The aim of this paper is to give a geometric interpretation of quantifiers in the intutionistic predicate calculus. We obtain it treating formulae withn free variables as functions withn arguments which run over an abstract set whereas the values of functions are open subsets of a suitable topological space.

The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. (...) I wish to examine the apparent dual nature of logical truth (without dwelling on Davidson), and suggest that we are dealing with a distinction between a metaphysical and a linguistic interpretation of truth. I take my cue from John Etchemendy, who suggests that absolute truth could be considered as being equivalent to truth in the ‘right model’, i.e., the model that corresponds with the world. However, the notion of ‘model’ is not entirely appropriate here as it is closely associated with relative truth. Instead, I propose that the metaphysical interpretation of truth may be illustrated in modal terms, by metaphysical modality in particular. One of the tasks that I will undertake in this paper is to develop this modal interpretation, partly building on my previous work on the metaphysical interpretation of the law of non-contradiction (Tahko 2009). After an explication of the metaphysical interpretation of logical truth, a brief study of how this interpretation connects with some recent important themes in philosophical logic follows. In particular, I discuss logical pluralism and propose an understanding of pluralism from the point of view of the metaphysical interpretation. (shrink)

Logics for ‘generally’ are intended to express some vague notions, such as ‘generally’, ‘several’, ‘many’, ‘most’, etc., by means of the new generalized quantifier ∇ and to reason about assertions with ‘generally’ . We introduce the idea of functional interpretation for ‘generally’ and show that representative functions enable elimination of ∇ and reduce consequence to classical theories. Thus, one can use proof procedures and theorem provers for classical first-order logic to reason about assertions involving ‘generally’.

Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is (...) to study the prospect of a logical pluralism based on different interpretations of logical systems. First, we give our analysis of what it means to interpret a logic – and make some hopefully useful distinctions along the way. Second, we present what we call an interpretational logical pluralism: there is more than one correct logic and a logic is correct only if it has some adequate interpretation. We consider four variants of this idea, bring up some possible objections, and try to find plausible solutions on behalf of the pluralist. We will argue that interpretations of logical systems provide a promising – albeit not unproblematic – route to logical pluralism. (shrink)

Quantum logic is only applicable to microscopic phenomena while classical logic is exclusively used for everyday reasoning, including mathematics. It is shown that both logics are unified in the framework of modal interpretation. This proposed method deals with classical propositions as latently modalized propositions in the sense that they exhibit manifest modalities to form quantum logic only when interacting with other classical subsystems.

This paper investigates set-theoretical semantics for logics that contain unary connectives, which can be viewed as modalities. Indeed, some of the logics we consider are closely related to linear logic. We use insights from the relational semantics of relevance logics together with a new version of the squeeze lemma in our semantics for logics with disjunction. The ideal-based semantics, which takes co-theories to be situations, dualizes the theory-based semantics for logics with conjunction.

This paper extends Fitting’s epistemic interpretation of some Kleene logics to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting’s “cut-down” operator is discussed, leading to the definition of a “track-down” operator later used to represent the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made, the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain operations defined in (...) this track-down fashion. Finally, further reflections on conjunction and disjunction in the weak Kleene logics accompany this paper, particularly concerning their relation with containment logics. These considerations motivate a special approach to defining sound and complete Gentzen-style sequent calculi for some of their four-valued generalizations. (shrink)

Verbs such as enjoy in the student enjoyed the book exhibit logical metonymy: enjoy is interpreted as enjoy reading. Theoreticalwork [Computational Linguistics 17 (4) (1991) 409; The Generative Lexicon, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995] predicts that this interpretation can be influenced by intra‐sentential context, e.g., by the subject of enjoy. In this article, we test this prediction using a completion experiment and find that the interpretation of a metonymic verb is influenced by the semantic role of its subject. (...) We present a Bayesian model that accounts for the interpretation of logical metonymy and achieves a good fit on our experimental data. We show that the parameters of the model can be estimated from completion data or from corpus data. (shrink)

Journal Name: SATS Issue: Ahead of print.

This paper deals with various substructural propositional logics, in particular with substructural subsystems of Nelson's constructive propositional logics N– and N. Doen's groupoid semantics is extended to these constructive systems and is provided with an informational interpretation in terms of information pieces and operations on information pieces.

Historically, it was the interpretations of intuitionist logic in the modal logic S4 that inspired the standard Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic. The inspiration of this paper is the interpretation of intuitionist logic in the non-normal modal logic S3: an S3 model structure can be 'looked at' as an intuitionist model structure and the semantics for S3 can be 'cashed in' to obtain a non-normal semantics for intuitionist propositional logic. This non-normal semantics is (...) then extended to intuitionist quantificational logic. (shrink)

In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel treats the religions of the world under the rubric "the determinate religion." This is a part of his corpus that has traditionally been neglected since scholars have struggled to understand what philosophical work it is supposed to do. In Hegel's Interpretation of the Religions of the World, Jon Stewart argues that Hegel's rich analyses of Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Egyptian and Greek polytheism, and the Roman religion are not simply irrelevant (...) historical material, as is often thought. Instead, they play a central role in Hegel's argument for what he regards as the truth of Christianity. Hegel believes that the different conceptions of the gods in the world religions are reflections of individual peoples at specific periods in history. These conceptions might at first glance appear random and chaotic, but there is, Hegel claims, a discernible logic in them. Simultaneously, a theory of mythology, history, and philosophical anthropology, Hegel's account of the world religions goes far beyond the field of philosophy of religion. The controversial issues surrounding his treatment of the non-European religions are still very much with us today and make his account of religion an issue of continued topicality in the academic landscape of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Since the time of Aristotle's students, interpreters have considered Prior Analytics to be a treatise about deductive reasoning, more generally, about methods of determining the validity and invalidity of premise-conclusion arguments. People studied Prior Analytics in order to learn more about deductive reasoning and to improve their own reasoning skills. These interpreters understood Aristotle to be focusing on two epistemic processes: first, the process of establishing knowledge that a conclusion follows necessarily from a set of premises (that is, on the (...) epistemic process of extracting information implicit in explicitly given information) and, second, the process of establishing knowledge that a conclusion does not follow. Despite the overwhelming tendency to interpret the syllogistic as formal epistemology, it was not until the early 1970s that it occurred to anyone to think that Aristotle may have developed a theory of deductive reasoning with a well worked-out system of deductions comparable in rigor and precision with systems such as propositional logic or equational logic familiar from mathematical logic. When modern logicians in the 1920s and 1930s first turned their attention to the problem of understanding Aristotle's contribution to logic in modern terms, they were guided both by the Frege-Russell conception of logic as formal ontology and at the same time by a desire to protect Aristotle from possible charges of psychologism. They thought they saw Aristotle applying the informal axiomatic method to formal ontology, not as making the first steps into formal epistemology. They did not notice Aristotle's description of deductive reasoning. Ironically, the formal axiomatic method (in which one explicitly presents not merely the substantive axioms but also the deductive processes used to derive theorems from the axioms) is incipient in Aristotle's presentation. Partly in opposition to the axiomatic, ontically-oriented approach to Aristotle's logic and partly as a result of attempting to increase the degree of fit between interpretation and text, logicians in the 1970s working independently came to remarkably similar conclusions to the effect that Aristotle indeed had produced the first system of formal deductions. They concluded that Aristotle had analyzed the process of deduction and that his achievement included a semantically complete system of natural deductions including both direct and indirect deductions. Where the interpretations of the 1920s and 1930s attribute to Aristotle a system of propositions organized deductively, the interpretations of the 1970s attribute to Aristotle a system of deductions, or extended deductive discourses, organized epistemically. The logicians of the 1920s and 1930s take Aristotle to be deducing laws of logic from axiomatic origins; the logicians of the 1970s take Aristotle to be describing the process of deduction and in particular to be describing deductions themselves, both those deductions that are proofs based on axiomatic premises and those deductions that, though deductively cogent, do not establish the truth of the conclusion but only that the conclusion is implied by the premise-set. Thus, two very different and opposed interpretations had emerged, interestingly both products of modern logicians equipped with the theoretical apparatus of mathematical logic. The issue at stake between these two interpretations is the historical question of Aristotle's place in the history of logic and of his orientation in philosophy of logic. This paper affirms Aristotle's place as the founder of logic taken as formal epistemology, including the study of deductive reasoning. A by-product of this study of Aristotle's accomplishments in logic is a clarification of a distinction implicit in discourses among logicians--that between logic as formal ontology and logic as formal epistemology. (shrink)

One problem with assessing quantum logic is that there are considerable differences between its practitioners. In particular they offer different versions of the set of sentences which the logic governs. On some accounts the sentences involved describe events, on others they are ascriptions of properties. In this paper a framework is offered within which to discuss different quantum logical interpretations of quantum theory, and then the works of Jauch, Putnam, van Fraassen and Kochen are located within it.

When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this (...) interpretation yields a semantics for default logic based on temporal epistemic models. A comparison between the various semantics for default logic will show the differences and similarities of these approaches and ours. (shrink)

An arithmetical interpretation of dynamic propositional logic (DPL) is a mapping f satisfying the following: (1) f associates with each formula A of DPL a sentence f(A) of Peano arithmetic (PA) and with each program α a formula f(α) of PA with one free variable describing formally a supertheory of PA; (2) f commutes with logical connectives; (3) f([α] A) is the sentence saying that f(A) is provable in the theory f(α); (4) for each axiom A of DPL, (...) f(A) is provable in PA (and consequently, for each A provable in DPL, f(A) is provable in PA). The arithmetical completeness theorem is proved saying that a formula A of DPL is provable in DPL iff for each arithmetical interpretation f, f(A) is provable in PA. Various modifications of this result are considered. (shrink)

A simple, bivalent semantics is defined for Łukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic Łm4. It is shown that according to this semantics, the essential presupposition underlying Łm4 is the following: A is a theorem iff A is true conforming to both the reductionist and possibilist theses defined as follows: rt: the value of modal formulas is equivalent to the value of their respective argument iff A is true, etc.); pt: everything is possible. This presupposition highlights and explains all oddities arising in (...) Łm4. (shrink)

This paper proposes a logic, motivated by modal interpretations, in which every quantum mechanics propositions has a truth-value. This logic is completely classical, hence violates the conditions of the Kochen-Specker theorem. It is shown how the violation occurs, and it is argued that this violation is a natural and acceptable consequence of modal interpretations. It is shown that despite its classicality, the proposed logic is empirically indistinguishable from quantum logic.

In this paper, we shall show that the following translation \(I^M\) from the propositional fragment \(\bf L_1\) of Leśniewski's ontology to modal logic \(\bf KTB\) is sound: for any formula \(\phi\) and \(\psi\) of \(\bf L_1\), it is defined as (M1) \(I^M(\phi \vee \psi) = I^M(\phi) \vee I^M(\psi)\), (M2) \(I^M(\neg \phi) = \neg I^M(\phi)\), (M3) \(I^M(\epsilon ab) = \Diamond p_a \supset p_a. \wedge. \Box p_a \supset \Box p_b.\wedge. \Diamond p_b \supset p_a\), where \(p_a\) and \(p_b\) are propositional variables corresponding (...) to the name variables \(a\) and \(b\), respectively. In the last, we shall give some comments including some open problems and my conjectures. (shrink)

The author is concerned with a minimal system dl of deontic logic, His main purpose being to draw attention to the existence of interpretations of dl that give rise to various systems of what may be called "atheoretical logic." by this we understand logical systems dealing with expressions that are--Very probably at least--Neither true nor false, Such as sentences expressing promises, Intentions, Wishes, Commands, And similar things. As it is well known, The status of atheoretical logic in (...) this sense is somewhat problematic for the reason that logical relations might be held to apply to true or false sentences only. However, The author here disregards this much discussed difficulty and proceeds to construct systems of atheoretical logic out of dl in a "philosophically naive" manner. (staff). (shrink)

We construct an extension P of the standard language of classical propositional logic by adjoining to the alphabet of a new category of logical-pragmatic signs. The well formed formulas of are calledradical formulas (rfs) of P;rfs preceded by theassertion sign constituteelementary assertive formulas of P, which can be connected together by means of thepragmatic connectives N, K, A, C, E, so as to obtain the set of all theassertive formulas (afs). Everyrf of P is endowed with atruth value defined (...) classically, and everyaf is endowed with ajustification value, defined in terms of the intuitive notion of proof and depending on the truth values of its radical subformulas. In this framework, we define the notion ofpragmatic validity in P and yield a list of criteria of pragmatic validity which hold under the assumption that only classical metalinguistic procedures of proof be accepted. We translate the classical propositional calculus (CPC) and the intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) into the assertive part of P and show that this translation allows us to interpret Intuitionistic Logic as an axiomatic theory of the constructive proof concept rather than an alternative to Classical Logic. Finally, we show that our framework provides a suitable background for discussing classical problems in the philosophy of logic. (shrink)

De Finetti gave a natural definition of “coherent probability assessment” β:E→[0,1] of a set E={X1,…,Xm} of “events” occurring in an arbitrary set of “possible worlds”. In the particular case of yes–no events, , Kolmogorov axioms can be derived from his criterion. While De Finetti’s approach to probability was logic-free, we construct a theory Θ in infinite-valued Łukasiewicz propositional logic, and show: a possible world of is a valuation satisfying Θ, β is coherent iff it is a convex combination (...) of valuations satisfying Θ, iff β agrees on E with a state of the Lindenbaum MV-algebra of Θ, iff for some Borel probability measure μ on . Thus Łukasiewicz semantics, MV-algebraic states, and Borel probability measures provide a universal representation of coherent assessments of events occurring in any conceivable set of possible worlds. (shrink)

This paper defends a deflationary conception of properties, according to which a property exists if and only if there could be a predicate with appropriate satisfaction conditions. I argue that purely general properties and relations necessarily exist and discuss the bearing of this conception of properties on the interpretation of higher-order logic and on Quine's charge that higher-order logic is ‘set theory in sheep's clothing’. On my approach, the usual semantics involves a false assimilation of the (...) class='Hi'>logic to set theory. I conclude with remarks about implications for the programme of founding mathematical theories in higher-order logic plus abstraction principles. (shrink)

My goal, in this paper, is to critically assess the categorization of “interpretations of probability” as it appears in the literature. In some sources only Carnap’s treatment of probability is understood to be the best example of “logical” probability. This is surprisingly narrow and I will here suggest otherwise. In fact, I believe that certain forms of Baysianism should also be included in the logical camp.

Lewis (Noûs 13:455–476, 1979) claimed that branching-time(-like) models can be derived from his sphere models. However, he did not present any specific construction of branching-time(-like) models from his sphere models formally. Meanwhile, Hosokawa (in: Modern logic of modality and its philosophical range: counterfactuals, Gettier problem, and information flow, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 2018) presented a logico-mathematically strict manner in which sphere models can be reconstructed from branching-time models. Subsequently, Hosokawa (J Logic Lang Inf 32:677–706, 2023) presented a proof-theoretically refined (...) version of hybrid tense logic for a certain type of conditionals, which is referred to as hybrid tense logic for temporal conditionals ( $$\textbf{HTL}_{TC}$$ ). In this paper, we interpret a hybrid version $${\textbf{V}}_{\mathcal {HC(@, \downarrow )}}$$ of Lewis’s counterfactual logic $${\textbf{V}}$$ into $$\textbf{HTL}_{TC}$$, and then prove that $$\textbf{HTL}_{TC}$$ is more expressive than $${\textbf{V}}_{\mathcal {HC(@, \downarrow )}}$$ on the class of temporal sphere models, i.e., sphere models derived from a type of branching-time models. (shrink)

In this article I describe and evaluate the debate that surrounds the proper interpretation of Tarski’s account of logical consequence given in his classic 1936 article ‘On the concept of logical consequence’. In the late 1980s Etchemendy argued that the familiar model theoretic account of logical consequence is not to be found in Tarski’s original article. Whereas the contemporary account of logical consequence is a variable‐domain conception – in that it calls for a reinterpretation of the domain of variation (...) of the quantifiers when evaluating logical consequence –, no such reinterpretation is found in Tarski’s original account, which was rather based on a ‘fixed‐domain’ conception. Etchemendy’s claims have sparked a debate on Tarski’s conception of logical consequence with important contributions by, among others, Bach, Bays, Corcoran, Gómez‐Torrente, Mancosu, Ray, Sagüillo, and Sher. (shrink)

This paper extends Fitting's epistemic interpretation of some Kleene logics, to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting's "cut-down" operator is discussed, rendering a "track-down" operator later used to represent the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made, the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain operations defined in this track-down fashion. Finally, (...) further reflections on conjunction and disjunction in the weak Kleene logics accompany this paper, particularly concerning their relation with containment logics. These considerations motivate a special approach to defining sound and complete Gentzen-style sequent calculi for some of their four-valued generalizations. (shrink)

The historical researches of Louis Couturat saved the logical work of Leibniz from the oblivion of neglect and forgetfulness. They revealed that Leibniz developed in succession several versions of a “logical calculus” (calculus ratiocinatororcalculus universalis). In consequence of Couturat's investigations it has become well known that Leibniz's development of these logical calculi adumbrated the notion of a logistic system; and for these foreshadowings of the logistic treatment of formal logic Leibniz is rightly regarded as the father of symbolic (...) class='Hi'>logic.It is clear from what has been said that it is scarcely possible to overestimate the debt which the contemporary student of Leibniz's logic owes to Couturat. This gratitude must, however, be accompanied by the realization that Couturat's own theory of logic is gravely defective. Couturat was persuaded that the extensional point of view in logic is the only one which is correct, an opinion now quite antiquated, and shared by no one. This prejudice of Couturat's marred his exposition of Leibniz's logic. It led him to battle with windmills: he viewed the logic of Leibniz as rife with shortcomings stemming from an intensional approach.The task of this paper is a re-examination of Leibniz's logic. It will consider without prejudgment how Leibniz conceived of the major formal systems he developed aslogicalcalculi – that is, these systems will be studied with a view to the interpretation or interpretations which Leibniz himself intends for them. The aim is to undo some of the damage which Couturat's preconception has done to the just understanding of Leibniz's logic and to the proper evaluation of his contribution. (shrink)

We present an interdisciplinary approach to study systematic relations between logical form and attacks between claims in an argumentative framework. We propose to generalize qualitative attack principles by quantitative ones. Specifically, we use coherent conditional probabilities to evaluate the rationality of principles which govern the strength of argumentative attacks. Finally, we present an experiment which explores the psychological plausibility of selected attack principles.

This paper offers a new and very simple alternative to Bochvar's well known nonsense -- or meaninglessness -- interpretation of Weak Kleene logic. To help orient discussion I begin by reviewing the familiar Strong Kleene logic and its standard interpretation; I then review Weak Kleene logic and the standard interpretation. While I note a common worry about the Bochvar interpretation my aim is only to give an alternative -- and I think very elegant (...) -- interpretation, not necessarily a replacement. (shrink)

Moral education is a core component of ideological and political courses in primary and secondary schools and universities in China, and also an important part of contemporary Chinese Marxist educational theory and practice. In Chinese senior high schools, the main curriculum and platform for moral education is ideological and political courses. The Ideological and Political Curriculum Standards for General Senior High Schools (2017 Edition, 2020 Revised) issued by the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China explicitly includes a (...) course on logical thinking in the ideological and political curriculum in general senior high schools, strengthening the importance of logic in moral education there. In this paper, the authors explain the necessity of intensifying logic training for contemporary Chinese teenagers, introduce and interpret the relevant contents in the Ideological and Political Curriculum Standards for General Senior High Schools (2017 Edition, 2020 Revised), and put forward some theoretical suggestions on how to conduct teaching on the subject of logic. (shrink)