There is an intuitive and seemingly significant difference between lying and falsely implicating. This difference has received scrutiny both historically and recently, mostly in the context of the following two questions. First, how should lying be defined so as to distinguish it from falsely implicating? Second, is the difference between lying and falsely implicating really significant, and if so, how and why is it significant? Answers to the first question typically invoke assertion, claiming (roughly) that to lie (...) is to assert something you take to be false, as opposed to merely implicating something you take to be false. The task is then to spell out the account of assertion that is needed for a satisfactory definition of lying. Answers to the second question divide over whether the difference between lying and falsely implicating has moral significance. This chapter will review and critically evaluate the current state of the literature on these two questions. One conclusion will be that it is not clear that lying can be defined by breaking it down into the components of asserting something, on the one hand, and taking that something to be false (or not taking it to be true), on the other. Another conclusion will be that a puzzle has emerged about the significance of the difference between lying and falsely implicating. There is strong reason to think that the difference is not a moral one, yet alternative explanations of its felt significance are unsatisfying. Finally, an effort will be made to link the two questions by examining the role that norms for assertion might play both in defining lying and in explaining the significance of the difference between lying and falsely implicating. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that there is a distinction to be made between the explicit content and the implicit import of an utterance. There is much less agreement about the precise nature of this distinction, how it is to be drawn, and whether any such two-way distinction can do justice to the levels and kinds of meaning involved in utterance interpretation. Grice’s distinction between what is said by an utterance and what is implicated is probably the best known instantiation of (...) the explicit/implicit distinction. His distinction, along with many of its post-Gricean heirs, is closely entwined with another distinction: that between semantics and pragmatics. Indeed, on some construals they are seen as essentially one and the same; “what is said” is equated with the truthconditional content of the utterance which in turn is equated with (context-relative) sentence meaning, leaving implicatures (conventional and conversational) as the sole domain of pragmatics. (shrink)

Innate talents supposedly limit an individual's highest attainable level of performance and the rate of skill acquisition. However, Howe et al. have not reviewed evidence that the level of expert performance has increased dramatically over the last few centuries. Those increases demonstrate that the highest levels of performance may be less constrained by innate capacities than is commonly believed.

The increasing workplace use of artificially intelligent (AI) technologies has implications for the experience of meaningful human work. Meaningful work refers to the perception that one’s work has worth, significance, or a higher purpose. The development and organisational deployment of AI is accelerating, but the ways in which this will support or diminish opportunities for meaningful work and the ethical implications of these changes remain under-explored. This conceptual paper is positioned at the intersection of the meaningful work and ethical AI (...) literatures and offers a detailed assessment of the ways in which the deployment of AI can enhance or diminish employees’ experiences of meaningful work. We first outline the nature of meaningful work and draw on philosophical and business ethics accounts to establish its ethical importance. We then explore the impacts of three paths of AI deployment (replacing some tasks, ‘tending the machine’, and amplifying human skills) across five dimensions constituting a holistic account of meaningful work, and finally assess the ethical implications. In doing so we help to contextualise the meaningful work literature for the era of AI, extend the ethical AI literature into the workplace, and conclude with a range of practical implications and future research directions. (shrink)

This paper investigates the implicative conditional, a connective intended to describe the logical behavior of an empirically defined class of natural language conditionals, also namedimplicative conditionals, which excludes concessive and some other conditionals. The implicative conditional strengthens the strict conditional with the possibility of the antecedent and of the contradictory of the consequent.$${p\Rightarrow q}$$p⇒qis thus defined as$${\lnot } \Diamond {(p \wedge \lnot q) \wedge } \Diamond {p \wedge } \Diamond {\lnot q}$$¬◊(p∧¬q)∧◊p∧◊¬q. We explore the logical properties of this conditional in (...) a reflexive normal Kripke semantics, provide an axiomatic system and prove it to be sound and complete for our semantics. The implicative conditional validates transitivity and contraposition, which we take to be integral parts of reasoning and communication. But it only validates restricted versions of strengthening the antecedent, right weakening, simplification, and rational monotonicity. Apparent counterexamples to some of these properties are explained as due to contextual factors. Finally, the implicative conditional avoids the paradoxes of material and strict implication, and validates some connexive principles such as Aristotle’s theses and weak Boethius’ thesis, as well as some highly entrenched principles of conditionals, such as conjunction of consequents, disjunction of antecedents, modus ponens, cautious monotonicity and cut. (shrink)

Implicational tonoid logics and their extensions with abstract Galois properties have been introduced by Yang and Dunn. They introduced matrix semantics for the implicational tonoid logics but did not do for the extensions. Here we provide such semantics for implicational partial gaggle logics as one sort of such extensions. To this end, first we discuss implicational partial gaggle logics in Hilbert-style. We next introduce one kind of matrix semantics based on Lindenbaum– Tarski matrices for the logics and show that those (...) logics are complete with respect to the matrix semantics. Finally, we further introduce a slightly different kind of matrix semantics based on reduced models for the logics and show that those logics are complete with respect to this matrix semantics. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the investigation of term-definable connexive implications in substructural logics with exchange and, on the semantical perspective, in sub-varieties of commutative residuated lattices (FL ${}_{\scriptsize\mbox{e}}$ -algebras). In particular, we inquire into sufficient and necessary conditions under which generalizations of the connexive implication-like operation defined in [6] for Heyting algebras still satisfy connexive theses. It will turn out that, in most cases, connexive principles are equivalent to the equational Glivenko property with respect to Boolean algebras. Furthermore, we (...) provide some philosophical upshots like, e.g., a discussion on the relevance of the above operation in relationship with G. Polya’s logic of plausible inference, and some characterization results on weak and strong connexivity. (shrink)

David Bohm is one of the foremost scientific thinkers of today and one of the most distinguished scientists of his generation. His challenge to the conventional understanding of quantum theory has led scientists to reexamine what it is they are going and his ideas have been an inspiration across a wide range of disciplines. _Quantum Implications_ is a collection of original contributions by many of the world' s leading scholars and is dedicated to David Bohm, his work and the issues (...) raised by his ideas. The contributors range across physics, philosophy, biology, art, psychology, and include some of the most distinguished scientists of the day. There is an excellent introduction by the editors, putting Bohm's work in context and setting right some of the misconceptions that have persisted about the work of David Bohm. (shrink)

We review some of the essential novel ideas introduced by Bohm through the implicate order and indicate how they can be given mathematical expression in terms of an algebra. We also show how some of the features that are needed in the implicate order were anticipated in the work of Grassmann, Hamilton, and Clifford. By developing these ideas further we are able to show how the spinor itself, when viewed as a geometric object within a geometric algebra, can be given (...) a meaning which transcends the notion of the usual metric geometry in the sense that it must be regarded as an element of a broader and more general pregeometry. (shrink)

The interpretation of implications as rules motivates a different left-introduction schema for implication in the sequent calculus, which is conceptually more basic than the implication-left schema proposed by Gentzen. Corresponding to results obtained for systems with higher-level rules, it enjoys the subformula property and cut elimination in a weak form.

GE algebras (generalized exchange algebras), transitive GE algebras (tGE algebras, for short) and aGE algebras (that is, GE algebrasverifying the antisymmetry) are a generalization of Hilbert algebras. Here some properties and characterizations of these algebras are investigated. Connections between GE algebras and other classes of algebras of logic are studied. The implicative and positive implicative properties are discussed. It is shown that the class of positive implicative GE algebras (resp. the class of implicative aGE algebras) coincides with the class of (...) generalized Tarski algebras (resp. the class of Tarski algebras). It is proved that for any aGE algebra the property of implicativity is equivalent to the commutative property. Moreover, several examples to illustrate the results are given. Finally, the interrelationships between some classes of implicative and positive implicative algebras are presented. (shrink)

Three semantic relations are analyzed: the relation of implication of a question by a question and a set of declarative sentences, the relation of implication of a question by a question, and the relation of strong implication of a question by a question and a set of declarative sentences. The connections between these concepts and the concepts of relative soundness, partial answerhood and presupposition are examined. The principal results are theorems about, to speak generally, epistemic reducibility of well-posed questions to (...) sequences of implied yes-no questions. (shrink)

This paper is a continuation of [Łukowski, 2019], where it is shown that just like sets, sentences can also be understood in two ways: distributively or collectively. A distributive understanding of sets leads to the Russell antinomy, and a distributive understanding of sentences to liar antinomy. A collective understanding of sets frees up the set theory from Russell’s antinomy. Taking a similar approach to sentences no liar like paradoxes appear. The aim of the paper is to examine Yablo’s problem from (...) this collective perspective. Given its nature, by using the content implication connective it becomes possible to assign logical values to all Yablo’s sentences. Moreover, it seems that Yablo’s problem is not a case of circularity. (shrink)

The Implications of Immanence develops a philosophy of life in opposition to the notion of “bio-power,” which reduces the human to the question of power over what Giorgio Agamben terms “bare life,” mere biological existence. Breaking with all biologism or vitalism, Lawlor attends to the dispersion of death at the heart of life, in the “minuscule hiatus” that divides the living present, separating lived experience from the living body and, crucially for phenomenology, inserting a blind spot into a visual field.Lawlor (...) charts here a post-phenomenological French philosophy. What lies beyond phenomenologyis “life-ism,” the positive working out of the effects of the “minuscule hiatus” in a thinking that takes place on a “plane of immanence,” whose implications cannot be predicted. Life-ism means thinking life and death together, thinking death as dispersed throughout life. In carefully argued and extensively documented chapters, Lawlor sets out the surpassing of phenomenology and the advent of life-ism in Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and Foucault, with careful attention to the writings by Husserl and Heidegger to which these thinkers refer.A philosophy of life has direct implications for present-day political and medical issues. The book takes its point of departure from the current genocide in Darfur and provides conceptual tools for intervening in such issues as the AIDS epidemic and life-support for the infirm. Indeed, the investigations contained in The Implications of Immanence are designed to help us emerge once and for all out of the epoch of bio-power.“Lawlor’s novel way of treating the concept of life is stimulating, original, and necessary for the social well being of our time.”—Fred Evans, Duquesne University“The Implications of Immanence continues the most promising, rigorous, and fruitful ongoing research project among scholars of twentieth-century philosophy. . . .A wonderful new book.”—John Protevi, Louisiana State University. (shrink)

This paper combines two classes of generalized logics, one of which is the class of weakly implicative logics introduced by Cintula and the other of which is the class of gaggle logics introduced by Dunn. For this purpose we introduce implicational tonoid logics. More precisely, we first define implicational tonoid logics in general and examine their relation to weakly implicative logics. We then provide algebraic semantics for implicational tonoid logics. Finally, we consider relational semantics, called Routley–Meyer–style semantics, for finitary those (...) logics. (shrink)

There are theoretical limitations to what can be implemented by a computer program. In this paper we are concerned with a limitation on the strength of computer implemented deduction. We use a version of the Curry paradox to arrive at this limitation.

This paper falls into two parts. In the first part, I argue that consideration of general indicative conditionals, e.g., sentences like If a donkey brays it is beaten, provides a powerful argument that a pure material implication analysis of indicative if p, q is correct. In the second part I argue, opposing writers like Jackson, that a Gricean style theory of pragmatics can explain the manifest assertability conditions of if p, q in terms of its conventional content – assumed to (...) be merely (p⊃q) – and the conversational implicature contents which utterance of if p, q may gain in certain contexts. I also defend the pragmatic approach against a recent objection by Edgington that appeal to pragmatics cannot explain what we are inclined to say about the believability conditions, as opposed to the assertability conditions, of indicative if p, q. (shrink)

For $n\in \omega$, the weak choice principle $\textrm{RC}_n$ is defined as follows: _For every infinite set_ _X_ _there is an infinite subset_ $Y\subseteq X$ _with a choice function on_ $[Y]^n:=\{z\subseteq Y:|z|=n\}$. The choice principle $\textrm{C}_n^-$ states the following: _For every infinite family of_ _n_-_element sets, there is an infinite subfamily_ ${\mathcal {G}}\subseteq {\mathcal {F}}$ _with a choice function._ The choice principles $\textrm{LOC}_n^-$ and $\textrm{WOC}_n^-$ are the same as $\textrm{C}_n^-$, but we assume that the family ${\mathcal {F}}$ is linearly orderable (...) (for $\textrm{LOC}_n^-$ ) or well-orderable (for $\textrm{WOC}_n^-$ ). In the first part of this paper, for $m,n\in \omega$ we will give a full characterization of when the implication $\textrm{RC}_m\Rightarrow \textrm{WOC}_n^-$ holds in ${\textsf {ZF}}$. We will prove the independence results by using suitable Fraenkel-Mostowski permutation models. In the second part, we will show some generalizations. In particular, we will show that $\textrm{RC}_5\Rightarrow \textrm{LOC}_5^-$ and that $\textrm{RC}_6\Rightarrow \textrm{C}_3^-$, answering two open questions from Halbeisen and Tachtsis (Arch Math Logik 59(5):583–606, 2020). Furthermore, we will show that $\textrm{RC}_6\Rightarrow \textrm{C}_9^-$ and that $\textrm{RC}_7\Rightarrow \textrm{LOC}_7^-$. (shrink)

Implication barrier theses deny that one can derive sentences of one type from sentences of another. Hume’s Law is an implication barrier thesis; it denies that one can derive an ‘ought’ (a normative sentence) from an ‘is’ (a descriptive sentence). Though Hume’s Law is controversial, some barrier theses are philosophical platitudes; in his Lectures on Logical Atomism, Bertrand Russell claims: You can never arrive at a general proposition by inference particular propositions alone. You will always have to have at least (...) one general proposition in your premises. (Russell, 1918, p. 206) We will refer to this claim—that one cannot derive general sentences from particular sentences—as Russell’s Law.1 A third barrier thesis claims that one cannot derive sentences about the future from sentences about the past or present. Hume’s endorsement of this barrier thesis is well-known: all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past . . . if there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any argument from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. (Hume, EHU 4.21/37) We will refer to this barrier thesis as Hume’s Second Law. A fourth barrier thesis says that one cannot derive a necessary sentence from one about the actual world and we will refer to this last thesis Kant’s Law. Such implication barrier theses present a problem. (shrink)

In abstract algebraic logic, the general study of propositional non-classical logics has been traditionally based on the abstraction of the Lindenbaum-Tarski process. In this process one considers the Leibniz relation of indiscernible formulae. Such approach has resulted in a classification of logics partly based on generalizations of equivalence connectives: the Leibniz hierarchy. This paper performs an analogous abstract study of non-classical logics based on the kind of generalized implication connectives they possess. It yields a new classification of logics expanding Leibniz (...) hierarchy: the hierarchy of implicational logics. In this framework the notion of implicational semilinear logic can be naturally introduced as a property of the implication, namely a logic L is an implicational semilinear logic iff it has an implication such that L is complete w.r.t. the matrices where the implication induces a linear order, a property which is typically satisfied by well-known systems of fuzzy logic. The hierarchy of implicational logics is then restricted to the semilinear case obtaining a classification of implicational semilinear logics that encompasses almost all the known examples of fuzzy logics and suggests new directions for research in the field. (shrink)

Connexive expansions of relevant logics tend to prove every negated implication formula. In this paper I discuss why they tend to satisfy this unsavoury property, and discuss avenues by which it can be avoided, providing logics which stand as proofs of concept that these avenues can be made to work.

Part 1 describes Stanisaw Jakowski's concept of defining some often used con ditionals, namely, factorial, ewfficient and definitive implications.Part 2 contains the results strictly connected with the theory of the above implications.

This paper compares two logical conditionals which are strengthenings of the strict conditional and avoid the paradoxes of strict implication. The logics of both may be viewed as extensions of KT, and the two conditionals are interdefinable in KT. The implicative conditional requires that its antecedent and consequent be both contingent. The consequential conditional may be viewed as a weakening of the implicative conditional, insofar as it also admits the case in which the antecedent and the consequent are strictly equivalent (...) (either both necessary or both impossible). The two conditionals share a number of properties, among them Transitivity, Contraposition, Aristotle’s Thesis, Weak Boethius’ Thesis and Aristotle’s Second Thesis. They also share some restricted principles such as Possibilistic Monotonicity, Possibilistic Simplification and Possibilistic Right Weakening. They differ in relation to Identity, which is validated by consequential implication, while the implicative conditional only validates the restricted principle of Possibilistic Identity. The relations between the two conditionals are represented by two Aristotelian cubes of opposition, one involving the contrariety between If A, then B and If A, then ¬B, according to Weak Boethius’ Thesis, and the other the contrariety between If A, then B and If ¬A, then B, according to Aristotle’s Second Thesis. We also explore the relations between the two logical conditionals and natural language conditionals, emphasizing the dependence of the latter on the context, and the need to distinguish natural language conditionals which may be viewed as consequential or implicative, on one side, and concessive and some other types of conditionals, on the other. (shrink)

The central thesis of Schizotypy: Implications for Illness and Health is both challenging and controversial: that the features of psychotic disorders actually lie on a continuum with, and form part of, normal behaviour and experience. The dispositional or 'schizotypal' traits associated with psychotic disorders certainly predispose an individual to mental illness, but they may also lead to positive outcomes such as enhanced creativity or spiritual experience. Discussion of each aspect of this theme is supported by extensive experimental and clinical evidence, (...) questioning the received medical wisdom which treats psychotic illness in the narrow context of neurological disease. The result is an authoritative and provocative overview of an important topic in psychological research and clinical practice. (shrink)

We analyze whether audit partners suffered damage to their professional reputations with the demise of Zhongtianqin, formerly the largest audit firm in China, after an audit failure enabled a major client, Yinguangxia, to fraudulently exaggerate its earnings in a high-profile scandal resembling the Andersen–Enron events in the US. This involves evaluating whether the reputational damage sustained by partners implicated in the scandal spreads to other partners in the same audit firm. We isolate whether impaired reputation impedes partners who were not (...) complicit in the ZTQ–YGX events from attracting new clients or keeping existing ones. Our evidence implies that the market shares of these partners fell after ZTQ’s collapse, supporting that guiltless partners’ reputations were tarnished. We also find that these partners are less likely to be employed by reputable audit firms. The clients of these partners tend to have lower earnings response coefficients, implying that investors downgrade the perceived quality of their audits. Moreover, compared to a matched sample, the former ZTQ partners tend to charge lower audit fees after the firm’s collapse. Finally, we exploit the unique structure of ZTQ to provide evidence consistent with the prediction that the former partners from the branch that handled the YGX audits experienced worse damage to their reputations. In a setting with minimal auditor discipline stemming from civil litigation, our results lend support to the intuition that partners’ reputation concerns motivate them to protect audit quality by closely monitoring other partners in the firm. (shrink)

Drawing on sociological and anthropological studies, the aim of this article is to reconstruct how obstetric technologies contribute to a moral conception of pregnancy and motherhood, and to evaluate that conception from a normative point of view. Obstetrics and midwifery, so the assumption, are value-laden, value-producing and value-reproducing practices, values that shape the social perception of what it means to be a “good” pregnant woman and to be a “good” mother. Activities in the medical field of reproduction contribute to “kinning”, (...) that is the making of particular social relationships marked by closeness and special moral obligations. Three technologies, which belong to standard procedures in prenatal care in postmodern societies, are presently investigated: informed consent in prenatal care, obstetric sonogram, and birth plan. Their widespread application issupposed to serve the moral goal of effecting patient autonomy. A reconstruction of the actual moral implications of these technologies, however, reveals that this goal is missed in multiple ways. Informed consent situations are marked by involuntariness and blindness to social dimensions of decision-making; obstetric sonograms construct moral subjectivity and agency in a way that attribute inconsistent and unreasonable moral responsibilities to the pregnant woman; and birth plans obscure the need for a healthcare environment that reflects a shared-decision-making model, rather than a rational-choice-framework. (shrink)

Whether people possess free will has been a long-lasting philosophical debate. Recent attention in social psychology has been given to the behavioral consequences of believing in free will. Research has demonstrated that manipulating free will beliefs has implications for many social behaviors. For example, free will belief manipulations have been associated with cheating, aggressiveness, and prejudice. Despite this work, some of these findings have failed to replicate. Testing theoretical predictions, such as whether believing in free will influences behavior, depends on (...) theoretical, auxiliary, statistical, and inferential assumptions (TASI). In this paper we apply the TASI category of assumptions to the free will belief debate. In doing so we demonstrate why these assumptions should be considered when appraising the influence of free will belief manipulations on free will beliefs and behavior. To provide a nuanced view of free will beliefs, we believe researchers should pay careful attention to these critical assumptions. (shrink)

Privacy remains an intractable ethical issue for the information society, and one that is exacerbated by modern applications of artificial intelligence. Given its complicity, there is a moral obligation to redress privacy issues in systems engineering practice itself. This paper investigates the role the concept of privacy plays in contemporary systems engineering practice. Ontologically a nominalist human concept, privacy is considered from an appropriate engineering perspective: human-centred design. Two human-centred design standards are selected as exemplars of best practice, and are (...) analysed using an existing multi-dimensional privacy model. The findings indicate that the human-centred standards are currently inadequate in dealing with privacy issues. Some implications for future practice are subsequently highlighted. (shrink)

Qu'attendre des chercheurs en sciences sociales? Qu'ils fassent tout bonnement leur métier ou qu'à partir de leurs analyses ils s'impliquent dans les problèmes qui relèvent de leur compétence ou même qu'à partir de leur position de chercheur ils prennent publiquement position sur les grandes questions du jour? Ces alternatives sont loin d'épuiser le champ des possibles, mais les énoncer invite à s'interroger sur les rapports qu'entretiennent les travaux de recherche en sciences sociales avec les pratiques sociales qu'elles étudient. Ces questions (...) n'étaient pas étrangères à Philippe Lucas - et c'est peu dire. Elles sont aussi à l'origine de ce livre. Président de l'université Lumière-Lyon II avant d'être nommé recteur de l'Académie de Bordeaux puis de l'Académie de Caen, Philippe Lucas fut aussi et d'abord un chercheur qui concevait son travail de recherche comme un engagement. Sa " sociologie impliquée " supposait la confrontation des points de vue et le débat non seulement après coup, une fois le travail terminé, mais avant tout dès les premières investigations et tout au long de la recherche. Quel meilleur hommage rendre à Philippe Lucas que de reprendre aujourd'hui ces questions qui furent les siennes? Il les avait posées à sa manière mais leur actualité nous frappe, leur importance aussi. Ceux qui ont contribué à cet ouvrage collectif ont tenté d'y répondre et d'abord de les reformuler en proposant tantôt leur témoignage tantôt leurs réflexions de chercheurs sur l'implication et l'engagement : leur propre implication et celle de leurs disciplines, leur propre engagement et celui de leurs disciplines. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis has recently excited renewed interest, especially in the physics and philosophy communities. However, the hypothesis specifically concerns {computers} that simulate physical universes, which means that to properly investigate it we need to couple computer science theory with physics. Here I do this by exploiting the physical Church-Turing thesis. This allows me to introduce a preliminary investigation of some of the computer science theoretic aspects of the simulation hypothesis. In particular, building on Kleene's second recursion theorem, I prove (...) that it is mathematically possible for us to be in a simulation that is being run on a computer \textit{by us}. In such a case, there would be two identical instances of us; the question of which of those is ``really us'' is meaningless. I also show how Rice's theorem provides some interesting impossibility results concerning simulation and self-simulation; briefly describe the philosophical implications of fully homomorphic encryption for (self-)simulation; briefly investigate the graphical structure of universes simulating universes simulating universes, among other issues. I end by describing some of the possible avenues for future research that this preliminary investigation reveals. (shrink)

The implications of Marxist state theories developed by Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband are useful for framing issues related to leftist strategy in twenty-first-century Venezuela. A relationship exists between each of the theories and three issues facing the Chavista movement: whether the bourgeoisie displays a sense of ‘class-consciousness’; the viability of tactical and strategic alliances between the left and groups linked to the capitalist structure; and whether socialism is to be achieved through stages, abrupt revolutionary changes, or ongoing state radicalisation (...) over a period of time. During Poulantzas’s lifetime, his concept of the state as a ‘strategic battlefield’ lent itself to the left’s promotion of ‘strategic alliances’ with parties to its right. The same concept is compatible with the ‘process of change’ in Venezuela, in which autonomous movements play a fundamental role in transforming the old state and the construction of new state structures. (shrink)

Humberstone asks whether every theorem of BCI provably implies $\phi\to\phi$ for some formula $\phi$. Meyer conjectures that the axiom $\mathbf{B}$ does not imply any such "self-implication." We prove a slightly stronger result, thereby confirming Meyer's conjecture.

Social representations research is often undertaken by scholars who seek to ‘give voice’ to knowledge that are held by socially disenfranchised individuals and groups. However, this endeavour poses a number of problems in practice, not least because it assumes that the ‘voices’ voiced by individuals and/or groups in social research will be unambiguous and uniform, and unchanged by the research encounter. Despite the growth of attention to the critical potential of social representations theory, there remains a lack of scholarship on (...) the relationship between the theory's emphasis on the relational, or dialogical, nature of social life and the implications of this for critical research. In this article, I argue that the dialogical epistemology from which social representations research must depart incites reflection upon the design of empirical studies, which must equally attend to both ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’, and the researcher-researched relationship, which may itself be best viewed as an Ego-Alter interaction. I make the case for adopting dialogical epistemology in critical social psychology, and argue that this is essential to undertaking ethical social research. I conclude by suggesting that claims to ‘giving voice’ have little place in critical social psychology in general, and social representations scholarship in particular. (shrink)

In a recent study on the spawn of the common frog surveyed over several breeding sites, a significant linear relationship. An open question exists, as to why such a strong linear relationship is to be found. Using elementary physics, I suggest some factors which may underly the observed linearity and how it may reveal characteristics other than size of a breeding population. A follow-up experiment is outlined to test for these in the field and some ecological implications are discussed.

We review three possible theoretical mechanisms for the placebo effect: conditioning, expectancy and endogenous opiates and consider the implications of the first two for clinical research and practice in the area of pain management. Methodological issues in the use of placebos as controls are discussed and include subtractive versus additive expectancy effects, no treatment controls, active placebo controls, the balanced placebo design, between- versus within-group designs, triple blind methodology and the double expectancy design. Therapeutically, the possibility of shaping negative placebo (...) responses through placebo sag, overservicing and the use of placebos on their own are explored. Suggestions for using conditioned placebos strategically in conjunction with nonplacebos are made and ways of maximizing the placebo component of nonplacebo treatments are examined. Finally, the importance of investigating the placebo effect in its own right is advocated in order to better understand the long-neglected psychological aspects of the therapeutic transaction. (shrink)