusoff and on this basis offers six observations to take the debate forward. (shrink)