Тема свободи є наскрізною для західної філософської традиції. Питання її тлумачення бентежило філософський дискурс Заходу з часів античності, находило свої варіанти у Середньовіччі, трансформувалося в Нові часи. У сучасному вигляді, але в мультиверсному розумінні, представлено постмодерністською філософською традицією. Автор статті порушує питання розуміння поняття «свобода» східною філософською традицією на прикладі раннього конфуціанства. Відзначається, що розуміння теми свободи у філософії у Давньому Китаю докорінно відрізняється від західного. Пояснюється, що терміна «свобода» в давній китайській традиції власне не існувало. Це поняття розумілося філософськими (...) течіями Китаю як само собою зрозуміле, а щодо конфуціанської традиції воно розчинялось у головних для неї питаннях – про природу людину та способи гідної соціальної взаємодії. (shrink)

This book rewrites the story of classical Chinese philosophy, which has always been considered the single most creative and vibrant chapter in the history of Chinese philosophy. Works attributed to Confucius, Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, Han Feizi and many others represent the very origins of moral and political thinking in China. As testimony to their enduring stature, in recent decades many Chinese intellectuals, and even leading politicians, have turned to those classics, especially Confucian (...) texts, for alternative or complementary sources of moral authority and political legitimacy. Therefore, philosophical inquiries into core normative values embedded in those classical texts are crucial to the ongoing scholarly discussion about China as China turns more culturally inward. It can also contribute to the spirited contemporary debate about the nature of philosophical reasoning, especially in the non-Western traditions. -/- This book offers a new narrative and interpretative framework about the origins of moral-political philosophy that tracks how the three normative values, humaneness, justice, and personal freedom, were formulated, reformulated, and contested by early Chinese philosophers in their effort to negotiate the relationship among three distinct domains, the personal, the familial, and the political. Such efforts took place as those thinkers were reimagining a new moral-political order, debating its guiding norms, and exploring possible sources within the context of an evolving understanding of Heaven and its relationship with the humans. Tao Jiang argues that the competing visions in that debate can be characterized as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the guiding norm for the newly imagined moral-political order, with the Confucians, the Mohists, the Laoists, and the so-called fajia thinkers being the major participants, constituting the mainstream philosophical project during this period. Thinkers lined up differently along the justice-humaneness spectrum with earlier ones maintaining some continuity between the two normative values (or at least trying to accommodate both to some extent) while later ones leaning more toward their exclusivity in the political/public domain. Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were the outliers of the mainstream moral-political debate who rejected the very parameter of humaneness versus justice in that discourse. They were a lone voice advocating personal freedom, but the Zhuangist expressions of freedom were self-restricted to the margins of the political world and the interiority of one's heartmind. Such a take can shed new light on how the Zhuangist approach to personal freedom would profoundly impact the development of this idea in pre-modern Chinese political and intellectual history. (shrink)

This essay aims to explore the meaning of freedom from a comparative perspective, focusing on critical comparisons between the discourses of liberalism and Neo-Confucianism. In so doing, my specific purpose is to characterize one of the possible, and perhaps the most plausible, presentations of Confucian liberalism as a perfectionist form of Hegelian liberalism. The contents are organized into three major sections.To begin with, thanks largely to Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” and Chang Fo-ch’üan’s Tzu-yu yü jen-ch’üan, an asymmetry emerged (...) in conceptualizing negative and positive freedom in the Chinese context; this development suggests that whereas negative.. (shrink)

This book traces the trajectory of traditional Chinese ethics from West Zhou Dynasty through Qing Dynasty and covers a myriad of Chinese philosophers who have expressed their ideas about the relationships between Heavenly Dao vs. Earthly Dao, Good vs. Evil, Morality vs. Legality, Knowledge vs. Behavior, Motive vs. Result, Righteousness vs. Profitability, Rationality vs. Animality. In this book, the readers can find Confucius’s discussion on Rite and Benevolence, Lao Zi’s meditation on Inaction of Great Dao, Zhuang Zi’s (...) elaboration on “Transcendental Freedom”, Mohist utilitarian “Universal Love”, and Mencian theory of “Primordial Good Humanity”, to name just a few phenomenal figures. A compact yet elaborate, panoramic yet profound guidebook to traditional Chinese ethical thought, this book is an excellent window to showcase traditional Chinese mental and spiritual legacy. Composed, translated, and proofread by brilliant scholars, it produces a fluent and coherent English discourse of Chinese morality and ethics, nimbly spinning together the threads of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and other ideological schools with brief references to the historical situation. Consequently, it provides English readers, especially those curious about Chinese psychology and rationality, with thought-provoking and horizon-expanding perspectives, and provides Chinese readers, especially those of philosophy and translation, with a great number of typical and characteristic quotes of archaic Chinese that have never been translated before. Ultimately, it is a fundamental threshold to learning about Chinese people, Chinese culture, Chinese morality, Chinese mentality, Chinese policy, and Chinese diplomacy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Chinese Buddhism and the Threat of Atheism in Seventeenth-Century EuropeThierry MeynardWhen the Europeans first came to Asia, they met with the multiform presence of Buddhism. They gradually came to understand that a common religious tradition connected the different brands of Buddhism found in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Japan, and China. I propose here to examine a presentation of Buddhism written in Guangzhou by the Italian Jesuit Prospero Intorcetta (1626-1696) (...) around the year 1668. This text was later edited by the Flemish Jesuit Philippe Couplet (1623-1693) and published in Paris in 1687, within an encyclopedia on Chinese thought titled Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (The Chinese Philosopher Confucius, hereafter called CSP).In the first part of this study, I shall introduce the background of the Jesuit encounter with Buddhism, first in Japan and then in China, as well as their literary production on the subject. Then, I shall examine Intorcetta's presentation of Chinese Buddhism, especially his understanding of the two faces of Buddhism: Pure Land Buddhism, which he categorized as superstition, and Chan Buddhism, categorized as atheism. These two notions of superstition and atheism seem contradictory, but in fact they are derived from Intorcetta's interpretation of the Buddhist theory of the "two truths." I shall conclude with an evaluation of Intorcetta's account. Because this early presentation of Buddhism exists only in Latin, I have inserted excerpts that I have translated.Historical Background of the Encounter with BuddhismSince the sixteenth century, missionaries have traveled to different regions of Asia and collected information about the religions they encountered, including Buddhism. They also exchanged information among themselves, asking questions of colleagues in order to confirm and complete information. The missionary reports were sent to Europe for their superiors and were sometimes published as such, but more often incorporated into larger works. [End Page 3]The First Encounter, from Japan to ChinaAmong the first reports reaching Europe about Buddhism were the letters of the Spanish Jesuit Francis-Xavier (1506-1552), who drew information from Yajiro, a Japa nese he met in Malacca in 1547. During his own stay of more than two years in Japan, in 1549-1551, Francis-Xavier had exchanges with monks and could progress in his understanding of Buddhism. His letters were very influential among the network of Jesuit schools in Europe, being copied and read at many venues.1 Other missionaries in Japan, like Cosme de Torres (1510-1570), Luís Fróis (1532-1597), and Baltasar Gago (1515-1583), went further in understanding Buddhism.Also, when, at the end of the sixteenth century, the Jesuit missionaries approached Buddhism in China, their understanding was already shaped by fifty years of knowledge gained in Japan. Just as in Japan, the China Jesuits were interested in Buddhism because it provided them with an indigenous vocabulary in which to express Christian ideas. Thus, the missionary was perceived as a kind of Buddhist monk. The symbolic identification with Buddhism went even further than in Japan, because for more than ten years in Guangdong, from 1579 to 1595, they adopted Buddhist dress and shaved their heads.However, as the missionaries deepened their understanding of the Buddhist doctrine, they realized that many tenets could not be reconciled with Christianity. Since they were greatly concerned about disseminating the orthodox faith and avoiding dubious theories, which they believed to be the tricks of the devil, they distanced themselves from Buddhism and became closer to Confucianism, whose discourse, which focused on moral life in the present world, did not directly conflict with the supernatural truths of Christianity. While Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) had initially started interacting with Chinese culture by using Buddhism, later on Ricci abandoned this approach and started to use Confucianism as the main medium. In the Tianzhu shiyi (True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven), Ricci wrote for his Chinese readers a strong refutation of the Buddhist doctrine from the standpoint of Aristotelian philosophy.2 He criticized the concept of selflessness (wuwo) on metaphysical grounds, writing that everyone should draw their existence from an ultimate origin. In his Della entrata della Compagnia di Gesù e Christianità nella China (Entry of the Society of Jesus into... (shrink)

Is freedom a Western concept? As a multifaceted human experience it seems fairly transcultural. Freedom is hardly a focus of philosophical discourses in China as it is in the West, and I suppose this partly accounts for the difficulty in tracking freedom and closely related notions of agency, choice, and autonomy in Chinese philosophy.Over four decades ago Herbert Fingarette raised the controversial idea about the absence of freedom in Confucian ethics. Although not intending to denigrate, Fingarette raised a (...) polemic that has lingered to the present.1 A. C. Graham noted the sour upshot of the issue when writing that "the claim that the concept of moral choice is foreign to Confucius has offended... (shrink)

"Nivison brings out the exciting variety within Confucian thought, as he interprets and elucidates key thinkers from over two thousand years, from Confucius himself, through Mencius and Xunzi, to such later Confucians as Wang Yangming, Dai Zhen, and Zhang Xuecheng."--Cover.

Chris Fraser presents a rich and broad-ranging study of the culminating period of classical Chinese philosophy, the third century BC. He offers novel and informative perspectives on Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, Legalism, and other movements in early Chinese thought while also delving into neglected texts such as the Guanzi, Lu's Annals, and the Zhuangzi 'outer' chapters, restoring them to their prominent place in the history of philosophy. Fraser organizes the history of Chinese thought topically, devoting separate (...) chapters to metaphysics and metaethics, political philosophy, ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and philosophy of language and logic. Focused specifically on the last century of the Warring States era, arguably the most vibrant, diverse period of philosophical discourse in Chinese history, the discussion covers the shared concerns, rival doctrines, and competing criticisms presented in third-century BC sources. Fraser explicates the distinctive issues, conceptual frameworks, and background assumptions of classical Chinese thought. He aims to introduce the philosophical discourse of early China to a broad audience, including readers with no prior familiarity with the material. At the same time, the thematic treatment and incisive interpretations of individual texts will be of interest to students and specialists in the field. (shrink)

1 Introduction1 In the 1980s, hermeneutics was often incorporated into deconstructionism and literary theory. Rather than focus on authorial intentions, the nature of writing itself including codes used to construct meaning, socio-economic contexts and inequalities of power,2 Gadamer introduced a different perspective; the interplay between effects of history on a reader’s understanding and the tradition(s) handed down in writing. This interplay in which a reader’s prejudices are called into question and modified by the text in a fusion of understanding and (...) topic revitalized the study of the printed word. Gadamer’s turn to language for understanding the meaning of Being also appealed to the post-modern antipathy toward modernity and metaphysics.3 If the truth and validity of interpretations are limited to communities of language, then our mode of being in history cannot but be historical. This point of view rendered Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics vulnerable to the critique of moral and epistemological relativism. However, Gadamer’s theory of interpretation also stems from re-examination of the beginning of knowledge in the Pre-Socratics and Plato, and on this basis, is receptive to another dimension of inquiry than that which was trending in North America. -/- At the East-West Center, University of Hawai’i at Manoa in 1982, Chung-ying Cheng for the first time introduced onto-hermeneutics to an audience of esteemed philosophers including Li Zehou, Ren Jiyu, Feng Youlan, and Zhang Liwen.4 In contrast to schools of deconstruction and literary theory that had disengaged the interpreter from trans-historical sources of meaning and truth, Cheng explained that interpreters exist within a cosmological order inextricable from responsibility to harmonize Heaven and Earth in creative acts of interpretation. By integrating Chinese cosmology into hermeneutics through ontology, he tacitly challenged philosophers in the West to re-examine assumptions about humanity’s place in nature and by implication, Gadamer’s recovery of the beginnings of knowledge in Western philosophy. -/- Cheng’s Neo-Confucianism is inspired by the method and goals of Thomé H. Fang. The following words by Fang seem to prefigure, although in an indistinct and bundled way, aspects of Cheng’s philosophy including a Mencian theory of human nature, comprehensive observation, and creativity: “In the very process of living in concord with creative Nature, Man is charged with an ideal to be fully realized in the light of the principle of comprehensive harmony.”5 Like Fang, Cheng reinvigorates Chinese culture and language, but not solely in order to vindicate the insights of Neo-Confucianism. He has studied Western thought, from pragmatism and the analytic school to German idealism and phenomenology, to unlock and clarify philosophical concepts within the Yijing tradition and thereby render them intelligible to Anglophones. The result has been an awakening of Western scholars to the moral and cultural consequences of decoupling their thought from metaphysical foundations that are neither dogmatic nor doctrinal. -/- Not unlike the dialectic of Gadamer’s dialogue form, onto-generative hermeneutics integrates contrary positions on the same topic in order to blend both sides into a world philosophy, or as Cheng says, a “totalizing or integrative theory,”6 not to be confused with a theoretical rewording of a theory. On the contrary, the universal scope and relevance of hermeneutics stems from personal experience. Just as Gadamer, in response to faction and strife, immersed himself in Plato during the war years, and developed a method with which to harmonize opposites, so too, according to On-cho Ng, was Cheng moved by faction, strife and political persecution to develop a path toward unity.7 Gadamer taught at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, and Cheng at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa among other institutions in North America. They facilitated trans-continental educational and cultural ties. Similar experiences yield similar insights irrespective of differences of time and place. Hence, authors in this issue who reside in Europe, China and North America, delineate the differences between Gadamer and Cheng, yet also, in light of Cheng’s onto-generative method and cosmology, develop integrative theories. Due to the page-budget restriction of the publisher, certain articles of this special theme will be subsequently published in the next issue. -/- 2 Integrative Theory This special issue of The Journal of Chinese Philosophy confirms a dimension of hermeneutics that Cheng has both motivated and inspired. The contributors do not abide by the conviction that since thought is mediated by language, interpretations cannot transcend culture. On the contrary, their research exemplifies the fruits of trans-historical onto-dialogical hermeneutics within limits defined by their field inquiry, organized into Parts I and II, around three themes: language, the philosophy of history and ethics. -/- Andrew Fuyarchuk introduces the theme of ontology in relation to Gadamer’s turn to language. Fuyarchuk argues that Chung-ying Cheng’s criticism of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is informed by Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and thereby overlooks how Gadamer’s Platonic-Pythagorean problem of the division between the One and Many is harmonized in the event of language, which in turn positions Gadamer in proximity to the presupposed grounds of receptivity in Cheng’s onto-generative hermeneutics. Lauren Pfister’s contributing article addresses the year 2000 meeting between Cheng and Gadamer in Heidelberg and expands the transhistorical grounds of meaning in Gadamer to matters of theology. Pfister’s summary of the written Chinese record of their conversation indicates that Cheng does not address the role of Christian philosophy and hence, the role of the inner word in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. This is important not only for detecting changes in Cheng’s philosophical development, but also for modifying his hermeneutics along the lines of a living conversation, possibilities explored by Pfister in a sequel to the article submitted to this issue. Nevertheless, by raising the issue of how Gadamer’s turn to language for understanding the meaning of Being extends possibilities in Cheng’s thought, Pfister anticipates the article by Katarina Gajdosova. She returns to the roots of Chinese thought during the Warring States period and broadens the meaning of names in recently excavated texts. Contrary to the conventions about how to understand terms, she appeals to both Heidegger’s ontology and Cheng’s notion of receptivity and creativity to reinterpret naming in relation to cosmology. Along the same lines, insofar as the event of Being is lingual, Jay Goulding captures its emergent structure in an evolving community of scholars and scholarship. He recalls his philosophical journey toward Cheng’s philosophy that begins in conversations with Gadamer at McMaster University in Hamilton, leads to Heidegger and Asian thought, expands into turning points with teachers and colleagues from various backgrounds that by increments contributed to Goulding’s formulation of “Daoist phenomenology.” -/- Although differing traditions guide their inquiries and research, Cheng and Gadamer recall the wisdom of the past to ameliorate the fragmentation in contemporary life. This leads them to re-examine the origins of philosophy; historical roots and thus sources of creative re-interpretations East and West whose affinities are developed in contributions by Hyun Höchsmann and Friederike Assandri. Höchsmann assesses convergences and divergences in the origins of Chinese and Western philosophy (Confucius and Socrates, the Yijing and Pre-Socratics) that culminates in pairing Gadamer’s understanding of paideia in the context of Plato’s political cosmology in the Timaeus with moral and social cultivation in The Western Inscription. She delineates the limits of this comparison which in turn justifies introducing Vattimo’s notion of locality. Assandri’s comparative analysis moves between India and China, Buddhism and Tang Daoism. Based on Gadamer’s argument that writing detaches concepts from their cultural moorings, she defines and applies three levels of understanding in onto-generative hermeneutics to Buddhist terms that were assimilated into the Benji Jing and in so doing clarifies essential dimensions of Daoism. -/- Contributions by Stephen Palmquist and Nicholas Brasovan position Cheng in relation to Kant and Gadamer by way of Aristotle’s ethics respectively. On the one hand, Palmquist plots Cheng’s evolving criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy and draws on crucial dimensions of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to reposition that criticism in a constructive relation to Kant’s emphasis on the philosophical conditions of morality while also indicating how religious dimensions of his thought answer Cheng’s concerns for lived moral action. For Palmquist, Gadamer enables a constructive criticism of Cheng. On the other hand, Brasovan compares Cheng’s Yijing-based account of moral deliberation with Gadamer’s Aristotelian-based ethics and reasons that in contrast to Cheng, Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness is disengaged from practical knowledge. For Brasovan, Cheng is a constructive critic of Gadamer. Palmquist and Brasovan’s divergent angles on Gadamer and Cheng map onto a dialectic of contrast and complementarity that constitutes the inner logic of Cheng’s philosophy. In other words, Gadamer and Cheng ought to be read alongside one another for the sake of removing discrepancies and contradictions, which constitutes the organic structure of their thinking. -/- 3 Our Mode of Being in History Is Not Historical The conversations between Cheng and Gadamer in this issue of The Journal of Chinese Philosophy pivot on language, philosophy of history and ethics within a comparative framework of analysis, but also explore the grounds that make the comparisons possible. Those grounds are informed by Chinese cosmology, and function to wrest Gadamer from the shadow of Heideggerian facticity and reposition him within the range of Cheng’s ideas about our place in nature that is embedded in his question about how mind emerges from inorganic matter.8 -/- For Gadamer scholars of Heidegger, human finitude, our ownmost individuating death ensures that hermeneutics is always open to the other as other, always on the way toward understanding the meaning of Being. To arrest the process in a concept of “the Absolute” cannot but represent someone’s point of view, and thereby render hermeneutics indistinguishable from ideology. However, insofar as finitude is defined by them in terms of an onto-theological concept of immorality, finitude is a metaphysical concept consistent with epistemologies and confuse beings with the meaning of Being. As a result, the celebrated political value of hermeneutics to always be on the way toward an understanding of the meaning of Being admits subtle variations on the same worldview that are insufficiently self-critical. -/- Gadamer scholars of Heidegger are right. A transformation in ethos and opening to the meaning of Being depends on awareness of finitude. Yet this awareness does not yield openness to more of the same, i.e., discourse structurally incapable of coming to unity but instead, for both Gadamer and Cheng, openness to a distinctly different ontological dimension of reality. As Sandra Wawrytko and So-Seong Park indicate,9 this ontological dimension is prefigured in the experience of being-as-a-whole or the totality of all possible relations in both Chinese totemic shamanistic rituals,10 and Greek Dionysian festivals.11 Through these religious experiences human ethos and therefore consciousness is expanded and elevated from being centered on one’s ownmost concerns toward an affinity with all sentient beings from insects and plants to animals. The channel for this affinity is an auditory disposition and hence, the emotions, compassion, and feeling response. -/- The capacity for an auditory disposition, or as Gadamer calls it, listening consciousness to respond to the inter-relationality and therefore inherent balance of nature is developed through music, song and dance of the religious rituals and festivals. They facilitate the unity of mind with nature. This use of music, that transforms ordinary consciousness, explains Cheng’s emphasis on the receptivity of feeling response in comprehensive observation, and Gadamer’s emphasis on openness to the other in attunement. However, an auditory disposition characteristic of pre-literate oral cultures that reveals the “All” need not rely on religion. As theorists about the evolution of language have explained,12 modern languages preserve their pre-historical past in music or prosody. That is to say, the song and dance that revealed the totality of inter-related beings to an ethos of comprehensive observation and attunement toward beings in classical civilizations is retained in the back-and-forth movement or rhythm of the dialogue form. Our mode of being in history is a mode of being in nature – through the music of language. -/- While alerting the reader to the limits of a nominalist interpretation, Gadamer expresses the inner law of the nature as follows: “in perishing there is always becoming, and in becoming there is always perishing.”13 Considered in process, opposites generate and blend into each other. This law of nature applies to everything.14 Hence, in a manner comparable to Pfister’s concluding insights, onto-dialogical hermeneutics is not only open to discrete events of otherness but moreover, to the moving structure of reality expressed, as Gajdosova suggests, in the existential moment of naming. Considered as interplay of tension and resolution with a life of its own, the dialectic of a dialogue is self-similar to the way in which an organism grows (by instinct). There is, therefore, a sense in which the art of interpretation extends the human mind into the eternal cycles of nature such that we participate in the articulation of the inner telos/homeostasis toward which all beings strive and importantly for Gadamer scholars of Heidegger, within the material limits of energy to which our embodied minds are self-evidently subject. In mortality there is always immortality. (shrink)

Confucius is finally rehabilitated. Party dignitaries kneel at his ancestral shrine. The benevolent Confucian is a new image of China for the outside, and for Chinese dealing with the collapse of ideology and the moral fabric of their society. The word tianxia is usually translated “all under Heaven.” It has a complicated history and a complicated contemporary appropriation in a desperate ideology-cum-PR campaign. The tianxia-idea is that China has for millennia been a government of all under heaven. It (...) was such a government in the past, is one today, and offers the whole world its benevolent alternative to liberalism and democracy. More than one contributor to this strong collection of interesting essays suspects that the Confucian revival is an act of desperation. As soft power, Confucianism may be no match for global capitalism. Soft power is not readily synthesized by official campaign. Its genuine source is in everyday life, and the life of ordinary Chinese is without much resonance beyond its borders. The whole world uses Chinese electronics, though almost none but the Chinese read their books, watch their television, or listen to their music. The world’s love affair with China is fixated on the economic numbers and is no less capricious. It has never been clear whether tianxia means a cultural realm without political boundaries, as is urged by modern ideologists, or is just another word for China, which is how modern Chinese dictionaries explain it. On the official account, membership in “all under Heaven” is a matter of shared culture, sustained by affective ties rather than coercion, but it is a culture that values order over freedom, ethics over law, and authority over democracy and human rights. Outsiders worry that tianxia is the cloak of a rising hegemon. However, the important audience for lofty talk of tianxia may be internal. Whether foreigners really trust it may be less urgent than for the Chinese to believe it about themselves. Postsocialist China has no unifying vision and has yet to honestly scrutinize official socialism. The new discourse of tianxia speaks to their need for a vision of their place in the world. The image of a tianxia government of benevolent authority may be more useful for identity within China than for offering the world a viable alternative to democracy and human rights. (shrink)

A substantial reason behind the Confucian canonization of the Yijing can be located in some underlying patterns of thinking common to both the Yijing and The Analects; especially relevant here is the doctrine of rectification of names. In particular, I analyze the fundamental structure of the Yijing by means of the names and symbols standing in unique semantic/semiotic relations to the world, and I go on to suggest that this is what is importantly entailed by the doctrine of the rectification (...) of names when the latter is understood by means of the perlocutionary function of the prescriptive language. (shrink)

Although Western and Chinese philosophy evolved from disparate doctrinal foundations, the department of ethics is a notable exception. “How to live the good life” is a subject treated by Confucius and Aristotle in a manner that exhibits many surprising points of coincidence, not least in the colossal influence of both these philosophers on the social and political shape of their respective civilisations. This article is an attempt to correlate the relevant ideas which, as it were, build a (...) bridge between East and West on the perennial issues that affect all mankind in the context of a civil society. (shrink)

Featuring contributions from the world's most highly esteemed Asian philosophy scholars, this important new encyclopedia covers the complex and increasingly influential field of Chinese thought, from earliest recorded times to the present day. Including coverage on the subject previously unavailable to English speakers, the _Encyclopedia_ sheds light on the extensive range of concepts, movements, philosophical works, and thinkers that populate the field. It includes a thorough survey of the history of Chinese philosophy; entries on all major (...) thinkers from Confucius to Mou Zongsan; essential topics such as aesthetics, moral philosophy, philosophy of government, and philosophy of literature; surveys of Confucianism in all historical periods and in key regions outside China; schools of thought such as Mohism, Legalism, and Chinese Buddhism; trends in contemporary Chinese philosophy, and more. (shrink)

Confucius, Lao Tzu and the doctrine of creation in their stretching two thousand years of Chinese tradition and culture through the history of a different fate. Old to learn it Snub and detractors, it is difficult and the people friendly, the fall in the ivory tower, and integrated into the mysterious road敎; Confucianism is received by the faith and worship, was regarded as a model and, ultimately, in the traditional society, ideology and culture in the formation of a (...) " Young and old hole suppression "of the set mode. This first part of the three aspects of the "Young and old hole suppression" of the causes: First, Confucius is still "benevolence" heavy "gift", a moderate conservative, I reject the "benevolence", "li", the radical insubordination, which is "Young and old hole suppression" of the political causes; Second, Confucianism into the secular and pragmatic, face life, old school negative recluse, doing nothing is no dispute that this is "Young and old hole suppression" of the social causes; Third, Kong Xueyi clear rationale, Refined salt tours, old school Ji hard to read, hard to obscure the deep, which is "Young and old hole suppression" of the causes of academic theory. This second part focuses on interpretation of the "Young-hole" of the benefits and the "old suppression" of the disadvantages: the former is conducive to rule the country and the people of softening; the latter had no ability to help the Chinese improve abstract thinking, technological advancement and economic growth. Finally, this paper presents "Young and old Confucian" benefit to the disadvantages of this idea exist. The doctrines of Laozi and Confucius have met with different destinies in the very long Chinese history. The former has been left out in the cold, and the latter was always believed by the rulers and the mass of the people. Why? The reasons were probed in the essay as follows: First, as a conservative, Confucius advocated 'Ren' and 'Li' ; but Laozi belittled them. Second, Confucianism was utility for the public; rather the Laozi's philosophy taught the people to renounce the world. Third, "The analects of Confucius" was very simple, oppositely, the "Laozi 'had few readers because it is too difficult to understand. The essay also analysed the effects of "Valuing Confucius and Negativing Laozi" in the Chinese traditional society. "Valuing Confucius" could be advantageous to the consolidation of the society; Nevertheless, "Negativing Laozi" had been impeding the development of the abstract thinking ability of the Chinese people as well as the progress of the Chinese economy. (shrink)

The formation and development of any architectural form and system has its own historical and cultural background. The ancient Chinese architectural system has a long history and characteristics inseparable from the historical development of Chinese traditional philosophy. Chinese philosophy, as a theory of human self-consciousness, does not give knowledge, but mainly gives ideas and ways of thinking for the needs of human self-development; At the same time, ancient Chinese architecture became a physical object reflecting (...) the idea of traditional Chinese philosophy. Therefore, in order to explore ancient Chinese architecture, it is necessary to analyze and study it from the point of view of traditional Chinese philosophy. Like Confucius' thoughts on etiquette, the idea of the "doctrine of the middle" and the concept of hierarchical division; These ideas had a profound influence on ancient Chinese architecture, including urban planning, traditional dwellings, the environment, Lao Tzu's desire for harmony and unity between man and nature, worship of the gods, etc., as well as the theory that emerged later "Feng Shui", etc. temple space and garden architecture in the south of the Yangtze River. This article is devoted to the analysis of the influence of Confucianism and Taoism on the general principle of designing spaces of ancient Chinese architecture. The article selects some typical examples of ancient Chinese architecture for analysis. The following principles are manifested in the design of spaces of Chinese architecture under the influence of Confucianism and Taoism: moderation of living space; the principle of symmetry, balance and coordination; architectural hierarchy formed on the basis of the needs of "rituals"; integration of architecture and the environment; design of spaces according to "Feng Shui". (shrink)

Yuejiao was the primary form of education ever since the time of Emperors Yao and Shun. This tradition of valuing Yue over Li lasted till the Three Dynasties period. After the Spring and Autumn Period, Lijiao became the dominant form, but it still consisted of a lot of yue. Seeing the declining of this tradition, Confucius claimed to “follow upon Zhou”. That is, he wanted to recover and inherit this ideology that engages primarily in music cultivation supplemented by ritual (...) normalization. His statement: “Let a man be first incited by the Songs, then given a firm footing by the study of ritual, and finally perfected by music,” also shows his emphasis on Yue. More proofs can be found in Confucian classics such as Analects and the Record of Rites, in which discourses on/ about beauty and goodness are characterized by the juxtaposition of Li and Yue to serve a higher purpose for the pre-Qin Confucians. However, this ideology was not inherited by later Confucians. And the consequence is with the increasing status and impact of Confucianism in China in the past 2500 years, such a tradition of valuing Yue over Li gradually turned into a tradition of valuing Li over Yue. This, however, is inconsistent with both Confucius’ ideology of Li and Yue and the real characteristic of Chinese cultural tradition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Of Diversities and Comparisons...Sor-hoon TanEncyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Antonio S. Cua. New York and London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. 1,020.Encyclopedias can be useful in teaching philosophy when students need some reading that sets out the basics on a key topic in a few pages without their getting lost in too many complex details or being misled by oversimplifications. They can also be edifying for the (...) philosophy teacher and scholar—providing reliable, up-to-date information on topics that lie in their field but that are not part of their working knowledge. For these reasons, those working in Chinese philosophy will welcome the publication of the Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. The 187 entries cover a variety of subject areas such as "Moral Philosophy" and "Philosophy of language"; Confucianism in different periods and countries, Daoism, Mohism, Legalism, the school of names, Buddhism, and Marxism in China; philosophical trends in post-Mao China, Taiwan, and overseas; key concepts such as dao (the way), fa (law, standards), liyi fenshu (principle and manifestations), and quanli (rights); texts such as the Huainanzi and the Wenzi; and thinkers from Laozi and Confucius to Hu Shih and Mou Zongsan.Instead of more numerous short entries, this encyclopedia has opted for fewer entries of greater length—the Preface tells us that entries on important thinkers and philosophical topics typically range from five thousand to nine thousand words in length, and a quick check reveals that even the shortest entry is at least two pages long (more than one thousand words). This format allows authors to explore the philosophical issues at some depth, and expound even complex arguments in detail. The connections between different concepts, thinkers, texts, philosophical theories, and development that stretch across different periods and territories can be delineated more clearly in a single entry. There is a danger of duplication with this format, as some texts and concepts may be covered in several articles; for example, most of "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought" is on what the author identifies as six key texts of Classical Confucianism: the Analects, Mencius, Xunzi, Yizhuan, Zhongyong (Doctrine of the mean), and Daxue (Great Learning). The sections on Mencius and Xunzi (pp. 66-67) merely introduce a small part of what is discussed in much greater depth and detail in the entries on these two thinkers (pp. 440-448 and 821-829). The Zhongyong and Daxue also have their own entries, and "Confucianism: Confucius" (p. 61) contains an entire section on the Analects.As it turns out, the duplication is less than expected. Pei-jung Fu, author of "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought," implicitly questions Xunzi's Confucian pedigree, beginning his discussion with "Xunzi professed to be an advocate of Confucianism" (p. 67). Such doubt is clearly not shared by A. S. Cua, who authored [End Page 111] the entry on "Xunzi," introducing the thinker as "an important exponent of classical Confucianism" (p. 821). Cua also does not share Fu's view that "the real issue between Mencius and Xunzi lies in their concepts of heaven (tian)" (p. 67). Fu and the author of the entry on the Zhongyong translate key terms in the texts differently: Fu discusses "five ethical codes" and "three comprehensive virtues" (p. 68) while Yanming An calls them "five universal paths" and "three universal virtues" (p. 890). Such differences can be either thought provoking or confusing (especially when unaccompanied by Chinese characters or even pinyin), depending on the reader. The sections on the Analects in "Confucianism: Confucius" and "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought" have hardly anything in common; the first examines it as an account of how Confucius lives as an exemplar remembered by his students, while the latter discusses its content, focusing on ren and li, as well as on Confucius' religious concerns. While concepts such as ren and li are frequently discussed, the different ways in which authors employ them and the different characteristics, contexts, and philosophical stakes they pay attention to enrich one's understanding of the many dimensions of these concepts even as similarities in diverse entries reinforce certain aspects and perspectives.One comes across disagreements to various degrees on common or related topics among different entries. While... (shrink)

Up until the present day, Confucianism has been a major factor in the normative discourses of East Asia. At first glance, it has sided with the preservation of the old and against innovation, according to Confucius’s self-declaration that he “only transmits and creates nothing new.” This also describes the historical role that Confucianism in distinction to other philosophies has actually played over long stretches of time. Nevertheless, Confucian ethics contains structural features, figures of thought and ideas which point beyond (...) mere traditionalism. They reflect the deep crisis of tradition against the background of which Confucianism came into existence and which has left its mark on it. They could set free a dynamic that made it possible to distance oneself from the Confucian tradition within this tradition itself and open it up to something new, if not in terms of its creation then at least in terms of its acceptance and support. This potential also intrinsically relates to the possibility of a “modern” Confucianism. The following three short essays do not claim to give a comprehensive account of the outlined problematique. It is only intended to throw a light upon some of the corresponding thought formations that developed in ancient China and explore by a few examples the extent to which the said potential has actually been realized in later Confucian discourse in Korea and Japan, assuming that border crossing might be among the factors to unleash it. (shrink)

This edition goes beyond others that largely leave readers to their own devices in understanding this cryptic work, by providing an entrée into the text that parallels the traditional Chinese way of approaching it: alongside Slingerland's exquisite rendering of the work are his translations of a selection of classic Chinese commentaries that shed light on difficult passages, provide historical and cultural context, and invite the reader to ponder a range of interpretations. The ideal student edition, this volume also (...) includes a general introduction, notes, multiple appendices--including a glossary of technical terms, references to modern Western scholarship that point the way for further study, and an annotated bibliography. (shrink)

Confucianism regarded mind-heart's nature with importance more than any other schools at all the time. Confucius was the first one to bring up the concept of mind-heart's nature in the history of chinese philosophy. Mencius was the first person to demonstrate reality of human nature's nature systematically and scientifically. Mencius was a protector to block heterodoxy after succeeding Confucius's the doctrine of mind-heart's nature. The mind-heart's nature provided by Mencius are 1) what distinguishes human beings from (...) animals. 2) a moral motivation of human beings. 3) comprised of benevolence(仁), righteousness(義), propriety(禮) and wisdom(智). T'oegye presented a The four & seven debate based Li-K with Gobong metaphysically. The four & seven debate was to present a moral motivation of human beings in their relation to metaphysical composition(Li-Ki). Li and Ki. human nature and particular with respect to metaphysical composition(Li-Ki). T'oegye introduced these of 'The four beginnings are the issuance of LI, and protected the human mind-heart's nature differed with other beings after succeeding Confucius-Mencius's the doctrine of mind-heart's nature. Such viewpoints about theory of mind-heart's nature plays an important role in the Age of AI. (shrink)

Reading Bertrand Russell’s Principles of Social Reconstruction, Liang Shuming began a process of interpreting Russell’s philosophy in a Confucian way. The first stage in this process was seeing Russell as a fellow Confucian. Its second stage was absorbing Russell’s theory of impulse, seeing this as sharing aspects of the Confucian doctrine of benevolence (ren). The third stage was reconstructing Russell’s theory of spirit as a Confucian theory of “reason” as impersonal feeling. Under Liang Shuming’s critical assimilation of Russell’s (...) class='Hi'>philosophy, Russell’s theories of impulse and spirit came to constitute an intrinsic component of modern New Confucianism and was incorporated into the discourse of modern Chinese philosophy. To a certain extent, this shifts our view of Russell as merely a passing figure in the history of modern Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Die vier Weisen im Garten der Philosophie: Anfangsgründe eines globalen Humanismus by Rainer SchulzerNiels Weidtmann (bio)Die vier Weisen im Garten der Philosophie: Anfangsgründe eines globalen Humanismus. By Rainer Schulzer. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2023. Pp. 290, Paper € 49.90, ISBN 978-3-495-99837-3.Rainer Schulzer has written an inspiring book, not yet translated into English, about “the four sages in the garden of philosophy.” The garden, created by Inoue Enryō, (...) the founder of Toyo University, in Tokyo in 1904, invites visitors to reflect on philosophy. Its centerpiece is the so-called “Shrine of the Four Sages” who, according to Inoue, are Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, and Kant. Schulzer, who is himself a professor of philosophy at Toyo University, takes Inoue’s compilation of the four sages as a starting point to reflect on the diversity of sources of a “global humanism.” He argues that the humanist concern for a justification of ethics without referring to metaphysics and religion as it characterizes Renaissance humanism as well as Kant’s ethics can already be found among the various thinkers of the Axial Age (p. 221). Confucius, Buddha, and Socrates are introduced by short texts contributed to the book by Yoshida Kōhei, Takemura Makio, and Volker Gerhardt. However, because Schulzer does not want to let the portraits stand alone, but rather see them located in the “horizon of a global humanism,” he prefaces them with his own assessments.Firstly, Schulzer shows why, despite major differences, it seems justified to regard the three axial sages as thinkers of a humanism centered on the question of how to lead a good life. He counters the prejudice that East Asian virtue teachings, especially Confucianism, were based on the dogmatic duty to fulfil social roles, whereas European-Western ethics of freedom led to ruthless individualism. Instead, he convincingly shows that a complex and mutually constitutive relationship between freedom and social roles can be found in both traditions. Regarding Buddhism, Schulzer explains why it does not aim for salvation in the afterlife; the unworldly life of Buddhist monks thus does not mean a denial of life, but rather serves the realization and acceptance of transience. In the concluding chapter of his humanistic localization of the three sages, Schulzer turns to the doctrine of retaliation, based on which he closely links Buddhist teachings with Kant’s philosophy. According to Schulzer, Buddhism sets itself apart from the karmic doctrine of reincarnation, according to which a person’s well-being depends on their behavior in a previous life, by transferring the doctrine of retaliation to the inner self. The endeavor is no longer for a better [End Page 1] future life, but for the “spirit already liberated from suffering and fear of death during one’s lifetime” (p. 87). Schulzer argues with Kant that a liberated spirit can only be achieved with a clear conscience. However, the attempt to transfer Hans Kelsen’s theory that the discovery of causality, which Kelsen attributes to the pre-Socratics, arose from the ancient doctrine of retaliation in Buddhism and to understand the doctrine of dependent origination, above all the realization that all suffering can be traced back to ignorance, as a theory of causality is somewhat overstepping the mark. Buddhist cognition, as Schulzer himself notes, is not interested in causality as an explanatory principle but aims precisely at breaking the so-called “twelve-link chain of dependent origination.” We would first have to ask about the respective meaning of causality; incidentally, this also applies to the European tradition, in which what we are used to calling causality today can only be traced back to one of the four causes named by Aristotle.The portraits of the three sages start with Yoshida Kōhei introducing us to Confucius as a virtuous teacher who first and foremost endeavored to ensure the well-being of his students and taught them to find their own role in society. Volker Gerhardt approaches Socrates from the perspective of Nietzsche and Kant. The main point of reference for him is that Socrates, like no other, stands for “moral self-determination,” “self-knowledge” and the experience of the divine in an “intimate relationship with... (shrink)

The formation of the discourse of Neo-Confucianism 1 in the Song period was a result of the interactions between many social and cultural trends. In the development of the Neo-Confucian discourse, the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) played key roles with their charismatic thoughts and impelling personalities, while Zhu Xi pushed Neo-Confucian thought and discourse to a pinnacle with his broad knowledge and precise reasoning. In the warm discussions and debates between different schools and thoughts, (...) the Neo-Confucian discourse proceeded towards completion and perfection, and evolved as contemporary topics and thinking modes changed. The essay argues that “ ding xing 定性 (stilling the nature)” was an important Neo-Confucian topic during the Song period. The doctrine of “stilling the nature” involves much central Neo-Confucian discourse such as the definition of xing 性 (human nature), the interior and exterior aspects of human nature, nature and qing 情 (feelings, sentiments), nature and xin 心 (mind, heart), nature and ren 仁 (benevolence, humanity, humaneness) and yi 义 (righteousness), nature and shi 事 (affair) or wu 物 (thing, object), the practice of preservation and cultivation, etc. Therefore, an examination of the formation, development and evolution of Neo-Confucianism is of great importance to the study of its early history. (shrink)

For anyone looking to understand Chinese philosophy, here is the place to start. Introducing this vast and far-reaching tradition, the longest continuous heritage of philosophical reflection in our existence, Ronnie L. Littlejohn tells you everything you need to know about those Chinese thinkers who have made the biggest contributions to the conversation of philosophy. From the Han dynasty to the present, he leads us into the indigenous philosophical traditions of Confucianism, Daoism and the uniquely modified forms (...) of Buddhism in China and introduces: - The six classical schools of Chinese philosophy (Yin-Yang, Ru, Mo, Ming, Fa and Dao-De) - The arrival of Buddhism in China and its distinctive development - The central figures and movements from the end of the Tang dynasty to the introduction into China of Western thought - The impact of Chinese philosophers ranging from Confucius and Laozi to Tu Weiming on their equivalents in the West. Weaving together key subjects, thinkers and texts, we see how Chinese traditions have profoundly shaped the institutions, social practices and psychological character of not only East and Southeast Asia, but the world we are living in. Praised for its completely original and illuminating thematic approach, this new edition includes updated features such as reading lists, a comparative chronology of Western and Chinese philosophers, and additional translated extracts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Is "Chinese Philosophy" a Proper Name?A Response to Rein RaudCarine DefoortIn the preface to his Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, Hu Shi wrote: "Today, the two main branches of philosophy meet and influence each other. Whether or not in fifty years or one hundred a sort of world philosophy will finally arise cannot yet be ascertained."1 Although uncertain, Hu was still (...) hopeful, since he believed that the two major traditions of modern world philosophy, founded in Europe and China, had finally met. That was in 1919. Now, almost a century later, we can respond to Hu's speculation with relative certainty: a world philosophy has not arisen and is not on the rise. In fact, the situation is much worse: Chinese ancient thought is not even considered "philosophy" by most Western specialists in the field.For Feng Youlan, Hu's contemporary, this lack of recognition had become a major frustration by the end of his life. Feng earnestly felt that "parts of classical Chinese philosophy have a contribution to make to the elevating of man's spiritual sphere and in solving universal problems in human life."2 But on the last page of the last volume of his New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy, completed a few weeks before his death in November 1990, Feng concluded that Western philosophers had not even begun to consider ancient Chinese thought to be worthy of their attention: "Chinese traditional philosophy has always been regarded as a part of sinological studies and is considered as having no relation to philosophy."3 Feng's sentiment is still widely shared today; for instance, in the Yearbook of Chinese Philosophy for 2001, Zheng Jiadong remarks that "in the West, especially in Europe, the legitimacy of 'Chinese philosophy' has always been questioned; 'Chinese philosophy' [End Page 625] has to a large extent been considered a strange thing of questionable antecedents."4 Others confirm that "Chinese thinking has been all but excluded from the discipline of philosophy in Western seats of learning."5Indeed, various eminent European philosophers, such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and, more recently, Jacques Derrida on his visit to Shanghai in 2001,6 have proclaimed that ancient Chinese thought is not really philosophy. Kant, for example, stated that "Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient.... Their teacher Confucius teaches in his writings nothing outside a moral doctrine designed for the princes."7 Even sinology scholars sometimes wonder whether ancient Chinese thought ought to be labeled "philosophy."8 But more powerful than such explicit rejections of the legitimacy of "Chinese philosophy," which are nowadays relatively rare, is the dominant and implicit Western (especially European) view, embedded in the organization of academic conferences, journals, university curricula (as Feng Youlan remarked), and bookstores, that ancient China did not have philosophy. The average European bookstore, for instance, does not display the Laozi or Yijing on the "philosophy" shelf, but rather among various types of wisdom or practical knowledge, between Celtic myths, herbal medicine, and the art of astrology. However unobtrusive, this organizational given reveals more clearly and influentially than any contemporary scholar explicitly states, that the name "Chinese philosophy" for the Chinese masters and some Classics is not proper—or, to put it in ancient Chinese terms: this ming 名 is not zheng 正.9The twenty-first century, however, has seen strong indications of change, not in the sense that "Chinese philosophy" is now being generally accepted as one of the two main branches of world philosophy, as Hu Shi had hoped, but in the sense that the debate has been reopened, both in China and in the West. In China, the appropriateness of the label "Chinese philosophy" for ancient Chinese thought was questioned by some leading scholars in the first part of the twentieth century. But in the last decade the matter has been experienced as a crisis and challenge, and has been discussed much more broadly and vividly by Chinese academia: conferences are being dedicated to the question of the "legitimacy of 'Chinese philosophy"' (Zhongguo zhexue hefaxing 中国哲学的合法性), newspapers report on it, and some journals devote whole forums to it.10 About one hundred articles or chapters related... (shrink)

The discourse on freedom that Kant unfolds in his writings on the history of philosophy, especially in his essay Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), is a constitutive component of the moral perspective whose key concept is the notion of freedom. This is why critical philosophy, as Kant says, has its own “chiliastic expectation”, and the critical philosopher is a prophet who himself “occasions und produces the events he predicts”. Questions concerning the proper use (...) of freedom – how does freedom position itself in the individual ethics of each person when he/she wants to act morally, how does it position the community in legal ethics when it merges in a liberal state through the peacemaking function of the law, or how does the community of states position itself in international law when, with cosmopolitan intent, freedom devotes itself to a utopian peace mission – these are always questions concerning the concept of freedom which has emerged from a critical process of arbitration. (shrink)

Edification 教化 is one of the central concepts of Confucianism. The metaphysical basis of the Confucian edification is the “philosophical theory” in the sense of rational humanism rather than the “religious doctrine” in the sense of pure faith. Confucianism did not create a system of ceremony and propriety owned by Confucians only. The system of ceremony and propriety on which Confucians depend to carry out their social edification is that of “rites and music,” the common life style of ancient China. (...) After continual metaphysical explanation and elevation, the system of ceremony and propriety and that of rites and music have undergone a sort of ever-evolving historical fluctuation, and evinced a sort of openness and forgiveness comparable to that of any other religious form. Compared with typical religious practices, whose ceremonies and rituals that have their own special fixity and exclusivity, Confucian ceremonies and rituals are fundamentally different. The edification of Confucianism can be labeled as “edification in the sense of philosophy.” As a “philosophy”, Confucianism’s vision did not focus on cognition but on completion and realization. (shrink)

In 1711, François Noël s.j. (1651-1729) published in Pragua two books related to Chinese philosophy, the Philosophia Sinica — a systematic presentation of Confucianism according to an Aristotelian framework divided into three treatises — and the Sinensis Imperii libri classici sex — a translation of the six Confucian Classics. In these two books, François Noël, who spent more than fifteen years in China, exemplifies how a European missionary has been transformed by reading Confucian Classics and their commentaries. Although (...) his writings were caught up in the Rites controversy, German philosophers like Christian Wolff were in contact with them. They used them in a debate where the autonomy of rationality in the field of ethics was at stake. Even if Noël’s assumptions and hermeneutical methods are no longer academically valid, his testimony shows that engaging with Confucian classics can change one’s framework, especially practically. Noël’s works are also an invitation to reconsider the modern split between systematic philosophy and philosophy as a practice, an opinion already formulated in the works of Pierre Hadot. In that sense, Noël’s attempt to bridge Aristotle with Confucius is a witness of a larger movement of interweaving symbolic tools belonging to different traditions to answer human existence issues. (shrink)

Neo-Confucianism of the Han and Tang dynasties is an indispensable part of the history of Chinese philosophy. From Han dynasty Confucians to Tang dynasty Confucians, the study of Confucian classics evolved progressively from textual research to conceptual explanation. A significant sign of this transformation is the book Lunyu Bijie 论语笔解 (A Written Explanation of the Analects), co-authored by Han Yu and Li Ao. Making use of the tremendous room for interpretation within the Analects, the book studied and reorganized (...) the relationship between the study of literature and the Dao and principles. It clearly shows an inevitable development of Confucianism, shifting its focus from phenomena to the nature of the heart-mind in order to comprehend nature and heavenly Dao, both of which cannot be heard (from Confucius). (shrink)

The concept of rectifying names [cheng-ming] is a familiar one in the Confucian Analects. It occupies an important, if not central, position in the political philosophy of Confucius. Since, according to Confucius, the rectification of names is the basis of the establishment of social harmony and political order, one might suspect that later political theories of Confucian-ists should be traced back to the Confucian doctrine of rectifying names. It need not be added that the theory of rectifying (...) names, as developed by Hsün Tzu in the third century B. C., served the double purpose of strengthening his political doctrine of government on the one hand and repudiating doctrines of names on the other. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality by Edward Y.J. ChingMaria Hasfeldt Long (bio)The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality. By Edward Y.J. Ching. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. Pp. vii + 204. Hardcover $99.00, isbn 978-3-030-77923-8.In recent years, the study of Korean Neo-Confucianism as an international field has (...) been growing exponentially. Compared to former decades, the number of international publications has grown significantly over the last ten years, with Edward Y.J. Chung as one of the most active scholars. The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality is the culmination of an almost decade-long study of the Korean Neo-Confucian scholar, Yi Hwang Toegye (1501–1570). With a focus on the moral and spiritual aspects of the theories of Toegye, Chung maps out a brilliant overview of the philosopher's worldview and literary works. Chung's primary objective is to provide "thought-provoking" and fresh insights into one of the most important Korean Neo-Confucian thinkers in history, as well as shed light on Neo-Confucian thought in general and how Toegye's philosophy in particular can be relevant in modern interreligious dialogues (p. 149).Consisting of ten chapters, where each chapter could serve as an individual article, Chung takes the reader through the core concepts of Toegye and his development of a form of self-cultivation different from the Chinese Neo-Confucian idea of self-cultivation. This together created a holistic religious worldview with a strong spiritual dimension, which manifests through selfcultivation practices. The first two chapters introduce Toegye and the historical context of 16th-century Joseon-dynasty Korea (1392–1910); his understanding of the Neo-Confucian tradition as the true learning; and his rejection of Daoism and Buddhism. With the reader introduced to the immediate historical context and Neo-Confucian discourse of the time, the following three chapters cover Toegye's religious and moral understanding of the relationship between the Heavenly Principle (C. tianli, K. cheolli) and human nature (C. renxing, K. inseong). Furthermore, Chung covers the moral-spiritual implications that the Four-Seven Debate had on Toegye's later practical self-cultivation for becoming a sage. In short, the debate concerns the relation between the "four sprouts" of human characteristics as first described by Mengzi (ca. 371–289 BCE) and the seven human emotions mentioned in various classical texts. Toegye believed in the doctrine that the "experience of Heaven was within oneself" (p. 47). Therefore, [End Page 1] to become a sage, one would have to commit to the active practice of an inner feeling of reverence (C. jing, K. gyeong) daily.Chapter six dives into the spiritual practice of self-reflection and mind cultivation (C. xinxue, K. simhak), which was an ongoing process that would lead the practitioner closer to sagehood. The seventh chapter focuses on how this spiritual dimension of Toegye's doctrine is relevant to broader discussions of ecology today. With a strong love for nature, Toegye incorporated the idea of nature within his spiritual self-cultivation, which Chung elaborates on. It was important for the human being to be in harmony with Heaven, earth, and all myriad things. This meant respecting and spending time in nature also played a part in the daily practice of spiritual self-cultivation. Moving on, in chapters eight and nine, Chung presents a comparative study on the philosophical and theological question of how to transcend evil, as well as the matter of interreligious dialogue. By way of a textual-interpretive approach, Chung compares Toegye's thought with Christian contra Buddhist theological ideas and how these findings can help develop an interreligious approach. In chapter nine, Chung suggests that the idea of self-transcendence through self-cultivation can be the ultimate reality. In this chapter, Chung wants to break with the tendency in interreligious dialogue where many scholars rely heavily on Christian theological terms. Chung introduces Neo-Confucian concepts and terms, especially the terms used by Toegye. The last and concluding chapter... (shrink)

In his own lifetime Confucius never attained real power and he died feeling that his life had been a failure; yet his teaching came to dominate the political and ritual life of China for thousands of years and to inspire many thinkers in the outside world. Howard Smith describes China in the sixth century B.C. and shows how its history of internal conflict, together with the cult of ancestor worship, gave rise to Confucius' central doctrines of order and (...) 'piety'. He relates how a few disciples kept this teaching alive after Confucius' death and how it came finally to be accepted throughout the huge Chinese empire as the basis for political, educational and ceremonial life. He describes also how Confucianism was slowly changed by the rival philosophies and religions with which it had to compete. This book is therefore not only a history of one of the world's greatest systems of belief but also a study of how such a system both creates and is created by the society in which it exists. -- From publisher's description. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that people of Asia, particularly the ethnic Chinese, subscribe to values which are not conducive to economic progress. The gap between the capitalist West and Asia is often attributed to the 'cultural' factor. Behind such perception is the supposition that capitalism is wholly a product of the West, alien to Asia and cannot be successfully embraced without doing violence to its cultural traditions. Against this position, I argue that classical capitalism is perfectly compatible with the (...) key elements of Chinese philosophy. Whether or not there is anything in the suggestion of some historians that Quesnay borrowed from Confucianism, I argue that his economic doctrine could have developed from the fundamentals of Chinese philosophy. If I am right, the economic gap between the West and Asia has to be explained in terms other than the 'cultural' factor, such as, perhaps, colonialism and post-colonialist ideologies. (shrink)

Zhongdaology is the core of Chinese traditional Confucian philosophy. The zhongdaological way of thinking represents the Chinese philosophical thinking mode, with Confucianism as the main body, and has deeply influenced many aspects of Chinese culture. It is different from the traditional ontological thinking in the West. However, for a long time, due to the influence of the dominant position of Western ontological thinking in the field of philosophical research, the characteristics of zhongdaological thinking have not been (...) fully elaborated and promoted. This essay briefly exposes the historical origin of the doctrine of zhongdaology and its significance in Confucianism. Like the situation of traditional Chinese philosophy, African philosophy also has long been overshadowed and ignored by western philosophy to some extent. To this end, it can be safely stated that the dominance of western tradition is why the interaction between Chinese philosophy and African philosophy and otherunderrepresented philosophical traditions in the south have not taken firm roots. This essay makes some preliminary comparisons betweenChinese Confucian zhongdaology with some African philosophical ideas such as Ezumezu and Ubuntu, to show, first, the significance of broader dialogue and exchange among different philosophical traditions in the south, second how zhongdaology itself could serve as a veritable framework for doing philosophy across borders. (shrink)

_This article makes the following comparative claims about the contributions of Song- and Ming-dynasty Chinese discourses to recent work in the related fields of new materialism and speculative realism: emerging trends in so-called new materialism can be understood through the Chinese study of _qi _, which can be translated as “lively material” or “vital stuff”; and the notion of “speculation” as this is used in recent speculative realism can be understood as the study of, engagement with, and ultimate (...) transformation by _li _, a term meaning “principle” or “structure.” However, the focus of the article is as much polemical as it is comparative. By arguing that these contemporary Western movements be categorized by Chinese schools, I challenge and reverse the tendency to subsume non-Western philosophies under Western categories and intervene in the academic practices that continue to define the “new” on Eurocentric models alone._. (shrink)

In this paper we take Luce Irigaray’s idea of fluid feminine subjectivity as productive for the project of rethinking agency in a collaborative feminist-Confucian context. We discuss how diffused agency in the Analects can be used alongside Irigaray’s work to critique contemporary notions of atomic agency. Our argument employs the notions of fluidity and agency in Irigaray and the Analects with concentrations on: 1) similarities between Irigaray’s “philosophy of breath” and Confucian ritual; 2) parallels between fluid feminine subjectivity and (...) diffused agency; and 3) a shared concern for the ethical life. We thus see how Confucianism can contribute to contemporary feminist discourse. (shrink)

_An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy_ unlocks the mystery of ancient Chinese philosophy and unravels the complexity of Chinese Buddhism by placing them in the contemporary context of discourse. Elucidates the central issues and debates in Chinese philosophy, its different schools of thought, and its major philosophers. Covers eight major philosophers in the ancient period, among them Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Illuminates the links between different schools of philosophy. Opens the door to (...) further study of the relationship between Chinese and Western philosophy. (shrink)

What is called theory of moral community is a socialpolitical idea that was established by Confucius and Mencius on the base of political practice of Yao, Shun, Yu and King of Chou and that was used as ideology of ancient Chinese Empire. Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu criticized the theory of moral community and established their naturalistic philosophical system. Lao Tzu said in the first chapter of Tao Te Ching that “The Tao is too great to be described (...) by the name Tao. If it could be named so simply, it would not be the eternal Tao”. If Tao which is indispensable to mortal fortune can be described, it must have existed in discourse of human beings; If the important pole that accords with fact can be named, it must have named by human beings. So people who lived in ancient times regarded the political idea of Yao, Shun, Yu and King of Chou as Tao that has been justified. At the same time they named Yao, Shun, Yu and King of Chou as sons of Heaven who inherited the vocation of Heaven. Hence by all appearances，Lao Tzu was denying the validity of traditional social-political idea. And Lao Tzu thought the traditional social-political practice, in fact, had kept away from intrinsic morality and switched to extrinsic criterions. Zhuang Tzu, as an inheritor of Lao Tzu, criticized the moral community of Confucius straight from the shoulder. First, according to Zhuang Tzu’s opinion, the system of demise is a way of handing over and taking over power accorded with particular instance of the time which was chosen by Yao, Shun and Yu, but it is not a perfect and universal political pattern as Confucius thought. Second, Zhuang Tzu enumerated many immoral behaviors done by these sons of Heaven, on the one hand, on the other hand he regarded the Confucian politics of all over the world was an hegemonic politics in essence which would destroy human’s moral faith on their autonomy. Contrary to Confucian theory of moral community, Lao Tzu brought forward a social idea of “a little state with a small population" which was often misunderstood as “a small state with a little population”, in fact the idea of “a little state with a small population" is a naturalistic political idea that will safeguard and realize freedom, equality and plural values by weakening compulsion of state and lusts of human beings furthest. Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu’s critique and reflection of Confucian theory of moral community, with their social-political idea of “a little state with a small population" will be very helpful to establish correct historical consciousness and build wonderful future society. (shrink)

Chinese philosophy has its roots in religion, and has spread to the general Chinese public as a mixture of attitudes in life, cultural spirit, as well as religious practices. However, Chinese philosophy is not just a collection of wisdom on life or a religious discourse on how to lead a good life; it is also a form of philosophy. And yet its philosophical import has often been slighted in the Western philosophical world. Two (...) hundred years ago, Hegel remarked that there is no separation between philosophy and religion in the East: “That which we call Eastern Philosophy is more properly the religious mode of thought and the conception of the world belonging generally to the Orientals and approximates very closely to Philosophy.” (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 1) Under this conception, Hegel’s attitude with Chinese philosophy was completely dismissive. He described Confucius as “only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom — one with whom there is no speculative philosophy,” and “it would have been better had [his works] never been translated.” With Laozi’s conception of ‘dao,’ Hegel commented: “to the Chinese what is highest and the origin of things is nothing, emptiness, the altogether undetermined, the abstract universal,” and “if.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mencius and Xunzi between Humaneness and JusticeSungmoon Kim (bio)In his now classic Disputers of the Tao (1989), A. C. Graham aptly captured the central feature of the ancient Chinese world of thought in terms of the dispute about the Way between competing philosophical schools. But it has since long remained an intellectual challenge how to understand and evaluate the unfolding of the philosophical schools in ancient China [End (...) Page 439] coherently from a philosophical standpoint. Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China attempts to meet this long overdue challenge, and it does so admirably with philological rigor and philosophical insight.What is central to Jiang's framework is the conceptual tripod of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom, which he generally understands as "the moral norm that is agent/recipient relative" (especially, natural inclinations toward one's family/kin members), "impartial judgment on the merits of persons and states of affairs," and "the appreciation and cultivation of personal space where one can be left alone … without [being] entangled in the sociopolitical world," respectively.1 Jiang begins with Confucius by presenting him as the first major thinker in Chinese history who wrestled with the tension between humaneness and justice. According to Jiang, Confucius' seminal idea of impartial justice was critically re-appropriated by the Mohists, who advocated "impartial care" (jian ai 兼愛), while his idea of partial humaneness was later developed by Mencius, who upheld "familial virtues" as the pivot of Confucian morality and politics—although, as will be discussed shortly, this represents only one dimension of Mencius' philosophical system. Jiang understands the later development of the Laoist, the fajia ist (commonly known as "Legalist"), and the Zhuangist thoughts, largely as critical responses to the Confucian (especially the Mencian) argument for partial humaneness and the congruity between the familial and the political by naturalizing Heaven (thereby decoupling the political from the familial), developing an objective political system independent of the ruler's moral virtue, and insulating private persons from human relationality and the intervention of the state. Finally, Jiang argues that while Han Feizi's political thought presents the culmination of the early Chinese concern with impartial justice, Xunzi reformulated Confucianism by synthesizing humaneness and justice.I find Tao Jiang's overall argument, buttressed by extensive philological examinations, well-structured and penetrating, and I have no doubt that this book will make an important contribution to Chinese moral and political philosophy. Like many great books, however, Jiang's book makes numerous novel yet controversial claims, and this review aims to engage with several key questions Jiang raises with regard to Mencius and Xunzi, the two giants of classical Confucianism.The Two Strands of Mencius?In interpreting Mencius, Tao Jiang's core argument is that there is "a deep tension at the heart of the Mencian system."2 This tension, according to Jiang, rises from the two incompatible strands in Mencian thought, the "extensionist" strand and the "sacrificialist" strand: [End Page 440][W]hile the extensionist Mencius operates on the assumption, normative within Confucianism, of congruity between the personal, the familial, and the political domains, the sacrificialist Mencius recognizes a tension between the familial and the political that can be hard to reconcile or even irreconcilable under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the sacrificialist Mencius radically separates the familial from the political and ultimately prioritizes the former over the latter, by embracing the necessity for sacrifice as a way that, at times, is required to save the familial.3The extensionist Mencius presents the normative (i.e., partial humane) strand of Confucianism, which stipulates the seamless continuity between the personal, the familial, and the political, as best demonstrated in Mencius' statement that "the root of the world lies in the state; the root of the state lies in the family; the root of the family lies in oneself."4 That is, the extensionist strand of Mencius highlights the transformative force of moral self-cultivation that achieves the unity between the inner self and the outer world through the Heaven-decreed human nature, thus denying the categorial separations between ethics and politics, between moral virtue and political virtue, and between private and public. In Jiang's view, the extensionist strand captures... (shrink)

One of the challenges facing instructors of Chinese philosophy courses at many Western universities is the fact that students can often bring orientalizing assumptions and expectations to their encounters with primary sources. This paper examines the nature of this student bias and surveys four pedagogical approaches to confronting it in the context of undergraduate Chinese philosophy curricula. After showcasing some of the inadequacies of these approaches, I argue in favor of a fifth approach that deploys sources (...) from the “pre-history” of comparative philosophy, viz. documents by some of the first Western interpreters of Chinese thought. Such sources give students an access point to the Chinese primary source material that might be prima facie more culturally familiar, while also prompting them to recognize the limitations of that perspective. Of course, most of these early Western interpretations are naive, ignorant, or even blatantly xenophobic; but as Confucius stresses, even bad role-models can still serve as effective teachers by reminding us of pitfalls to avoid. Thus, if we can appreciate the failings of earlier interpretive efforts, we may be more cautious and open-minded in how we ourselves approach primary texts. An analysis is given of the hermeneutic climate of early modern European-Chinese comparativism, and Leibniz’s writings on Confucianism are unpacked as a specific case-study of this teaching strategy. (shrink)

Introduction: Confucianism as humanism. Confucianism as a religion. The spirit of Confucianism.--Confucius.--Mencius.--Hsün Tzu.--Ta hsüeh (The great learning)--Chung yung (The doctrine of the mean)--Hsiao ching (The classic of filial piety)--Li chi (The book of rites)--Tung chung-shu.

This book presents twelve of the author’s selected essays on subjects related to contemporary Chinese thought and examines other significant works on the history of Chinese philosophy. By combing the basic political discourse on Confucianism, it highlights the significance of Confucian Socialism in the present day and explains the author’s reflections on the philosophy and modernization of Chinese thought. This book is a valuable resource for experts and scholars as well as for general readers (...) who have an understanding of contemporary Chinese philosophy, offering deep insights into current Chinese thought and Confucian modernization. (shrink)

1. What is Korean Philosophy? 2. What is Philosophy? : Philosophy as Axial Ideas, and Philosophy as Modern ideas 3. What are the distinctions of Korean Philosophy? 1. What is Korean Philosophy? What is Philosophy? It represents human, universal ideas. Does there exist Korean Philosophy that could represent the prevalent and universal ideas among Koreans, within the Korean regions? There are two popular meanings of Philosophy: a narrow meaning and a broad (...) one. Korean Philosophy does not exist as philosophy within the narrow meaning. Philosophy (philosophy = philia+sophia) means “love (philia) of wisdom (sophia)” in the narrow sense that appeared as a demotic term in ancient Greece, and it became a technical term afterward. In the broad sense of philosophy,there are Arabic, Indian, and Chinese Philosophy. They mainly declare their existence through their respective philosophical histories. What is Korean Philosophy? In the narrow definition of ancient Greece, Korean Philosophy first appeared in the Modern Age (1860 A.D.). But In the broad definition of Arabia, India, and China, Korean Philosophy first appeared in “Age of Three Kingdoms of Korea” (37 B.C. ~688 A.D.). Is there a distinct, Korean Philosophy? Korean Philosophy can be defined in two ways: by the philosophy of the Axial Idea and by the philosophy of modern ideas. There are three periods in the history of Korean Philosophy: Korean original, traditional, and modern philosophy. Is there a distinct, Korean Philosophy? The distinctions of the Philosophy native to Korea are based on: 1) contents of “Josunchendook” (Sanhaegyung) 2) terms of “Gojosun,” (Samgukyusa) 3) “Punglu” (Samguksagi) 4) “Chenbugyung” (Handangogi). In these texts are these concepts: 1) the ideas of human respect in “Josunchendook”, 2) the philosophy of the mutual, respectful relations in “Gojosun”, 3) the synthesis ideas from three doctrines - Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism-in “Pungludo”, and 4) an integration of these three concepts (1 to 3) in“Chenbugyung”; their characteristic is state philosophy, and is seen as modern inter-subjectivity. The distinction of Korean traditional philosophy is one that contains thorough, synthetic ideas (e.g., Wonhyo's idea of one Buddhism that contains all Buddhist sects, Euichon's Chentaejong, Jinul's Jogaejong and so on). These ideas have achieved international renown due to their thoroughness and precision. All types of Korean, traditional philosophy have the trait of thoroughness, whether they stem from primarily Buddhist and Confucian thought. Korean modern philosophy includes the philosophical products (or thoughts) of seven Korean national societies of philosophy. Korean modern philosophy must study modern Korea society. It is changing the Candle spiritual Revolution.This Revolution claims not modern Rights of freedom, equality, and benevolence, but Rights to live all lives altogether. It is happening in the background of two fears: a fear of crazy ox and a fear of distrust society system. The Subject of candle Revolution is mass in the streets, networks, and homes. They have both sunin and democratic citizen minds. While candles fire in the streets, internets, and homes, Candle Revolution is continuing forever in Korean mind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-MingChenyang LiUnderstanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming. By Shu-hsien Liu. Westport and London: Praeger, 1998. Pp. xii + 273.Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming, by Shu-hsien Liu, a leading contemporary Neo-Confucian scholar, aims to present the Confucian tradition [End Page 312] from a contemporary Neo-Confucian perspective and purports to provide some background clues to what has led to the Third (...) Epoch of Confucianism, that is, the emergence of the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement.As its title suggests, the book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with Classical Confucianism, and part 2 is a study of Sung-Ming Confucian philosophy. The Classical period begins with an informative chapter on the historical background to the emergence of Confucian philosophy, which is particularly useful if the book is to be used as a university-level text. The historical chapter is followed by chapters on Confucius (Kong Zi), Mencius (Meng Zi), The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, and the Book of Changes. Part 1 ends with a chapter on the transformation of Confucianism since the Han dynasty. Compared with similar books on Confucian philosophy, the chapter on Confucius appears sketchy, but its treatment of Confucius' central concept, jen (ren), is first-rate, clear, and insightful. The chapter on Mencius is more elaborate. It surveys virtually every key concept of Mencius' philosophy. As with similar works by Chinese scholars, the sheer number of quotations in this chapter may appear excessive to Western readers. Hsün Tzu (Xun Zi), another key classical Confucian philosopher, is only mentioned in passing, although this is not surprising in a book written from a Neo-Confucian perspective; in the Neo Confucian tradition Hsün Tzu is considered unorthodox.The chapter on the Book of Changes is a breath of fresh air in that it has adopted a developmental point of view. The author argues that there are four layers of meaning in the work: it offers a system of mystical symbolism, a system of rational/natural symbolism, a system of cosmological symbolism, and finally a system of ethics/metaphysical symbolism. Professor Liu says of the four systems, "each one succeed[s] the other and yet interpenetrate[s] the other" (p. 74). Overall, Classical Confucianism is analyzed according to three inseparable aspects—spiritual, political, and popular—which define the heritage as well as the burden of this tradition.At first I was a bit surprised to see that the chapter on "The Characteristics and Contemporary Significance of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian Philosophy" is at the beginning, not at the end, of part 2 on Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy. But it turns out that this chapter contains a brief survey of some major Neo-Confucian philosophers of the period and serves well as an introduction to part 2. Recognizing Chu Hsi's (Zhu Xi) contribution to the movement of the Second Epoch, Liu spends two chapters out of six on this great Sung philosopher. The chapter on Wang Yang-ming aims "to destroy the myth once and for all that there is no discrepancy between Lu [Hsiang-shan] and Wang and that there is not a close relationship between Wang and Chu [Hsi]" (p. 198). This goes against a widespread (mis)conception that Wang and Chu represent two distinct lines of Neo-Confucianism.Part 2 ends with a chapter on Huang Tsung-hsi (Huang Zongxi), arguably the most liberal of all Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers. Liu regards Huang as the culmination of an unfinished Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophical tradition, from which the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement should take up the cause. Altogether, part 2 is not as systematic in introducing Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy as is part 1 on Classical Confucianism. [End Page 313]As a synthesis of various articles previously published by the author over a twenty-five-year period, the book bears both the strengths and the weaknesses of works of this kind: there are in-depth studies focused on specific topics of particular interest in the Neo-Confucian movement, but there is occasionally a lack of smooth transition from one chapter to another or... (shrink)

Edification 教化 is one of the central concepts of Confucianism. The metaphysical basis of the Confucian edification is the “philosophical theory” in the sense of rational humanism rather than the “religious doctrine” in the sense of pure faith. Confucianism did not create a system of ceremony and propriety owned by Confucians only. The system of ceremony and propriety on which Confucians depend to carry out their social edification is that of “rites and music,” the common life style of ancient China. (...) After continual metaphysical explanation and elevation, the system of ceremony and propriety and that of rites and music have undergone a sort of ever-evolving historical fluctuation, and evinced a sort of openness and forgiveness comparable to that of any other religious form. Compared with typical religious practices, whose ceremonies and rituals that have their own special fixity and exclusivity, Confucian ceremonies and rituals are fundamentally different. The edification of Confucianism can be labeled as “edification in the sense of philosophy.” As a “philosophy”, Confucianism’s vision did not focus on cognition but on completion and realization. (shrink)

Is there the possibility for Confucianism to have a third-phase development? In saying this we mean to regard the school of thought advocated by Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi during the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States as the first-phase development of Confucianism. After the Han Dynasty Buddhism spread to China. Under the impact of Buddhist ideas, a Confucian school of idealist philosophy emerged during the Song and Ming dynasties. It greatly pushed forward the Confucian doctrines and (...) constituted the second-phase development of Confucianism. Over the last century, Western civilization has found its way into China. Especially around the time of the "May Fourth" [1919] Movement Marxism was also disseminated into our country. That gave an even bigger and more serious impact on China's traditional thought and culture. Under such circumstances, is it possible for Confucianism to have a third-phase development? Can it be brought back to life? Can it still have a role to play in China and the world? In my opinion, it is perhaps too early to conduct an all-round discussion of this issue. However, to raise questions and opinions from certain angles in an attempt to push the inquiry forward may prove helpful. (shrink)