If explicit cognition about morality promotes moral behavior then one might expect ethics professors to behave particularly well. However, professional ethicists' behavior has never been empirically studied. The present research examined the rates at which ethics books are missing from leading academic libraries, compared to other philosophy books similar in age and popularity. Study 1 found that relatively obscure, contemporary ethics books of the sort likely to be borrowed mainly by professors and advanced students of philosophy were actually about 50% (...) more likely to be missing than non-ethics books. Study 2 found that classic (pre-1900) ethics books were about twice as likely to be missing. (shrink)

Because the United States has failed to provide a pathway to citizenship for its long-term undocumented population, clinical ethicists have more than 20 years of addressing issues that arise in caring for this population. I illustrate that these challenges fall into two sets of issues. First-generation issues involve finding ethical ways to treat and discharge patients who are uninsured and ineligible for safety-net resources. More recently, ethicists have been invited to help address second-generation issues that involve facilitating the presentation for (...) care of undocumented patients. In the current environment of widespread fear of deportation in the immigrant community, ethicists are working with health care providers to address patient concerns that prevent them from seeking care. I illustrate that in both generations of issues, values implicit within health care, namely, caring, efficiency, and promotion of public health, guide the strategies that are acceptable and recommended. (shrink)

If philosophical moral reflection improves moral behavior, one might expect ethics professors to behave morally better than socially similar non-ethicists. Under the assumption that forms of political engagement such as voting have moral worth, we looked at the rate at which a sample of professional ethicists—and political philosophers as a subgroup of ethicists—voted in eight years’ worth of elections. We compared ethicists’ and political philosophers’ voting rates with the voting rates of three other groups: philosophers not specializing in ethics, political (...) scientists, and a comparison group of professors specializing in neither philosophy nor political science. All groups voted at about the same rate, except for the political scientists, who voted about 10–15% more often. On the face of it, this finding conflicts with the expectation that ethicists will behave more responsibly than non-ethicists. (shrink)

Ethicist assumptions about the causes and solutions of environmental problems are widely held within environmental philosophy. It is typically assumed that an important cause of problems are the attitudes towards the natural environment held by individuals and that problems can be solved by getting people to adopt a more ethical orientation towards the environment. This article analyses and criticises these claims. Both the highly mediated nature of the relationship between individuals and the natural environment and the pervasive pressure on firms (...) in market economies to reduce their costs provide reasons to question the ethicist assumptions. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been growing calls for nurses to have a formal advanced practice role as nurse ethicists in hospital contexts. Initially proposed in the cultural context of the USA where nurse ethicists have long been recognised, the idea is being advocated in other judications outside of the USA such as the UK, Australia and elsewhere. Such calls are not without controversy, however. Underpinning this controversy are ongoing debates about the theoretical, methodological and political dimensions of clinical ethics (...) support services generally, and more recently where nurses might ‘fit’ within such a service. In considering whether nurse ethicists ought to have a place in clinical ethics support services, a number of questions arise such as: Is such a role warranted? If so, what credentials should nurses assuming the title of ‘nurse ethicist’ be required to have? What standards of practice ought nurse ethicists be required to uphold? What is the ultimate role and function of nurse ethicists in hospital contexts? And in what contexts might a nurse ethicist be most useful? In this essay, brief attention will be given to addressing these questions. It will be concluded that, as a minimum, nurses wishing to assume an advanced nursing practice role as a nurse ethicist must have substantive grounding in the foundational knowledge of the disciplines of both moral philosophy and nursing ethics. They must also not lose sight of the ultimate goal of nursing ethics, notably, to promote and advance ethical nursing practice and the provision of ‘good’ nursing care. (shrink)

Medical ethicists have assumed a role in justifying public voyeurism of human "curiosities." This role has precedent in how scientists and natural philosophers once legitimized the marketing of museums of "human curiosities." At the beginning of the twentieth century, physicians dissociated themselves from entrepreneurial displays of persons with anomalies, and such commercial exhibits went into decline. Today, news media, principally on television, promote news features about persons that closely resemble the nineteenth century exhibits of human curiosities. Reporters solicit medical ethicists (...) for soundbites to affirm the newsworthiness and propriety of public voyeurism of these medical stories. Ethicists' soundbites are usually ambiguous or self-evident and rarely enable viewers to morally engage the issues. The precedent of early twentieth century physicians disengaging from such exploitive public shows is a useful example for medical ethics. (shrink)

Contemporary literature investigating the significant impact of technology on our lives leads many to conclude that ethics must be a part of the discussion at an earlier stage in the design process i.e., before a commercial product is developed and introduced. The problem, however, is the question regarding how ethics can be incorporated into an earlier stage of technological development and it is this question that we argue has not yet been answered adequately. There is no consensus amongst scholars as (...) to the kind of ethics that should be practiced, nor the individual selected to perform this ethical analysis. One school of thought holds that ethics should have pragmatic value in research and design and that it should be implemented by the engineers and/or scientists themselves, while another school of thought holds that ethics need not be so pragmatic. For the latter, the ethical reflection can aim at a variety of goals, and be carried out by an ethicist. None of the approaches resulting from these lines of thinking have been adopted on a wide-scale basis. To that end, the approach presented here is intended to bridge the gap between these schools of thought. It is our contention that ethics ought to be pragmatic and to provide utility for the design process and we maintain that adequate ethical reflection, and all that it entails, ought to be conducted by an ethicist. Thus, we propose a novel role for the ethicist—the ethicist as designer—who subscribes to a pragmatic view of ethics in order to bring ethics into the research and design of artifacts—no matter the stage of development. In this paper we outline the series of steps that a pragmatic value analysis entails: uncovering relevant values, scrutinizing these values and, working towards the translation of values into technical content. In conclusion, we present a list of tasks for the ethicist in his/her role as designer on the interdisciplinary team. (shrink)

Do professional ethicists behave any morally better than other professors do? Do they show any greater consistency between their normative attitudes and their behavior? In response to a survey question, a large majority of professors (83 percent of ethicists, 83 percent of nonethicist philosophers, and 85 percent of nonphilosophers) expressed the view that “not consistently responding to student e-mails” is morally bad. A similarly large majority of professors claimed to respond to at least 95 percent of student e-mails. These professors, (...) and others, were sent three e-mails designed to look like queries from students. Ethicists’ e-mail response rates were not significantly different from the other two groups’. Expressed normative view correlated with self-estimated rate of e-mail responsiveness, especially among the ethicists. Empirically measured e-mail responsiveness, however, was at best weakly correlated with self-estimated e-mail responsiveness; and professors’ expressed normative attitude was not significantly correlated with empirically measured e-mail responsiveness for any of the three groups. (shrink)

We report here an emerging dispute in Italy concerning triage criteria for critically ill covid-19 patients, and how best to support doctors having to make difficult decisions in a context of insufficient life saving resources. The dispute we present is particularly significant as it juxtaposes two opposite views of who should make triage decisions, and how doctors should best be supported. There are both empirical and normative questions at stake here. The empirical questions pertain to the available level of evidence (...) that healthcare professionals would rather not be left alone with their ‘clinical judgments’ to make triage decisions, and to the accounts of distributive justice that doctors and healthcare professionals rely on, when making triage decisions. The normative questions pertain to how this empirical evidence should inform guidelines on how prioritisation decisions are made in a context of emergency, and who gets to have the authority to do so. This debate goes beyond the discussion of the care of critically ill patients with COVID-19 and has broader implications beyond the national context for the discussion of how to relieve moral distress in contexts of imbalances between healthcare resources and clinical needs of a population. (shrink)

This article discusses the transition that business ethics has undergone since its start essentially as a philosophical sub-discipline of applied ethics. Today, business ethics—as demonstrated by four examples of gatekeepers—is a well-established field in general management, and increasingly business scholars without a “formal” background in philosophy are entering the scene. I take this transition to examine an updated positioning of business ethics and offer a proposal to redefine what makes a business ethicist. I suggest taking critical thinking as the common (...) denominator of all business ethics activities beyond the academic silos of various disciplines. In conclusion, by borrowing from the post-colonial theorist Edward Said, this article offers a definition of what makes a business ethicist in the broadest possible sense. Implications are discussed, including the consequences suggesting that if critical thinking is the common denominator, business ethics-as-business-case logic is not considered a part of business ethics publications, but should be addressed within more instrumental publication outlets of business. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically examine Berys Gaut’s proposals regarding ethical criticism, that is, regarding the question of whether, and if so how, an ethical evaluation of a work of art can be considered amongst the determinants of the work’s value as art. I critically examine Gaut’s proposed taxonomy on the possible positions on the ethical criticism question as well as his own influential answer to such question: ethicism. My critique focuses on one missing element, I argue, in Gaut’s (...) overall approach and in ethicism as he formulates and defends it: reference to artistic categorization and to the aims and commitments artworks have in virtue of the artistic categories they belong to. I show how reference to artistic categorization facilitates the generation of a more fine-grained taxonomy of positions than the one Gaut proposes. Such taxonomy makes it possible to distinguish between two very different types of positions within what Gaut dubs ‘contextualism’: what I call limited or restricted ethicism and particularism. As an application of this more fine-grained taxonomy, I show how Noël Carroll’s ‘moderate moralism’, which Gaut convincingly claims to be incomplete, need not reduce to either ethicism or contextualism as Gaut claims: the view can also be completed in the direction of a limited or restricted ethicism. As for Gaut’s own proposal, surprisingly it itself proves to have leanings towards particularism, in so far as it delegates the question of the artistic (or aesthetic) relevance of ethical features to case-by-case decisions. Again, reference to artistic categorization would offer Gaut grounds to be less sceptical on the possibility of finding general philosophical principles governing the relevance of ethical features to artistic worth. Further, lack of reference to artistic categorization can be shown to affect Gaut’s claims within all three the arguments he puts forward in defence of ethicism—the moral beauty, the cognitive, and the merited-response argument. I show such claims to be ill founded when not implausible. (shrink)

Lists of paid registrants at Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association from 2006–2008 were compared with lists of people appearing as presenters, commentators or chairs on the meeting programme those same years. These were years in which fee payment depended primarily on an honour system rather than on enforcement. Seventy-four per cent of ethicist participants and 76% of non-ethicist participants appear to have paid their meeting registration fees: not a statistically significant difference. This finding of no difference survives (...) scrutiny for several possible confounds. Thus, professional ethicists seem no less likely to free-ride in this context than do philosophers not specializing in ethics. These data fit with other recent findings suggesting that on average professional ethicists behave no morally better than do professors not specializing in ethics. (shrink)

We review and present a new meta‐analysis of research suggesting that ethicists in the United States appear to behave no morally better overall than do non‐ethicist professors. Measures include: returning library books, peer evaluation of overall moral behavior, voting participation, courteous and discourteous behavior at conferences, replying to student emails, paying conference registration fees and disciplinary society dues, staying in touch with one's mother, charitable giving, organ and blood donation, vegetarianism, and honesty in responding to survey questions. One multi‐measure study (...) found ethicists tending to embrace more stringent moral views, especially about meat eating and charitable donation. The same multi‐measure study found ethicists and other professors to show similarly small‐to‐medium correlations between their expressed normative attitudes and their self‐reported or directly measured behavior. (shrink)

Background: Demand for organisational ethics capacity is growing in health organisations, particularly among managers. The role of clinical ethicists in, and perspective on, organisational ethics has not been well described or documented in the literature. Objective: To describe clinical ethicists’ perspectives on organisational ethics issues in their hospitals, their institutional role in relation to organisational ethics, and their perceived effectiveness in helping to address organisational ethics issues. Design and Setting: Qualitative case study involving semi-structured interviews with 18 clinical ethicists across (...) 13 health organisations in Toronto, Canada. Results: From the clinical ethicists’ perspective, the most pressing organisational ethics issues in their organisations are: resource allocation, staff moral distress linked to the organisation’s moral climate, conflicts of interest, and clinical issues with a significant organisational dimension. Clinical ethicists were consulted in particular on issues related to staff moral distress and clinical issues with an organisational dimension. Some ethicists described being increasingly consulted on resource allocation, conflicts of interest, and other corporate decisions. Many clinical ethicists felt they lacked sufficient knowledge and understanding of organisational decision-making processes, training in organisational ethics, and access to organisational ethics tools to deal effectively with the increasing demand for organisational ethics support. Conclusion: Growing demand for organisational ethics expertise in healthcare institutions is reshaping the role of clinical ethicists. Effectiveness in organisational ethics entails a re-evaluation of clinical ethics training to include capacity building in organisational ethics and organisational decision-making processes as a complement to traditional clinical ethics education. (shrink)

In the United States, disturbing concerns pertaining to both how putative bioethicists are perceived and the potential for the abuse of their power in connection with these perceptions compel close examination. This paper addresses these caveats by examining two fundamental and interrelated components in the image-construction of the ethicist: definitional and contextual. Definitional features reveal that perceptions and images of the ethicist are especially subject to distortion due to a lack of clarity as to the nature and qualifications of the (...) ethicist. Furthermore, the clinical, professional, political, academic, and linguistic contexts in which these ethicists are engaged are contexts of disquieting degrees of power. I argue that the lack of definitional clarity as to what constitutes an ethicist combined with the above volatile contexts together set the stage for the abuse of power on the part of ethicists. Throughout, I question the extent of self-critical analyses among ethicists, and, in view of these components in image-construction and their relationship to power, I challenge the degree of integrity within the field. In conclusion, I propose some areas for further investigation. (shrink)

The aims of this paper are (1) to reconstruct the dialectic between two rival theories on the relation between art and morality, (2) to argue against Berys Gaut’s recent defense of ethicism, and (3) to elaborate some of my critical remarks and propose new considerations in favor of immoralism. To a first approximation, an ethicist maintains that the moral value of a work of art, when relevant, is an important element of its artistic value. In particular, assuming that the (...) moral value of a work, w, is relevant for its artistic value, if w has an immoral character (in a sense to be specified), then its aesthetic value is lessened. In addition, if w has a morally positive character, then w is also artistically more .. (shrink)

In some sense, argues Christopher Meyers in the lead article in this, the July‐August 2021, issue of the Hastings Center Report, to be a good ethicist is to be an activist. The question for the ethicist, and for Meyers, is about how hard and far to push: how much personal risk to shoulder, how much to tick off colleagues, how much institutional disruption to create, how much to look like an angry protester. Meyers argues for aiming at the middle, in (...) two senses. In a time of anger and activism about relentless, pervasive, overwhelming wrongs, the question of balance is increasingly front of mind. A set of commentaries we solicited both welcome Meyers's call for activism and push for more. (shrink)

Background Although clinical ethicists are becoming more prevalent in healthcare settings, their required training and education have not been clearly delineated. Most agree that training and education are important, but their nature and delivery remain topics of debate. One option is through completion of a clinical ethics fellowship. Method In this paper, the first four fellows to complete a newly developed fellowship program discuss their experiences. They describe the goals, structure, participants and activities of the fellowship. They identify key elements (...) for succeeding as a clinical ethicist and sustaining a clinical ethics program. They critically reflect upon the challenges faced in the program. Results The one-year fellowship provided real-time clinical opportunities that helped them to develop the necessary knowledge and skills, gain insight into the role and scope of practice of clinical ethicists and hone valuable character traits. Conclusion The fellowship enabled each of the fellows to assume confidently and competently a position as a clinical ethicist upon completion. (shrink)

John H. Evans’s views on the multiple roles of healthcare ethics consultants are based on his claim that bioethics is a “distinct profession” that has a “system of abstract knowledge.” This response to Professor Evans disputes both of his claims. It is argued that clinical ethicists are consultants but not professionals. Their roles as consultants require more than one abstract form of knowledge (principlism). Instead, clinical ethicists rely upon a variety of ethical perspectives and other skills to help resolve conflicts (...) and facilitate healthcare decisions and policy making, whether it is in clinical, research, policy, or organizational contexts. The credibility and effectiveness of clinical ethicists depend upon their knowledge of ethics, their practical experience, and personal abilities, not one form of abstract knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clinical Ethicists: Can They Help Families in Their Times of Need?Tracy R. WilsonI am a doctorally-prepared nurse practitioner with over 20 years in healthcare, and I am currently pursuing my MS in Bioethics and Medical Humanities at Tulane University, with an anticipated graduation of May 2023. In the fall of 2022, I had the pleasure of taking a Clinical Ethics course. As part of that course, I shadowed a (...) Clinical Ethicist for a week. It was a valuable experience, and I gained some insights about a role I didn’t know about previously. The last two years have been difficult for my family and me. I lost my dad in November 2020 and then a “sister cousin” in May 2021. In both instances, we had the team involved in their care and helping with the decision-making process.The role of the Clinical Ethicist Consultant (CEC) service is to help families process medical decisions—most of those decisions deal with endof-life care. The CEC works as the mediator between the family and the medical team. This is how I saw the CEC role play out in my experience.During my shadowing experience, my preceptor was phenomenal at his role because 1) he listened to the patient and the family, and 2) he consulted with the appropriate team members. My shadowing experience was virtual due to the restrictions of the healthcare facility. However, I was able to attend ethical team meetings. I was able to listen to multiple family calls and consultations. During my experience, my clinical ethicist was very conscientious of taking inventory of the feelings of everyone involved. Before he provided an opinion on a case, he did a deep dive into the patient’s chart to gain the patient’s historical context. He always asked for my opinion while we discussed a case, which made me feel included even as a student. It made me feel like my opinion had some weight, and it did in one of the cases. When I returned the next day, the feelings I had about a patient and her family using her for financial gain turned out to be true. Elder abuse was taking place.My personal experiences were more complicated, in which we didn’t always have a medical team that always heard what we needed for our loved ones. In the case of my sister cousin, she entered the hospital and was diagnosed with COVID-19. Our family never thought she would die from it, so it was shocking to us when she was placed on a ventilator and never came off. When the critical care MD stated that “there was nothing else he could do for her,” I could not understand how that could be when lung transplants were being done all over the US and even less than 100 miles away.We needed a CEC team then. I was the medical expert for my family, and I felt the medical team was not listening to what we wanted. The medical team believed that to continue treatment would be futile and their belief about this exceeded their need to continue treating my sister cousin. However, having a CEC mediate by first understanding the clinical team’s perspective, explaining those considerations to us, and then helping our family relay back our [End Page 23] wants, needs, and values to the clinical team could have helped. Unfortunately, my cousin never got this option. There was a palliative care team implemented but never a Clinical Ethicist. Having faced both, from a student perspective and from a personal experience, I would say that having a CEC present allows a family to have an advocate in the room, someone who knows the medical language and can explain to you and will explain to the medical team your perspective, which can sometimes be lost in translation or not heard.When my father passed away, he did not have a Clinical Ethicist as a part of his medical team either. My dad was a Vietnam Vet and a very prideful man. So, when my dad became ill in 2018 with vascular dementia, it took a toll on me and my sisters. To... (shrink)

A project featuring scholars in nursing ethics was planned in 2005. The goal was to document the contributions of some 24 selected American nurse ethicists to bioethics, and to discuss and explore the future trajectory of that work through a two-day working seminar. This article outlines the beginnings of bioethics in the USA and the specific contribution of nurse scholars to the debate, the preparation for the seminar, the results of the project, and the possible application of such a model (...) for teaching and archiving in the future. Documentation of the work carried out at the seminar resulted in the publication of a book. Short biographies of the participants at the seminar are included in Appendix 1. (shrink)

Although clinical ethics scholarship and practice has largely avoided assuming an activist stance, the many health care crises of the last eighteen months motivated a distinct change: On listserves, in blog postings, and in published essays, activist language has permeated conversations over such issues as the impact of triage policies on persons with disabilities and of color, and how the health care system has historically failed African Americans. In this paper, I defend this turn, arguing that clinical ethicists should embrace (...) activism—generally, and with particular emphasis on institutional, mesolevel concerns. Ethicists are often uniquely situated to understand the structural factors that regularly motivate clinical ethics cases, and they are often in a privileged position to be effective change agents. In making this case, I also stress the need not to overstep one's skills and to be acutely cognizant of the political risks associated with such work. (shrink)

Ethics in the modern context is under the dual pressure of scientific-technological rationality and market commercialization, which has led to breakthroughs in the original boundaries of knowledge and academic methodology. The gradual separation of the domain of public life and that of private life in modern society and the former’s increasing pressure on the latter, in addition to the above dual pressure on ethics, is causing a dramatic transformation of the structure of ethical knowledge itself. All of these raise new (...) theoretical problems for ethics and ethicists in the modern context. Answering and solving these problems makes sense for the future development of ethics as one of the classic humanities, and tests modern ethicists’ ability to realize their moral and theoretical duties. (shrink)

abstract The paper, using Spielberg's Munich as a test case, argues that the theory of ethicism – the view that a work of art's moral point of view affects the work's overall aesthetic evaluation – has serious restricted applicability owing to a number of reasons. Ethicism does not apply to works of art (1) that have no moral content; (2) that do have moral content but whose prescribed responses are non-moral; (3) whose prescribed moral responses do not ask (...) the audience to accept or reject the moral claim but merely to contemplate or entertain it; (4) whose prescribed moral responses assert moral claims that are indeterminate; and (5) whose prescribed moral responses are embodied in equally plausible or true but incompatible interpretations. (shrink)

Much has been written about the rights of health-care professionals to conscientiously object. Ironically, there has been no formal discussion as to whether clinical ethicists have the same right. Given that ethicists routinely deal with the same situations and questions that other health-care professionals find morally discomforting, the question as to whether they have the same right is a critical one. We conclude that ethicists should not have the same right to conscientious objection. The role of an ethicist is to (...) competently manage those situations and cases that cause moral discomfort and confusion. By conscientiously objecting, an ethicist would be failing to fulfil their primary function. The same cannot be said as forcefully about other professionals who object. Moreover, ethicists retain the right to conscientious objection to the joining of the discipline in the first place, and also retain the right to exit if they so choose. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 85-87.

Debates regarding clinical ethicists’ scope of practice are not novel and will continue to evolve. Rapid changes in healthcare delivery, outcomes, and expectations have necessitated flexibility in clinical ethicists’ roles whereby hospital-based clinical ethicists are expected to be woven into the institutional fabric in a way that did not exist in more traditional relationships. In this article we discuss three emerging roles: the ethicist embedded in the interdisciplinary team, the ethicist with an expanded educational mandate, and the ethicist as a (...) therapeutic presence in the patient care space. Such expanded capacities offer more robust, positive contributions to institutional culture, stakeholders’ relationships, and patient-centered care. (shrink)

A distinction is made between the function of ethics in clinical medicine, which is to guide the clinician in his/her practice, and the role of the ethicist. It suggests that ethicists can help by clarifying values expressed in various clinical behaviours. The author proposes that certain ethical positions, such as patient advocacy, have compromised the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship and created a potential for ethical leverage through financial-legal consequences they did not intend or foresee.

An ethics consultant’s scope of practice is best understood as equipping stakeholders to achieve closure over time following after the ethics consultation. This is in contrast to Autumn Fiester’s position in the article, “Neglected Ends: Clinical Ethics Consultation and the Prospects for Closure,” where she claims that moral closure is a necessary condition for the proper completion of an ethics consultation case.

If philosophical moral reflection tends to promote moral behavior, one might think that professional ethicists would behave morally better than do socially comparable non-ethicists. We examined three types of courteous and discourteous behavior at American Philosophical Association conferences: talking audibly while the speaker is talking (versus remaining silent), allowing the door to slam shut while entering or exiting mid-session (versus attempting to close the door quietly), and leaving behind clutter at the end of a session (versus leaving one's seat tidy). (...) By these three measures, audiences in ethics sessions did not appear to behave any more courteously than did audiences in non-ethics sessions. However, audiences in environmental ethics sessions did appear to leave behind less trash. (shrink)

The following text is a voice in the discussion around normative problems of innovative therapies. It refers to problems related to the amendment to the Polish Act on the Professions of Physician and Dentist, particularly to therapeutic experiment category, also discussed in this issue in the article by Maria Gutowska-Ibbs: “Off-label - practical consequences of unclear legislation.”.

“Naturalistic fallacy” is generally associated with Moore’s charge against the naturalists. But for Moore, metaphysical ethics, including those of Kant is as guilty as naturalistic ethics in committing the naturalistic fallacy. Here, the fallacy is identifying “good” with anything metaphysical. Moore appreciates that ‘metaphysical’ propositions provide us with a chance to talk about objects that are not natural. And he thinks that metaphysical ethicists’ do not recognise that these objects do not exist at all, rather they think if the object (...) in question does not exist in nature and time it must exist somewhere else, i.e., in a supersensible reality. Moore’smain criticism of metaphysical ethics focuses on the belief that an objects existence is an essential requirement for its ‘goodness’. For Moore, there are non‐natural objects, by definition they do not belong to nature, they do not exist in nature, they are not sensible. Moore’s only difference from the metaphysical ethicists seems to be in saying that these non-natural objects are not supersensible and in fact they do not exist. In this paper I will investigate such similarities and differences between Moore and metaphysical ethicists and where Moore really stands in the metaphysical-naturalistic spectrum. I will concentrate on Kantian ethics, for Moore thinks that Kantian ethics is an exemplar of metaphysical ethics, and Kant has committed naturalistic fallacy. I will try to show that Moore’s argument on Kant committing naturalistic fallacy is gratuitous. I will argue that Moore’s notion of “good” as a non-natural object that does not exist in time ishard to conceive without assuming a ‘transcendental object’ and the existence of a supersensible reality, as Kant does. And I suggest that Moore is as guilty as Kant in stepping into the supersensible reality. (shrink)

Lying to one’s patients is wrong. So obvious as to border on a platitude, this truism is one that bioethicists have heartily endorsed for several decades. Deception, the standard line holds, underc...

I am grateful to colleagues for their comments on my target article ; they are almost uniformly insightful, telling, and helpful. In this brief response, I extend the discussion on, in order...

This impressive and informative book deserves a wider readership than it is likely to get. Unfortunately there are still too many people who consider they have no need to read anything about the virus as it will, to their way of thinking, never touch them. In addition there will be those who think that a volume by Catholic ethicists will be too narrow in outlook to be worthwhile. Both sets of people are mistaken: HIV is here to stay, there is (...) no cure nor is there likely to be and sooner or later it will affect, let alone infect, millions across the world. On the second count readers will be surprised and energised by the clear and honest debate concerning the teachings of the Catholic Church. The first and longest section is made up of a series of case studies ranging from needle exchange in Puerto Rico, to confronting social stigma in Uganda, and matters relating to confidentiality in Australia. The second consists of seven …. (shrink)

If stem cells ever show promise in treating diseases of the human brain, any potential therapy would need to be tested in animals. But putting human brain stem cells into monkeys or apes could raise awkward ethical dilemmas, like the possibility of generating a humanlike mind in a chimpanzee's body.

Several readers of Kierkegaard have proposed that his works are a good source for contemporary investigations of virtues, especially theistic and Christian ones. Sylvia Walsh has recently offered several arguments to cast doubt on the thesis that Kierkegaard can be profitably read as a “virtue ethicist.” Examination of her arguments helps to clarify what virtues, as excellent traits of human character, can be in a moral outlook that ascribes deep sin and moral helplessness to human beings and their existence and (...) salvation entirely to God’s grace. The examination also clarifies the relationship between virtues and character and between the practices of virtue ethics and character ethics. Such clarification also may provide a bridge of communication between Kierkegaard scholarship and scholars of virtue ethics beyond the theistic communities. In particular, I’ll argue that a character ethics that is not a virtue ethics would be suboptimal as an aid to the formation of Christian wisdom and sanctification. Kierkegaard’s character ethics is a virtue ethics. (shrink)

In his last two books and in the essays and interviews associated with them, Foucault develops a new mode of ethical thought he describes as an aesthetics of existence. I argue that this new ethics bears a striking resemblance to the virtue ethics that has become prominent in Anglo-American moral philosophy over the past three decades, in its classical sources, in its opposition to rule-based systems and its positive emphasis upon what Foucault called the care for the self. I suggest (...) that seeing Foucault and virtue ethicists as engaged in a convergent project sheds light on a number of obscurities in Foucault's thought, and provides us with a historical narrative in which to situate his claims about the development of Western moral thought. (shrink)

In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Mélanie Terrasse, Moti Gorin, and Dominic Sisti, urge ethicists to devote scholarly attention to a wave of troubling artificial intelligence applications affecting health consumers’ rights and the quality of their care. I very much agree. We already have neuroethicists, business ethicists, and genetics ethicists; AI‐related systems in health care present more than enough warrant to herald the appearance of a new ethics specialist—the “intel‐ethicist,” let’s say. Nonetheless, Terrasse and colleagues may have exaggerated (...) some of the potential moral problems of AI. Examining only social media and e‐health programs, the authors produce an impressive array of questions to consider, but I will argue that two of them are not nearly as worrisome as might be supposed. (shrink)