Aristotle admits the possibility of many vices opposed to one virtue, but insists that there are always at least two, related as deficiency and excess. The doctrine that "virtue is in a mean" is thus both true and useful.

This paper describes and defends the “virtues of ingenuity”: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philosophers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in the practice of using reasoning to solve problems and gather information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less important uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent revival of rhetoric and argumentative approaches to reasoning (in psychology, philosophy and science studies) has highlighted the virtues of persuasiveness and cast a new light on some of its apparent vices—bad faith, deluded (...) confidence, confirmation and myside biases. Those traits, it is often argued, will no longer look so detrimental once we grasp their proper function: arguing in order to persuade, rather than thinking in order to solve problems. Some of these biases may even have a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen in this light, the virtues of ingenuity may well seem redundant. Defending them, I argue that the vices of conviction are not innocuous. If generalized, they would destabilize argumentative practices. Argumentation is a common good that is threatened when every arguer pursues conviction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for nor explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a collapse of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect, humility or honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues that specifically attach to the practice of making conscious inferences. (shrink)

Despite his unreserved appreciation of Turing’s analysis for being a “precise and unquestionably adequate definition” of formal system or mechanical computability, Gödel nevertheless published a short note in 1972 claiming to have found a “philosophical error” in Turing’s argument with regard to the finite nature of mental states and memory. A natural question arises: how could Gödel enjoy the generality conferred on his results by Turing’s work, despite the error of its ways? Previous interpretative strategies by Feferman, Shagrir and others (...) have mainly tried to resolve the disparity by distinguishing different types of arguments in Turing and taking Gödel to approve only some of them. By a more integral examination of their ideas, especially Turing’s response to the “mathematical objection” based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and Gödel’s own conception of finite yet non-mechanical procedures, and taking some of the main ideas of current developments in machine learning into consideration, I will try to present a new explanation for the apparent disparity, arguing that there is no “error” on Turing’s side and the seemingly conflicting views held by Turing and Gödel should best be seen as complementary, keeping intuition and ingenuity together. (shrink)

One of the central assumptions of the present study is that mystic or religious poetry not just formulates mystic or religious ideas: it somehow converts theological ideas into religious experience, by verbal means. It somehow seems to reach the less rational layers of the mind by some drastic interference with the smooth functioning of the cognitive system, or by a quite smooth regression from ‘ordinary consciousness’ to some ‘altered state of consciousness’. In this way, the experience is affected not only (...) by its contents, but also by the perceived quality of the structure of the underlying mental process. This brings us to recognize that mystic or religious poetry is sometimes of vastly different styles. In my book I distinguish between two prototypes of such styles, those that are based on drastic and on smooth interference, respectively. The present article will examine poems based on a very special kind of drastic disruption, of which George Herbert was the grand master. This prototype uses typographic schemes for disruptions in orientation, activating mechanisms of prelinguistic babbling, delaying connection of signifiers with the signified, and transcending distinctions to go to unity. Also looked at will be psychological and social defenses against these disruptions as well as ways to overcome those defenses. In this article I will consider the relationship between mystic poetry and what Willie van Peer calls ‘typographic foregrounding’. In this relationship, I will suggest, both mystic and aesthetic principles are involved. (shrink)

European prostitutes occupied an important intermediary status in colonial Bombay’s racially stratified sexual order. In this article, the author offers a transnational feminist analysis of how the colonial state managed its racial and spatial location. The colonial state individuated, fostered, and monitored European prostitutes much more closely than others involved in the sex trade, and “coercive protection” by the police and brothel mistresses kept European brothel workers within their assigned spaces. Paradoxically, international antitrafficking efforts in colonial Bombay consolidated, rather than (...) undermined, these relations of coercive protection. The League of Nations’ antitrafficking measures in the 1920s encouraged the police to focus on cross-nationalcases andthird-partyprocurers andto overlook women who were deemed insufficiently pure. Comparing police, missionary, and social workers’ records, the author offers a critique of both international antitrafficking discourses and the Indian colonial state’s interests in sustaining the sex trade. (shrink)

Shows how Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) picked up ideas on metaphor and ingenuity from the literary rhetoric of the age and turned them into valuable concepts in a general theory of knowledge and the philosophy of history for which he is now mainly known. Also shows how his original position enabled him to criticize Descartes' idea of rationality. Appends translations of relevant passages from contemporary writers. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Journal Name: Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique Volume: 2013 Issue: 196 Pages: 35-56.

Le problème historique majeur posé par l’étude de la prostitution à Rome est celui de l’existence de prostitué(e)s libres dans une société esclavagiste. Puisque des corps serviles, ou affranchis, masculins et féminins étaient disponibles en grand nombre, aussi bien dans les demeures des hommes libres que dans les maisons de prostitution, comment se fait-il que des femmes nées libres aient renoncé à leurs privilèges et statut de matrones? Comment se fait-il aussi que la société ait institutionnalisé ce renoncement en prévoyant (...) d’enregistrer officiellement ces prostituées d’origine libre? L’explication proposée ici est que les prostitué(e)s libres assument une fonction symbolique qui est d’être l’autre du soldat comme l’acteur est l’autre de l’orateur. Ces « parias » de la société romaine, toujours « efféminés » servent à marquer les marges de l’humanité civilisée dans la continuité, à définir les hommes, libres et adultes et donc « masculins » par ce qu’ils ne sont pas mais ce qu’ils pourraient par malheur, devenir des « effeminés » ou leur équivalent, des prostituées libres. (shrink)

Questions regarding the nature and acquisition of mathematical knowledge are perhaps as old as mathematical thinking itself, while fundamental issues of mathematical ontology and epistemology have direct bearing on mathematical cognition. Several original contributions to logic and mathematics made by the American polymath, Charles Sanders Peirce, are of direct relevance to these fundamental issues. This chapter explores scientific reasoning as it relates to abduction, a name that Peirce coined for educated “guessing” of hypotheses, which he took to be “the first (...) step of scientific reasoning” and the only creative one. Yet he also argued that all deductive reasoning is mathematical and that all mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic. Representation, especially in the form of a diagrammatic system of logic that Peirce developed, is explored here along with his logic of inquiry, most notably in terms of its manifestation as the logic of ingenuity. Originating in the field of engineering, here the diagram of a problem serves as a heuristic substitute for evaluating the actual situation, an approach that can be extended to other forms of practical reasoning such as ethical deliberation. This chapter also touches upon such diverse but related subjects as non-Euclidean geometry and nonclassical logic, with additional examples that help to elucidate cognitive elements of mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Original, ingenuous, and heterodox the philosopher Margaret Cavendish (1661-1717) is one of the most important writers and thinkers of the seventeenth century. Almost entirely self-taught, as well as engaging deeply with the philosophical currents of her time she wrote on a rich array of topics including gender, science and manners. Her utopian novel, The Blazing World, is one of the earliest works of science fiction. In this outstanding introduction to Cavendish's philosophy Alison Peterman explores the full span of Cavendish's work. (...) She begins by examining Cavendish's metaphysics, in particular her view that matter is divisible, sensitive and rational and that the only kind of change is motion, contrasting Cavendish's approach with that of other 'mechanical' philosophers Descartes, Hobbes, Boyle and Gassendi. Peterman then assesses Cavendish's arguments concerning order and causation in nature, particularly her view that order can only be explained if nature is whole and that matter has 'sense' and 'reason', before turning to her theory of the human mind and perception, knowledge and scientific method. Finally, she explains and assesses Cavendish's ethics and politics, returning to her distinction between the natural and artificial and how her moral and political views are evident in her poetry, fiction, plays and other literary writings. Including a chronology, glossary of key terms, and suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, Cavendish is an ideal starting point for anyone coming to Cavendish's philosophy for the first time. It will also be of great interest to those studying seventeenth century philosophy, metaphysics, the history and philosophy of science, and women philosophers in early modern philosophy. (shrink)

Although the authors' ingenuity in identifying criteria for innovation for field studies is appealing, most field studies will lack adequate data. Additionally, their definition does not clearly distinguish innovation from individual learning and is vague about cognitive mechanisms involved. We suggest that developmental data are essential to identifying the causes and consequences of learning new behaviors.

Ambitious and elegant, this book builds a bridge between evolutionary theory and cultural psychology. Michael Tomasello is one of the very few people to have done systematic research on the cognitive capacities of both nonhuman primates and human children. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition identifies what the differences are, and suggests where they might have come from. -/- Tomasello argues that the roots of the human capacity for symbol-based culture, and the kind of psychological development that takes place within (...) it, are based in a cluster of uniquely human cognitive capacities that emerge early in human ontogeny. These include capacities for sharing attention with other persons; for understanding that others have intentions of their own; and for imitating, not just what someone else does, but what someone else has intended to do. In his discussions of language, symbolic representation, and cognitive development, Tomasello describes with authority and ingenuity the "ratchet effect" of these capacities working over evolutionary and historical time to create the kind of cultural artifacts and settings within which each new generation of children develops. He also proposes a novel hypothesis, based on processes of social cognition and cultural evolution, about what makes the cognitive representations of humans different from those of other primates. -/- Lucid, erudite, and passionate, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition will be essential reading for developmental psychology, animal behavior, and cultural psychology. (from the HUP website). (shrink)

The niche is allegedly the conceptual bedrock underpinning the most prominent, and some would say most important, theorizing in ecology. We argue this point of view is more aspirational than veridical. Rather than critically dissect existing definitions of the concept, the supposedly significant work it is thought to have done in ecology is our evaluative target. There is no denying the impressive mathematical sophistication and theoretical ingenuity of the ecological modeling that invokes ‘niche’ terminology. But despite the pervasive labeling, (...) we demonstrate that niche talk is nothing more than a gloss on theory developed without it, that doesn’t need it, and that doesn’t benefit from it. (shrink)

Esprit or ?ingenuity? was one of the principle qualities sought by the connoisseurs who populate seventeenth?century Flemish pictures of collections. This essay scrutinizes the ways in which the flourishing discipline of connoisseurship was depicted, explored and fashioned in Antwerp gallery interiors. Placing these images within the context of Early Modern writings on discernment, Gage explores the ways in which the directed gazes, postures and gestures of cognoscenti reflect the growth of trained artistic judgement within the period?s elite, concluding that (...) such images exemplify a major social and epistemological shift in which one can make apparent one?s universal understanding and keen judgement, and to rightly claim membership in a nobility, no longer defined solely by lineage, but also by learning. (shrink)

The adverse effects of the Covid-19 pandemic have exposed the lack of multi-scalar community resilient strategies that catalyze the development of alternative coping mechanisms for future challenges. To address the immediate needs of vulnerable and marginalized groups, especially in times of crisis, as evidenced by the pandemic, micro-networks within communities have mitigated and reduced harm through self-devised ingenuity based on local ways of life. Socio-spatial micro-networks have the potential to empower communities to self-organize, engage, collaborate, co-design, co-build, and connect (...) with other communities to improve their resilience. This paper focuses on the impact of micro-networks of care, participatory action research, community health, solidarity and mutual aid in Nairobi (Kenya), comparing their resilience strategies, pre- and post Covid-19 pandemic era. Through analytical, empirical, and comparative studies, this paper envisions viable ways of augmenting and enhancing self-devised, self-sufficient, and resilient culture in marginalized communities in Africa and worldwide. -/- . (shrink)

Parmenides’ Doxa (B8.51-B19) outlines a dualistic cosmology underlying the changing, multifarious world of sense experience. Characterized by the goddess as “untrustworthy” and “deceptive”, the entities described in this section of text lack the features of what-is, as outlined in the Truth (B2-B8.20). For this reason and others, much of the scholarly sentiment on the Doxa has traditionally disparaged its philosophical value. There is, however, an emerging appreciation for the scientific ingenuity evidenced by its contents, motivating the possibility of an (...) interpretation that treats this part of the poem as philosophically interesting in its own right. In this chapter, I offer one such interpretation by arguing that the poem as a whole advances a notion of inquiry as a goal-directed activity governed by domain-specific norms that are dictated by features of the objects proper to different kinds of inquiry. I contrast the purely “rationalist” norms that govern inquiry into what-is in the Truth with the contents of the Doxa (focusing in particular on the astronomy fragments in B10, B14, and B15) which appear to be the results of rigorous empirical investigation into the natural world. I suggest that error and deception are not inherent features of this kind of inquiry. Rather, they are the consequences of mistaking inquiry in one domain for inquiry in a different domain and thereby violating the zetetic principles implicit in the poem. On my reading, far from serving as a mere dialectical exercise, a warning, or a ‘negative ideal model’ outlining the illusory world of appearances, the Doxa demonstrates that the sensible world is a legitimate domain of inquiry that can contribute positively to the inquirer’s body of knowledge. My reading challenges traditional interpretations of the relationship between the Truth and the Doxa, and suggests that Parmenides is both a serious proponent of natural philosophy and a critic of the Ionian method which confuses inquiry into the sensible world for inquiry into what-is. (shrink)

Many questions concerning the future of the urban Indian landscape have at their core the conflict of a modernist design aesthetic, which privileges uniformity and predictability, with what many consider to be the unsightly presence of a chaotic local aesthetic. The hand-painted signboard, a hallmark of Indian urban experience, is largely disdained by modernist planners, who became especially vocal in the lead-up to the Commonwealth Games in 2010, when the goal of transforming Delhi into a ‘world class city’ envisioned, among (...) other measures, a reining in of the city’s frenetic signboard culture. This paper examines the ingenuity of the hand-painted signboard which employs complex visual strategies such as three-dimensional depth cues, typographic innovation and visual metaphor, while assessing the unique ways in which hand-painted signage shapes the experience of public space in an urban environment. Against ideas of uniformity and order which underpin liberal modernist visions of the city both in relation to its visual cultures and the use of public spaces, this paper proposes what we call an ‘aesthetic of accommodation’: the visual and the social order here become sites for the expression of an ‘adjustment’ ethic visible in the hybrid art practice of hand-painted signboards and the multiple rather than single usage of public spaces evident in the manner in which signboards spill onto sidewalks and sidewalks onto streets. (shrink)

This article explores an understanding of organizational management developed from the metaphorical application of complexity science to the field of organizational development. It focuses on the insights that fractality triggers in relation to an alternative way of examining and appreciating organizational hierarchy, and the subsequent implications to liberating creativity, ingenuity and potentiality of individuals working within the organization. Sites where such a fractal-hierarchy mindset appears to be evident are discussed, and the effects on productivity noted.

Aggregation-friendly moral theories such as classical utilitarianism are forced to invest a great deal of ingenuity in damping out and modulating the effects of welfare aggregation. In Mill's treatment, the problem famously appears as the puzzle of how the Principle of Liberty is meant to be compatible with the Principle of Utility, and there have been a great many attempted interpretations of his solution, all, in my view, unsatisfactory. I will first reconstruct Mill's generally unnoticed account of the psychological (...) implementation of higher pleasures; this will allow me to explain what the distinction between higher and lower pleasures was, and how Mill was introduced lexical preference orderings into his theory. Then I will show how the underlying psychological theory permits Mill to argue for the lexical priority of liberty over the goods which liberty allows us to obtain. Finally, I will turn to the Millian considerations omitted from the argument I will have reconstructed. By way of explaining why they are so difficult to accommodate, I will consider why Mill might have abandoned his projected sciences of character. I will take my leave by asking what Mill's failure to turn his implementation analysis of the higher pleasures into an argument expressing the importance of individuality and originality means for us. (shrink)

A proposal for a new model of the evolution of gene regulation networks and development that draws on work from artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind. Each of us is a collection of more than ten trillion cells, busy performing tasks crucial to our continued existence. Gene regulation networks, consisting of a subset of genes called transcription factors, control cellular activity, producing the right gene activities for the many situations that the multiplicity of cells in our bodies face. Genes working (...) together make up a truly ingenious system. In this book, Roger Sansom investigates how gene regulation works and how such a refined but simple system evolved. Sansom describes in detail two frameworks for understanding gene regulation. The first, developed by the theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman, holds that gene regulation networks are fundamentally systems that repeat patterns of gene expression. Sansom finds Kauffman's framework an inadequate explanation for how cells overcome the difficulty of development. Sansom proposes an alternative: the connectionist framework. Drawing on work from artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind, he argues that the key lies in how multiple transcription factors combine to regulate a single gene, acting in a way that is qualitatively consistent. This allows the expression of genes to be finely tuned to the variable microenvironments of cells. Because of the nature of both development and its evolution, we can gain insight into the developmental process when we identify gene regulation networks as the controllers of development. The ingenuity of genes is explained by how gene regulation networks evolve to control development. (shrink)

Author Samuel Smiles coined the phrase self-help with this bestseller, originally published in 1859. Smiles envisions a world in which the lowliest members of a community can reach the heights of society through merit and hard work. A firm believer in the value of sustained effort, he emphasizes the pleasure of engaging in self-improvement for its own sake rather than strictly as a means to worldly advancement. The capacity of work well done to ennoble the life of any man, however (...) humble, is Smiles' main thesis, illustrated with examples of wisdom gleaned from the biographies of notable self-starters. Written at the close of the Industrial Revolution, this book was influenced by the technological advances of the previous century, in which new manufacturing processes and scientific advances enabled greater accomplishments by determined, hard-working individuals. Citing incidents from the lives of prominent inventors and entrepreneurs, Smiles exhorts readers to draw upon their internal resources to get ahead in the world. The book celebrates the traits of perseverance and ingenuity, advocating in self-belief despite hardships and failures, with many illustrations of the value of patience and optimism. The founding work of the self-help movement, this volume retains the capacity to inspire."-- Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Ancient allures the postmodern social subject trapped in the strangeness of time—the time after the end of history. For that time-beaten subject ancient is the unconscious of coherence, predictability, and certainty. Or perhaps that ancient is a glory fled. Whatsoever, ancient is generally sacralized—irrespective of the type of socialization that happened in the past—and journey to the ancient is often deemed to be a pilgrimage. When ideas of the ancient in their individuality and totality inter alia become the natural intellectual (...) resource for rebuilding postmodern societies, discriminative ingenuity becomes an essential faculty. Any uncritical reverence of the ancient becomes antithetical to modern social and political values, inviting the risk of reproducing inequities of the past. This article problematizes such uncritical dependence on the ancient using Ancient Indian Jurisprudence, which has been looked up on as a repository of moral and legal values, as a case in point. It meditates from the experiences and perspectives of an imaginary ‘teaching subject’ on the many pitfalls and possibilities of the ancient as it builds a framework of teaching and learning, and a representative scheme of evaluation for Ancient Indian Jurisprudence. (shrink)

With this significant work from 1932, The Self-Conscious Determination of Nothingness, we have the third important book of Nishida’s period of philosophical maturity. Here, Nishida has moved beyond the unconvincing essays of the previous periods, such as the ingenuous psychologism of A Study of Good or the epistemological theorization of the hesitant neo-Kantian period. Nishida is now developing the consequences of his major philosophical notion, the “logic of place”. Thanks to the translation work of Jacynthe Tremblay, the whole production of (...) this decisive period is now... (shrink)

Scotus is notorious for occasionally making statements that, on their face at least, smack of voluntarism, but there has been a lively debate about whether Scotus is really a voluntarist after all. Now the debate is not over whether Scotus lays great emphasis on the role of the divine will with respect to the moral law. No one could sensibly deny that he does, and if such an emphasis constitutes voluntarism, then no one could sensibly deny that Scotus is a (...) voluntarist. As I am using the word, however, voluntarism is the view that (i) the goodness of almost all things, as well as the rightness of almost all acts, depends wholly on the divine will and (ii) what God wills with respect to those things and those acts is not in turn to be explained by reference to the divine intellect, human nature, or anything else. This is the view that Scotus’s critics decry and his defenders disclaim. Thus, his critics have seized on these passages and accused Scotus of believing that the moral law depends simply on “the arbitrary will of God.” His most sympathetic interpreters, however, have devoted great ingenuity to showing that Scotus did not mean anything unpalatable by these statements.1 What the critics and defenders apparently have in common is the view that voluntarism is an implausible and even discreditable doctrine. Interpreters who read Scotus as a voluntarist intend thereby to damn his moral views; interpreters sympathetic to his moral views feel compelled to mitigate his voluntarism. I wish to argue for a different approach. I agree with his defenders that Scotus’s moral philosophy ought to be taken seriously. But I think the best way to take any philosopher’s view seriously is to let him speak for himself, not to decide in advance that he must not have held a view that we find implausible. Let me suggest an analogy that will make my position clearer. Very nearly everyone finds immaterialism implausible. (shrink)

Alfredo Traps in Durrenmatt’s tale discovers that he has brought off, all by himself, a murder involving considerable ingenuity. The mock prosecutor in the tale demands the death penalty “as reward for a crime that merits admiration, astonishment, and respect.” Traps is deeply moved; indeed, he is exhilarated, and the whole of his life becomes more heroic, and, ironically, more precious. His defense attorney proceeds to argue that Traps was not only innocent but incapable of guilt, “a victim of (...) the age.” This defense Traps disavows with indignation and anger. He makes claim to the murder as his and demands the prescribed punishment—death. (shrink)

On a remarkably thin base of evidence – largely the spectral analysis of points of light – astronomers possess, or appear to possess, an abundance of knowledge about the structure and history of the universe. We likewise know more than might even have been imagined a few centuries ago about the nature of physical matter, about the mechanisms of life, about the ancient past. Enormous theoretical and methodological ingenuity has been required to obtain such knowledge; it does not invite (...) easy discovery by the untutored. It may seem odd, then, that we have so little scientific knowledge of what lies closest at hand, apparently ripe for easy discovery, and of greatest importance for our quality of life: our own conscious experience – our sensory experiences and pains, for example, our inner speech and imagery, our felt emotion. Scientists know quite a bit about human visual capacities and the brain processes involved in vision, much less about the subjective experience of seeing; a fair bit about the physiology of emotion, almost nothing about its phenomenology. Philosophers began in earnest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to describe and classify our patterns of conscious experience. John Locke, for instance, divided experienced “ideas” into those that arise from sensation and those that arise from reflection, and he began to classify them into. (shrink)

The present book is the English version of a monograph 'Die aristotelische Syllogistik', which first appeared ten years ago in the series of Abhand 1 lungen edited by the Academy of Sciences in Gottingen. In the preface to the English edition, I would first like to express my indebtedness to Mr. J. Barnes, now fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. He not only translated what must have been a difficult text with exemplary precision and ingenuity, but followed critically every argument (...) and check ed every reference. While translating it, he has improved the book. Of those changes which I have made on Mr. Barnes' suggestion I note only the more important ones on pages 4, 12, 24sq, 32, 39, 6lsq, and 158. Since the second edition of the German text appeared in 1963 some further reviews have been published, or come to my notice, which I have 2 been able to make use of in improving the text of this new edition. I must mention here especially the detailed critical discussions of my results and arguments published by Professor W. Wieland in the Philosophische Rundschau 14 (1966), 1-27 and by Professor E. Scheibe in Gnomon 39 (1967), 454-64. Both scholars, while agreeing with the main drift and method of my interpretation, criticise some of my results and disagree with some of my arguments. It would not be possible to discuss these technical matters here with the necessary thoroughness. (shrink)

An AI winter may be defined as the stage when technology, business, and the media come to terms with what AI can or cannot really do as a technology without exaggeration. Through discussion of previous AI winters, this paper examines the hype cycle (which by turn characterises AI as a social panacea or a nightmare of apocalyptic proportions) and argues that AI should be treated as a normal technology, neither as a miracle nor as a plague, but rather as of (...) the many solutions that human ingenuity has managed to devise. (shrink)

Since 1981 AIDS has illuminated, like a roving searchlight, a series of ethical questions, which extend far beyond the apparently narrow limits of one disease. It has revealed, one by one, human attitudes and behaviours that were previously unquestioned, or unobserved - based on unidentified but shaky pre-suppositions.This commentary offers two contrasting perspectives on the problems facing developing countries. In the first part, I comment on the preceding article, from the perspective of a clinician who has worked for many years (...) in Africa, and who witnessed the emergence of AIDS in the early 1980s and its medical, social, political and economic consequences.1 In the second, I comment on a conference in Lusaka in September 1999 that addressed many of the issues.Narrowing the gap?“Narrowing the gap” raises questions about truth or transparency in the activities of multinational companies, the ethics and economics of health care in global society and the distribution of responsibility for unwanted side effects of new treatments. The scale of HIV infection in developing countries draws attention to weaknesses or instability in theoretical and practical structures, which serve - or should serve - human wellbeing, whenever it is disturbed by disease.Truth and transparencyDuring the last 60 years, combined with improved standards of living, the products of pharmaceutical effort and ingenuity have resulted in large gains in life expectancy. These were most marked in rich northern societies, but even poor southern countries had seen it extended by 15 to 20 years, until recently.However, “the costs of drug development are not small”.2 A detailed study of costs of clinical trials found that the total cost of new drug development can be as high as $500 million per drug.3 Patent laws allow a temporary monopoly for the production and sale for a number of years. During this “protected” …. (shrink)