Historical Epistemology: On the Diversity and Change of Epistemic Values in Science. Historical epistemology involves the claim that the system of scientific knowledge is not determined by the observations but is also subject to epistemic requirements that may change in the historical process of doing research. As a result, the system of knowledge is path‐dependent in that its shape is contingent on epistemic choices made at certain historical points. I attempt to elaborate this approach (...) by drawing attention to the double role of epistemic values. First, such values create relations of significance and thereby contribute to directing research into certain avenues. Second, they are also important in the process of confirmation in that they entail that certain forms of agreement with the facts are superior and preferable to other such forms. Some epistemic orientations and reorientations can be reconstructed as arising from an interaction with nature, but others are based on commitments to the kind of knowledge we appreciate. The epistemic authority of science is created in large measure by rules of the scientific community that express how to deal with knowledge claims. (shrink)

The paper addresses recent developments in historical epistemology, traces the main inspirational sources that feed this approach, and suggests a possible agenda for closer approximation between historical epistemology and the human sciences in studying thought styles and thought collectives, conceptual and theoretical levels of knowledge and the material culture of science.

In this article, I argue for historical epistemology as a methodology for critical disability studies by examining Foucault’s archaeology of cure in History of Madness. Although the moral, medical, and social models of disability frame disability history as an advancement upon moral and medical authority and a replacement of it by sociopolitical knowledge, I argue that the more comprehensive frame in which these models circulate—the “models framework”—requires the more nuanced approach that historical epistemology offers. In particular, (...) the models framework requires greater use of epistemology as an analytical tool for understanding the historical construction of disability. Thus, I turn to Foucault’s History of Madness in order to both excavate one particular archaeological strand in the text—the archaeology of cure—and to demonstrate how this narrative disrupts some of the key assumptions of the models framework, challenging DS to consider the epistemological force of non-medical fields of knowledge for framing disability and procedures for its cure and elimination. I conclude by arguing that DS must develop historical epistemological methodologies that are sensitive to the complex overlays of moral, medical, and social knowledge, as well as attend to the social construction of scientific and biomedical knowledge itself. (shrink)

The academic path of Jean Gayon (1949–2018) follows in the wake of the “French style” in epistemologyEpistemology, but he is also one of the first representatives of philosophy of biology in France. In the light of this double philosophical heritage, this chapter re-examines the relations between the works of Gayon, the tradition in which he first studied, and the one he later adopted, but not without reservations. Tracing his intellectual journey, this article explores why he naturally appears as a Canguilhemian, (...) a view against which he defends himself. Attending to the connexions that he established with the philosophers of biology will bring to light the growing tension that inhabits him, from the middle of the 1980s onwards, and which led him to identify some of the limits inherent to theHistorical epistemology matrix of historical epistemologyGayon, JeanOn historical epistemology, without disowning his first philosophical tradition. Finally, in an attempt to reconcile two approaches, I will underline the emergence in the thought of Jean Gayon of a third way seeking to overcome the opposition between a “unitarian” style that seeks to make a clear break with the history of scienceHistory of science and its philosophical past, and the “dualist” style which tends to stay above scientific debates, and which accepts a clear distinction between the work of science and the work of philosophy. Reuniting the history and the philosophy of the sciences, privileging the long durée and depths of history, where the problems of biology unfold, while also recognizing the value of analysing the conceptual puzzles which structure the contemporary life sciences, the oeuvre of Jean Gayon illustrates the complementary character of these disciplines. (shrink)

This essay aims to sharpen debates on the pros and cons of historical epistemology, which is now understood as a novel approach to the study of knowledge, by comparing it with the history of epistemology as traditionally pursued by philosophers. The many versions of both approaches are not always easily discernable. Yet, a reasoned comparison of certain versions can and should be made. In the first section of this article, I argue that the most interesting difference involves (...) neither the subject matter nor goal, but the methods used by the two approaches. In the second section, I ask which of the two approaches or methods is more promising given that both historical epistemologists and historians of epistemology claim to contribute to epistemology simpliciter. Using traditional problems concerning the epistemic role of perception, I argue that the historical epistemologies of Wartofsky and Daston and Galison fail to show that studying practices of perception is philosophically significant. Standard methods from the history of epistemology are more promising, as I show by means of reconstructing arguments in a debate about the relation between perception and judgment in psychological research on the famous moon illusion. (shrink)

This article attempts to define a historical epistemology not as separate place in disciplinary space, but as rather specific area, which unstable configuration and “stuff" are determined by quite different from philosophy ways of talking and investigation of knowledge, especially in social sciences. More significant than emergence of competitors of philosophy in production of knowledge about knowledge (sociology, history, anthropology) was that they introduce a new regime of this production. This regime became empirical. Within that regime knowledge is (...) objectified not as homogeneous order of representation, but as fuzzy dynamic set of heterogeneous elements, relations between which are complex and historically variable. The claims of non-philosophical disciplines to investigate knowledge generate the field of uncertainties and problematisations. Just this field is referred to as “historical epistemology". But this field is also space of conceptual imagination, where the new ways to investigate knowledge are worked on, when refusing to ascribe to it any ultimate (transcendent or transcendental) specification. (shrink)

As an independent philosophical discipline, historical epistemology had been forming in the French Academy from the early 20 century and to its middle developed to the point where it left behind other types of epistemologies, which succeeded to take revenge only in the late 1980s. However, historians and sociologists often consider French historical epistemology as a “marginal” discipline, compared to other areas of philosophical research. The focus of the study is the formation of the French version (...) of historical epistemology as a philosophical discipline in the historical perspective, which includes not only recognized Maîtres of this direction, but also secondary figures associated with the development of this trend of philosophical thought. In the article we will try to demonstrate that historical epistemology, at least genetically, belongs to the general trend in the development of the philosophy of science, formed from the XIX century, and may well claim to be considered a “normal” version of epistemology and/or philosophy of science. (shrink)

The paper approaches the topic of what a general philosophy of science could mean today from the perspective of a historical epistemology. Consequently, in a first step, the paper looks at the notion of generality in the sciences, and how it evolved over time, on the example of the life sciences. In the second part of the paper, the urgency of a general philosophy of science is located in the history of philosophy of science. Two attempts at the (...) beginning of the twentieth century are particularly highlighted: that of Karl Popper and that of Martin Heidegger. Both of them concentrate, albeit in widely different form, on the phenomenon of research as an open-ended process. This trend is even more pronounced in Gaston Bachelard’s version of a historical epistemology, whose work is taken as a point of reference for a general historical epistemology of research. The paper concludes with a plea to look, with Georges Canguilhem, at the history of the sciences as a laboratory for epistemology. (shrink)

Sets out the epistemological context for my enquiry, by outlining the key moves in a formative phase of its historical development: the writings of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Reid, and Kant. My purpose here is not to engage in the detailed exegesis and interpretation of these philosophers’ views, but to delineate the space of live options in the area, and to point out some dead ends.

The paper begins with a detailed reconstruction of the development of Ian Hacking’s theory of scientific ‘styles of reasoning’, paying particular attention to Alistair Crombie’s influence, and suggesting that Hacking’s theory deserves to come under the title ‘historical epistemology’. Subsequently, the paper seeks to establish three critical theses. First, Hacking’s reliance on Crombie leads him to adopt an outdated historiographical position; second, Hacking is unsuccessful in his attempt to distance historical epistemology from epistemic relativism; and third, (...) Hacking has not offered convincing criteria for individuating styles of reasoning. Keywords: Styles of reasoning; Historical epistemology; Ian Hacking; Alistair Crombie; Relativism; Sociology of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper it is performed a historical account of the theoretical roots that grounded the following four key basic ideas of chemical equilibrium: ‘incomplete reaction’, ‘reversibility’, ‘equilibrium constant’ and ‘molecular dynamics’. These notions developed in nineteenth-century as a consequence of the evolution of the concept of chemical affinity. The discussion begins with the presentation of the earliest affinity table [‘Table des rapports’] published in 1718 by Geoffroy. Afterwards, it is examined Bergman’s compilation. The theory supporting this arrangement assumed (...) that chemical displacement reactions were complete and could not be reversed. It is analysed how Berthollet’s model showed the inadequacy of this view. His new conceptual considerations established that the amount of the substances involved in a reaction was an essential factor determining its direction, which accounted for the early concepts of incomplete reaction and reversibility. Guldberg and Waage specified the role of mass in chemical equilibrium reactions as they considered the concentrations of the chemicals involved, formulating the first chemical equilibrium mathematical equation that approximates what is called nowadays chemical equilibrium constant. Finally, it is presented how Pfaundler was the first to consider the kinetic theory in the interpretation of the macroscopic properties of equilibrium reactions. (shrink)

This introduction to the theory of knowledge argues for the continuing relevance of philosophical debates about knowledge by connecting them to issues of authority. The discussion takes the form of an essay in historical epistemology which treats the philosopher-politician Frnacis Bacon as its pivotal figure. This affords a non-Cartesian perspective on the transition to modern philosophy from which the distinctive configurations of the Cartesian framework can be discerned. The strategy is to use history as a route to a (...) critical appraisal of "modernism" without embracing post-modernism,Ancient Greek discussions of knowledge from Protagoras to Epicurus via Plato and Aristotle are introduced to illustrate the sense in which modern philosophy broke with ancient tradition while being at the same time conditioned by it. The Baconian vision was of human progress achieved through the acquisition of knowledge which makes domination of nature possible. The tensions inherent in this vision and the way in which they have worked to undermine it are illustrated by refesrence to the views of Kant and Hume and by tracing their consequences. (shrink)

Bruno Latour, as part of his advocacy of science studies urges us to move beyond what he calls ‘the Modernist Settlement’ that, among other things, separated science from politics and subject from object. As part of this project he has frequently called for the abolition of epistemology, including quite specifically the historical epistemology/epistemological history of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. Pierre Bourdieu, on the other hand, deploys the resources of historical epistemology, to dismiss Latour’s science (...) studies. After examining the charges against historical epistemology and their rebuttal, I rule in favor of the defense. However, I also suggest that Latour raises genuine concerns about how to equip ourselves to tackle problems such as those associated with climate change; these are problems that require engagement with the politics of nature, with the politics of the sciences of nature and with the epistemological challenges associated with the need to deploy multiple disciplines in the service of complex, practical, policy-relevant problem solving. (shrink)

While there are important tensions between French historical epistemology and classical phenomenology as modes of thought, fixation on these differences has obstructed recognition of their similarities. Using the writings of Jean Cavaillès and Gaston Bachelard as case studies, this chapter shows that historical epistemology may be read as simultaneously critiquing and expanding the phenomenological project originated by Husserl in the early twentieth century. The author rebuffs the widespread conception that historical epistemology is phenomenology’s ‘Other’ (...) and calls for further research on their historical and philosophical relationships. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine the reception of French philosophy of scienceFrench philosophy of science on the world stage, taking up what was a constant concern of Jean Gayon. Three major features distinguish this tradition. First, the use of the term epistemologyEpistemology to designate philosophy of science, thereby allowing for discontinuities between common knowledge and scientific knowledge. Secondly, the conviction that philosophy of science should be grounded on history of scienceHistory of science. Finally, what has come to (...) be called the regional turn: philosophical reflection should be carried out with respect to a specific body of knowledge. These directions of research, which have been cultivated for over a century by French thinkers, emerged belatedly within the Anglo-American tradition. Gayon devoted particular attention to the case of philosophy of biology. I complement his endeavor by an examination of philosophy of chemistry. Such divergences raise the question of the relations between the two traditions. It is only recently, with the advent of a newHistorical epistemologyhistorical epistemologyGayon, JeanOn historical epistemology, that a true dialogue has been established. However, the many misunderstandings that have arisen between French and Anglo-American philosophy of sciencePhilosophy of science (Anglo-American), show how fragile such a dialogue is. (shrink)

This article argues that historical epistemology offers the history of philosophy and science more than a mere tool to write the history of concepts. It does this, first of all, by rereading historical epistemology through Michel Foucault's “techniques of the self.” Second, it turns to the work of Léon Brunschvicg and Gaston Bachelard. In their work we see a proposal for what the subjectivity of scientists and philosophers should be. The article thus argues that their work (...) is driven by a normative psychology: a set of prescriptions for which mental constitution a scholarly self has to have. In the Conclusion, it returns to existing analyses of “open‐mindedness” as a virtue and explores in what way these cases challenge these analyses, as well as to what extent Foucault's “techniques of the self” can be applied to other cases in the history of French philosophy. (shrink)

The author considers the thesis about the opposition between the universal (philosophy of science) and particular (history of science), and about the retreat of epistemology in their juxtaposition to the transformations in contemporary philosophy during last decades and its links to science studies. He claims that in order to define historical epistemology project a reason to support this project is to be found.

In this book, Arnold Davidson elaborates a method for considering the history of concepts and the nature of scientific knowledge, a method he calls "historical epistemology." He applies this to the history of sexuality, with consequences for our understanding of desire, abnormality, and sexuality.

We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression “Historical epistemology” (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as a study of the history of higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or probability; (2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research, such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3) HE as the long-term study of scientific developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current (...) debates within both epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., skepticism, realism, rationality of scientific change), we conclude by highlighting three topics as especially worthy of further philosophical investigation. The first concerns the methods, aims and systematic ambitions of the history of epistemology. The second concerns the ways in versions of HE can be connected to versions of naturalized and social epistemologies. The third concerns the philosophy of history, and in particular the level of analysis at which a historical analysis should aim. (shrink)

Positivist medical historians, guided by the savoir of modern western biomedicine, have long depicted medieval medicine as an aberration along the continuum of scientific and medical progress. Historical epistemology, founded in the ideas of Cavailles, Foucault, Davidson, and Hacking, however, allows the historian to disrupt this false continuum and to unchain medieval medicine from modern medicine. Postmodernist approaches, such as those sourced in Lyotard, Barthes, and Derrida, allow the historian to further deconstruct medieval and modern medical discourse, revealing (...) a multitude of narrative lenses spinning around biomedical and biocultural strands. In liberating these two medical systems and setting them within the distinct historical and epistemological contexts that both shaped and were shaped by them, the historian can revision the theories, practices, and culture of medieval medicine without having to anachronistically justify them according to modern medical discourse. (shrink)

The term “historical epistemology” can be read in two different ways: (1) as referring to a program of ‘historicizing’ epistemology, in the sense of a critique of traditional epistemology’s tendency to gloss over historical context, or (2) as a manifesto of ‘epistemologizing’ history, i.e. as a critique of radical historicist and relativist approaches. In this paper I will defend a position in this second sense. I show that one can account for the historical development (...) and diversity of science without disavowing the relevance of a (normatively understood) epistemology and without denying the existence of human cognitive universals across historical and cultural differences. In support of my thesis, I draw on cognitive scientific research on causal and symbolic cognition, arguing that causal understanding constitutes a basic part of science, which, in the course of its development, becomes more and more superimposed by a culturally and historically variable symbolic superstructure. (shrink)

This article seeks to address what the work of Catherine Malabou can offer to the thinking and understanding of history. Characterizing Malabou’s intellectual project as a meditation on the relation between history and possible knowledge, it situates the philosopher’s work in the tradition of historical epistemology. It will be argued that, in its engagement with philosophical and (neuro)biological theories of plasticity and epigenesis, the historical constitution of Malabou’s philosophical system problematizes the practical and ontological difficulty behind any (...) commitment to a historically bounded knowledge of what here will be called, following Heidegger and Foucault, ‘pure finitude’. The article concludes by suggesting that, if placed alongside the work of intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, Malabou’s historical epistemology makes a decisive and useful contribution to contemporary debates regarding historical method by underscoring the (neuro)biological rooting of persistent epistemic gaps between historical understanding and experience. (shrink)

This article investigates the historical and philosophical background of the French tradition of historical epistemology. As a sort of ‘historical epistemology of historical epistemology,’ it traces some of the forces, incidents, and events that made possible the emergence of a new way of doing epistemology in the first half of the twentieth century in France. Three developments that occupy a position privilege in this narrative are: the collapse of German idealism, the birth (...) of French positivism, and what the author calls ‘the crisis in the theory of science’ that swept over Europe in the early 1900s. These developments suggest that the emergence and development of historical epistemology was the effect of changes internal to the history of Western philosophy as much as a function of changes external to this history. (shrink)

The usefulness of “analogy” as an epistemological tool was at the center of a Victorian debate over the nature of historical knowledge. While researching one of her novels, George Eliot combined her obsession with historical veracity with a belief in the efficacy of analogical reasoning in the generation of historical knowledge to create a method of imaginative representation that was meant to advance our understanding of the past. Her work, along with that of her companion, G.H. Lewes, (...) constituted a rejection of the ascendant view that history needed to become an austere, inductive science, advanced by J.S. Mill, H.T. Buckle, and William Stubbs. (shrink)

In the recent decade the perspectives of historical epistemology have turned economic practices into a novel object of study: the focus lies on how discourses, techniques of measurement and valuation produce economic facts.1 The research on the historical epistemologies of economic facts belongs to a broader scholarly endeavor that takes place in cultural anthropology, social theory, literary studies, political theory and history. This interdisciplinary work brings to light how deeply economic issues are constituted by intermingling a set (...) of cultural, political, technical and legal distinctions, which distinguish what counts as properly economic from what does not.2 In this perspective, the very definition of economy becomes a hybrid and contentious affair.The central theoretical question for the historical epistemology and cultural anthropology of economy is currently how to conceptualize the link between epistemic practices and acts of ‘doing the economy’. This special issue on the Historical Episte mology of the Economic pushes us to think about this crucial link. Monika Dommann, Daniel Speich Chassé and Mischa Suter explore different modes of approaching the interlacing of epistemology and economy. These modes can be discussed under the following headings: 1) Pragmatics and Poetologies of Knowledge, 2) Economic Discourses and Epistemic Techniques, 3) Boundaries of Economy. On the basis of the richness of the historical material and the finely grained arguments that these papers bring forth, I will elaborate on the conceptualization of these linkages between epistemology and economy. My discussion culminates in the attempt to clarify an analytical distinction that is freely used in this special issue but that deserves further discussion: the distinction between the economic and the economy as an object of historical epistemology. My question is, does it matter if we write a historical epistemology of the economic or of the economy? What distinction do we wish to make by juxtaposing these two? (shrink)

Cet article examine les défis épistémologiques actuels de l’économie à travers le prisme de l’épistémologie des Lumières écossaises. Smith et Hume s’étaient concentrés sur la manière dont les connaissances (provisoires et incertaines) étaient formulées, en examinant comment des circonstances différentes engendrent et soutiennent différentes théories et approches. Sur cette base, nous explorons le discours actuel sur la manière dont les économistes doivent aborder les défis épistémologiques des situations de crise et leurs causes.

The importance given by historian and philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem to the role of practice, techniques, and experimentation in concept-formation was largely overlooked by commentators. After placing Canguilhem’s contributions within the larger history of historical epistemology in France, and clarifying his views regarding this expression, I re-evaluate the relation between concepts and experimental practices in Canguilhem’s philosophy of science. Drawing on his early writings on the relations between science and technology in the 1930s, on the Essai sur (...) quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologique , and on La formation du concept de réflexe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles , I argue that the formation and rectification of concepts in Canguilhem’s sense are intrinsically bound with the experimental, material, technical, and cultural contexts in which concepts are operationalized. (shrink)

The article deals with the phenomenon of French historical epistemology and Gaston Bachelard's role in its theoretical and institutional establishment. It analyses the place of history of sciences in French historical epistemology, which was considered in France as epistemology perse from the beginning of XX century. The article accompanies first Russian translation of Bachelard's lecture "Topicality of the History of Science" and argues that this text represents Bachelardian program for reformation of scientific history as an (...) academic discipline. The importance of this text for French epistemological tradition bases on, firstly, the analysis of methodology of the historical investigation, which subject is a scientific discipline, and secondly, historian's and epistemologist's theoretical approaches. (shrink)

Raymond Aron was a student of Léon Brunschvicg, a representative of French historical epistemology. This article explores Aron’s relation to this tradition through three claims. First of all, it contests that Raymond Aron’s philosophy of history constituted a complete break with this tradition. Secondly, resituating Aron in this tradition is valuable, because it highlights how Aron’s own philosophy of history is to be understood as a normative project, seen as an alternative to that of Brunschvicg. Finally, Aron’s philosophy (...) can still hold valuable lessons for present-day historical epistemology and history and philosophy of science in general. (shrink)

: This paper discusses the origins of two key notions in Foucault's work up to and including The Archaeology of Knowledge. The first of these notions is the notion of "archaeology" itself, a form of historical investigation of knowledge that is distinguished from the mere history of ideas in part by its unearthing what Foucault calls "historical a prioris". Both notions, I argue, are derived from Husserlian phenomenology. But both are modified by Foucault in the light of Jean (...) Cavaillès's critique of Husserl's theory of science. On Husserl's view, we demand that propositions holding of scientific objects be intersubjective and invariant, but this demand conflicts with our immediate experience, which is essentially bound to a subject's perspective. Thus the mathematical and physical sciences must utilise formal languages to fix these truths independently of the thoughts of a particular subject. This necessary procedure leads to the sedimentation of these formal systems: we forget their source in the concrete experiences of individuals, and use them as purely technical means. The technique of reactivating the intentional acts in which sedimented formal systems originated is thus, in Fink's terminology, an archaeological method. Foucault and Cavaillès retain the general outlines of this archaeology of the sciences, but they reject its appeal to conscious acts of meaning, to what Cavaillès calls "the philosophy of consciousness". I conclude by discussing the implicit difficulties in the "linguistic transcendentalism" proposed as an alternative by these French critics of Husserl. (shrink)

The article gives a generalized view of the historical epistemology and highlights its main problems: the nature of historical reality, historical knowledge and historical agent. The historical epistemology represents a special philosophical discourse, the purpose of which is constructing historical knowledge for cultural assimilation of the new historical reality at the intersection of science and society. A distinction is proposed between the position of a historian of science and a historical (...) epistemologist in terms of the essence of historical event and historical fact. The historical epistemology reveals its boundaries and a position within modern epistemological approaches. On the one hand, it is the substantialist interpretation of the historical event, which loses its a priori status only by socio-epistemological explanation. On the other hand, a figure of the historical agent (hero and author) keeping the status of a theoretical fiction in historical epistemology, acquires the adequate meaning in the existential philosophy of science. (shrink)

A non-epistemological history of historical epistemology Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9501-5 Authors W. R. Albury, School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

This paper describes the possible compatibility of positions of the discussion participants on the current project of historical epistemology. The tension between descriptive and normative elements of this project is determined as one of the most important issue. I make an assumption of a philosophical nature of historical epistemology that does not detract from, but supports the historicity of thinking science.

The paper reconstructs the key epistemological ideas of Merab Mamardashvili which form the bridge between his philosophy and phenomenology. He advances four key concepts in his sketch of a natural historical epistemology: the geometry of causal experience, the belonging to a certain time, the chronotype of a subject, and the ‘elaboration’ of the mind by consciousness. The concept of “fruitful tautology” leads Mamardashvili to a new aesthetics of thinking. The semiotics, rightfully included in Russian social sciences, assumes that (...) the symbol is a certain universal first element of psychic reality. (shrink)

The article deals with the phenomenon of French historical epistemology and Gaston Bachelard's role in its theoretical and institutional establishment. It analyses the place of history of sciences in French historical epistemology, which was considered in France as epistemology perse from the beginning of XX century. The article accompanies first Russian translation of Bachelard's lecture "Topicality of the History of Science" and argues that this text represents Bachelardian program for reformation of scientific history as an (...) academic discipline. The importance of this text for French epistemological tradition bases on, firstly, the analysis of methodology of the historical investigation, which subject is a scientific discipline, and secondly, historian's and epistemologist's theoretical approaches. (shrink)

In this short essay I reflect on Stephen Gaukroger’s enterprise especially as presented in the four-volume study on science and the shaping of modernity, and ask if it is a version of historical epistemology. Because the Gaukrogerian project is (deliberately?) ambiguous when it comes to choosing between the safe neutrality of the study of science, and the more committed versions of a ‘political epistemology’ in which, to paraphrase Shapin and Schaffer, questions of knowledge and questions of social (...) order turn out to be one and the same. (shrink)

This paper tries to motivate three desiderata for historical epistemologies: (a) that they should be reflective about the pedigree of their conceptual apparatus; (b) that they must face up to the potentially relativistic consequences of their historicism; and (c) that they must not forget the hard-won lessons of microhistory (i.e. historical events must be explained causally; historical events must not be artificially divided into internal/intellectual and external/social “factors” or “levels”; and constructed series of homogenous events must not (...) be treated as quasi-organisms). Ian Hacking’s work on styles of reasoning and Lorraine Daston’s and Peter Galison’s investigation into epistemic virtues are used to identify the costs of neglecting these desiderata. (shrink)

Modern epistemology adopted the idea of historicism, of the historicity of knowledge and the self-consciousness of the cognizer. The research, undertaken within cultural–historical epistemology, also spread in the context of the prevailing tendencies in the sphere of modern epistemology. The specificity of this type of epistemology is related to a special interpretation of the history of cognition. On this interpretation knowledge represents a cultural phenomenon that has an existentially-symbolical meaning for the cognizer. Therefore this type (...) of epistemology returns us to the dimension of knowledge, which has in fact been lost today. It returns us to the original antique notion of knowledge as “good,” as something that changes the person who acquires it. And here in this context comes forth such a feature of knowledge as its integrity. At the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, Russian philosophers turned to the problem field of “integral knowledge,” the core of which lies in the unity of the integral and cognitive, which is reflected in the concreteness of knowledge. Such an understanding of knowledge enabled the articulation of a number of ideas that enriched European traditions of socio-humanitarian research and influenced the development of semiotics and structuralism both in Europe and in Russia. The ideas of R. Jakobson that stimulated the structure-semiotic research in the first half of the twentieth century are very well-known to world humanity science. Yet their epistemological potential is related to the idea of the integral knowledge. The epistemological turn towards historicism in semiotics in Russia was accomplished by G. Shpet. Jakobson communicated with Shpet at the Moscow linguistic circle in the 1920s. They both referred to the ideas of Husserl, and, as Jakobson acknowledged himself, he borrowed many ideas from Shpet—in particular, the idea of semiotics. Shpet’s helped implement the idea of “integral knowledge” that opened a perspective of the analysis of knowledge as an open symbolic sign system. This methodological approach appears to be especially topical nowadays in the sphere of humanities, which scientific character does not exclude historicism. The ideas of Russian philosophers, then, provide a productive context immediately as well as long-term prospects for developing the methodology of the humanities. The concepts that prevail in modern methodology accentuate the historical relativity and the outer social determinacy of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile the problem of the cultural–historical status of the humanities and the problem of addressing the idea of “integral knowledge” become increasingly topical and allow the transfer of the epistemological search for the conditions and the landmarks of scientificity. (shrink)

One of the difficulties facing the philosopher of science today is the divide between historical epistemology and analytic philosophy of science. For over half a century these two traditions have followed independent and divergent paths. Historical epistemology, which originated in France in the early twentieth century, has recently been reformulated by a number of scholars such as Lorraine Daston, Ian Hacking, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. Elaborating novel historical methods, they seek to provide answers to major questions (...) in the field. In the light of this situation, my article examines the cultural barrier that explains the uneasy relationship between the two traditions. This barrier hinges on a number of factors—institutional, political and social—that are bound up with the philosophical issues in question. By resorting both to historical study and logical analysis, the new historical epistemology incites us to move beyond a rather sterile antagonism. (shrink)

The essay, based also on unpublished writings, analytically reconstructs the Italian debate concerning the problem of historical epistemology and of the different relationships that can be established between epistemological reflection and the history of science. We start from awareness, à la Lakatos, that a “history of science without philosophy of science is blind, while a philosophy of science without the history of science is empty”. However, during the twentieth century Italian different theoretical positions emerged. Giulio Preti began by (...) underlining how the history of science should be understood as the history of scientific thought. This position was close to that expressed by Giovanni Gentile for whom the history of science had to be reduced to the history of philosophy. Against this neo-realist claim, an epistemologist like Ludovico Geymonat reacted by underlining how science has its own history as a science. The critical debate between Preti and Geymonat has finally led the first to underline how the history of science must then be articulated in different conceptual traditions, while the latter ended up sharing the need to study the history of science as a history of scientific thought. (shrink)