Lately, it seems a number of philosophical memory theories are incorporating false memory phenomena into their conceptual frameworks. At the same time, scientific research is extending its analysis of false memories to nondeclarative forms of memory. However, both sides have paid little attention to the notion of false procedural memory. Yet, from everyday experience as well as from psychological investigation, we are aware of different ways procedural memory goes wrong. Here, I characterize the conceptual foundation of false procedural memory. First, (...) I distinguish remembering-how from knowing-how by proposing that remembering-how requires the performance of an act. Accordingly, genuine remembering-how is characterized as the performance of an act for which a respective ability has been acquired that is instrumental in the execution of said act. False remembering-how is identified as a kind of error where a subject acquires the ability to perform a certain act, which is then correctly executed, but is not what the subject tried to perform. This framework of false procedural memory is delineated from notions of interference and crosstalk. A comparison with current philosophical theories of false memory and analysis showing the relevance for current psychological research and everyday life concludes the paper. (shrink)

Memories and emotions are both vital parts of everyday life, yet crucial interactions between the two have scarcely been explored. While there has been considerable research into how emotions can influence how well things are remembered, whether or not emotions themselves can be remembered is still a largely uncharted area of research. Philosophers and scientists alike have diverging views on this question, which seems to stem, at least in part, from different accounts of the nature of emotions. Here, I try (...) to answer this question in a way that takes an intuitive notion of emotion and includes both scientific as well as philosophical aspects of both emotions and memory. To do this, I first distinguish between two different ways emotions can be expressed: as certain physiological responses, or as certain conscious experiences. Next, I show how each of these expressions of emotions can be remembered. Finally, I bring these two ways of expressing emotions, and the ways of remembering each of them, together into an explanation that also includes aspects often ascribed to emotions such as cognition. This interdisciplinary endeavor aims to serve as a starting point on what it could mean to remember emotions, and in doing so tries to build a bridge between scientific research and philosophical investigation of the memory of emotions. (shrink)

Recently, several philosophers have argued that, when faced with moral uncertainty, we ought to choose the option with the maximal expected choiceworthiness (MEC). This view has been challenged on the grounds that it is implausibly demanding. In response, those who endorse MEC have argued that we should take into account the all-things-considered choiceworthiness of our options. I argue that this gives rise to another problem: acts that we consider to be supererogatory are rendered impermissible, and acts that we consider to (...) be suberogatory are rendered obligatory, under MEC. I suggest a way to reformulate MEC to solve this problem. (shrink)

We are typically near-future biased, prioritising our present and near-future interests over our own distant-future interests. This bias can be directed at others as well, prioritising their present and near-future interests over their distant-future interests. I here argue that, given these biases, and given a plausible limit on the extent to which we can permissibly prioritise our present interests over the present interests of strangers, we are morally required to prioritise the present interests of strangers over our distant-future interests. I (...) also argue that a similar conclusion holds even if we are near biased only towards ourselves, and regardless of whether this bias is rational. And I show that my conclusions have interesting implications for the ethics of charitable giving, because they generate moral pressure to donate to charity those funds that would otherwise have gone into our long-term savings. (shrink)

Most people have the intuition that, when we can save the lives of either a few people in one group or many people in another group, and all other things are equal, we ought to save the group with the most people. However, several philosophers have argued against this intuition, most famously John Taurek, in his article ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ They argue that there is no moral obligation to save the greater number, and that we are permitted to save (...) either the many or the few. I argue in this article that, even if we are almost completely persuaded by these ‘numbers sceptics’, we ought not to just save the few. If the choice is simply between saving the many or the few, we ought to save the many. (shrink)

Recently, several philosophers have argued that, when faced with moral uncertainty, we ought to choose the option with the maximal expected choiceworthiness (MEC). This view has been challenged on the grounds that it is implausibly demanding. In response, those who endorse MEC have argued that we should take into account the all-things-considered choiceworthiness of our options when determining the maximally choiceworthy option. In this paper, I argue that this gives rise to another problem: for the most part, acts that we (...) consider to be supererogatory are rendered impermissible, and acts that we consider to be suberogatory are rendered obligatory, under MEC. This problem arises because, when we factor in prudential reasons, we often have most reason, or most expected reason, to act in accordance with our interests. I suggest a way to reformulate MEC so that prudential reasons only make acts permissible or non-obligatory, without ever making acts obligatory or wrong under moral uncertainty. (shrink)

Peraḳim 1-12 - ḥeleḳ 2 be-sefer ha-tanya, be-tosefet beʼurim u-marʼe meḳomot, mahadurah 2 ʻim hosafot ṿe-tiḳunim.

ḥelek 1. kolel beʼurim ʻal pereḳ ha-haḳdamah le-Shaʻar ha-yiḥud ṿeha-emunah. "Ḥanokh la-naʻar" --.

ḥeleḳ 1. Be-Sefer ha-Zohar ha-ḳadosh ṿe-Tiḳune ha-Zohar, hashmaṭot ha-Zohar, Zohar ḥadash, Sefer ha-Bahir --.

1. Ḳlorshṭeln dem emes̀'n Toyrehdign 'ṿeg tsu a gliḳlikh leb' durkh arbeṭn af di mides̀ on darfn nutsn profesyonale ṭerapi. Ṿen darfn yo nutsn ṭerapi un ṿos iz der rikhṭiger tsugang dertsu. A breyṭe erḳlerung iber di yesoydes̀ fun Idishḳeyṭ.

ḥeleḳ 1. Peraḳim 1-34 -- ḥeleḳ 2. Peraḳim 35-53.

1. Lo taḥamod. Lo titʼaṿeh. Lo taḥanifu. Isur genevat daʻat. Lo teḳalel. Lo tiḳom ṿe-lo tiṭor -- ḥeleḳ 2. Lo tiśna ṿa-ahavat le-reʻakha. Ahavat ha-ger -- ḥeleḳ 3. Onaʼat devarim. Hilkhot panim. Onaʼat ha-ger -- ḥeleḳ 4. Isur hakaʼah. Mitsṿot maʻaḳeh. Shemirat ha-guf -- ḥeleḳ 6. Kibud av ṿe-em. Kibud melamde ha-Torah ve-ḥakhameha. Kibud kohen.