The relationship between humans and animals is complex and influenced by multiple variables. Humans display a remarkably flexible and rich array of social competencies, demonstrating the ability to interpret, predict, and react appropriately to the behavior of others, as well as to engage others in a variety of complex social interactions. Developing computational systems that have similar social abilities is a critical step in designing robots, animated characters, and other computer agents that appear intelligent and capable in their interactions with (...) humans and each other. Further, it will improve their ability to cooperate with people as capable partners, learn from natural instruction, and provide intuitive and engaging interactions for human partners. Thus, human−animal team analogs can be one means through which to foster veridical mental models of robots that provide a more accurate representation of their near-future capabilities. Some digital twins of human−animal teams currently exist but are often incomplete. Therefore, this article focuses on issues within and surrounding the current models of human−animal teams, previous research surrounding this connection, and the challenges when using such an analogy for human−autonomy teams. (shrink)

In the wake of recent advancements in the field of AI, this paper investigates the impact of recommender systems and generative models on human decisional and creative autonomy. For this purpose, we adopt Dennett’s conception of autonomy as self-control. We show that recommender systems can play a double role in relation to decisional autonomy: as information filter, they can augment self-control in decision-making, but also act as mechanisms of remote control that clamp degrees of freedom. As (...) for generative models in AI, we show that they can be seen as a powerful system of selection and suggestion (similar to standard recommender systems) but also as an instrument for information production. We suggest that the latter perspective opens new possibilities in terms of creative autonomy. Additionally, for both systems we propose a distinction between “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” mechanisms and effects. Through Dennett’s theory of self-control, this paper offers new insights into the relation between AI and human autonomy by framing it in terms of remote or self-control and by addressing the impact of generative models on creative autonomy. (shrink)

Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on (...) class='Hi'>human autonomy of digital experiences are neither straightforward nor consistent, and are complicated by commercial interests and tensions around compulsive overuse. This multi-layered reality requires an analysis that is itself multidimensional and that takes into account human experience at various levels of resolution. We borrow from HCI and psychological research to apply a model (“METUX”) that identifies six distinct spheres of technology experience. We demonstrate the value of the model for understanding human autonomy in a technology ethics context at multiple levels by applying it to the real-world case study of an AI-enhanced video recommender system. In the process we argue for the following three claims: 1) There are autonomy-related consequences to algorithms representing the interests of third parties, and they are not impartial and rational extensions of the self, as is often perceived; 2) Designing for autonomy is an ethical imperative critical to the future design of responsible AI; and 3) Autonomy-support must be analysed from at least six spheres of experience in order to approriately capture contradictory and downstream effects. (shrink)

We continuously talk about autonomous technologies. But how can words qualifying technologies be the very same words chosen by Kant to define what is essentially human, i.e. being autonomous? The article focuses on a possible answer by reflecting upon both etymological and philosophical issues, as well as upon the case of autonomous vehicles. Most interestingly, on the one hand, we have the notion of “autonomy”, meaning that there is a “law” that is “self-given”, and, on the other hand, (...) we have the notion of “automation”, meaning that there is something “offhand” that is “self-given”. Yet, we are experiencing a kind of twofold shift: on the one hand, the shift from defining technologies in terms of automation to defining technologies in terms of autonomy and, on the other hand, the shift from defining humans in terms of autonomy to defining humans in terms of automation. From a philosophical perspective, the shift may mean that we are trying to escape precisely from what autonomy founds, i.e. individual responsibility of humans that, in the Western culture, have been defined for millennia as rational and moral decision-makers, even when their decisions have been the toughest. More precisely, the shift may mean that we are using technologies, and in particular emerging algorithmic technologies, as scapegoats that bear responsibility for us by making decisions for us. Moreover, if we consider the kind of emerging algorithmic technologies that increasingly surround us, starting from autonomous vehicles, then we may argue that we also seem to create a kind of technological divine that, by being always with us through its immanent omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence and inscrutability, can always be our technological scapegoat freeing us from the most unbearable burden of individual responsibility resulting from individual autonomy. (shrink)

Researchers are beginning to transition from studying human–automation interaction to human–autonomy teaming. This distinction has been highlighted in recent literature, and theoretical reasons why the psychological experience of humans interacting with autonomy may vary and affect subsequent collaboration outcomes are beginning to emerge (de Visser et al., 2018;Wynne and Lyons, 2018). In this review, we do a deep dive into human–autonomy teams (HATs) by explaining the differences between automation and autonomy and by reviewing (...) the domain of human–human teaming to make inferences for HATs. We examine the domain of human–human teaming to extrapolate a few core factors that could have relevance for HATs. Notably, these factors involve critical social elements within teams that are central (as argued in this review) for HATs. We conclude by highlighting some research gaps that researchers should strive toward answering, which will ultimately facilitate a more nuanced and complete understanding of HATs in a variety of real-world contexts. (shrink)

Current AI policy recommendations differ on what the risks to human autonomy are. To systematically address risks to autonomy, we need to confront the complexity of the concept itself and adapt governance solutions accordingly.

This short note considers the relationships between human autonomy, both individual and collective, and technology. At the collective level, numerous writers have observed the profound effects on society of technological discoveries — leading to the suggestion that societal mechanisms through which we might seek to make deliberate choices about technologies are ineffective. One such mechanism is the law, and I suggest through various examples that legal doctrines and judicial processes may indeed be limited in their ability to regulate (...) technology. At the individual level, technologies have profound effects on human autonomy, both making certain choices possible but also changing the material and cultural environment in ways that make the adoption of technologies inescapable in a way that appears to erode human autonomy. (shrink)

It is argued here that we have good reason to aspire to be autonomous in certain ways that deserve a place in the theory of virtue, but not in some of the ways that have figured most prominently in theories of moral obligation. This grounds an argument that the sorts of autonomy to which we have reason to aspire need not be enemies of theological ethics. The focus is on the relation of autonomy to obligation in sections 1-4, (...) and on the relation of autonomy to love in section 5. (shrink)

Social robots are robots that can interact socially with humans. As social robots and the artificial intelligence that powers them becomes more advanced, they will likely take on more social and work roles. This has many important ethical implications. In this paper, we focus on one of the most central of these, the impacts that social robots can have on human autonomy. We argue that, due to their physical presence and social capacities, there is a strong potential for (...) social robots to enhance human autonomy as well as several ways they can inhibit and disrespect it. We argue that social robots could improve human autonomy by helping us to achieve more valuable ends, make more authentic choices, and improve our autonomy competencies. We also argue that social robots have the potential to harm human autonomy by instead leading us to achieve fewer valuable ends ourselves, make less authentic choices, decrease our autonomy competencies, make our autonomy more vulnerable, and disrespect our autonomy. Whether the impacts of social robots on human autonomy are positive or negative overall will depend on the design, regulation, and use we make of social robots in the future. (shrink)

Autonomy is a core value that is deeply entrenched in the moral, legal, and political practices of many societies. The development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) have raised new questions about AI’s impacts on human autonomy. However, systematic assessments of these impacts are still rare and often held on a case-by-case basis. In this article, I provide a conceptual framework that both ties together seemingly disjoint issues about human autonomy, as well as highlights differences (...) between them. In the first part, I distinguish between distinct concerns that are currently addressed under the umbrella term ‘human autonomy’. In particular, I show how differentiating between autonomy-as-authenticity and autonomy-as-agency helps us to pinpoint separate challenges from AI deployment. Some of these challenges are already well-known (e.g. online manipulation or limitation of freedom), whereas others have received much less attention (e.g. adaptive preference formation). In the second part, I address the different roles AI systems can assume in the context of autonomy. In particular, I differentiate between AI systems taking on agential roles and AI systems being used as tools. I conclude that while there is no ‘silver bullet’ to address concerns about human autonomy, considering its various dimensions can help us to systematically address the associated risks. (shrink)

Considering the relationship between human autonomy, law and technology has deep origins. Both technology studies and legal theory tell origin stories about human autonomy as the prize from either a foundational technological or jurisprudential event. In these narratives either law is considered a second order consequence of technology or technology is revealed as a second order consequence of law. In the alternative what is suggested is a foundation story drawing upon human autonomy as (...) class='Hi'>human responsibility for law and technology and for the stories told about them. (shrink)

As the church historian Henri Crouzel observed, questions about the nature of human autonomy were central to the thought of the third-century theologian Origen of Alexandria. On this question, his influence on later generations, though complicated, would be difficult to overstate. Yet, what exactly Origen thought autonomy required has been a subject of debate. On one widespread reading, he has been taken to argue that autonomy requires that human beings have the capacity to act otherwise (...) than they do in fact act; that is, that alternative possibilities of action are causally available to them. As Susanne Bobzien has argued, however, there is good reason to think that the view that such alternative possibilities are required for the ascription of autonomy did not explicitly emerge until Alexander of Aphrodisias, a rough contemporary of Origen's of whose thought he was likely unaware. In revisiting Origen on the notion of ‘free will’, Michael Frede, against the ‘alternative possibilities’ reading, argued that his theory of the will was largely attributable to Stoicism, and in particular to Epictetus’ theory of will as προαίρεσις. George Boys-Stones, for his part, has claimed that, while Origen's theory of the descent of the pre-existent minds is aimed at providing an account of how human beings are entirely responsible for their characters, in the embodied state we find no evidence that he understood human choice subsequent to the fall to depend upon the existence of alternative possibilities in order to be autonomous. (shrink)

For most of its career philosophy of religion has been a controversial dis cipline: it has usually ended up becoming a substitute for what it set out to explain. Born out of the religious scepticism of the late seventeenth century it remained for many years what it was to Hume and Lessing: an instrument for criticizing rather than for interpreting faith. Gradually the hostility subsided, but not the tendency to reduce. Nearly each one of the great names in this area (...) represents a theory that goes "beyond" faith. Phenomenology changed that situation. Conceived for accurate under standing of acts and meanings rather than for the building of vast synthe ses, its method was more apt to yield understanding than criticism. Moreover, by distinguishing the ideal meanings from the psychic realities of the act, it chased its followers from the quagmire of psychic genesis, causal justification and rational "proof" of the religious object, and forced them to concentrate on the intentional terminus of the experience. (shrink)

The author inquires into the relation between the production of genetic knowledge on the one hand, and human autonomy and self-determination on the other. He does so by specifying the notions of “genetic test” and “human autonomy”; by discussing the epistemic status of genetic knowledge, given its importance for the clarification of its anthropological and ethical implications; and by inquiring into some ethical implications by investigating the conditions under which genetic knowledge of the individual may justifiably (...) be established. This discussion shows that the autonomy-based right to self-determination as far as gene in formation is concerned, is fundamental. This has major implications, which the author identifies with regard to the difficult problem of the moral legitimacy of the use of genetic knowledge in the context of insurance policies. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(1) 2004: 69-81. (shrink)

Complex work in teams requires coordination across team members and their technology as well as the ability to change and adapt over time to achieve effective performance. To support such complex interactions, recent efforts have worked toward the design of adaptive human-autonomy teaming systems that can provide feedback in or near real time to achieve the desired individual or team results. However, while significant advancements have been made to better model and understand the dynamics of team interaction and (...) its relationship with task performance, appropriate measures of team coordination and computational methods to detect changes in coordination have not yet been widely investigated. Having the capacity to measure coordination in real time is quite promising as it provides the opportunity to provide adaptive feedback that may influence and regulate teams’ coordination patterns and, ultimately, drive effective team performance. A critical requirement to reach this potential is having the theoretical and empirical foundation from which to do so. Therefore, the first goal of the paper is to review approaches to coordination dynamics, identify current research gaps, and draw insights from other areas, such as social interaction, relationship science, and psychotherapy. The second goal is to collate extant work on feedback and advance ideas for adaptive feedback systems that have potential to influence coordination in a way that can enhance the effectiveness of team interactions. In addressing these two goals, this work lays the foundation as well as plans for the future of human-autonomy teams that augment team interactions using coordination-based measures. (shrink)

This book offers an extensive historical, philosophical and ethical discussion on the role of autonomous technologies, and their influence on human identity. By connecting those different perspectives, and analysing some practical case studies, it guides readers to dissect the relationship between machine and human autonomy, and machine and human identity. It analyses how the relationship between human and technology has been evolving in the last few centuries. Last, it aims at proposing an explanation on the (...) reason/s why humans have been keen on developing their own autonomy’s perfect avatar. (shrink)

The present paper aims at contributing to the ethical debate on the impacts of artificial intelligence (AI) systems on human autonomy. More specifically, it intends to offer a clearer understanding of the design challenges to the effort of aligning driving automation technologies to this ethical value. After introducing the discussion on the ambiguous impacts that AI systems exert on human autonomy, the analysis zooms in on how the problem has been discussed in the literature on connected (...) and automated vehicles (CAVs). On this basis, it is claimed that the issue has been mainly tackled on a fairly general level, and mostly with reference to the controversial issue of crash-optimization algorithms, so that only limited design insights have been drawn. However, integrating ethical analysis and design practices is critical to pursue the implementation of such an important ethical value into CAV technologies. To this aim, it is argued, a more applied approach targeted at examining the impacts on human autonomy of current CAV functions should also be explored. As an example of the intricacy of this task, the case of automated route planning is discussed in some detail. (shrink)

This study concerns the sociotechnical bases of human autonomy. Drawing on recent literature on AI ethics, philosophical literature on dimensions of autonomy, and on independent philosophical scrutiny, we first propose a multi-dimensional model of human autonomy and then discuss how AI systems can support or hinder human autonomy. What emerges is a philosophically motivated picture of autonomy and of the normative requirements personal autonomy poses in the context of algorithmic systems. Ranging (...) from consent to data collection and processing, to computational tasks and interface design, to institutional and societal considerations, various aspects related to sociotechnical systems must be accounted for in order to get the full picture of potential effects of AI systems on human autonomy. It is clear how human agents can, for example, via coercion or manipulation, hinder each other’s autonomy, or how they can respect each other’s autonomy. AI systems can promote or hinder human autonomy, but can they literally respect or disrespect a person’s autonomy? We argue for a philosophical view according to which AI systems—while not moral agents or bearers of duties, and unable to literally respect or disrespect—are governed by so-called “ought-to-be norms.” This explains the normativity at stake with AI systems. The responsible people (designers, users, etc.) have duties and ought-to-do norms, which correspond to these ought-to-be norms. (shrink)

Teams are a fundamental aspect of life—from sports to business, to defense, to science, to education. While the cognitive sciences tend to focus on information processing within individuals, others have argued that teams are also capable of demonstrating cognitive capacities similar to humans, such as skill acquisition and forgetting (cf., Cooke, Gorman, Myers, & Duran, 2013; Fiore et al., 2010). As artificially intelligent and autonomous systems improve in their ability to learn, reason, interact, and coordinate with human teammates combined (...) with the observation that teams can express cognitive capacities typically seen in individuals, a cognitive science of teams is emerging. Consequently, new questions are being asked about teams regarding teamness, trust, the introduction and effects of autonomous systems on teams, and how best to measure team behavior and phenomena. In this topic, four facets of human-autonomy team cognition are introduced with leaders in the field providing in-depth articles associated with one or more of the facets: (1) defining teams; (2) how trust is established, maintained, and repaired when broken; (3) autonomous systems operating as teammates; and (4) metrics for evaluating team cognition across communication, coordination, and performance. (shrink)

Autonomy is often considered a core value of Western society that is deeply entrenched in moral, legal, and political practices. The development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems to perform a wide variety of tasks has raised new questions about how AI may affect human autonomy. Numerous guidelines on the responsible development of AI now emphasise the need for human autonomy to be protected. In some cases, this need is linked to the emergence of (...) increasingly ‘autonomous’ AI systems that can perform tasks without human control or supervision. Do such ‘autonomous’ systems pose a risk to our own human autonomy? In this article, I address the question of a trade-off between human autonomy and system ‘autonomy’. (shrink)

In bringing intentions, understandings, meanings and interactions down to earth this book invites its readers to account for the complex communications between ...

이 글은 최근 제기된 인간 정신의 자율성 문제를 심리철학적 관점에서 접근해 보려는 시도다. 김광수는 김재권을 비롯한 주류 심리철학들이 정신의 자율을 부정하는 한에서 “철학적 스캔들”이라고 비판한다. 특히 김광수의 이러한 주장을 도리어 철학의 스캔들이라 주장하는 백도형에 대한 체계적인 반론을 시도한다. 최근 인공지능의 문제가 사회적인 관심사가 되고 있다. 인공지능이 몰고 올 인문, 사회, 경제적 파장은 결코 작지 않아 보인다. 강 인공지능은 과연 인간과 똑같은 감정과 의식을 가진 존재로 등장할 것인가? 그렇다면 인간의 의식이란 과연 무엇일까? 그것은 수학적으로 계산가능하고 과학적으로 제작 가능할 것인가? 이런 일련의 (...) 문제들에 대해 철학적 물음을 제기한 현대의 심리철학은 결국 인간의 자율성 문제에 봉착한다고 김광수는 주장한다. 김광수가 보기에 행동주의, 동일론, 기능주의, 제거주의 등 모든 형태의 환원주의는 결국 인간의 자율성을 부정하는 심각한 결과에 이른다. 그는 이를 타개하기 위해 비환원적 유물론의 입장을 취한다. 논자가 약간 끌어들여 정신의 자율성 문제를 설명하고자 한 것이 김재권의 성층설과 연관하여 칸트와 하르트만의 성층설이다. 칸트는 나름 인과이율배반을 해결하여 인간의 자유를 철학적으로 확보했으며, 하르트만은 우리가 사는 사실계의 존재원리의 층이 네 층으로 이루어져 있다는 성층설을 통해 자유가 존재론적으로 정당함을 제시한다. (shrink)

Beginning with Kant, modernity has developed the secular dogma that human autonomy is incompatible with obedience to religious law. Can philosophy critique a faulty understanding of both autonomy and obedience? Can theology work out a healthy interaction between the two? In other words, can Christian faith integrate both a redefined autonomy and a redefined obedience?

인권교육의 궁극적인 목표는 현실화, 즉 삶의 실천적 과정 속에서의 인권에 대한 이해 와 적용이다. 인간은 자신의 삶을 통제하고, 그러한 통제에 영향을 미치는 결정을 스스로 에게 부과할 수 있는 힘이 있어야 한다. 인간의 기본적 권리인 인권을 주권자로 제대로 행 사하게 하는 것은 바로 자력화이다. 자력화를 위한 인권교육은 학생들이 책임 있는 독립적 행위주체로서 살아가게 할 뿐만 아니라 사적이고 공적인 삶의 영역에서 적극적이고 능동 적인 참여의 자세를 보다 공고히 하게 한다. 이렇게 볼 때, 자력화에 토대한 인권교육은 우리로 하여금 일상에서 인권과 관련된 원리를 이해하는 (...) 차원을 넘어 우리 스스로가 행위 주체로서 실천하는 차원으로 나아가게 한다. 이런 점에서 자율성은 인권 개념의 근본적 토 대이며, 이 자율성을 통해 우리는 각자의 인권뿐만 아니라 사회적 삶의 참여 및 타인의 권 리를 보호하고 존중하는 연대의 길로 나아갈 수 있다. (shrink)

Research on autonomy exhibits a constellation of variegated perspectives, from the problem of the crude deprivation of it to the study of the distinction between personal and moral autonomy, and from the problem of the role of a “self as narrator”, who classifies its own actions as autonomous or not, to the importance of the political side and, finally, to the need of defending and enhancing human autonomy. My precise concern in this article will be the (...) examination of the role of the human cognitive processes that give rise to the most important ways of tracking the external world and human behavior in their relationship to some central aspects of human autonomy, also to the aim of clarifying the link between autonomy and the ownership of our own destinies. I will also focus on the preservation of human autonomy as an important component of human dignity, seeing it as strictly associated with knowledge and, even more significantly, with the constant production of new and pertinent knowledge of various kinds. I will also describe the important _paradox of autonomy_, which resorts to the fact that, on one side, cognitions (from science to morality, from common knowledge to philosophy, etc.) are necessary to be able to perform autonomous actions and decisions because we need believe in rules that justify and identify our choices, but, on the other side, these same rules can become (for example, as a result of contrasting with other internalized and approved moral rules or knowledge contents) oppressive norms that diminish autonomy and can thus, paradoxically, defeat agents’ autonomous capacity “to take ownership”. (shrink)

The bioethical principle of respect for a person’s bodily autonomy is central to biomedical and healthcare ethics. In this article, we argue that this concept of autonomy is often annulled in the maternity field, due to the maternal two-in-one body (and the obstetric focus on the foetus over the woman) and the history of medical paternalism in Western medicine and obstetrics. The principle of respect for autonomy has therefore become largely rhetorical, yet can hide all manner of (...) unethical practice. We propose that large institutions that prioritize a midwife–institution relationship over a midwife–woman relationship are in themselves unethical and inimical to the midwifery philosophy of care. We suggest that a focus on care ethics has the potential to remedy these problems, by making power relationships visible and by prioritizing the relationship above abstract ethical principles. (shrink)

Do not attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation decisions (DNACPR) are considered good medical practice for those dying at the end of natural life. They avoid intrusive and inappropriate intervention. Historically, informing patients of these decisions was discretionary to avoid undue distress. Recent legal rulings have altered clinical guidance: disclosure is now all but obligatory. The basis for these legal judgments was respect for the patient’s autonomy as an expression of their human rights. Through critical analysis, this paper explores other bioethical (...) considerations and the potential harms if they are ignored. Arguably, disclosure of DNACPR status on its own will do little to improve patient experience. A focus on good communication with those identified as approaching end-of-life will facilitate personalized care. Discussions around DNACPR may still occur, but only if likely to be beneficial and at a patient-appropriate pace (not dictated by the need to activate the decision). (shrink)

All people have human rights and there is a close connection between human rights, needs, and autonomy. Accounting for this connection is difficult on many of the traditional rights theories. On many traditional theories, human rights protect individuals’ important interests. These theories are well suited to account for the fact that human rights protect individuals from dire need. Even the non-autonomous have some needs, which constitute some of their important interests. But because these theories sometimes (...) say autonomy is not constitutive of the interests human rights protect they can fail to capture the close relationship between human rights and autonomy. On other traditional human rights theories, human rights only protect individuals’ autonomy. These theories avoid the problem sketched above. But, purely autonomy-based theories cannot explain the universality of rights -- some people lack autonomy. Furthermore, if human rights only protect individuals’ autonomy, human rights can be fulfilled and yet some can be left in dire need. So, some of the best known attempts to justify human rights either cannot appropriately connect human rights and autonomy or cannot account for the human right of all to meet their basic needs. This paper suggests that a theory on which human rights protect individuals’ ability to live minimally good lives should be taken seriously because it can avoid this dilemma. For, it argues, people need whatever will enable them to live such lives and autonomy is partly constitutive of such a life. (shrink)

A psychology of human individual development is proposed which argues against its reduction to the description and control of human behavior or to cognitive psychology in the model of information and communication technology. Instead the author’s earlier conceptualization of the autonomy of human individual development is now elaborated further. The foundational premise to this end rests in Macnamara’s explication of Brentano’s notion of intentionality, i.e., referring to something as an object. It reveals the access of the (...) mind to the ideal objects and to the kinds which provide for identity and individuation of the objects of human cognition. It converges with the anti-irrationalism postulate which was put forward by Ajdukiewicz. The reduction of the mind in psychology to something else proves unable to meet the anti-irrationalism postulate, regards perception and cognition to be of one piece, and it excludes intuition and ideals. In contrast to this, the notions of the spontaneous and self-sustainable perception and the self-determined mind open a way for psychology without the reduction of it to anything else. The same route has been taken earlier with a study of personality development from adolescence to the late ages. (shrink)

Based on an empirical study regarding ethical challenges within intercultural health care, the focus of this article is upon autonomy and disclosure, discussed in light of philosophy and anthropology. What are the consequences for patients if the patients’ right to be autonomous and to participate in treatment and care decisions by health care workers is interpreted as an obligation to participate? To force a person to make independent choices who is socio-culturally unprepared to do so, may violate his/her integrity. (...) This may in turn jeopardise the respect, integrity and human worth the principle of autonomy was meant to ensure, and if so, may damage any relationship of trust that may exist between patient and health care worker. There is necessarily a link between autonomy and disclosure. Western disclosure practices may make the relationship between patients and health care workers difficult -- even distrustful. To confront a patient with a very serious diagnosis may be seen not only as a tactless action, but also an unforgivable one. Hence, among many ethnic groups it is a family member’s duty to shield patients from bad or disquieting news, e.g., a cancer diagnosis. If a family member is used to interpret in such situations, will the information given equal the information communicated by that interpreter? Even though respect for a person’s autonomy is part of the respect for a person, one’s respect for the person in question should not depend on his/her ability or aptitude to act autonomously. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that public education should provide a constructive forum for discussing aspects of lesbian and gay lifestyles in both primary and secondary schools. My argument is that such action is necessary to offset the way the dominant culture limits the capacities of gays and lesbians to achieve human self-fulfillment. In making this argument, I recognize that I am going beyond merely promoting social tolerance to legitimizing an actual place for discussion of the needs and interests (...) of gays and lesbians in the society at large. The principles I will apply to make this argument are not specifically situated in legal philosophy (concerning the nature of law and its evaluation), but rather, principles of normative political philosophy (concerning ethical justifications of governmental institutions) as we might find in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948. (shrink)

The severe shortage of organs for transplantation and the continual reluctance of the public to voluntarily donate has prompted consideration of alternative strategies for organ procurement. This paper explores the development of market approaches for procuring human organs for transplantation and considers the social and moral implications of organ donation as both a gift of life and a commodity exchange. The problematic and paradoxical articulation of individual autonomy in relation to property rights and marketing human body parts (...) is addressed. We argue that beliefs about proprietorship over human body parts and the capacity to provide consent for organ donation are culturally constructed. We contend that the political and economic framework of biomedicine, in western and non-western nations, influences access to transplantation technology and shapes the form and development of specific market approaches. Finally, we suggest that marketing approaches for organ procurement are and will be negotiated within cultural parameters constrained by several factors: beliefs about the physical body and personhood, religious traditions, economic conditions, and the availability of technological resources. (shrink)

Freedom of religious expression is to many a fundamental element of their identity. Yet the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic headscarf issue does not refer to autonomy and identity rights of the individual women claimants. The case law focuses on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides a legal human right to freedom of religious expression. The way that provision is interpreted is critically contrasted here with (...) the right to personal autonomy and identity now developed by that court in interpreting Article 8 which contains a right to respect one’s private life. (shrink)

This paper explores the new frontier within Kantian scholarship which suggests that Kant places so much special importance on the value of rational nature that the supreme principle of morality and the concept of human dignity are both grounded on it. Advocates of this reading argue that the notion of autonomy and dignity should now be considered as the central claim of Kant’s ethics, rather than the universalisation of maxims. Kant’s ethics are termed as repugnant for they place (...) a high demand on the universalisation of maxims as a universal moral principle. As a result, they argue that there is an urgent need to rescue Kant’s ethics from the controversies surrounding maxims and universalisability, and the best way to rescue his ethics is by “leaving deontology behind”. It must be left behind because the categorical imperative is not needed in order to rescue Kant’s ethics, as deontology is often overrated. Consequently, the highest duties of the human being are to ensure that his fellow human beings enjoy unhindered autonomy and receive the honour that their dignity duly deserves, as well as to look after their welfare and treat them with respect, regardless of their dispositions. I review recent literature to appraise this new frontier within Kantian scholarship. I also explore the works of philosophers, such as Herman, Korsgaard, Wood, Höffe, and, specifically, Hill, on Kant’s conception of human dignity in relation to its conception as autonomy, humanity, and the source of human rights. (shrink)