Recognition of the harms done by free speech is a function of the social ontology presupposed. An atomist ontology implies that the harms suffered are restricted to individual people. This paper suggests an alternate ontology—one that describes systems established by the causal reciprocities of their proper parts. It proposes a consequentialist moral theory, and considers the harms suffered by these systems when speech exposes their internal, otherwise private, behaviors or features, when speech is malicious and false, (...) and when speech is monopolistic. Does the proposed ontology have objectionable implications for public policy? Alternative answers are considered briefly. (shrink)

Western European liberal democracies have recently enacted laws that prohibit the diffusion of fake news on social media. Yet, many consider that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression. In this paper, I argue that democratic governments have strong pro tanto reasons to prohibit fake news, and that doing so is compatible with free speech. First, I show that fake news disrupts a mutually beneficial form of epistemic dependence in which members of the public are engaged with (...) journalists. Second, I contend that laws against fake news enhance rather than thwart personal autonomy. If these suggestions are plausible, then the same considerations about truth and autonomy that underpin the value of free speech give us reasons to prohibit fake news. (shrink)

Free speech fallacies are errors of meta-argument. One commits a free speech fallacy when one argues that since there are apparent restrictions on one’s rights of free expression, procedural rules of critical exchange have been broken, and consequently, one’s preferred view is dialectically better off than it may otherwise seem. Free speech fallacies are meta-argumentative, since they occur at the level of assessing the dialectical situation in terms of norms of argument and in (...) terms of meta-evidential principles of interpreting how and why people follow (or fail to follow) argumentative rules. Our plan here is to begin with a brief explanation of meta-argument and meta-argumentative fallacy. We will then turn to the variety of forms of the free speech fallacy, which we will explain as meta-argumentatively erroneous. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: free speech fallacy (FS). The FS consists in thinking one's political right to freedom of expression includes protection from criticism. Those who commit this fallacy allege that critical scrutiny is either tantamount to censorship or equivalent to the imposition of one's views on others. The error in the fallacy is that the freedom of expression includes critical expressions. The trouble with the argument is that freedom of (...) expression does not mean freedom from criticism. The first distortion concerns the logical consequences of criticism. The second distortion confuses logical implications of criticism with the criticism itself. The FS thus takes the personal implications, necessary though they may be, as the defining features of criticism, when they are merely incidental. (shrink)

Free Speech is a philosophical treatment of a topic which is of immense importance to all of us. Writing with great clarity, wit, and genuine concern, Alan Haworth situates the main arguments for free speech by tracing their relationship to contemporary debates in politics and political philosophy, and their historical roots to earlier controversies over religious toleration. Free Speech will appeal to anyone with an interest in philosophy, politics and current affairs.

This collection of thirteen new essays is the first to examine, from a range of disciplinary perspectives, how the new technologies and global reach of the Internet are changing the theory and practice of free speech.

This article was one of SCSS President Stephen M. Krason’s online “Neither Left nor Right, but Catholic” columns. It appeared on April 1, 2012. There is a link to Krason’s monthly column at the SCSS website. Since August 2012, his column also appears at Crisismagazine.com. This article considers new, serious threats to free speech in the contemporary Western world.

In this article Glen Newey defends the view that freedom of expression, and specifically free speech, enjoys special status because it is a necessary condition of politics itself. The first political question concerns the terms on which people associate with one another. This requires free speech, because in order to associate, people need to think of themselves as entering into unconstrained agreements and this demands full access to information. He considers different ways in which free (...) speech has been understood and argues that underlying classical liberal defences is a concern to protect the content rather than occasions of speech. He then applies this understanding to toleration. He argues that free speech is prior to toleration, rather than a corollary of it and considers the implications of this view for some recent controversies concerning free speech. (shrink)

This book presents an accessible and carefully argued challenge to conventional approaches to thinking about free speech. Anthony Leaker provides a richer, more nuanced understanding of what free speech is and how it operates, explaining how free speech arguments are situated within a broader liberal humanist ideology.

We defend the view of some feminist writers that the notion of silencing has to be taken seriously in discussions of free speech. We assume that what ought to be meant by ‘speech’, in the context ‘free speech’, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. And we argue that what one ought to mean includes illocution, in the sense of J.L. Austin.

How important is free speech? Should it be defended at any cost? Or should we set limits on what can and cannot be said? This Very Short Introduction offers a lively and thought-provoking guide to these questions, exploring both the traditional philosophical arguments as well as the practical issues and controversies facing society today.

Democratic theories of free speech hold that the right to free speech is grounded in the nature of collective self-governance. The legitimacy of imposing laws on those who disagree with them depends on giving all citizens an equal right to participate in the lawmaking process, including the right to express their opposition. Ronald Dworkin argues that views of this kind are in tension with hate speech regulation. If we forbid the expression of prejudice, we undermine (...) the legitimacy of laws protecting minority groups. The aim in this chapter is to diffuse the tension Dworkin sees between a democratic justification of the right to free speech and hate speech regulation. This is done by developing an account of how our bodily rights constrain the right to free speech. (shrink)

One of the strongest defences of free speech holds that autonomy requires the protection of speech. In this paper I examine five conditions that autonomy must satisfy. I survey recent research in social psychology regarding automatic behaviour, and a challenge to autonomy is articulated. I argue that a plausible strategy for neutralising some of the autonomy-threatening automatic responses consists in avoiding the exposure to the environmental features that trigger them. If this is so, we can good autonomy-based (...) pro tanto reasons for controlling exposure to certain forms of speech. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically assess John Rawls' repeated claim that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and should not be enforced by law. In the first part of the paper, I examine and reject the view that Rawls' position may be due to the practical difficulties that the legal enforcement of the duty of civility might entail. I thus claim that Rawls' position must be driven by deeper normative reasons grounded in a conception of free (...) speech. In the second part of the paper, I therefore examine various arguments for free speech and critically assess whether they are consistent with Rawls' political liberalism. I first focus on the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment. Both arguments, I argue, rely on comprehensive doctrines and therefore cannot provide a freestanding political justification for free speech. Freedom of speech, I claim, can be justified instead on the basis of Rawls' political conception of the person and of the two moral powers. However, Rawls' wide view of public reason already allows scope for the kind of free speech necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers and therefore cannot explain Rawls' opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. Such opposition, I claim, can only be explained on the basis of a defence of unconstrained freedom of speech grounded in the ideas of democracy and political legitimacy. Yet, I conclude, while public reason and the duty of civility are essential to political liberalism, unconstrained freedom of speech is not. Rawls and political liberals could therefore renounce unconstrained freedom of speech, and endorse the legal enforcement of the duty of civility, while remaining faithful to political liberalism. (shrink)

Contemporary civil libertarians claim that their works preserve a worthy American tradition of defending free-speech rights dating back to the framing of the First Amendment. _Transforming Free Speech_ challenges the worthiness, and indeed the very existence of one uninterrupted libertarian tradition. Mark A. Graber asserts that in the past, broader political visions inspired libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment. In reexamining the philosophical and jurisprudential foundations of the defense of expression rights from the Civil War to the (...) present, he exposes the monolithic free-speech tradition as a myth. Instead of one conception of the system of free expression, two emerge: the conservative libertarian tradition that dominated discourse from the Civil War until World War I, and the civil libertarian tradition that dominates later twentieth-century argument. The essence of the current perception of the American free-speech tradition derives from the writings of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., the progressive jurist most responsible for the modern interpretation of the First Amendment. His interpretation, however, deliberately obscured earlier libertarian arguments linking liberty of speech with liberty of property. Moreover, Chafee stunted the development of a more radical interpretation of expression rights that would give citizens the resources and independence necessary for the effective exercise of free speech. Instead, Chafee maintained that the right to political and social commentary could be protected independent of material inequalities that might restrict access to the marketplace of ideas. His influence enfeebled expression rights in a world where their exercise depends increasingly on economic power. Untangling the libertarian legacy, Graber points out the disjunction in the libertarian tradition to show that free-speech rights, having once been transformed, can be transformed again. Well-conceived and original in perspective, _Transforming Free Speech_ will interest political theorists, students of government, and anyone interested in the origins of the free-speech tradition in the United States. (shrink)

“ 'Free speech' is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance”—or so literary theorist and professor of law Stanley Fish has claimed. This cynical dictum is one of several skeptical challenges to freedom of speech that have been extremely influential in the American academy. I will follow the skeptics' lead by distinguishing between two broad styles of critique: the progressive and the postmodern. Fish's dictum, however, like many (...) of the bluntest charges, belongs to neither class exclusively. As an initial characterization of the distinction between these critiques, progressive skepticism claims that freedom of speech is a bad thing, while postmodernist skepticism claims it to be conceptually impossible. Both forms of skepticism hold the classical liberal endorsement of free speech and condemnation of censorship to be both naive and reactionary. Skepticism about free speech flourishes at universities in the United States and is especially well represented among professors at the country's most prestigious law schools. As legal scholar Robert Post approvingly observes: “Liberated from traditional inhibitions against official suppression of speech, the left has mobilized to pursue a rich variety of political agendas.”. (shrink)

Recent arguments trying to justify further free speech restrictions by appealing to harms that are allegedly serious enough to warrant such restrictions regularly fail to provide sufficient empirical evidence and normative argument. This is also true for the attempt made by Bonotti and Seglow. They offer no valid argument for their claim that it is wrong to direct “religiously offensive speech” at “unjustly disadvantaged” minorities (thereby allegedly undermining their “self-respect”), nor for their further claim that this is (...) not the case when such speech is directed at “established majorities.” Moreover, their account has either counter-intuitive moral implications or succumbs to logical or pragmatic incoherence. Thus, they have not adduced convincing reasons to further restrict speech. In fact, some of the reasons for this failure provide, in turn, positive reasons in support of free speech. Two important (not new, but newly confirmed) reasons are that restricting free speech undermines both equal civic standing as well as fact-guided (as opposed to blindly ideological) policies. Free speech, in contrast, is indispensable for both. (shrink)

It is widely held that free speech is a distinctive and privileged social kind. But what is free speech? In particular, is there any unified phenomenon that is both free speech and which is worthy of the special value traditionally attached to free speech? We argue that a descendent of the classic Millian justification of free speech is in fact a justification of a more general social condition; and, via an (...) argument that 'free speech' names whatever natural social kind is justified by the best arguments, that free speech is therefore this more general condition. This condition involves not merely the orthodox freedom (in some sense) of speakers to distribute words, but also two less frequently acknowledged dimensions of free speech: audience understanding and consideration. We conclude with some discussion of the policy implications of this conception of free speech. (shrink)

This article examines what is wrong with some expressive acts, ‘insults’. Their putative wrongfulness is distinguished from the causing of indirect harms, aggregated harms, contextual harms, and damaging misrepresentations. The article clarifies what insults are, making use of work by Neu and Austin, and argues that their wrongfulness cannot lie in the hurt that is caused to those at whom such acts are directed. Rather it must lie in what they seek to do, namely to denigrate the other. The causing (...) of offence is at most evidence that an insult has been communicated; it is not independent grounds of proscription or constraint. The victim of an insult may know that she has been insulted but not accept or agree with the insult, and thereby submit to the insulter. Hence insults need not, as Waldron argues they do, occasion dignitary harms. They do not of themselves subvert their victims' equal moral status. The claim that hateful speech endorses inequality should not be conflated with a claim that such speech directly subverts equality. Thus, ‘wounding words’ should not unduly trouble the liberal defender of free speech either on the grounds of preventing offence or on those of avoiding dignitary harms. (shrink)

Both books reviewed here argue for the importance of free speech, though apart from that they have little in common. One, The Most Human Right: Why Free Speech is Everything by Eric Heinze is a cas...

Largely thanks to Mill’s influence, the suggestion that the state ought to restrict the distribution of misinformation will strike most philosophers as implausible. Two of Mill’s influential assumptions are particularly relevant here: first, that free speech debates should focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause; second, that false information causes minimal harm due to the fact that human beings are psychologically well equipped to distinguish truth and falsehood. However, in addition (...) to our moral obligations, we also have a distinct set of epistemic obligations—and even when a false belief doesn’t harm anyone, it constitutes an epistemically bad outcome. Moreover, Mill was profoundly mistaken about human psychology: human beings are vulnerable to the influence of a wide variety of false claims via a wide variety of psychological mechanisms. Consequently, there is a purely epistemic justification for restricting the distribution of misinformation: because each of us has an individual epistemic obligation to avoid unnecessary exposure to misinformation, and because avoiding such exposure is simply too difficult when acting alone, we all have a shared epistemic obligation to establish laws or regulations restricting the widespread distribution of misinformation. (shrink)

This article looks at liberalism as a political tradition encompassing competing and, at times, incommensurable values. It looks in particular at the potential conflict between the values of free speech and equal respect. Both of these are foundational values for liberalism, in the sense that they arise as normative ideals from the very inception of the liberal tradition itself. Yet from the perspective of this tradition, it is by no means clear which of these values should be prioritized (...) in those instances where they come into conflict. This article insists that the only way these two values can be meaningfully weighed against each other is if their competition can be understood within the broader framework of liberalism and democracy. Within this broader framework it is possible to find criteria which enable us to choose between these values in a non-circular manner — i.e. in ways which do not already presuppose a commitment to the value we wish to support. (shrink)

In 2012, baker Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, citing religious beliefs. Colorado Public Accommodations law prohibits business owners from denying the “full and equal enjoyment” of their services on the basis of sexual orientation, and Phillips refused to sell the couple the very same items he would sell to a heterosexual couple. But Phillips, who fashions himself as a “cake artist,” argues that applying the law here would interfere with his (...) free-speech rights. Moreover, he argues that he is not actually discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation but on the basis of a particular understanding of marriage; he is happy to sell Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender people a wide range of other items. In this chapter, I evaluate both arguments. In the postscript, I briefly explain the US Supreme Court's June 2018 ruling on the case. (shrink)

Free speech has been treated as a preeminent constitutional right in the United States for more than half a century. The rights of property owners, on the other hand, have received little constitutional protection since the New Deal period of the 1930s. This modern dichotomy is particularly striking because it obscures an older constitutional tradition that equated economic liberty and freedom of expression. This tradition saw both property rights and speech rights as essential to the protection of (...) personal freedom by restraining the power of government. (shrink)

This paper argues that what scholars call ‘the free speech principle’ is not one principle but a slew of principles, and that these principles harbour several important differences that have remained largely unremarked upon, namely: (i) extending vs. limiting principles; (ii) comparative vs. non-comparative principles; and (iii) monistic vs. pluralistic principles. The paper also critically assesses certain generalisations that people might be tempted to make about these different principles, such as that one kind of free speech (...) principle is harder to defend than another. Finally, the paper teases out the practical as well as theoretical implications of these insights, including degrees of complexity, the logical relationship between free speech principles and free speech policy dilemmas, and the virtue of compromise over free speech principles. (shrink)

If the University had a constitution, would it contain a free speech provision such as exists in the U.S. Constitution? The author develops in some detail the idea of the University as a special social institution that has as its goal the dissemination and advancement of knowledge.Free Speech on Campus examines the arguments, pro and con, concerning appropriate standards of discourse and expression that are particularly germane to the campus context, public or private, whether or not (...) they are constitutionally enforceable. Students and teachers in every discipline will find this book engaging and illuminating; it is especially relevant for ethicists and philosophers of education. (shrink)

Free Speech and the Politics of Identity challenges the scholarly view as well as the dominant legal view outside the United States that the right of free speech may reasonably be traded off in pursuit of justice to stigmatized minorities. The book's innovative normative and interpretative methodology calls for a new departure in comparative public law, in which all states responsibly address their common problems, not only of inadequate protection of free speech, but also (...) correlative failure to take seriously the continuing political power of such evils as anti-Semitism, racism, sexism, and homophobia. (shrink)

Reno v. ACLU, the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open (...) the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible. (shrink)

Recent years have seen recurring episodes of tension between proponents of freedom of speech and advocates of the disenfranchised. Recent survey research attests to the ideological division in attitudes toward free speech, whereby conservatives report greater support for free speech than progressives do. Intrigued by the question of whether “canceling” is indeed a uniquely progressive tendency, we conducted a vignette-based experiment examining judgments of offensiveness among progressives and conservatives. Contrary to the dominant portrayal of progressives (...) and conservatives, our study documented ideological symmetry in their evaluations of offensive speech. When faced with utterances whose content matters to them, both conservatives and progressives viewed outgroup speakers as more offensive than ingroup speakers. A second contribution of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanism implicated in evaluating outgroup speech as more offensive than ingroup speech. Our results suggest that perception of offensiveness is mediated by ascriptions of intent: we tend to attribute negative intent to the speaker whenever we deem their utterances to be offensive, even against the explicitly stated speaker’s background attitudes. (shrink)

This chapter examines two ways in which liberal thinkers have appealed to claims about disagreement in order to defend a principle of free speech. One argument, from Mill, says that free speech is a necessary condition for healthy disagreement, and that healthy disagreement is conducive to human flourishing. The other argument says that in a community of people who disagree about questions of value, free speech is a necessary condition of legitimate democratic government. We (...) argue that both of these arguments, in their standard guises, are premised upon contestable views about the realpolitik of disagreement in a liberal society. (shrink)

Free speech has historically been viewed as a special and preferred democratic value in the United States, by the public as well as by the legislatures and courts. In 1937, Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote in Palko v. Connecticut that protection of speech is a “fundamental” liberty due to America's history, political and legal, and he recognized its importance, saying, “[F]reedom of thought and speech” is “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” (...) It is likely notable that in the Bill of Rights free speech is protected in the First Amendment rather than later. (shrink)

In this paper I provide an interpretation of Kant’s conception of free speech. Free speech is understood as the kind of speech that is constitutive of interaction respectful of everybody’s right to freedom, and it requires what we with John Rawls may call ‘public reason’. Public reason so understood refers to how the public authority must reason in order to properly specify the political relation between citizens. My main aim is to give us some reasons (...) for taking a renewed interest in Kant’s conception of free speech, including his account public reason. Kant’s position provides resources for dealing with many of the legal and political problems we currently struggle to analyze under this heading, such as the proper distinction between the sphere of justice and the sphere of ethics, hate speech, freedom of speech, defamation, and the public guarantee of reliable media and universal education. (shrink)

I have argued elsewhere that in past history, freedom of speech, whether granted to few or many, was granted as bestowing some important benefit. John Stuart Mill, for example, in On Liberty, saw it as enabling us to learn from each other through discussion. By the test of benefit, I here argue that social media that are funded through trade in our personal data with advertisers, including propagandists, cannot claim to be supporting free speech. We lose our (...) freedoms, if the personal data we entrust to online social media are used to target us with information, or disinformation, tailored as persuasive to different personalities, in order to maximize revenue from advertisers or propagandists. Among the serious consequences described, particularly dangerous because of its effect on democracy, is the use of such targeted advertisements to swing voting campaigns. Control is needed both of the social media and of any political parties that pay social media for differential targeting of voters based on personality. Using UK government documents, I recommend legislation for reform and enforcement. (shrink)

For commercial purveyors of digital speech, information and entertainment, the biggest threat posed by the Internet isn''t the threat of piracy, but the threat posed by free speech -- speech that doesn''t cost any money. Free speech has the potential to squeeze out expensive speech. A glut of high quality free stuff has the potential to run companies in the business of selling speech out of business. We haven''t had to worry (...) about this before, because speaking in a meaningful way to a large audience was expensive, and people couldn''t afford to do serious mass speaking for free for very long. The Internet has made it much cheaper. It doesn''t take much to give out information to the whole world, every day, for free, for years. And people do. If we are trying to increase the abundant dissemination of information, free speech is good. If we are trying to increase commerce in information, free speech is arguably bad, in that it competes with pay speech. Information merchants would obviously prefer that the only speech in the marketplace be pay speech. In the past two years, commercial content owners have scored significant progress in herding free speakers off the Net. There''s an important synergy between persuading the government to give your industry some friendly new laws or regulations, and using new and old legal tools to make life more difficult or expensive for inconvenient competitors who aren''t necessarily doing anything illegal. Recently, businesses have been able to combine the two strategies to make the Internet a much safer place to sell speech, by making the Internet a less friendly, more dangerous place to give away speech for free. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a novel and in-depth account of how, for Kant, free speech is the mechanism that moves a society closer to justice. I argue that the criticism of the legislator preserved by free speech must also be the result of collective agreement. I further argue that structural features of judgements of taste and the sensus communis give guidance for how we should communicate publicly to succeed at the aims Kant has laid out, (...) as judgements of taste, like politics, belong fundamentally to a transitional sphere between nature and freedom. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Autonomy may be used to justify free speech claims where the right is raised against the state but also to justify state intervention intended to promote autonomy which may entail restraints on others' speech. The appeal to diversity and autonomy may be used by both sides of the pornography and censorship debate. Although autonomy may be invoked in defence of pornography as part of the general defence of free speech, it is argued that autonomy (...) favours the regulation of pornography. The ‘free speech’defence of pornography is critically examined here and an alternative argument advanced for regulation. (shrink)

In What 'Snowflakes' Get Right About Free Speech, Ulrich Baer draws on jurisprudence, philosophical texts, and his long experience as a senior university administrator to show that debates surrounding free speech on university campuses are not about the feelings of offended students but about our democracy's commitment to equality and the university's critical role as an arbiter of truth in society.

By examining the highly contested legal debate about the regulation of pornography through an epistemic lens, this book analyzes competing claims about the proper role of speech in our society, pornography’s harm, the relationship between speech and equality, and whether law should regulate and, if so, upon what grounds.

Formułowane w ostatnim czasie przez postępowych Amerykanów zarzuty wobec cynicznej, konserwatywnej „weaponizacji” wolności słowa trafnie zwracają uwagę na tkwiący w niej aspekt hipokryzji. Przesłankę tych oskarżeń często stanowi jednak wolność słowa rozumiana „absolutystycznie” jako bezwzględne dobro. W istocie należy ją zawsze rozumieć jako coś, co prowadzi do innego celu: mającego wymiar obiektywny, subiektywny bądź intersubiektywny. Najczęstszą funkcją wolności słowa jest tworzenie warunków dla epistemologicznego poszukiwania prawdy. Zwracali na to uwagę liberałowie, tacy jak John Stuart Mill, oraz marksiści, tacy jak Herbert (...) Marcuse – twierdzący, że realizację tego celu utrudnia „represywna tolerancja” dla szkodliwych lub błędnych idei. Wolności słowa można bronić również ze względu na wpisaną w nią możliwość wyrażania indywidualnych opinii i uczuć, bez której nie ma mowy o jednostkowej autonomii. Trzecia funkcja wolności słowa ma charakter performatywny: język może służyć do działania w świecie. Współcześnie najczęściej mówi się w tym kontekście o ograniczaniu „mowy nienawiści” jako aktu przemocy symbolicznej, jednak konsekwencje tak rozumianej wolności słowa mogą być również pozytywne. Czwarty telos wolności wypowiedzi – semantyczny raczej niż epistemologiczny, ekspresywny czy performatywny – to tworzenie nowych znaczeń kulturowych bądź krytyka konwencjonalnych. Ponieważ wolność słowa może służyć jednej lub większej liczbie z tych funkcji, warto jej bronić również w niedoskonałym społeczeństwie, niezależnie od tego (przy całym szacunku dla Marcusego), że nie ma ona wartości bezwzględnej. (shrink)

Free Speech in the Balance is the first comprehensive study of proportional analysis in free speech theory. This book challenges the US Supreme Court's categorical approach and explains the importance of understanding the breadth of concerns arising from regulations directly and indirectly impacting expression. The author provides in-depth analysis of some of the important social and political principles governing topics of vital concern, including campaign financing, university speech codes, secondary school rules, incitement, and threats. This (...) book should be read by students and scholars of free speech theory and anyone interested in learning more about the history of existing law, the issues of current importance, and trends in expressive significance. (shrink)

Scientists can choose different claims as interpretations of the results of their research. Scientific rhetoric is understood as the attempt to make those claims most beneficial for the scientists' interests. A rational choice, game-theoretic model is developed to analyze how this choice can be made and to assess it from a normative point of view. The main conclusion is that `social' interests (pursuit of recognition) may conflict with `cognitive' ones when no constraints are put on the choices of the authors (...) of scientific papers, as in an `ideal free speech situation'. Scientific institutions may help to solve this conflict. Lastly, some empirical predictions are offered that can inspire future social research of the refereeing process. (shrink)