In The Tragedy of the Self, Gary F. Greif attributes social violence and individual isolation to a contemporary neglect of a fundamental human need for support that only human culture and interaction can promote and reinforce. Greif bases this interpretation on the works of Heinz Kohut, a psychoanalyst who by degrees transformed Freud's theory of the instincts into a theory of the self. Kohut maintains that every individual fundamentally requires continual human support in order to live with confidence (...) and hope. Greif introduces Kohut's understanding of the nature, development, and disintegration of the self, analyzes modern and contemporary assumptions regarding the individualistic, anti-social nature of humans, and concludes that contemporary societal assumptions regarding the acceptance of individualism reflect and perpetuate a tragic human condition. Greif argues that the inability of the self to experience a human, fulfilling life is a tragedy intensified by a century of economic and cultural forces promoting social antagonism. A unique and stimulating book, The Tragedy of the Self will appeal to professionals in psychoanalytic psychology, self-psychology, and philosophy as well as academics and students in the Humanities and Social Sciences. (shrink)

Professor Frondizi's The Nature of the Self proposes to solve the problems involved in conceiving the self as a substance. The first section of the book is an historical study of the gradual disintegration, after Descartes, of the view that the self is a substance. The second section offers an account of the self that is presumably not contaminated by this "substantialist outlook." Frondizi's attempt to trace the disintegration of Descartes' concept of the (...) class='Hi'>self through Locke, Berkeley and Hume is not remarkable. Rather than a detailed exegesis of the texts of these philosophers, Frondizi presents a polemical commentary, relying on selected letters and a few obvious and familiar texts. He intends to prove that the British philosophers were forced to opt either for the substantialist view of the self or no theory of the self at all. Frondizi excuses this simplistic and biased judgment on the grounds that he is attempting to chart a philosophical movement rather than follow the thought of a particular philosopher: "The history of philosophy has a certain sense of direction, even though there be no concrete goal; and in some periods it is easy to note the general direction in which ideas are developing. Such is the case with the period which extends from Locke to Hume." Such surveys, however, usually beget unwarranted generalizations; certainly Frondizi's has. His thesis that the British philosophers were forced to choose either "substantialism" or skepticism shows a shallow understanding of the empiricist view of the self. This misunderstanding is the basis upon which Frondizi builds his own account of the self. His task, as he sees it, is to preserve the permanence of the self while providing for changes in moods, attitudes, etc. The "functional" interpretation of the self that results from Frondizi's proposal is Gestalt psychology unadulterated. According to Frondizi the self is a "functional Gestalt," a "dynamic structure"; and this homeostatic character accounts for the permanence as well as the fluctuations in the self. In other words, Frondizi advocates a naïve version of Kurt Lewin's "field theory" of the self. Yet, philosophers both Continental and Anglo-American have cautioned against taking Gestalt theory as an unqualified solution to problems endemic of philosophy. Also, psychologists have raised serious objections to Lewin's theory. Moreover, even granted that Frondizi was not familiar with these authors, has Frondizi's naïve study answered Hume? To what extent does a "structure" change and what are the criteria for determining when a structure is dissolved? Hume is not refuted merely by identifying the self with the Whole. Frondizi himself must either claim "substantiality" for his "dynamic structure" or submit it to Hume's analysis. Frondizi advocates an uncritical Gestalttheorie of the self as a result of his uncritical reading of 18th Century British philosophy. As a consequence, Frondizi's book is another example of how not to combine philosophy with psychology.--J. J. F. (shrink)

This paper argues that one’s authority to issue advance directives governing one’s medical care is limited in ways that have not been appreciated. It focuses on advance directives issued by people who go on to suffer from dementia. An adequate account of decision-making for those with dementia should be able to do justice to two related aspects of that condition. First, for practical purposes, sufferers of dementia both are and are not the same people they were before. Second, the “otherness” (...) of the demented self reflects an unraveling rather than a becoming. The demented self is not a new self but rather the same old self in the process of disintegrating. The paper suggests that Christine Korsgaard’s treatment of personal identity provides a helpful framework for understanding these aspects of dementia. It also gives an account of decision-making for those with dementia that is sensitive to these aspects of dementia. (shrink)

This article seeks to provide a phenomenological inquiry into schizophrenia through which I propose to bring to the fore the mental violence exercised against the self in the case of a psychotic patient. My main aim is to show that a phenomenological analysis of mental illness, interpreted as a disintegration of the ego, can be very fruitful for understanding violence in general because it raises fundamental questions concerning intersubjectivity, intentionality, and self-awareness. In order to accomplish this objective, (...) I will take as my point of departure a case study of mental illness as presented by the analyst Marguerite Sechehaye, and I will explore, first, the phenomenological implications of the disintegration of the ego, and second, the dynamics of the reconstruction of the ego. Third, I will address the question whether mental illness is a form of violence against the self, sketching an answer by interpreting the transition from the disintegration of the ego to its reconstruction as an elevation from a poor phenomenon to a saturated phenomenon. Finally, I will suggest how opening a dialogue between phenomenology and psychoanalysis can contribute to understanding the phenomenon of mental violence. (shrink)

In his reflections on action in Being and Nothingness, Sartre goes to the heart of what it is to be human. Our free actions are not the consequence of ouridentity, they are its foundation. As human beings we go beyond who we are towards a freely chosen future self. Human identity is ambiguous because consciousness simultaneously accepts and sees beyond the identity it discovers; there is an internal disintegration which distances us from ourselves. The intentionality of consciousness means (...) that we are constituted not by an objective presence but by a “presence to” our identity. Personhood is established only when we select certain values and allow them to shape our identity and guide our actions. As “being-for-itself” we go beyond the present and project ourselves towards an identity that does not yet exist, thus creating ourselves through our freedom, through our concrete choices. This article pays careful attention to Sartre’s understanding of consciousness, selfconsciousness, and “selfness,” before drawing some conclusions about the role of human freedom in the construction of identity. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to discuss the relation between ambivalence and the unity of the self. I will raise the question whether a person can be both ambivalent about his own will and nevertheless be wholehearted. Since Harry Frankfurt’s theory is my main point of reference, I briefly introduce his account of the will and the reasons for his opposition towards ambivalence in the first section. In the second section, I analyse different interpretations of ambivalence. In the third (...) section, I provide a narrative account of a diachronic integration of the self that allows for the integration of volitional ambivalence. Finally, I scrutinise different meanings of the unity of the self, since disintegration, not ambivalence, seems to be bad for us. I conclude that persons can indeed be wholeheartedly ambivalent. (shrink)

The thesis argues for the need to reexamine current theoretical conceptions or assumptions regarding Romantic self-consciousness and its perceived dependency on a productive dimension of expression. The origins of the allegedly aporetic relation between an inward form of consciousness and its linguistic "presentation" are traced in the Idealist reflection on self-consciousness by Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Inadvertently, language as a productive force reveals itself as the contingent "ground" for the highly elusive, though philosophically essential, "unity" of self-consciousness. (...) Thus the respective conception of self-consciousness as a relation , production , or re-membring is always grounded in a stratum of "immediacy" that can no longer be contained within a systematic philosophical idiom. Through an incisive critique of the Idealists, Schleiermacher demonstrates that any notion of "immediacy" is essentially homologous to the transformation that all language undergoes in each individual utterance. Pointing to the "coinherence" of the psychological and the grammatical poles of interpretation, Schleiermacher develops a theory of "style" whereby consciousness becomes readable rather than being postulated as an autonomous transcendental agency. ;Wordsworth's narrative poetry conceives of self-consciousness as originating in a purportedly primordial affect. Beginning with the dialogic poems in the Ballads, yet also in Tintern Abbey and in the 1799 Prelude, Wordsworth experiments with a densely figurative form of "presentation" of these affective origins. Yet as his revisions--both between discrete narrative segments in his poetry yet also between earlier and later versions of the Prelude--evidence, Wordsworth becomes increasingly weary of the opacity that inheres in the figurative presentation of this "original" affect. The densely allusive and deliberately self-referential diction of later versions of the Prelude not only compromises the earlier paradigm of self-consciousness as originating in an inward affect, but it also highlights the mutual and irreducible "coinherence" of rhetorical and psychological structures. The final chapter examines Shelley's ironic response to the Wordsworthian impasse in Epipsychidion where the autobiographical vision of a perfect self continues to disintegrate under the verbal onslaught of the very language that constituted it in the first place. (shrink)

The narrated self: time and the dramatisation of historical agency -- The publication of the self: the sublimation of personal identity in publicity and art appreciation -- The disintegration of the self: the origins of abstraction and the de-objectification of the world -- The democratisation of the self: the integration of creative endeavour into the fabric of daily life and the death of art -- The trans-personalisation of the self: the material culture of communication (...) and the communalisation of identity -- The psychological self: the pathology of art and cinematographic modes of self-remembering -- The linguistic self: the de-verberation of the self and the end of meaning. (shrink)

I argue for a transformative revival or actualization of the very core of an integrative, methodologically secured form of intellect‑mystical asceticism. This approach draws on traditional sources that are re‑examined from a systematic—synthetic and transcultural—philosophical perspective and in light of the multi‑civilizational global environment of the 21st century. The main traditional points of reference in this paper are provided by Nicolaus de Cusa and Ibn Sīnā, and I refer toa few others, such as Attar of Nishapur, in passing. I begin (...) by developing a basic concept of intellect‑mystical asceticism. It is distinguished from mystification, science, scientism, and modes of everyday communication and cognition. Then, I make the case for an updated, transcultural approach to intellect‑mysticism that can foster the internal (social) and external (environmental) reintegration of the human noosphere and technosphere in future planetary development. In this context, a modern intellect‑mystical philosophical notion of “knowing non‑knowing” (wissendes Nichtwissen, docta ignorantia) is developed. It is inspired by Nicolaus de Cusa and contextualized from a systematic transcultural angle at the same time. Finally, I discuss the problem of the practical, or rather ascetic, realization of the related possibilities of intellect‑mystical self‑enfolding. Here, the preceding steps of the reflection are mapped onto an outline regarding distinct developmental stages of such a transformative intellect‑mystical practice in Ibn Sīnā’s Remarks and Admonitions (al‑Ishārāt wat‑Tanbīhāt). (shrink)

The phenomenon of multiple personality--Like the "split-Brain" phenomenon--Involves a disintegration of the normally unified self to the point where one must question whether there is one, Or more than one, Person associated with the body even at a single moment in time. Besides the traditional problem of determining identity over time, There is now a new problem of personal identity--Determining identity at a single moment in time. We need the conceptual apparatus to talk about this new problem and (...) a test, Like the one I propose, For determining the number of persons associated with a body at a single moment in time. (shrink)

The ‘self’ is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self ascription task. We show how the experimental (...) instrumentalization has gone hand in hand with a simplification of the self-concept, and how more conceptual and theoretical reflections on the structure, function and nature of self have either disappeared altogether or receded into the background. We argue that this development impedes and complicates the interdisciplinary study of self. (shrink)

The goal of this dissertation is to provide a critique of Jurgen Habermas's communication-theoretic proposal for a discourse ethics. In doing so, I confront the theory of communicative rationality with the pronounced intention of letting discourse ethics take, as Habermas puts it, its orientation for an intersubjective interpretation of the categorical imperative from Hegel's theory of recognition. My objections to this attempt to provide a critical theory with normative grounds generally relate to what I see as a too excessive formalism, (...) and a tendential repression of the dimension of ethical ontology. ;Although Habermas insists that agents always bring their lifewordly conditions of existence--their particular identities and histories--with them when they engage argumentatively to redeem validity claims, the discourse model has throughout its effective history been notoriously helpless when engaging with the internally related issues of motivation and the cognitive problems of judgment and context-sensitive application. In analyzing the principle of universalizability , I show why it is necessary to construct a dialectical relationship between morality and issues of the good life, and to introduce a notion of reflective judgment. Moreover, I argue for a detachment of moral theory from the quasi-transcendental grounding in formal structures of rationality. ;In the course of my successive interpretative confrontations with discourse ethics, I formulate a hermeneutic approach. One important upshot of this is that discourse ethics will be situated closer to Habermas's early suggestions towards a critical hermeneutics. This is a conception which emphatically promotes an internal link between judgment, action and argumentation. Another consequence relates to the need for a realist realignment of discourse ethics. I suggest that reflection and moral discourse, starting from the particularity of concrete cases but ultimately aiming towards universality , should be involved, not in a process of further disintegration of ethical life , but in a process of healing, in which universality serves a memorial, imaginative and communicative function: it creates a conceptual reservoir for interpreting our complex moral experiences, and ultimately for gaining knowledge of the self and its intricate bonds and attachments to others. (shrink)

Reaching into our own time, _Crisis and the Apocalypse of Man_ confronts the disintegration of traditional sources of meaning and the correlative attempt to generate new sources of order from within the self. Voegelin allows us to contemplate the crisis in its starkest terms as the apocalypse of man that now seeks to replace the apocalypse of God. The totalitarian upheaval that convulsed Voegelin's world, and whose aftermath still defines ours, is only the external manifestation of an inner (...) spiritual turmoil. Its roots have been probed throughout the eight volumes of _History of Political Ideas,_ but its emergence is marked by the age of Enlightenment. In our postmodern era, discussions of the collapse of the "enlightenment project" have become commonplace. Voegelin compels us to follow the great-souled individuals who sought to go from disintegration of the present toward evocations of order for the future. Such thinkers as Comte, Bakunin, and Marx suffered through the crisis and fully understood the need for a new outpouring of the spirit. They resolved to supply the deficiency themselves. As a consequence they launched us irrevocably on the path of the apocalypse of man. One of the great merits of Voegelin's analysis is his exposition of the pervasive character of this crisis. It is not confined to the megalomaniacal dreamers of a revolutionary apocalypse; rather, echoes of it are found in the more moderate Enlightenment preoccupation with progress to be attained through application of the scientific method. Faith in the capacity of instrumental reason to answer the ultimate questions of human existence defined men such as Voltaire, Helvétius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and Condorcet. It remains the authoritative faith of our world today, Voegelin argues, demonstrated by our continuing inability to step outside the parameters of the Enlightenment. Are we condemned, then, to oscillate between the rational incoherence of a science that never delivers on its promises and a now discredited revolutionary idealism that wreaks havoc in practice? This is the question toward which Voegelin's final volume points. While not direct, his response is evident everywhere. _Crisis and the Apocalypse of Man_ could have been written only by a man who had reached his own resolution of the crisis. (shrink)

The blockchain social movement led to the emergence of Web3, a new, token-orchestrated iteration of the World Wide Web comprised of decentralized applications. With Web3, users can adopt a unique digital identity, known as a self-sovereign identity, that allows them to have access to their data and be central administrators of their transportable and interoperable identity. An inherent feature of digital identity in Web3 is that, in some cases, it can live forever. Web3 users, therefore, may accumulate digital assets, (...) such as non-fungible tokens, in an attempt to leave a digital legacy behind. Terror-management theory, a social and evolutionary psychology theory, was theoretically applied to the act of digital asset accumulation as a potential mechanism of escaping death-related fears. In contrast, the current uses of non-fungible tokens (ie, proof-of-ownership) and soulbound tokens (ie, proof-of-character) were evaluated from a Logotherapy perspective to inform how Web3 could evolve toward a Decentralized Society. (shrink)

Sketching a new portrait of the human self in this thought-provoking book, leading American philosopher Calvin O. Schrag challenges bleak deconstructionist and postmodernist views of the self as something ceaselessly changing, without origin or purpose. Discussing the self in new vocabulary, he depicts an action-oriented self defined by the ways in which it communicates. The self, says Schrag, is open to understanding through its discourse, its actions, its being with other selves, and its experience of (...) transcendence. In his discussion, Schrag responds critically to both modernists and postmodernists, avoiding what he calls the modernists' overdetermination of unity and identity and the postmodernists' self-enervating pluralism. He agrees with postmodernist attacks on both the classical theory of the self as a metaphysical substance and the modern epistemological construal of the self as transparent mind, yet he maintains that jettisoning the self as understood in these terms does not mean jettisoning it altogether. The self as subject is not dead, nor are the constitutive features of self-formation and self-understanding. In addressing the role of culture in the dynamics of self-formation, the author offers a critique of Max Weber's and Jürgen Habermas's view of modernity as a radical differentiation of three cultural spheres: science, morality, and art; he adds religion as a legitimate fourth cultural sphere. The overview of Schrag's philosophy that _The Self after Postmodernity_ provides will appeal to readers with an interest in literary criticism and religion as well as philosophy. (shrink)

A comprehensive reader on the problem of the self as seen from the viewpoints of philosophy, developmental psychology, robotics, cognitive neuroscience,...

Comparisons have been drawn between certain aspects of Hume’s philosophy and Buddhist philosophy, particularly concerning their views on the self. While it is intriguing to discover affinities between two philosophical systems that are separated far apart by both time and space, comparison would become superficial if similarities are found merely in their general, overall claims or doctrines. Although engaging in a comparative exploration between Hume and Buddhist philosophers on the self can reveal remarkable similarities in their accounts, it (...) can also provide valuable insights into their differences. The differences between Hume’s and Buddhist philosophers’ views become evident when considering the debates about the self among Buddhist philosophers, which have resulted in diverse accounts within the Buddhist tradition. Indeed, it is those differences that prove to be more illuminating for recognizing and understanding subtle aspects and various components of Hume’s account, which may not be adequately described or distinguished by Hume himself. These aspects are particularly revealed in Hume’s brief description of dissatisfaction with his own account in the Appendix. The primary objective of this paper is to uncover the system of reality underlying Hume’s account of the self, which creates a labyrinth for him, by drawing upon Buddhist ideas and debates regarding the self. (shrink)

How is it conceivable or even psychologically possible that rational agents sometimes appear to act against their own acknowledged self-interest? This issue, commonly known as “weakness of the will”, has contributed to much of our individual and collective failure to address pressing problems even if solutions are well-known and readily available. It has fascinated philosophers since ancient times. Recent advances in psychology, behavioural economics and neuroscience have allowed us to approach the phenomenon from a new perspective. A novel account (...) that draws on empirical research characterises weakness of will as a failure to persist in an intention in the face of temptation. However, contemporary work finds it difficult to determine whether this account should replace or supplement orthodox views. This is partially due to a larger problem: philosophers struggle to understand and conceptually connect the various independent strands of empirical research into self-control, willpower, delay of gratification, ego depletion, implementation intentions, delay discounting, etc. Targeting both issues, the present work advances current research into weakness of will in two ways: first, it raises a novel challenge specific for orthodox accounts in philosophy. More precisely, I argue that they yield absurd results in dilemmas, and I show that this puzzle has repercussions for decision theory and epistemology. Second, my thesis renders econometric and psychological research into delay discounting intelligible to a philosophical readership. More specifically, I explain why standard discounting models fail to capture core cases of weakness of will that are also the object of research in developmental psychology. I thereby rectify rampant myths about preference reversals and discount functions in the philosophical and scientific literature. In short, my dissertation connects empirical and philosophical work into weakness of will conceptually in order to tackle issues in current research and advance our joint understanding of a longstanding and problematic phenomenon. (shrink)

Two approaches to authenticity have gained currency in the recent analytic philosophical literature. The first takes authenticity to be a property of how people act (authentic agency). The second takes it to be a property of who people are (authentic self). This paper motivates both views, then argues that there is a dependency between the two: the exercise of authentic agency depends on the possession of an authentic self, while the possession of an authentic self relies on (...) the prior exercise of authentic agency. On a particular, individualist conception of the self, this leads to a paradox. This paradox is resolved if one instead adopts a social conception of the self, according to which the self is partially ontologically constituted by other agents (a ‘we’, rather than an ‘I’). (shrink)

The relationship between psychology and mysticism has gained a great deal of currency over the years. Various psychological models have provided theoretical foundations allowing the researchers to grasp profound varieties and nuances in mystical experiences across cultures and religious traditions. This has, in fact, broadened the canvass for mystical studies. The current paper attempts to carry out a psychological analysis of mystical experience of a character named Kimya in Muriel Maufroy’s novel “Rumi’s Daughter”. The study carries out an analysis of (...) how the mystic’s experience of the Divine can be translated in terms of a psychological process of personality disintegration initiated by a conflict, deconstruction of preconceived notions and beliefs and ultimately leading towards secondary integration of personality. Kazimierz Dabrowski’s theory of positive disintegration is employed as a framework to analyse her spiritual encounter. Through a minute textual analysis of the novel, the research reveals certain parallels between the process of personality development and mystical experience. It confirms the contention that the culmination of mystical union underlies psychological wellbeing and serenity on the part of mystic. The study also shows that mystics are those rare individuals who are capable of reaching the final level of personality development characterised by self-autonomy and higher level of consciousness. (shrink)

The article presents a theoretical analysis of the extramural polemic between Slavoj Žižek and Evald Ilyenkov, undertaken in the context of the search for the foundational underpinnings of the two philosophers’ perspectives on the limit-logical definitions of being. It shows how this apparently “abstract” search grows out of the socio-historical circumstances of the thinkers’ lives, which are inscribed in the dramatic conditions of existence of the political events of the twentieth century. The active life-political position of the follower of Marx’s (...) ideas, figuratively expressed in the text by Lenin’s term “tactics of social democracy” (Lenin 1962), is justified by one or another cognitive position: the unified attitude “not to explain but to transform the world” breaks down into various “tactics” precisely in the attempt to solve the problem of radical negativity (as Žižek formulates it). This is expressed in the division of Marxism into “Western” and “Eastern”. This article analyzes the legitimacy of such a division and shows the conditions for a disintegration of the divide. The relation of Ilyenkov and Žižek to Hegel’s works turns out to be the key to understanding this division, and consequently to the essential difference in socio-political attitudes and “tactics”, of which they are creative representatives. The analysis leads to the formulation of the “germ cell” of disagreement between Ilyenkov and Žižek—the problem of the universal—which unfolds in the difference between the thinkers’ positions on certain theoretical points. The limitation of Ilyenkov’s position, established under the fire of Žižek’s criticism, is removed, according to the author, by the development of a new category of “fractality”, which acts as a counterpart to the main dialectical category of “totality” and provides a concrete (in the Hegelian sense) solution to the problem of radical negativity in the spirit of the classical philosophical tradition. (shrink)

In defense of his Market Failures Approach to business ethics Joseph Heath relies on an understanding of business as essentially oriented towards competition and profit maximization. In these remarks I defend an alternative understanding of business that is centered on the creation of valuable goods and services. It is preferable because it: (a) creates less pressure to take advantage of vulnerable stakeholders, (b) can readily recognize “beyond compliance” norms that do not relate to efficiency, (c) provides a more meaningful framework (...) for people who work in and with corporations, (d) may mitigate negative moral impacts outside the market, and (e) better captures the range of what actually counts as business activity. (shrink)

It is not uncommon for early-modern philosophers to portray a perfectly philosophical way of life as a condition that approaches the divine. The philosopher becomes as like God as a human being can, and in doing so experiences unparalleled and unalloyed joy. Spinoza advocates a version of this view and defends it with impressive consistency. To suggest that the process of philosophical enlightenment involves any affective cost, he argues, is simply to display a lack of understanding, and thus to fall (...) short of the insight and joy that understanding ultimately yields. Nevertheless, something seems to be missing. I turn to a pair of novels by J.M. Coetzee - The Childhood of Jesus and The Schooldays of Jesus - to elucidate a significant though suppressed form of emotional loss that is integral to Spinoza’s image of the philosophical life. (shrink)

This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim (...) Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone. (shrink)

The central claim here is that the self is an emergent experiential, information processing and behavioral system that arises reflexively in the conscious subject and a body setting that is organized and primed with many of the required processes in place. These processes and their associated functions represent our world as coherent and temporally unified within the construct of a developing and roughly continuous experiencer-agent, or self. These representations are not, however, copies of the external world. In this (...) way, selves develop as temporal subjects; as active and complex informational, dispositional, belief-driven and memory-driven configurations of mental states with unique (personal) properties that interact. They are robust and pivotal subsystems of our global mental organization and are suffused with the phenomenality of perception. As constructs in internal and external time, selves have histories, memories, beliefs, skills, cognitive capacities, attitudes, standpoints, social and emotional equities, pre-dispositions and default responses. Yet they are neither causally nor ontologically reducible to their embodied physical states. They are, rather, implemented in them. The body, I maintain, is a necessary but insufficient condition for the occurrence of a self. (shrink)

Clearly, if a man holds a self-contradictory belief, then his belief cannot be rational, for there can be no set of evidence sufficient to justify it. This is most apparent when the self contradictory belief is a belief in a conjunction, , rather than when it is a non-conjunctive self-contradictory belief, e.g. a belief that red is not a color.

Self-driving vehicles will need to make decisions that carry ethical dimensions and manufacturers have (the responsibility) to pre-determine this underlying, deliberate decision-making process. With the rise of self-driving vehicles, scholars have simultaneously started investigating what ethical theories should guide machine behavior, but have not concluded as to which theory should be preferred and adopted. We aim to address this matter by providing a holistic and analytical review of the autonomous driving ethics literature. Based on this review, we summarize (...) the social, moral/legal, and functional advantages and disadvantages of applying particular (traditional) ethical theories to the decision-making of self-driving vehicles. Furthermore, we derive an integrated model that shows how each identified ethical theory could be technically implemented and guide the decision-making of self-driving vehicles. Overall, this article aims to set the groundwork for reflected, successful integration of ethical behavior within self-driving vehicles and deduce an updated research agenda. (shrink)

Simon D. Podmore claims that becoming a self before God is both a divine gift and an anxious obligation. Before we can know God, or ourselves, we must come to a moment of recognition. How this comes to be, as well as the terms of such acknowledgment, are worked out in Podmore’s powerful new reading of Kierkegaard. As he gives full consideration to Kierkegaard's writings, Podmore explores themes such as despair, anxiety, melancholy, and spiritual trial, and how they are (...) broken by the triumph of faith, forgiveness, and the love of God. He confronts the abyss between the self and the divine in order to understand how we can come to know ourselves in relation to a God who is apparently so wholly Other. (shrink)

In The Recovery of the Soul, Kenneth Rankin suggests that the current impasse over solutions to many philosophical problems is the result, in part, of a failure to consider how each of these problems bears on the rest. Rankin shows that a libertarian theory of free will, an A-theory of time, a corporealist theory of personal identity, and a non-relativist interpretation of the foundation of ethics all contribute to or are derived from a psychocentric form of physicalism. The proposed Modal (...) Identity thesis identifies the mind, or that which ensouls the body, with a strictly physical power, the power to act intentionally from occasion to occasion in any one of several mutually exclusive ways. Rankin argues further that the non-arbitrary individuation of particular physical things derives from the causal powers they possess. The distinctive power that ensouls our bodies is identified as the primary causal power: all other powers derive their status as powers from it in so far as they are constitutive, or instruments, of it. Rankin demonstrates that many of our ontological preconceptions are Aristotelian in origin. The psychocentric physicalism of the central thesis is a response to Aristotle's question "What is being?" and in the earlier chapters of the book Aristotle's contributions to a theory of being are used as a preliminary study to suggest which parts of these preconceptions should be kept and which revised. Later chapters suggest that failure to resolve many philosophical problems results in part from the failure of Aristotle's philosophy to fulfil its promise. (shrink)

Recovering the Self seeks to place issues of morality and justice at the heart of social theory. Because of the breakdown of traditional forms of authority, respect for authorities can no longer be taken for granted. Increasingly people believe that respect has to be earned and people have to discover sources of authority within themselves. Victor Seidler seeks to establish a framework to rethink the relation between self and society, identities and power. Through exploring the works of Marx, (...) Weber, and Durkheim he shows the hidden complexities of a modernity too often identified with a unified vision of the rational self. Reinstating the body and emotional life into the discussion, Seidler sets new terms for respect and equality by showing ways the self is undermined in its sense of self-worth and adequacy through the working of relationships of power and subordination. (shrink)

El concepto de autoestima ha ido cambiando a lo largo de los tiempos. Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar como el uso de este constructo para la investigación en salud en Brasil contribuyó a su sistematización conceptual y aplicabilidad clínica. Se trata de un estúdio descriptivo de revisión de la literatura; en el que se llegó a la conclusión de que la medición de la autoestima resultó ser eficiente en la conducción de la investigación en salud con diferentes audiencias, que (...) varían en edad, la ocupación, la relación con los perfiles sociodemográficos y de salud-enfermedad.. A concepção sobre autoestima foi mutável no transcorrer das épocas. O presente estudo teve por finalidade analisar como a utilização desse constructo pelas pesquisas em saúde no Brasil, contribuiu para sua sistematização conceitual e aplicabilidade clínica. Trata-se de um estudo descritivo de revisão teórica; no qualse concluiu que, por ter um aspecto mais avaliativo, a mensuração daautoestima mostrou-se bastante eficiente na condução de pesquisas em saúde com diferentes públicos, variando em faixa etária, ocupação, relação com variáveis sociodemográficas, e perfis de saúde-doença. The concept of self-esteem has changed throughout times. The objective of this study is analyzing how the use of this construct in health research in Brazil contributed to its conceptual systematization and clinical applicability. It is a descriptive study of bibliographic review which led to the conclusion that, by having another evaluation aspect, measuring self-esteem turned out to be very efficient in conducting the health research with different audiences that vary in age, occupation and the relation with sociodemographic and health-disease profiles. (shrink)

Although Karl Marx and Søren Kierkegaard are both major figures in nineteenth-century Western thought, they are rarely considered in the same conversation. Marx is the great radical economic theorist, the prophet of communist revolution who famously claimed religion was the "opiate of the masses." Kierkegaard is the renowned defender of Christian piety, a forerunner of existentialism, and a critic of mass politics who challenged us to become "the single individual." But by drawing out important themes bequeathed them by their shared (...) predecessor G. W. F. Hegel, Jamie Aroosi shows how they were engaged in parallel projects of making sense of the modern, "dialectical" self, as it realizes itself through a process of social, economic, political, and religious emancipation. In The Dialectical Self, Aroosi illustrates that what is traditionally viewed as opposition is actually a complementary one-sidedness, born of the fact that Marx and Kierkegaard differently imagined the impediments to the self's appropriation of freedom. Specifically, Kierkegaard's concern with the psychological and spiritual nature of the self reflected his belief that the primary impediments to freedom reside in subjectivity, such as in our willing conformity to social norms. Conversely, Marx's concern with the sociopolitical nature of the self reflected his belief that the primary impediments to freedom reside in the objective world, such as in the exploitation of the economic system. However, according to Aroosi, each thinker represents one half of a larger picture of freedom and selfhood, because the subjective and objective impediments to freedom serve to reinforce one another. By synthesizing the writing of these two diametrically opposed figures, Aroosi demonstrates the importance of envisioning emancipation as a subjective, psychological, and spiritual process as well as an objective, sociopolitical, and economic one. The Dialectical Self attests to the importance and continued relevance of Marx and Kierkegaard for the modern imagination. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Birth of The Birth of TragedyDennis SweetIntroductionNietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy, is ostensibly an account of the psychological motives behind the creation and modifications of Greek drama, but it is really much more than this. It is the author’s first attempt to understand the dynamic processes of human creativity in general—a concern that would occupy him throughout his career. When we look at his own estimation (...) of the value of his first book, however, we see that he maintained something of a love-hate relationship to it. In the second edition, published in 1886, Nietzsche included a prefatory “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” in which he castigates the style of his first literary effort:[T]oday I find it an impossible book: I consider it badly written, ponderous, embarrassing, image-mad and image-confused, sentimental, in places saccharine to the point of effeminacy, uneven in tempo, without the will to logical cleanliness... disdainful of proof, mistrustful even of the “propriety” of proof... an arrogant and rhapsodic book.... 1Yet Nietzsche was convinced that the book, despite its stylistic flaws, did indeed have its merits. In Ecce Homo he evaluated the positive value of The Birth of Tragedy in the following way:The two decisive innovations of the book are, first, its understanding of the Dionysian phenomenon among the Greeks: for the first time, a psychological analysis of this phenomenon is offered, and it is considered as one root of the whole of Greek art. Secondly, there is the understanding of Socratism; Socrates is recognized for the first time as an instrument of Greek disintegration, as a typical decadent. “Rationality” [End Page 345] against instinct. “Rationality” at any price as a dangerous force that undermines life. 2Since its appearance in 1872 The Birth of Tragedy has been the object of both intensely negative and strongly positive assessments among classical scholars. Either it is dismissed out of hand as a piece of unscholarly romanticism, or it is praised as a unique contribution to the study of Greek art and life, a book of seminal importance for modern classical scholarship. 3 Among those who judge the book to be valuable and original, most follow the author in regarding the “two decisive innovations” spoken of in the above quotation as the heart of the book’s value and originality. Yet few of Nietzsche’s advocates have gone on to show clearly how or in what sense these innovative insights are innovative and insightful.To understand the significance and to appreciate the originality of The Birth of Tragedy it is important to see it against the background of some of the established theories of art and tragedy which preceded it. I shall begin, therefore, by characterizing, in broad strokes, two such theories that emerged in the eighteenth century; then I shall consider how the theory of tragedy that Nietzsche offers in his first book grew out of his dissatisfaction with these earlier views. Finally I shall show how the “two decisive innovations” expressed in The Birth of Tragedy developed during the years preceding the book’s publication. [End Page 346]The Theoretical BackgroundDuring the middle decades of the eighteenth century there emerged a keen interest in providing a theoretical account of the beauty expressed in the works of classical Greek art in general and in the literary achievements of the Attic tragedians in particular. Among German writers the person most responsible for bringing about this interest was the art historian, Johann Joachim Winckelmann. According to Winckelmann, the dominant characteristics of beauty found in ancient Greek works of art are expressed in terms of their “noble simplicity and quiet grandeur [edle Einfalt und stille Grösse].” 4 The ideal qualities of harmony and composure characteristic of classical Greek sculpture reflect and embody the serene and happy world-view of the Greek artists and of classical Greek culture in general. The two best examples of this character are found in the famous “Apollo Belvedere” statue and in the equally well-known statue depicting the Trojan priest Laocoön and his sons’ being devoured by twin serpents—an example of “classical” art that would be utilized by... (shrink)

PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION THIS work, which is now for the first time presented to the American public, was written when Existentialism had ...

Recently there have been strong reactions against the Enlightenment idea of the self, originating with Descartes, as a unitary “I” defined as wholly self-legislating and self-identical. It has become commonplace to stress the dialogic disposition of the self and affirm not only the social dimension of selfhood, but also its ineradicable embodiment. Of course, taken too far, such a view can reduce the self to a mere play of impersonal material forces or temporal flows; such (...) is the “post-modern” self envisaged by Gilles Deleuze, who sought to rid subjectivity of all forms of interiority, coherence, integrity and consistency. It is…. (shrink)

_Care of the Self: Ancient Problematizations of Life and Contemporary Thought_, by Lívia Flachbartová, Pavol Sucharek, and Vladislav Suvák, focus on different manifestations of “taking care of the self” present in ancient and contemporary thought.

First, a remark on the topic of my paper, which contains an 'and' where one would expect an 'or'. It might seem highly questionable to want to establish a relation between the self-proclaimed 'last anti-political German', teacher of self-overcoming and solitude, and a political thinker with an express commitment to political action and citizen equality. Would a genuine concern with both thinkers not precisely preclude any attempt to fabricate an alliance between them?One way of circumventing this difficulty might (...) be to argue that Nietzsche is really a political thinker, and, more problematically, that he is some version of a radical democrat. Conversely, one might try to demonstrate that Arendt is really a closet Nietzschean — provided, of course, that one takes Nietzsche to be amenable to a modicum of democratic theory.However, such an attempt to force their divergent projects into the straitjacket of mutual consistency would lose more in integrity — and ultimately, in relevance — than it would gain in cohesion. It is not my intention, therefore, to try and merge their respective undertakings into either a watered-down Nietzsche or a spiced-up Arendt, or to cobble together a new political theory out of their different philosophies.Instead of aiming at an ultimate synthesis, my concern in this paper is with a particular field of inquiry where Nietzsche’s thinking finds, to some extent, its analogue in that of Arendt. The purpose of this exercise is not to simply show up a few points of similarity, but rather, to illuminate a particular problem from two perspectives that stand in an analogical, rather than dialectical, relationship to one another.This analogical relationship does not resolve itself into an ultimate synthesis, and is not predicated on a seamless fit between two different fields of reference. On the contrary, this relationship, like any analogy, has an inevitable remainder, something held in abeyance that transcends the relationship with the analogon. Moreover, as will become clear, it is the differences as much as the affinities between Nietzsche and Arendt’s thinking that serve to illuminate the question this paper aims to address.This question concerns modernity as a condition of disintegration or loss, and particularly the loss of a coherent cultural complex — that is, an inter-human domain of “structured sense”, to borrow a term from Nancy — which necessarily circumscribes the meaning of the human. The premise of the paper, then, is that what has been lost in modernity are the cultural conditions for being — or becoming — human, as opposed to enduring only as a form of animal life or, on the other side of the scale, descending into barbarism . This premise derives from the analogous critiques of modernity developed by Nietzsche and Arendt, in so far as both thinkers examine the problem of modernity through the optics of culture.My argument proceeds in three stages. The first part of the paper examines the meaning and status of 'modernity' in Nietzsche's and Arendt’s respective projects. Here I investigate the time of modernity as falling literally 'between past and future', in which the present exists as only as a gap or aporia between the 'no longer' and the 'not yet'. This focus also serves as an introduction to the problem of the meaning of the human in the absence of any conception of a durable world. Part two examines Nietzsche's and Arendt’s analogical understanding of the human in relation to limitation and transcendence, which allows for a consideration, in part three of the paper, of the extent to which modernity entails a negation of both limitation and transcendence, and a concomitant loss of the human.By way of conclusion, I offer a brief consideration of the future of the human, at which point it also becomes clear in which respects the Nietzschean and Arendtian projects ultimately diverge. (shrink)

One argument against epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution. A particularly powerful form of this argument was developed by William James. James argued against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that, if it were correct, it would be inexplicable why the things that we find pleasurable are mostly beneficial to us while the things we find painful are mostly harmful. The aim of the present paper is to defend and extend James’s argument. James’s argument is here defended against criticisms due to (...) Karl Popper, John Eccles and William Robinson. Recently, an argument similar to James’s has been developed by Hedda Hassel Mørch. Mørch argues that the phenomena to which James drew our attention can be explained if we say pleasure and pain have phenomenal powers. In the present paper it is argued that, as it stands, the argument developed by Mørch is not satisfactory. It is argued that Mørch’s account needs to be supplemented with the thesis that the self has certain causal powers. A similar addition, it is argued, needs to be made to a position defended by Bradford Saad. The paper argues that, supplemented with the appropriate attributions of causal powers to the self, James’s argument against epiphenomenalism is effective. (shrink)

A number of philosophers hold that some types of mental states are composed of two or more mental states. It is commonly thought, for instance, that hoping involves the desire for some outcome to occur and the belief that such an outcome is possible (but has yet to occur). Although the existence of combinatory states (CS’s) is widely accepted, one issue that has not been thoroughly discussed is how we know we token a given combinatory state. This paper aims to (...) fill this lacuna. I do so by first discussing one way of knowing our CS’s—namely, by knowing we token the relevant constituting states, and then inferring that we have the relevant CS from such a knowledge-base. I argue that while anti-skeptics of self-knowledge should embrace the view that we can know our CS’s in this manner, this way of knowing we possess such states is quite demanding. Given the latter, I proceed to examine whether there are alternative ways we can know our CS’s. I defend the view that given the tenability of particular accounts of self-knowledge for non-CS's, we can avoid the view that we only know our CS’s by in part knowing the constituents of such states. (shrink)

This paper explores the theme of torture in the Colombian Truth Commission’s Final Report, focusing on its characterization of torture as a way of annulling a person’s identity. Drawing on Jean Améry’s approach, I argue that torture destroys the victim’s world and explore the further implications of this assertion. I begin by highlighting how the history of torture distorts legal and medical practices, masquerading as a quest for truth while exercising a farce of power, disintegrating the victim’s lived body. By (...) delving into Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “flesh,” I also explain how torture erodes the carnal trust that connects us to the world and enables proper communication. Consequently, torture results in an utter negation of the self and the world. In conclusion, I suggest that torture as understood as the destitution of a person’s world, can serve as a paradigm for comprehending the experiences of violence faced by victims in Colombia. (shrink)

The studies presented here in this work have a central point of departure: it is remarkable that we, as biological organisms in a social world, configure our lives in terms of selves. This book succeeds in brining together different but related disciplines concerned with people and the histories and conditions of their lives. The answer worked out to the central question addressed is thus an optimistic one in that it shows the niche for knowledge of human nature and the texts (...) that enfold lives, and of cause-effect links and meaningful things. (shrink)

Our approach bases on the explication of Rosanov’s creativity as the special intention, that implements the unspeakable Self-Selfness of Vasiliy Rosanov. The ineffability of Self-Selfness can be dialectical expressed by Rosanov through phenomena, of that consists the Rosanov’s world. This ineffability actualizes by Rosanov by means of understanding as a filled emptiness, that determinates the specialties and the structure of the understood objects. The exposition of this emptiness conditions the antinomies of Rosanov’s creativity: one sides is understanding by (...) Rosanov the closed world, other sides it corresponds with the world of things. Rosanov mythically fills the void, using the intimate personal contact with the things. We consider the creativity of Rosanov as the synthesis of both this global directions of Rosanov’s theory: the vision of understanding through things, this vision causes the special perception of things by Rosanov. The things are by Rosanov neither material objects, nor the ideal essences. This are by Rosanov the givens, inherent to the understanding. At the same time Rosanov examines the things through understanding, including it with help of the carnivalisation in his own special world. This method defines in our opinion style and content of Rosanov’s works. The thinker realizes by means of the carnivalisation the understanding, according to the concrete things, creating the special world of life (reality). For Rosanov this world is the second world. (shrink)

The History of Political Ideas by the German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin is a monumental work of around 2,600 pages. It remained unpublished during his lifetime, and it came to light through the American edition and the now completed Portuguese edition. Being the author of the first world edition of an abridged version of the History of Political Ideas ; the translator of the first three volumes of the 2012-2018 Portuguese edition; and the author of The civil philosophy of Eric Voegelin (...) I consider that the History of Political Ideas challenges the present climate of opinion: it subverts the dominant corrosive forces of moral relativism, intolerant neo-positivism, end-of-history obsessions, postmodernist deconstructions, agnosticism, nihilism, new age religions, and the all-pervasive ideology of money. Eric Voegelin achieves all this leading his readers from Antiquity to Modern Age. His monumental work begins with the “spiritual disintegration” of the Greek world, after the peak of Plato and Aristotle, a disintegration that ushered a long process of transition in the self-understanding of man in the Mediterranean world. The series goes through Middle Ages, R enaissance and Reformation as Voegelin analyzes the collapse of imperial Christianity, which led to the rise of autonomous reason and sectarian revolts that reached full development in later centuries. A new form of modern human consciousness replaced the Christian understanding of a divinely created closed cosmos. The collection ends - in a suspensive way - with “The Crisis and the Apocalypse of Man” focused on thinkers such as Comte, Bakunine and Marx; although they experienced true epiphanies, they become self-obsessed to the detriment of the world to which they refer. Such “Apocalypse of Man” must now be challenged, albeit with methodologies and hermeneutic principles other than those that Voegelin himself abandoned some decades ago. (shrink)

Introduction to S. Gallagher and S. Watson. (2004). _Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intersubjectivity_ . Rouen: Presses Universitaires. Originally published in 2000 as a special issue of the online journal _Arobase: Journal des lettres et sciences humaines,_ 4 (1-2).