in Jeremy McKenna (ed), At the Boundaries of Cricket, to be published in 2007 as a special issue of the journal Sport in Society and as a book in the series Sport in the Global Society (Taylor and Francis).

In this paper I explain how, for Spinoza, humans can acquire the “habit of virtue” from “fatal necessity” (Ep.58). Spinoza claims that no decision can be made without memory of the thing that one wants to do. However, his rejection of free will also implies that nobody can freely select what to remember. It seems that, as it is not in the power of an individual to freely choose what to remember and do, it is not possible to (...) establish a disposition towards virtuous behavior. To solve this puzzle, I focus on the way in which memory interacts with reason, in Spinoza’s system. I argue that this interaction allows the unfolding in time of reasoning processes. Reasoning can, in turn, be conceived as a kind of habit, which generates and sustains virtuous behavior. First, I clarify what the notion “habit of virtue” signifies for Spinoza. Then, I briefly review his account of memory. Next, I elucidate his conception of reason and its building blocks, “common notions.” On these grounds, I show how reason can be understood as an activity by which mnemonic associations are reconfigured. Finally, I point out how reason relies on memory to preserve itself in time, determining virtuous habits. (shrink)

The focus of this paper will be, on the one hand, on a prime example of the historical issues and practices related to the teaching of the habits involved in the art of artificial memory: on Lambert Schenckel, a didactic genius, possibly the most important teacher that the tradition of the art of memory ever saw; on Martin Sommer, his follower and betrayer; on the true history of the Gazophylacium artis memoriae. This, on the other hand, will allow (...) us to highlight relevant aspects of the seventeenth-century reshaping of certain habits of the human mind, setting them on a background where the habit-forming practices on which the art of memory is based, and their teaching, can be seen not so much as a merely instrumental component, but rather as a relevant social phenomenon in themselves, that accompanies a seemingly contradictory transformation of individual and social needs. (shrink)

Hegel has not been considered a philosopher of trauma. But the fact is that trauma is one of the themes most elaborated by Hegel in his Anthropology under the notion of mania (_Wahnsinn_). Mania was considered as a series of pathological behaviours because of fixed ideas or elements that triggered it. This causes a bad associative habit, whose hold is involuntary and unconscious. This is sedimented in the human being in memory and recollection. Hegel will state that (...) class='Hi'>memory and recollection are necessary for representation, which means that if these are associated by habituation with traumatic experiences, then the person generates pathologized representations. This Hegelian theory of mania is later compared with the DSM-5 to corroborate that Hegel's theory of mania is what we now call trauma. (shrink)

A philosophical analysis of different kinds of memory used in the film Memento.

This article investigates the place that habit occupies in different ‘architectures of the person’, focusing particularly on constructions of the relations between habit and other components of personhood that are marked by time. Three such positions are examined: first, the relations between thought, will, memory, habit and instinct proposed by post-Darwinian accounts of ‘organic memory’; second, Henri Bergson’s account of the relations between habit, memory and becoming; and, third, the temporal aspects of Pierre (...) Bourdieu’s concept of habitus understood as a set of hereditable dispositions. These different ‘architectures of the person’ are considered with regard to the role they accord habit in trans-generational mechanisms of inheritance; the historicised forms of embodied personhood that they propose; and the manner in which they account for the emergence of a capacity for freedom that can (partially) offset the weight of the inherited past. It is argued that the imputation of such a capacity to some forms of personhood, but not others, is both shaped by and provides the conditions for the operation of liberal forms of government. The manner in which the conduct of those who exhibit such a capacity for freedom is brought under the direction of varied ‘authorities of freedom’ is given particular consideration. (shrink)

This article examines the issues that are at stake in the current resurgence of interest in the subject of habit. We focus on the role that habit has played in conceptions of the relations between body and society, and the respects in which such conceptions have been implicated in processes of governance. We argue that habit has typically constituted a point of leverage for regulatory practices that seek to effect some realignment of the relations between different components (...) of personhood – will, character, memory and instinct, for example – in order to bring about a specific end. In reviewing its functioning in this regard across a range of modern disciplines – philosophy, psychology, sociology – we explore the tensions between its use and interpretation in different lineages: in particular, the Cartesian–Kantian/ravaisson–bergson–deleuze lineages. The article then identifies how these questions are addressed across the contributions collected in this special issue. (shrink)

Habits are the topic of a venerable history of research that extends back to antiquity, yet they were originally disregarded by the cognitive sciences. They started to become the focus of interdisciplinary research in the 1990s, but since then there has been a stalemate between those who approach habits as a kind of bodily automatism or as a kind of mindful action. This implicit mind-body dualism is ready to be overcome with the rise of interest in embodied, embedded, extended, and (...) enactive (4E) cognition. We review the enactive approach and highlight how it moves beyond the traditional stalemate by integrating both autonomy and sense-making into its theory of agency. It defines a habit as an adaptive, precarious, and self-sustaining network of neural, bodily, and interactive processes that generate dynamical sensorimotor patterns. Habits constitute a central source of normativity for the agent. We identify a potential shortcoming of this enactive account with respect to bad habits, since self-maintenance of a habit would always be intrinsically good. Nevertheless, this is only a problem if, following the mainstream perspective on habits, we treat habits as isolated modules. The enactive approach replaces this atomism with a view of habits as constituting an interdependent whole on whose overall viability the individual habits depend. Accordingly, we propose to define a bad habit as one whose expression, while positive for itself, significantly impairs a person’s well-being by overruling the expression of other situationally relevant habits. We end by considering implications of this concept of bad habit for psychological and psychiatric research, in particular with respect to addiction research. (shrink)

Poor sleep quality negatively affects memory performance, and working memory in particular. We investigated sleep habits related to sleep quality including sleep duration, daytime nap duration, nap frequency, and dream content recall frequency (DCRF). Declarative working memory can be subdivided into verbal working memory (VWM) and visuospatial working memory (VSWM). We hypothesized that sleep habits would have different effects on VWM and VSWM. To our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate differences between VWM (...) and VSWM related to daytime nap duration, nap frequency, and DCRF. Furthermore, we tested the hypothesis that the effects of duration and frequency of daytime naps and DCRF on VWM and VSWM differed according to sex. We assessed 779 healthy right-handed individuals (434 males and 345 females; mean age: 20.7 ± 1.8 years) using a digit span forward and backward VWM task, a forward and backward VSWM task, and sleep habits scales. A correlation analysis was used to test the relationships between VWM capacity (VWMC) and VSWM capacity (VSWMC) scores and sleep duration, nap duration, nap frequency, and DCRF. Furthermore, multiple regression analyses were conducted to identify factors associated with VWMC and VSWMC scores and to identify sex-related differences. We found significant positive correlations between VSWMC and nap duration and DCRF, and between VWMC and sleep duration in all subjects. Furthermore, we found that working memory capacity (WMC) was positively correlated with nap duration in males and with sleep duration in females, and DCRF was positively correlated with VSWMC in females. Our finding of sex-related differences in the effects of sleep habits on WMC has not been reported previously. The associations between WMC and sleep habits differed according to sex because of differences in the underlying neural correlates of VWM and VSWM, and effectiveness of the sleep habits in males and females. (shrink)

As people age their actions often become entrenched—we might say they are not open to the new; they are less able to adapt; they are stuck in a rut. Indeed, in The Coming of Age (La Vieillesse) Simone de Beauvoir writes that to be old is to be condemned neither to freedom nor to meaning, but rather to boredom (Beauvoir 1996, 461; 486). While in many ways a very pessimistic account of ageing, the text does provide promising moments where her (...) descriptions do capture other possibilities for aged existence. In particular, I turn to Beauvoir’s suggestion that habit can take on a “kind of poetry” since it merges past, present and future in a sense of eternity that the present moment now lacks with its limited futural horizon (468; 492). In this paper, I draw out, delineate, and further explore this phenomenological reconfiguration of the present that she gestures towards through a consideration of the intensification and modification of the present through habit. Drawing as well upon Merleau-Ponty’s insights into the phenomenal body, I argue that poetical habit is an active passivity that allows for the spontaneity of the new out of the sedimentation of corporeal memory, and for the attentive perception of what appears in the present. To disrupt someone’s habitual life is to unanchor that life from the world, from an identity shaped by repetition, by the constancy of a shared reality of things, that is, from the spatial-temporal process of inhabitation, and thus from her ability to engage with others and to disclose the world. (shrink)

Lately, it seems a number of philosophical memory theories are incorporating false memory phenomena into their conceptual frameworks. At the same time, scientific research is extending its analysis of false memories to nondeclarative forms of memory. However, both sides have paid little attention to the notion of false procedural memory. Yet, from everyday experience as well as from psychological investigation, we are aware of different ways procedural memory goes wrong. Here, I characterize the conceptual foundation (...) of false procedural memory. First, I distinguish remembering-how from knowing-how by proposing that remembering-how requires the performance of an act. Accordingly, genuine remembering-how is characterized as the performance of an act for which a respective ability has been acquired that is instrumental in the execution of said act. False remembering-how is identified as a kind of error where a subject acquires the ability to perform a certain act, which is then correctly executed, but is not what the subject tried to perform. This framework of false procedural memory is delineated from notions of interference and crosstalk. A comparison with current philosophical theories of false memory and analysis showing the relevance for current psychological research and everyday life concludes the paper. (shrink)

This paper attempts to elucidate the nature of kinesthetic memory, demonstrate itscentrality to everyday human movement, and thereby promote fresh cognitive andphenomenological understandings of movement in everyday life. Prominent topics in this undertaking include kinesthesia, dynamics, and habit. The endeavor has both a critical and constructive dimension.

Critics have raised many moral and legal concerns about posthumous digital avatars. Here my focus instead falls on whether they are likely to enable the bonds with the dead that users apparently yearn for. I conclude that though posthumous avatars can have short-term therapeutic benefits in replicating “habits of intimacy” with the dead, users’ expectations for sustaining long-term bonds with the deceased via posthumous avatars are unlikely to be fulfilled. Posthumous avatars are unlikely to foster the construction of valued memories (...) of the deceased and could in fact impede this process. Furthermore, bonds that develop with posthumous avatars are likely to disappoint users’ expectations for relationships that echo relationships among the living in being temporally dynamic, open-ended, authentic, and mutually shaping. Simply put, users will struggle to sustain living relationships with dead people. Posthumous avatars are therefore likely to prove ill-suited to continue the bonds that the living have with the dead in either of these two forms, especially if a ‘digital afterlife industry’ emerges to commercialize these. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se analiza la relación entre las memorias inscritas en el cuerpo, el trauma y los recursos corporizados subjetivos y colectivos con los que cuentan las mujeres víctimas de violencia para reconstruir y resignificarse como personas dignas de credibilidad y agentes de cambio. Se refieren casos específicos de violencia sexual en Colombia y se expone la importancia de la creación de comunidades de confianza que propicien espaclos para la narración y escucha de los testimonlos de víctimas, la tramitación de conflictos (...) y nuevas vías de afrontamiento, a partir de los recursos que brinda la reinvención de hábitos corporizados en el arte. ABSTRACT The article analyzes the relation among memories inscribed in the body, trauma, and the subjective and collective embodied resources available to women victims of violence in order to reconstruct and resignify themselves as persons worthy of credibility and as agents of change. It discusses specific cases of sexual violence in Colombia and the importance of creating communities of trust that foster spaces for narrating and listening to the testimonies of victims, as well as for handling conflicts and exploring new ways of coping, on the basis of the resources provided by the reinvention of habits embodied in art. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Integrative Habit of Mind: John Henry Newman on the Path to Wisdom by Frederick D. AquinoDavid FleischackerAn Integrative Habit of Mind: John Henry Newman on the Path to Wisdom. By Frederick D. Aquino. DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012. Pp. x + 129. $29.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-87580-452-1.Frederick Aquino has spent a number of years digesting Newman’s thought and interfacing it with a number of (...) facets of modern epistemology that cover both the subjective and social conditions of knowledge. In this volume he focuses on qualities that lead to an integrative habit of mind specific to a pluralistic world filled with seemingly incommensurable horizons. Aquino [End Page 481] thinks that this integrative habit is the key to how we can live together in such a pluralistic context.The introduction identifies the meaning of an integrative habit of mind. It requires informed judgment and a growing understanding of the unity of things. To be clear, Aquino does not want to present the outlines of a perfected mind, one characterized by a particular set of judgments and beliefs. Rather, his point is that the human mind is always developing, and he is seeking what promotes that ongoing development in a pluralistic context. He gleans and develops these characteristics from Newman, whose lifelong work as an educator and pastor provides a fertile field of thought on this topic. Aquino dwells on three texts written by Newman: the University Sermons, The Idea of a University, and An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. These three texts especially are rich in describing the interior and social conditions of the development of the human intellect.The first chapter examines a wide umbrella of elements that fall under the heading of the personal and social conditions required of an integrative habit of mind. It starts with a need to attend to the particular way that a person has developed within a tradition because from that tradition the mind pushes forth to broaden its horizon within a fruitful matrix of interlocutors. Aquino describes this path as a sacramentally embodied integration of the mind. His formulation of the sacramental highlights how this knowledge of the world is a pointer to reality, but not the same as reality. Knowledge here is a kind of allegory.The second chapter explores how one comes properly to exercise the mind in real-world situations. Aquino notes that it is not always possible or reasonable reflectively to articulate the subjective and social conditions in which one reaches beliefs and judgments. So, how does one navigate this in life? The answer is a proper fit. All human beings have some innate capabilities or faculties, such as reason, memory, and the senses. Moving from an unreflective to a reflective use of these—or to use Newman’s language, from an uncultivated to a cultivated illative sense—depends upon a number of factors (e.g., who one has become, what one is doing, and the world in which one lives). One individual may be too young to shift to this reflective mode; another may be in the midst of a battle or asleep. The union of these personal and social conditions into a whole that determines whether one shifts into a reflective mode or not is the discovery of a proper fit. Again, recognizing this proper fit is the act of an integrative habit of mind.The third and final chapter introduces the last key facet of the integrative habit that leads to wisdom and a right use of the illative sense, namely, a “connected view.” Such a view brings together into relation a multitude of data and ideas. A connected view is one of the primary concerns in Newman’s Idea of a University, and it is essential to a university education. This is why Aquino spends a good portion of the chapter exploring practical ways within [End Page 482] the university that one can awaken and sustain this quest for a connected view.Throughout the book, the method used by the author strikes one as a manifestation of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s fusion of horizons, in this case the author’s horizon... (shrink)

In Aspiration, Agnes Callard examines the phenomenon of aspiration, the process by which one acquires values and becomes a certain kind of person. Aspiring to become a certain type of person involves more than wanting to act in certain ways. We want to come to see the world in a certain way and to develop the dispositions, attributes, and skills that allow us to seamlessly and effectively respond to situations. The skilled athlete or musician, for example, has developed the muscle (...) memory and the perceptual equivalent to naturally see what a situation requires and to respond well, whether playing a Rachmaninoff concerto or returning a tennis volley. -/- I use Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception to flesh out the process of becoming, through which aspired-to values, skills, and characteristics become part of one’s embodied being-in-the-world. Although some rightly focus on Merleau-Ponty’s efforts to avoid over-intellectualizing skillful action, without appreciating his distinction between habitual actions and human (or personal) acts, we overlook an important aspect of robust human agency—the way “a human act becomes dormant and is continued absent-mindedly as a reflex” (90). Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit and its relation to personal acts offers a rich and phenomenologically sensitive picture of aspiration. (shrink)

Bergson identifies multiple forms of memory throughout his work. In Matter and Memory, Bergson considers memory from the perspectives of both psychology and metaphysics, and he describes what we might refer to as contraction memory, perception memory, habit memory, recollection memory, and pure memory. Further, in subsequent works, Bergson discusses at least two additional forms of memory – namely, a memory of the present and a non-intellectual memory of (...) the will. However, it is often not clear how these different forms of memory relate to one another. With the aim of providing an overview of Bergson's philosophy of memory that can also serve as a point of entry to his philosophy as a whole, this article explores the different senses and forms of memory that Bergson describes, paying special attention to how they are distinct from one another and how they are unified. It is my intention to show that, although these various senses and forms of memory are different from one another , they are also continuous and unified insofar as they are equivalent to different tones of one's mental life and to different tensions of one duration. (shrink)

This article addresses cultural memory’s ability to address past and present injustices by focusing on the artistic-political practices displayed by the professional actresses of Roma descent from the independent theater the Giuvlipen in Bucharest. The founders of this Romani women-centered theater also have ‘invented’ the word ‘Giuvlipen’ – ‘feminism’ in the Romani language – because there had previously been no word to connote both the forms of oppression and the consciousness raising politics performed by Romani women. By applying the (...) lens of intersectional feminism, the argument this article aims to put forth is that Giuvlipen’s artistic performances can foster the awareness raising of the Romani women’s ‘double jeopardy’. At the same time, the artistic performances displayed by the Giuvlipen Theater challenge the habits of historical remembering and its politics of oblivion, which can in turn promote experiential forms of knowledge and new structures and archives of feelings. (shrink)

Henri Bergson is one of the few philosophers who both explicitly and extensively discusses the phenomenon of habit. In view of his engagement with habit, does Bergson develop a philosophically robust account of the phenomenon? Most commentary on his account of habit refers to his early work, Matter and Memory. In this paper, I begin by arguing that Bergson's treatment of habit in Matter and Memory is problematic because it does not adequately differentiate between (...) habit and material nature. Despite its neglect in secondary literature, Bergson also discusses habit in the first part of his final book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. With respect to this book, I subsequently show how Bergson deploys Ravaisson's distinction between instinct and habit to reconceptualize habit as the second of our two natures, our social nature. Lastly, I reconstruct Bergson's late contribution to the philosophy of habit: rather than a tendency that is hard to resist, habit is a resistance to which we tend to submit. By shedding light on the effort that we expend to adhere to them, Bergson's resistance account of habit advances an original and productive perspective on our social habits. (shrink)

몸의 기억은 일종의 암묵적 기억으로서 삶의 과정동안 형성된 지각습관과 운동 감각, 상황과 공간 경험 그리고 다른 사람과의 신체적 상호 작용을 통해 형성된 행위구조 속에 침전되어 평생 개인의 삶에 영향을 미친다. 그래서 몸의 기억은 언제나 삶의 세계에 뿌리를 두고 있으며, 개인이 살아온 삶의 역사가 담긴 자기 정체성의 근원이 되는 것이다. 따라서 개인의 인격의 지속성은 주체가 스스로 기술한 자기 서사에서 확인되는 것이 아니라, 암묵적으로 침전된 개인의 역사가 현재화되는 몸의 기억에서 근본적으로 확인되는 것이다. 그래서 몸의 기억은 우리가 항상 되돌아가는 전반성적인 자기 신뢰의 지점이며 (...) 자기정체성의 기반이 되는 것이다. 이러한 몸의 기억에 대한 현상학적 이해는 특히 치매를 앓고 있는 환자에게 세상에 대한 신뢰와 자기 자신에 대한 안정감을 되찾을 수 있는 돌봄의 방향을 제시해 줄 수 있다. 또한 뇌졸중 환자의 회복 체험에 대한 해석학적 현상학적 연구들은 몸의 회복이란 삶의 환경과 엮여 있는 생활습관, 가치관, 관심 등이 통합적으로 육화된 몸의 기억을 회복하는 데 있음을 보여준다. 따라서 몸의 기억에 대한 현상학적 이해는 뇌졸중환자, 치매환자에서 뿐만이 아니라 몸의 회복을 목표로 하는 다양한 의료 실천현장에서 신체적 자기 정체성의 회복을 위한 돌봄의 실천 방향을 제시해준다고 여겨진다. (shrink)

Prerequisite to memory is a past distinct from present. Because wave evolution is both continuous and time-reversible, the undisturbed quantum system lacks a distinct past and therefore the possibility of memory. With the quantum transition, a reversibly evolving superposition of values yields to an irreversible emergence of definite values in a distinct and transient moment of time. The succession of such moments generates an irretrievable past and thus the possibility of memory. Bohm’s notion of implicate and explicate (...) order provides a conceptual basis for memory as a general feature of nature akin to gravity and electromagnetism. I propose that natural memory is an outcome of the continuity of implicate time in the context of discontinuous explicate time. Among the ramifications of natural memory are that laws of nature can propagate through time much like habits and that personal memory does not require neural information storage. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish’s conception of memory has received little scholarly attention. Here, I taxonomize various notions of memory within her system, focusing primarily on a crucial distinction between what she calls ‘memory’ and what she calls ‘remembrance.’ I argue that Cavendish considers remembrance a more general and pervasive action in nature than memory. Memory, an action uniquely associated with animal creatures, refers to the animal’s reason storing past sense perceptions and conceptions such as thoughts, ideas, imaginations, (...) etc. Remembrances, or voluntary repetitions of past motions, manifest in two varieties. In the first, the animal retrieves perceptions or conceptions stored in memory. In the second, which all creatures exhibit, a creature’s parts voluntarily repeat past actions via custom or habit, such as in respiration and photosynthesis. These remembrances do not rely on anything stored in memory but derive directly from what Cavendish calls a creature’s ‘self-knowledge.’. (shrink)

ces, learning facts and gaining conceptual knowlge, recognizing objects and people, and acquiring ills and habits. Scientific thinking about memory was minated for many years by the assumption that mory is a unitary or monolithic entityRi2;a single ulty of the mind and brain. However, the assumpri of a unitary memory has been challenged by conging evidence from psychology and neuroscience inting toward multiple memory systems that can be sociated from one another. This chapter provides a torical introduction (...) to the issue and summarizes.. (shrink)

Abstract: The following is an outline of an emerging foundation for science that begins to explain living forms and their patterns of movement beyond the sphere of mechanistic interactions. Employing an event ontology based on a convergence of quantum physics and Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, coupled with the controversial yet promising theory of formative causation, this development will explore possible influences on the outcomes of events beyond any combination of external forces, laws of Nature, and chance. If it turns (...) out there are no such additional influences--beyond mechanistic causes--it is difficult to see how agency or free will could exist. Assuming agency exists, as Whitehead apparently does, while committing to an event ontology in which process is fundamental leads to interesting questions about the natures of any entities that might participate in events. Furthermore, what might the purposes and agendas of such entities be based upon, beyond memory traces or DNA code? This ontological model, recognizing processes as fundamental, leads to a revised cosmology where the trajectory of a series of events may be due to more than rearrangement of material bits according to external forces and where goal-directed, recurring processes and the emergence of mind are not so surprising. Just as special relativity reduces to classical treatment when speeds slow down, this scientific model for a living world reduces to mechanistic materialism whenever conditions are more limited. Though this development is based on a philosophy of process, there are some dissimilarities with respect to Whitehead’s particular version. (shrink)

Ockham developed two theories to explain the intentionality of memory: one theory that takes previously perceived things to be the objects of memory, and another that takes one’s own earlier acts of perceiving to be the objects of memory. This paper examines both theories, paying particular attention to the reasons that motivated Ockham to give up the first theory in favor of the second. It argues that the second theory is to be understood as a theory of (...) double intentionality. At the core of this theory is the thesis that one directly remembers one’s own acts, and indirectly also the objects of these acts. The paper analyzes the cognitive mechanism that makes this double intentionality possible and examines the causal account that Ockham gave for explaining the emergence of acts of remembering. It emphasizes that he accepted nothing more than a causal chain of acts and habits, thereby offering an ontologically parsimonious theory of memory. (shrink)

This paper seeks to respond to two questions posed by previous commentators concerning the arrangement of Trimalchio's porticus as described in Petronius’ Satyrica (Sat. 29): first, whether the freedman's house lacked an atrium; second, whether the cursores (runners) who are described as unconventionally exercising in the portico were pictorial representations or real-life athletes who would symbolize the social incompetence of the dominus. This paper argues that nothing in the text supports the interpretation of Trimalchio's house as having an unconventional architectural (...) layout. Instead, as the narrative requires that Encolpius move quickly towards the triclinium, in his description the loca communia appear conflated, while he only sparsely notices a few relevant elements of the decor. The presentation of Trimalchio's porticus appears to have a functional rather than a simply descriptive purpose: it symbolizes both Roman contemporary practices (the loca communia as a distinctive unit within the domus) and the influence of Greek cultural habits (the characteristic association of colonnaded courtyards and athletics). The excerpt that describes the guests’ arrival at Trimalchio's house, therefore, serves an important narrative function, providing essential information about the character's origins, self-image and social life. (shrink)

The chapter’s central question is how place and memory connect so intimately and how the architecture of buildings and rooms can play such a powerful role in memory. I develop an initial answer in two steps. First, I explicate Merleau-Ponty’s argument in the passivity lectures (IP ) that, contra classical concepts of memory as purely passive recording or purely active construction, memory entails a peculiar passivity that is not, however, wholly passive. Merleau-Ponty’s argument entails some deep (...) conceptual points about the ontology of temporality and spatiality that I briefly tackle. In the second step I flesh out these ontological points in terms of a passivity granted by bodily levels and habits. This let me show how place, as that through which we move and as intrinsic to movement, also grants a passivity crucial to memory, such that our memorial activity is fringed with and draws on a passivity that is beyond us in the places we inhabit. I make sense of this by conceptualizing such passivity, specifically as granted by places through which we move, as an “I already can” that is kin to a habit—but outside us. We thus find ourselves fringed with a peculiar habit through which we find our movements already passively woven into surrounding places. I suggest that architecture works to actively articulate this fringing habit, and that, like bodily habits, this fringing habit opens our future by keeping our past going—and thus garbs our movement with our past. To move in architectural places is thus to move to one’s future through the garb of one’s past and is thence to be fringed with memory. The key to this linkage between memory and place is the passivity of memory. (shrink)

The most effective—indeed, the only—way to make the future different from the past is, in the judgment of pragmatists such as William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, to remake the present. As Dewey notes, "present activity" is the only phase of human conduct really under our control (MW 14.184). 1 For just this reason, we must be mindful of the past and solicitous about the future as well as attuned to the present: "Memory of the past, observation (...) of the present, foresight of the future are indispensable. But they are indispensable to a present liberation, an enriching growth of action" unfolding in the here and now (MW 14.182). 2 Dewey goes so far as to assert: "We do not use the .. (shrink)

Dissociative symptoms are notorious for their enigmatic, disparate nature encompassing excessive daydreaming, memory problems, absentmindedness, and impairments and discontinuities in perceptions of the self, identity, and the environment. Recent studies (e.g., Koffel & Watson, 2009) have linked dissociative symptoms to vivid dreaming, nightmares, and objective sleep parameters (e.g., lengthening of REM sleep) for discussion, see (Van der Kloet et al., 2013). Germane to this link between dissociative symptomology and sleep, is the idea that in dissociative individuals, the waking state (...) as compared to REM sleep may be marked by an increase in “fluid” and hyperassociative thinking. Against this background, we invited contributions in the following areas: 1) a progressive and enduring de-differentation of wake and dream states of consciousness eventually results in schizophrenia (Llewellyn, 2011); a lesser degree of de-differentiation may have implications for dissociative symptoms; 2) sleep disturbances are not only linked to dissociation but to memory fragmentation also, further fuelling both dissociation and other manifestations of psychopathology; 3) sleep, memory and psychopathologies have complex interlinkages. Our summary below, relates the contributions to our topic to these areas. The contributing articles also give a comprehensive overview on current directions and challenges in these research fields.First, Soffer-Dudek elucidates why heightened sleep experiences (vivid dreams, nightmares, hypnagogic hallucinations) might be particularly associated with psychopathology. She explains how various psychopathologies may represent de-differentiation of the waking and dreaming states through intrusions of wake-like consciousness into sleep and dream-like cognition into wake. With regard to de-differentiation, she discusses theories of transliminality (‘thin boundaries between consciousness states’) and dissociation as potential mechanisms. Lucid dreaming is a hybrid state where wake-like cognition suffuses REM sleep/dreaming (Voss et al. 2009). Mota and colleagues compared the spontaneous occurrence of lucid dreaming in patients with psychotic symptoms (25 with schizophrenia and 20 with bipolar disorder) and 28 non-psychotic subjects. They found lucid dreaming was associated with psychosis- giving some support to the hypothesis of a link between state de-differentiation and psychopathology. In a methodological note, Ribeiro et al, having studied the prevalence of lucid dreaming using two questionnaires, show that the type of methodology used in lucid dreaming studies may have an effect upon their findings. Poerio et al state that both research and theory points to dissociation being engendered by the intrusion of dream-like mentation into waking consciousness. To extend this idea they examine the role of sleep and daydreaming as potentiating states for subsequent dissociation in depersonalization/derealization disorder (DDD). They show the occurrence and content of daydreams may act as potentiating states for heightened, in the moment, dissociation. Sleep paralysis is a dissociated state where a heightened level of wake-like alertness coexists with muscle atonia. Rodrigez de Sa and Mota-Rolim take a broad interdisciplinary perspective on sleep paralysis through reviewing its occurrence in Brazilian folklore by exploring the “Pisadeira” with a sleep science approach and link this with the field of history and art.There is now substantial evidence that active memory processing continues during sleep (see, for example, Rasch and Born (2013)) and dreaming may be involved (Llewellyn, 2013). De-differentiation of the wake, sleep and dream states would disrupt this memory processing fuelling dissociation and other psychopathologies. Horton presents an overview of discontinuity of consciousness in both wake and sleep, focusing on the processes of sleep-dependent memory consolidation and fragmentation. Nakagawa et al focus specifically on working memory and the relation with sleep. With their article, they are the first to investigate differences between verbal working memory (VWM) and visuospatial working memory (VSWM) related to daytime nap duration, nap frequency, and dream content recall frequency (DCRF). They discuss sex-related differences in the effects of sleep habits on VMW and VSWM and ascribe this to differences in underlying neural correlates, and effectiveness of sleep habits in males and females. Rosales-Lagarde and colleagues related to emotional memory by designing an extended International Affective Picture System (IAPS) instrument to measure bizarreness and show some interesting age and gender disparities. Finally, several authors took a developmental approach through focusing on sleep, memory and psychopathology in adolescents. Wang and colleagues show the relation between children and adolescents’ mental health and sleep problems in a 10-year longitudinal trial, and find anxiety, depression, attention problems and aggressive behaviour during childhood to be important predictors for later sleep problems. Importantly, sleep problems are also predictive of behavioural difficulties later in life. Nader, Murkar, and Smith investigated changes in sleep in adolescents between 12 and 19 years old following procedural task training and found that contrary to earlier work, there were no changes in sleep spindle density. Interestingly, participants who successfully learned the task showed no changes in their sleep stage proportions, but participants who were not successful showed a decrease in the proportion of Stage 2 and increases in both SWS and REM sleep, which is in line with the two stage model of sleep and memory by Smith et al. (2004).The self and the world during dreaming differ. The perceived world during waking depends on making sense of external sensory input, which engenders a strong sense of external reality in which the ‘self and its inner-world’ exists. Self-organizing during waking and dreaming enables integration of the self and the world in both states. It is noteworthy, that within this research topic so many novel themes have emerged and new questions and speculations have been posed with regards to relations among unusual sleep experiences – specifically lucid dreaming -, dissociation, psychosis, and memory. It brings together a richness of research by combining fields that originally have worked in isolation from each other. (shrink)

‘There is no place in the phenomenology of fully absorbed coping’, writes Hubert Dreyfus, ‘for mindfulness. In flow, as Sartre sees, there are only attractive and repulsive forces drawing appropriate activity out of an active body’1. Among the many ways in which history animates dynamical systems at a range of distinctive timescales, the phenomena of embodied human habit, skilful movement, and absorbed coping are among the most pervasive and mundane, and the most philosophically puzzling. In this essay we examine (...) both habitual and skilled movement, sketching the outlines of a multidimensional framework within which the many differences across distinctive cases and domains might be fruitfully understood. Both the range of movement phenomena which can plausibly be seen as instances of habit or skill, and the space of possible theories of such phenomena are richer and more disparate than philosophy easily encompasses. We seek to bring phenomenology into contact with relevant movements in psychological theories of skilful action, in the belief that phenomenological philosophy and cognitive science can be allies rather than antagonists. (shrink)

"The main spine of this book stems from a comprehensive series of interviews with subjects recalling their experiences of 1930s cinemagoing. Your feel the breath of life in these spectators, a rarity in film studies, thanks to the painstaking work contracting the interview subjects and recording and tabulating their testimony."- JUMPCUT In the 1930s, Britain had the highest annual per capita cinema attendance in the world, far surpassing ballroom dancing as the nation's favorite pastime. It was, as historian A.J.P. Taylor (...) said, the "essential social habit of the age." And yet, although we know something about the demographics of British cinemagoers, we know almost nothing of their experience of film, how film affected them, how it fit into their daily lives, what role cinema played in the larger culture of the time, and in what ways cinemagoing shaped the generation that came of age in the 1930s. In Dreaming of Fred and Ginger , Annette Kuhn draws upon contemporary publications, extensive interviews with cinemagoers themselves, and readings of selected film, to produce a provocative and perspective-altering ethno-historical study. Taking cinemagoers' accounts of their own experiences as both "the engine and product of investigation," Kuhn enters imaginatively into the world of 1930s cinema culture and analyzes its place in popular memory. Among the topics she examines are the physical space of the cinemas; the role film played in growing up; the experience of being a member of a cinema audience; film-inspired fantasies of American life; the importance of cinema to adolescence in offering role models, ideals of romance, as well as practical opportunities for courtship; and the sheer pleasure of watching such film stars as Fred Astaire, Ginger Rogers, Nelson Eddy, Ronald Colman, and many others. Engagingly written and painstakingly researched, with contributions to film history, cultural studies, and social history, Dreaming of Fred and Ginger offers an illuminating account of a key moment in British cultural memory. (shrink)

Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...) to satisfy the trade-off above when achieving goals of each type. While actions of the first two types depend on non-conceptual appraisals of a given intensity and valence, strategic intentions have a propositional format and guide action within longer-term executive frameworks involving prospective memory. (shrink)

Traditionally, Hume's account of memory is considered an individualist-atomic representational theory. However, textual evidence suggests that Hume's account is better seen as a first attempt to create a social theory of memory that considers social context, custom and habits, language, and logical structures as constitutive elements of memory.

The human body is not a given fact; it is not, as Descartes believed, a machine made up of flesh and bones. The body is acquired, achieved, and learned. It is thus full of mimetic and mnemonic implications. The body remembers, and it does so in collectively relevant ways. Gestures, corporeal and phonetic rhythms, affective idioms, and emotional styles perceptual, sensorial, motoric, and affective schemata are all largely learned in shared social contexts. These aspects of the embodied experience are often (...) consigned to habit, to bodily automatisms, and to corporeal memories that reflect aspects of culture. But if the body reflects certain aspects of culture that press to become naturalized and organically attached to social actors, it also resists these kinds of cultural pressures. These adaptive and resistive dynamics, as this book shows, are not without consequences for individuals and groups. These processes can result in both advantages and disadvantages for social actors. They can take us toward certain futures while foreclosing others. It is therefore necessary to understand how, why, and to what extent corporeal memories are constructed but also resisted, modified, or created anew. (shrink)

Traditional memory strategy training interventions improve older adults’ performance on tests of episodic memory, but have limited transfer to episodic memory tasks, let alone to everyday memory. We argue that an alternative approach is needed to assist older adults to compensate for age-related cognitive declines and to maintain functional capacity in their own natural ecologies. We outline a set of principles regarding how interventions can successfully train older adults to increase successful goal pursuit to reduce risks (...) of everyday memory failures. We argue that training individuals to use metacognitive self-regulatory strategies to proactively manage formulation and pursuit of daily goals can compensate for age-related cognitive changes and increase the likelihood of goal attainment. We then describe an intervention approach that instantiates these principles in a multi-modal intervention that is unique in its three-phase approach: individualized assessment of an individual’s current approaches to self-regulation; training memory strategies, self-management skills, and new habits of mind in a group training context; and a behavioral shaping period in which individuals receive coaching and feedback on their efforts to use trained procedures to improve everyday cognition. A recently completed study conducted an initial test of the intervention, with highly encouraging results. We advocate further efforts to replicate, extend, and fine-tune this type of intervention. The ultimate goal is to be able to deliver the intervention in a way that increases its potential reach, including to subpopulations of older adults at risk for everyday cognitive impairments. (shrink)

Inside the family, all individuals define their identity in relation to previous generations, the present ones, and the future ones. This intergenerational exchange plays important educational roles: it fosters a sense of belonging and identification, promotes dialogue, and guarantees the passing down of ethical orientations. In addition to feelings of security and reliance on others, family memory creates a matrix that gives people a placement in the world, a sort of existential code through which to be located in existence. (...) Fostering the habit of memory-making becomes therefore a major educational imperative, which however is not without challenges. The present contribution will consider those phenomena which can give rise to a weakening of bonds between generations and a growing exclusion of the ethical value of family heritage. The educational perspective that will be drawn is that of building a sense of alliance.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Alcaics In Exile: W. H. Auden’s “In Memory Of Sigmund Freud”Rosanna WarrenOn September 23, 1939, Sigmund Freud died in exile in London, a refugee from Nazi Austria. Within a month, Auden, who had been living in the United States since January of that year, wrote a friend in England that he was working on an elegy for Freud. 1 The poem appeared in The Kenyon Review early in (...) 1940. A stately public ode, the poem mourns not only the death of a publicly significant individual, but the collapse of a world. Hitler had overrun Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland; assaults on Jews had intensified; England and France had just declared war on Germany. There would be, indeed, many who would have to be mourned:When there are so many we shall have to mourn, when grief has been made so public, and exposed to the critique of whole epoch the frailty of our conscience and anguish,of whom shall we speak?...Someone encountering this poem for the first time, on the page or in the ear, might be pardoned for puzzling over its form. It sounds prosy. It seems to have some recognizable English cadences, pentameters (“[inline-graphic 01]”), tetrameters (“ ”), and even trimeters (“ ”). But the pattern seems unruly, with some [End Page 111] lines stretching out beyond five traditional beats, and ignoring any iambic order: “turned elsewhere with their disappointment as he.” Groping for a more satisfactory principle of organization, a reader with some knowledge of versification may be moved to count syllables. Such a reader will discover that the poem is indeed organized syllabically in lines of 11, 11, 9, and 10 syllables. “Aha,” says the reader, alert to Auden’s intimacy with Classical civilization: “A Horatian ode. Not inappropriate for a formal elegy.” Reflecting further, and leafing through the pages of Horace, that reader will find, or remember, that two thirds of Horace’s odes are in these quatrains, the alcaic stanza. Auden, it appears, has composed his elegy in some version of the meter of Alcaeus, the 7th century b.c.e. Greek poet whose stanza became second nature to Horace. And we cannot enter the world of Auden’s poem without asking, why alcaics? And how do they work here?“In Memory of Sigmund Freud” is sometimes said to be Auden’s first syllabic poem. 2 Others demur, proposing both earlier and later examples. 3 Whatever the spats about dating Auden’s early syllabic practice, scholars conventionally agree that his turn toward syllabic composition reflects his evolving interest in a discursive poetry; in the poet as a private intelligence with a public voice; and in the work, respectively, of Horace and Marianne Moore. Having identified the poem as syllabic, many critics move on to heftier topics like psychoanalysis versus Marxism, Auden more than most poets having laid himself open to an overridingly thematic criticism of Big Ideas. But if, having acknowledged the influence of Horace and Moore in Auden’s refusal of English iambic lyricism here, we stay with the question of meter, we are led back to the older progenitor, Alcaeus, a great poet of exile, whose stanza Auden adopts and adapts. I shall ask how it affects our reading to observe that the stanza itself has a genealogy, and brings its expressive burden to bear on Auden’s poem.“In Memory of Sigmund Freud” relies on a counterpoint of two metrical systems, the largely iambic accentual/syllabic system, traditional in English since Wyatt, and a flattened version of Greek quantitative meter, which was a musical notation of syllable length. For Auden, whose great prosodic facility was almost a handicap, the problem was, “not how to write in iambics but how not to write in them from automatic habit.” 4 Throughout his poetic life, he reached for cadences to interrupt the “natural” iambics, sometimes recalling the Old English alliterative beat, and often turning to ballads and popular tunes for rhythmical variation. By the late thirties, he was not only disillusioned [End Page 112] with the Spanish Civil War and his role as quasi-Socialist bard, but was seeking new compositional principles as well. Free verse was not an alternative: his ear required an evident... (shrink)

In a series of recent articles, including his Boyle Lecture, Rowan Williams has developed a theology of the role of intelligence and attention in spiritual life. There is a sense in which all intelligence is spiritual activity. Current approaches to intelligence are often mechanistic, but intelligence in spiritual life needs to be understood in a more embodied and organic way. Attention is often thought of as a matter of choosing which already‐formed objects to focus on. That overlooks the fact that (...) sensory information is often confusing and ambiguous, and neglects how habits of attention make the world appear more atomized than it really is. If we can learn restraint in how we impose order upon the world around us in attending to it, there is an opportunity to encounter the divine Spirit which is the source of all that we experience. That leads to a more participatory, less objectifying, way of engaging with the world. (shrink)

'Leading economists presenting fundamentally important issues in economic theory' is the theme of the Nancy Schwartz lectures series held annually at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management of Northwestern University. Reporting on lectures delivered in the years 1983 through 1997, this collection of essays discusses economic behavior at the individual and group level and the implications to the performance of economic systems. Using non-technical language, the speakers present theoretical, experimental, and empirical analysis of decision making under uncertainty and (...) under full and bounded rationality, the influence of economic incentives and habits, and the effects of learning and evolution on dynamic choice. Perfect competition, economic development, social insurance and social mobility, and negotiation and economic survival, are major economic subjects analyzed through our understanding of economic behavior. (shrink)

Marcel Proust’s works contain a lot of ideas consonant with the ideas that were actively discussed by philosophers of his time. Many philosophers focused on the issues of perception, memory, will, freedom, personal identity, etc., which constituted an important part of academic curriculum. Proust familiarized himself with the issues studying philosophy at the Lyceum (he was taught by Alphonse Darlu) and at the Sorbonne. In his novel In Search of Lost Time, Proust describes an existential experience of his character (...) viewing these issues from a particular perspective, through the prism of the main character’s lifelong search of his calling. He gradually proceeds from philosophical psychology exploring the interaction of memories and impressions in a particular perception, to philosophy proper, to metaphysics aimed at understanding the truth, at going beyond time. The article traces some moments of this transition, shows that for Proust it is not just the work of memory that is important but the emphasis on those states of consciousness where the present and the past coincide, merge, and thereby we go beyond time, to eternity. The author analyzes some images and signs that accompanied the character of the novel on the way to the realization of his calling. Particular attention is paid to the Proustian interpretation of the role of art in changing and enriching the perception of the world, as well as the importance in human life of a habit in which positive and negative aspects are highlighted. Proust himself believed that a work of art is an optical instrument through which the readers begin to discern in themselves what they would otherwise fail to see. His own novel was such an instrument. (shrink)

In Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricœur does not provide us with a clear definition of collective memory. In this article, we will try to show how it could nevertheless be described, based on the same text, as the capacity for recognition, by way of reciprocal attribution, memories that are engraved in temporal spaces and are shared with our neighbors and, through them, with strangers. To verify this hypothesis, we will analyse Ricœur’s reflection on architecture as public memory’s engraving (...) into space, presented for the first time in the text “Architecture et narrativité.” Lastly, we will consider imagination and bodily memory, i.e. habit emanating from the act of inhabiting, as the conditions of possibility for the crystallization of memories in shared places. (shrink)

The goal of this inquiry is to discover whether a plausible naturalistic case can be made for personal survival after death. Personal survival is defined, and a plausibility scale developed as a tool. ;Various analytical objections to survival are considered and rejected as faulty. A key empirical objection is then examined: namely, that personal identity depends on memories, memories are stored in the brain, and personal identity thus cannot survive the brain's death. First, we distinguish habit memories from "pure" (...) memories of individual events and insights; the latter alone are crucial to personal identity. We then review memory findings and cases in neurology, neurophysiology, psychology, psychiatry and phenomenology, concluding that brain storage of "pure" memories is highly implausible. This being so, the memory argument against personal survival fails. ;A plausible self-structure is proposed, with pure memories lodged in the inmost self, fed by the experiencing self. Further evidence and argument indicate, with moderate plausibility, that the inmost/experiencing self is not reducible to, or identical with, or intextricably dependent on, the brain; nor is it merely a cell in the social web or the natural environment. ;Further inquiry suggests that survival of the inmost/experiencing self, after death of the organic self, coheres with a defensible ontology. Building on insights of recent philosophers of becoming, this ontology grounds human existence in temporality or real duration, stretching from birth to death. In this system our mental life, largely in the inmost self, greatly overflows our cerebral life, so that, as Bergson wrote, "survival becomes so probable that the onus of proof falls on him who denies it rather than on him who affirms it." ;The inquiry then widens and deepens this ontological discussion, without entering into theology, and also offers some speculation on what a naturalistic personal survival might be like. The inquiry concludes that such survival is plausible, that is, its reality is supported by substantial evidence outweighing the opposing evidence. (shrink)

Ervin Laszlo's concept of the Akashic Field includes the idea of a cosmic memory. This field is a universal field, and Laszlo's (2004) scientific starting point is the physics of the vacuum underlying space itself. A similar idea of a memory in nature arises from the hypothesis of formative causation, with its central concept of morphic fields. This hypothesis arose from biology rather than physics. Morphic fields help to explain embryology, biological development, habits, memories, instincts, telepathy, and the (...) sense of direction. They have an inherent memory. In its most general form this hypothesis implies that many of the so-called laws of nature are more like habits. (shrink)

Van Vugt, van der Velde, and collaborators show how cognitive architectures can implement verbal theories of psychiatric problems. They show how one theory of depressive rumination can be implemented in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture by changing the contents of its simulated memory. These manipulations of memory habits lead the model to show impairments in a sustained attention task‐‐a plausible impairment given that people who suffer from depression have concentration complaints.