I have taken the traditional problem of the seeming interdependence of identity concepts and essentialistic concepts and the attendant difficulties with circularity as a starting point in my consideration of recent attempts to provide accounts ofde re essences. Having distinguished between theories of individual and generic essences, I have shown how a linguistic device based upon a new approach to referring expressions has, perhaps, provided some advance in the understanding of individualde re essences. I have argued that, (...) however efficacious these linguistic devices may be in dealing with individual essences, they are of no help in dealing with generic essences. I considered, therefore, one of the recent attempts to use science as the arbiter ofde re essences and concluded that such attempts will not, ultimately, solve the traditional problem of circularity. That problem remains, arising in different forms to thwart different attempts to account forde re generic essences. (shrink)

L'Homme, cet être vivant doué de raison, fabricant d'objets élaborés, doté d'un langage articulé, chez lequel a émergé la pensée conceptuelle et symbolique, se caractérise par une aptitude à l'émerveillement, et une capacité d'espérance accompagnée d'un refus de l'absurde. Avec l'invention de l'outil manufacturé et les premiers témoignages d'une pensée symbolique, comment la fabuleuse aventure culturelle et spirituelle de l'Homme a-t-elle débuté? Pourquoi à travers les temps, même les plus anciens, et dans toutes les cultures, l'émergence du sens de la (...) transcendance n'a-t-il cessé de se manifester et de s'inscrire au coeur de notre humanité? Comment est-il devenu une caractéristique de l'Homme, une de ses aspirations profondes? Comment définir le sens du sacré? C'est de cette dimension intrinsèquement humaine, et des traces qu'elle a laissées, qu'il est ici question. Après L'Univers, la Vie et l'Homme : émergence du sens de la Conscience et Le Beau, l'Art et l'Homme : émergence du sens de l'Esthétique, voici le troisième et dernier opus dirigé par Henry de Lumley, issu d'un cycle de conférences au Collège des Bernardins. L'ambition de ces rencontres? Faire dialoguer physiciens, astrophysiciens, géologues, biologistes, paléoanthropologues, préhistoriens, historiens de l'art, philosophes et théologiens autour de questions qui ont trait à l'essence de l'humanité. (shrink)

De re modality is eliminable if there is an effective translation of all wffs into non-de re equivalents. We cannot have logical equivalence unless 'logic' has odd theses, but we can have material equivalence by banning all essences, something the nonde re facts let us do, or by giving everything such humdrum essences as self-identity and banning the more interesting ones. Eliminability cannot be got from weaker assumptions, nor independent ones of even modest generality. The net philosophical import (...) is that, quite apart from the merits of essentialism, de re language has scant utility. (shrink)

Faire valoir un réalisme minimal c'est faire tenir ensemble deux exigences : celle d'un réalisme qui cherche à montrer que les relations exprimées par le langage n'existent pas seulement dans le langage, ni seulement dans l'esprit, mais qu'elles nous font connaître quelque chose du monde ; celle d'un nominalisme qui applique le rasoir d'Occam avec vigilance et refuse, non seulement de poser l'existence d'universels qui seraient des essences ou des propriétés, mais même de concevoir les relations elles-mêmes comme des (...) réalités existant dans un autre monde que celui des individus liés par elles. (shrink)

Les Theoremata d'esse et essentia (ca 1278-1285), qui, en depit d'une edition critique deja ancienne (Hocedez, 1930), n'avaient pas encore ete traduits integralement en francais a ce jour, apparaissent comme l'uvre majeure pour bien saisir la genese doctrinale et conceptuelle de la theorie de la distinction reelle. Peu de temps avant les Questions disputees sur l'etre et l'essence (1286-1287), qui sont au cur du debat entre Gilles de Rome (ca 1245-1316), partisan d'une distinction reelle entre l'etre et l'essence, et Henri (...) de Gand (ca 1217-1293), promoteur d'une theorie de la distinction " intentionnelle ", les Theoremes apparaissent comme un essai de synthese, dans lequel le maitre augustin donne un expose d'ensemble des arguments qui le conduisent a faire de l'etre une res (" chose " au sens de " realite ") a part entiere. Dans ces conditions, les disciples de Thomas d'Aquin (ca 1224-1274) n'ont pas manque de voir, en Gilles, l'un des partisans d'une these qu'ils revendiquaient comme un heritage de l'Aquinate. Les Theoremes revelent cependant une pensee incontestablement personnelle, et manifestent le caractere resolument original de Gilles de Rome, metaphysicien incontournable du XIIIe siecle finissant. (shrink)

La foi chrétienne propose une interprétation de la condition humaine selon laquelle le sens de la vie présente est son inscription dans une perspective eschatologique, c'est-à-dire son rapport à une réalité qui est à la fois encore à venir mais qui cependant, en même temps, est déjà présente parmi nous. Cette réalité est annoncée, dans les textes fondateurs de la foi chrétienne, par l'expression " le Royaume de Dieu ". La foi chrétienne se comprend elle-même comme adhésion, dans la pratique (...) qu'elle inspire à la grande œuvre de la construction du Royaume de Dieu. L'existence humaine reçoit ainsi une " destinée ", au sens de " destination ". Par ailleurs, à partir de certaines expériences historiques, comme celles de la géométrie ou de la cité, s'est élaborée une perspective qui s'est définie elle-même par le concept de raison. Cette perspective est de portée eschatologique, en ce sens proprement philosophique qu'elle ouvre sur un horizon indéfini, en lequel s'annonce l'accomplissement de la tâche historique de la construction de la raison. Comment penser le rapport entre ces deux perspectives? Que nous apprend à ce propos l'histoire dont nous héritons? Peut-on se borner à reconnaître que l'on se trouve en présence de deux processus totalement différents et dès lors totalement étrangers l'un à l'autre? Et, d'autre part, si l'on reconnaît que ces perspectives se rencontrent nécessairement, comment penser et vivre cette dualité sans tenter de la ramener à un seul de ses termes? Mais d'abord, comment, pour chacun d'entre eux, se détermine son essence? Les textes recueillis dans le présent volume tentent de rencontrer ces questions, en évoquant d'abord ce qu'est " l'univers de la rationalité ", en exposant ensuite la problématique du rapport entre la destinée selon la foi et la destinée selon la raison, en suggérant enfin une interprétation selon laquelle la destinée de la raison est inscrite dans le 'fait chrétien, et en illustrant cette proposition par l'évocation de problématiques plus particulières, concernant les rapports entre foi, science et philosophie. (shrink)

Le projet dont cet ouvrage est l'aboutissement n'a pas été d'établir une théorie du droit, mais d'en rechercher la signification au plus près de la pratique quotidienne des juristes. Chaque fois que l'un d'eux emploie le mot droit, il le fait sans s'expliquer comme s'il s'agissait là d'une chose commune qu'il suffirait de désigner pour être compris. Pourtant, dans sa brièveté même, il renvoie à des contenus divers qui ne font sens qu'à un haut degré d'élaboration. C'est à la recherche (...) de ces significations que l'on a voulu partir, en examinant le réseau complexe de représentations que les juristes mobilisent quand ils parlent de droit. On doute qu'il y ait une essence du droit, intemporelle et transcendante, qui en figerait la définition par-delà les époques et les climats. Mais il y a des constantes que l'on a voulu explorer. Un lieu, qui rend possible le développement d'un système de droit : l'ordre juridique, qui en réunit les conditions institutionnelles. Une matière commune à tous ses énoncés : la norme, règle ou décision, qui est au droit ce que l'atome est à la matière, la cellule au vivant. Enfin, par-delà l'unicité de l'énoncé des normes, il y a la diversité des pratiques d'application, qui en bouleversent la signification sociale et la compréhension. Tout cela permet, par des approches successives, de découvrir la texture du droit et d'examiner le singulier discours que tient l'ordre juridique. En première approximation, on appelle droit tout ce qui circule dans un ordre juridique. Plus profondément, le discours tenu par cet ordre permet à une société de décliner ses valeurs : l'exposé de son fonctionnement de principe doit permettre aux individus de s'y insérer sans la troubler. S'agit-il d'un discours qui dirait la vérité de la collectivité? Pas forcément : par son droit, toute société propose un miroir qui la reflète, mais seulement telle qu'elle se voit. On le constate, certains miroirs se révèlent déformants. Il en va ainsi pour la France, dont le droit présente à la fois un modèle de construction rationnelle et un véritable trompe-l'oeil ménagé par l'Etat, pour égarer sur la régulation véritable de la société. (shrink)

Expanded edition with new chapters and updates to the translation and bibliography. Borges cites innumerable authors in the pages making up his life’s work, and innumerable authors have cited and continue to cite him. More than a figure, then, the quotation is an integral part of the fabric of his writing, a fabric made anew by each reading and each re-citation it undergoes, in the never-ending throes of a work-in-progress. Block de Behar makes of this reading a plea for the (...) very art of communication; a practice that takes community not in the totalized and totalizable soil of pre-established definitions or essences, but on the ineluctable repetitions that constitute language as such, and that guarantee the expansiveness—through etymological coincidences of meaning, through historical contagions, through translinguistic sharings of particular experiences—of a certain index of universality. This edition includes a new introduction by the author and three entirely new chapters, as well as updated images and corrections to the original translation. Lisa Block de Behar is Professor of Communications at the Universidad de la República in Montevideo, Uruguay and is a renowned Jorge Luis Borges scholar. William Egginton is Andrew W. Mellon Professor in the Humanities and Chair of the Department of German and Romance Languages and Literatures at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of several books, including In Defense of Religious Moderation. Christopher RayAlexander is a graduate student and language instructor in the Department of German and Romance Languages and Literatures at Johns Hopkins University. (shrink)

Les quinze sections de cet ouvrage proposent un parcours de réflexion à partir du démantèlement sadien de la normativité et de la déconstruction kierkegaardienne de la vie "bonne", qui engage des auteurs tels qu'Adorno, Arendt, Otto Gross, Agnes Heller, Kalivoda, Lacan, Cavell, Nussbaum, parmi d'autres, dans une analyse inusitée de la subjectivité révolutionnaire et des individualités révoltées. Ces critiques de l'aliénation comme "métaphysique de l'essence humaine" relancent, d'après l'autrice, la continuité artistique et l'aspiration politique du romantisme révolutionnaire, réinstallant ainsi la (...) dialectique permanente du libertinisme et du romanticisme au coeur même de l'échafaudage communiste comme scène réelle, symbolique et imaginaire de l'émancipation humaine."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage n'est autre qu'une étude a-méthodique sur l'essence phénoménologique humaine appuyée sur la philosophie de Michel Henry. Elle gravite autour de la notion de douleur basée sur la passivité précoce de l'être par rapport à lui-même et dans le cadre révélateur de l'affectivité. En d'autres termes, la révélation de l'être tel qu'il est dépeint dans sa passion. Une nouvelle conception de la corporéité, du temps et du langage vient de la tonalité affective de base de la douleur. Comprendre ces (...) thèmes en les reliant à l'être masculin est crucial pour ne pas le scinder en champs ou dimensions inconciliables qui ne le laisseraient pas comprendre dans ce qu'il fait, dit ou vit, c'est-à-dire sur ce que l'être est vécu -- Contracubierta. (shrink)

The term Republic is a word whose obviousness and presence in our contemporary political culture are matched only by its long-term indeterminacies. The first of these indeterminacies, moreover, has to do with the origin of “republic” in the Latin syntagm res publica with the immediately complex and polysemous meaning of a notion that we find frequently used under the Roman Republic itself but also under the Empire. Questioning res publica also obviously means questioning a crucial part of Roman political history, (...) but also means thinking political history as such and methodologically reflecting on the language of these politics. As such, there is no stabilised model, no searching for “the essence of the thing”, or any claim to a stabilised definition of the object of study as a series of deletions and reappearances of core meanings is characteristic of res publica. The dynamic investigation concerns a question which, according to a syntagm present in the last page of Claudia Moatti’s book in a significant way, becomes a “mobilising reference”, therefore political. In this journey, the acceptance of uncertainty and indeterminacy, in a way, becomes the price to pay to rediscover the life of words and their historical signifiance, insofar as they are linked to the action of individuals, to their commitment to the world, without relying on semantic certainties or on a programme to be implemented, but by starting precisely from open questions because none of the proposed answers has proven to be satisfactory. The comparison with another moment of political and semantic crisis, the Machiavellian moment, will in conclusion illustrate the fruitfulness of the perspective adopted. (shrink)

In my dissertation I approach the subject of the attributes of God in Spinoza's metaphysics by considering three pivotal and closely linked problems. I discuss the problem of the relation of God to the attributes, the problem of the essence of God, and the problem of the true conception of God. ;I examine three interpretations of God and the attributes in Spinoza: that of Jonathan Bennett, according to which God is the thing that has the attributes and modes as properties, (...) that of Edwin Curley and Alan Donagan, according to which God is the collection of attributes, and that of H. F. Hallett and Steven Parchment, according to which God is the totality of attributes. I examine each stance relative to the three problems. I reveal the weaknesses of each interpretation by making explicit the problems that each interpretation is unable to deal with successfully and by exposing new problems that some of the interpretations create. I then discuss topics in Spinoza that need to be understood in order to arrive at the correct answers to the three problems. For example, I carefully examine 2D2---a definition that commentators on Spinoza generally consider imperative in the discussion of the essence of God. ;I then suggest an interpretation of God and the attributes that is motivated by Spinoza's claim in 1P34 that God's power is God's essence. I claim that an adequate idea of the essence of God is a de re conception of God; and I invoke Michael Della Rocca's account of the opacity of attribute-contexts in order to support my view of de re conceptions of God. I show that, for Spinoza, the essence of a thing is given by the definition of the thing; and I show that 1D6 correlates with his claim in 1P34 that God's power is God's essence. I argue that God's essence is absolutely infinite and eternal power, and that power is what is constituted and expressed by each of the infinite attributes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938Nicolas de WarrenRonald Bruzina. Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. Pp. xxvii + 627. Cloth, $45.00.Edmund Husserl defined a new field and method of philosophical research that required the employment of students in the pursuit of a rigorous and elusive science called transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's most famous (...) student, Heidegger, quickly proved a disappointment to the phenomenological cause, and it is in the shadow of Heidegger's waywardness that Eugen Fink, known primarily as the author of spirited defenses of Husserl's thinking, developed a close intellectual relationship with Husserl as his assistant from 1928 until 1938. Fink's collaboration with Husserl and his metaphysical recasting of phenomenology are the principal themes of Bruzina's scrupulously researched study, largely based on Fink's unpublished writings.A first chapter presents a narrative of Fink's significant influence on Husserl's thinking and writing. In chapter two, "Orientation I: Phenomenology Beyond the Preliminary," Bruzina details how Fink further developed Husserl's phenomenology in a systematic and self-critical direction. Whereas Husserl cautiously argued that the noetic-noematic schema "runs through all levels of constitution," including the seemingly intractable level of absolute time-consciousness, Fink—under the influence of Heidegger—rejects the universality of the "apriori-correlation" and its attending "philosophy of reflection." Working out the "being of transcendental subjectivity" and its distinctive temporality is, for Fink, the "remaining task of phenomenology." Bruzina pursues the confrontation between Husserl and Heidegger in Fink's thinking in chapter three, "Orientation II: Whose Phenomenology?" According to Fink, Husserl remains "blind to transcendence," yet Heidegger remains blind to "constitution" (132). What emerges from this chapter, however, is the significance of Hegel as Fink recasts the difference between Husserl and Heidegger into a difference between a philosophy of reflection and a philosophy of Being. Against this backdrop, Bruzina signals Fink's proposal to re-think the concept of origin in a speculative register of the "meontic," that is, as "non-being."Before launching directly into Fink's "meontic" recasting of metaphysics, Bruzina presents three thematically defined chapters. In chapter four, "Fundamental Thematics I: The World," Bruzina discusses Fink's sublimation of Husserl's "natural attitude" into the concept of "world-captivation" and his charge that Husserl presupposes the horizon of the world as a whole. Chapter five, "Fundamental Thematics II: Time," examines Fink's writings on time-consciousness. A first set of writings speaks to the task of rendering Husserl's "Bernau Manuscripts" into a publishable form; a second set reflects Fink's intention to complete his own larger work on "Time and Temporalization." Both projects were abandoned, the later manuscript destroyed by Fink himself. Fink emphasizes the "special character of retention-protention intentionality as depresencing (Entgegenwärtigung), providing therein the basic consideration for addressing the question of finiteness in the stream of consciousness" (261). This insight allows Fink to propose a critique of Husserl's "presentialism" and his own thesis that "the Absolute is origin" in both a temporal and non-temporal sense, as the "excess/superabundance (Überschwang) of depresencing," further characterized the Plotinian idea of "emanation" (273). "Life" and "Spirit" are the final set of fundamental themes discussed by Bruzina in chapter six. For Fink, the essence of life is conceived as the "play of being," which he understands with a Nietzschean emphasis on "creation" (333). The "self-realization" of life in its creative self-performance delivers a "meontic" definition of the absolute; subjectivity is displaced (entstellt) in its self-performance such that it remains incomplete, a "metaphysical gap in the cosmos" (341).In chapter seven, we arrive at the "critical-systematic core" of Fink's "meontic" speculations. Here, much of Fink's pronouncements are a heady mixture of Heidegger and Plotinus. Bruzina admits that Fink "freely draws" from the traditions of Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism; yet a quick attempt to distance Fink from his sources remains unconvincing. The "radical difference between the One of ultimate origin and all else" (448) that Bruzina takes as the exceptional focus of Fink's thinking is also of metaphysical concern in... (shrink)

Etienne Bakissi cherche à trouver une "clef" explicative de l'essence du politique. Il évoque la finalité de celui-ci comme étant celle du Bien commun et s'interroge sur les manières d'y parvenir. Pour lui, c'est la subsidiarité dans sa double forme : ascendante et descendante, qui permet d'atteindre cet objectif. Ce moyen encouragé par l'Eglise de Rome permettrait de sortir de la "malédiction du politique" telle qu'elle s'exprime dans certains pays de l'Afrique francophone.

Kit Fine famously objected against the idea that essence can be successfully analyzed in terms of de re necessity. In response, I want to explore a novel, interesting, but controversial modal account of essence in terms of intrinsicality and grounding. In the first section, I will single out two theoretical requirements that any essentialist theory should meet—the essentialist desideratum and the essentialist challenge—in order to clarify Fine’s objections. In the second section, I will assess Denby’s improved modal account, which appeals (...) to the notion of intrinsicality, and argue that it is untenable. In the third section, I will explain how, when combined with a modal-existential criterion, a hyperintensional account of intrinsicality—in the same vein as Bader (J Philos 110(10): 525–563, 2013) and Rosen (in: Hale and Hoffman (eds) Modality: Metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, Oxford, OUP, 2010)—can help successfully address Fine’s counterexamples. In the fourth section, I will evaluate how this novel analysis of essence stands with respect to sortal, origin, and natural kinds essentialism and discuss potential objections and difficulties. (shrink)

This paper evaluates six contenders which might be invoked by essentialists in order to meet Quine’s challenge, viz., to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the crossworld identity of individuals: (i) an object’s qualitative character; (ii) matter; (iii) origins; (iv) haecceities or primitive non-qualitative thisness properties; (v) “world-indexed properties”; and (iv) individual forms. The first three candidates, I argue, fail to provide conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the crossworld identity of individuals; the fourth and fifth criteria are (...) open to the charge that they do not succeed in meeting Quine’s demand in an explanatorily adequate fashion. On balance, then, individual forms, or so I propose, deserve to be taken very seriously as a possible response to Quine’s challenge, especially by neo-Aristotelians who are already committed to a hylomorphic conception of composite concrete particular objects for other reasons. Theorists who also accept a non-modal conception of essence, i.e., a conception according to which essence is not reducible to modality, in addition face the further difficult task, over and above what is required to meet Quine’s challenge, of having to explain how an object’s de re modal profile in some way follows from facts about its essence. Haecceities and world-indexed properties, as I indicate, are unlikely to be of much help with respect to this second challenge, while the forms of hylomorphic compounds are in fact well-suited for this purpose. (shrink)

A reconsideration of the crucial historical role of slavery in the consolidation of the global regime of capital accumulation provides a vital source of Marxian critique for our postcolonial present. The Atlantic slave trade literally transformed African men and women into human commodities. The reduction of human beings into human commodities, or ‘human capital’ – indeed, into labour and nothing but labour – which was the very essence of modern slavery, served as a necessary prerequisite for the consolidation and perfecting (...) of what Marx called ‘labour in the abstract’, and requires us to re-situate enslaved labour as the defining and constitutive limit for how we comprehend labour as such under capitalism. The production of labour in the abstract, or labour ‘in general’, depended nonetheless upon concrete productions of sociopolitical difference, particularly the branding of race. The term ‘Black’, which was devised to literally and figuratively brand the flesh of enslaved people, was also contrived to signify their particular sociopolitical condition of brutal degradation as the ultimate limit for the subjugation of labour. Blackness names that limit. Thus, Blackness is in fact necessary for apprehending labour as such under capitalism. Marx’s scathing critique of wage labour is always haunted by the long shadow of slavery as its limit figure. If we comprehend labour to be the antithesis of capital, then to the extent that Blackness names the ultimate condition of labour’s subordination and subjection to capital, we need to recognise the tendency for all labour under capital to be pressed toward a sociopolitical condition of Blackness (or approximating Blackness), where Blackness does not name any kind of essential identity but the racialised sociopolitical condition of that subordination/subjection. Consequently, the labour theory of value – which has always been in fact, more accurately, a value theory of labour – must be complemented with what we might posit to be a racial theory of labour. Such an ostensibly historical perspective on the foundational role of slavery in the genesis of capitalism is no mere scholastic exercise in the historiography of ‘primitive accumulation’, however, but rather must be re-purposed toward the ends of elaborating what has remained an as-yet underdeveloped Marxian theory of migrant labour. Extrapolating key insights from Marx’s corpus for the formulation of a racial theory of labour, this essay is ultimately concerned with the ways that slavery supplies capitalism with a defining horizon for all labour, and thus how this insight might instructively serve to comprehend the racialised subordination of migrant labour within our global/postcolonial sociopolitical order. (shrink)

Recently, a debate has developed between those who claim that essence can be explained in terms of de re modality (modalists), and those who claim that de re modality can be explained in terms of essence (essentialists). The aim of this paper is to suggest that we should reassess. It is assumed that either necessity is to be accounted for in terms of essence, or that essence is to be accounted for in terms of necessity. I will argue that we (...) should assume neither. I discuss what role these key notions – essence and necessity – can reasonably be thought to contribute to our understanding of the world, and argue that, given these roles, there is no good reason to think that we should give an account of one in terms of the other. I conclude: if we can adequately explain de re modality and essence at all, we should aim to do so separately. (shrink)

During the last decade of the XXth and the early years of the new millennium, public and/or governmental institutions have undergone a process of adjustment and change with the introduction of the management techniques stem from the private sector known as New Public Management. These techniques have generated, on the one hand, a substantive change in the way to organize, build and operate public services and, on the other hand, some changes in the behaviour of public servants but deviating from (...) the original essence of public service. Faced with this situation, this article seeks to consider whether there is any alternative to this situation. (shrink)

Many philosophers today accept the broadly Aristotelian view that one can explain de re necessary properties by invoking essence. These ‘Neo-Aristotelian essentialists’ hold that a property F is an essential property of x iff specifying F gives a correct answer to the Aristotelian ‘what is x?’ question. We are sceptical. According to neo-Aristotelian essentialists, essential properties are not themselves de re modal properties, but they are supposed to explain why things have their de re modal properties. Neo-Aristotelian essentialists accept the (...) following principle (ENL): If x is essentially F, then x is necessarily F. We ask: Why? We first clarify the neo-Aristotelian notion of essence via the Aristotelian “what is x?” question. So far as we can see, the only way to do this is by appeal to the notion of a substance sortal. We then consider the notion of a substance sortal itself, and argue that there is nothing in that notion that even so much as suggests that ENL is true. (shrink)

Kit Fine (1994. “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16) argues that the standard modal account of essence as de re modality is ‘fundamentally misguided’ (p. 3). We agree with his critique and suggest an alternative counterfactual analysis of essence. As a corollary, our counterfactual account lends support to non-vacuism the thesis that counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are not always vacuously true.

How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality? How can someone come to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a philosophy teacher, but could not have been a turnip? Jago proposes an account of a route to knowledge of the way things could have been and must be. He argues that we can move to knowledge of metaphysical modality from knowledge about essence. Curtis rejects Jago’s explanation. It cannot, he argues, explain our (...) knowledge of de re necessity. We agree. But there is more to be said. To give an account of our knowledge of metaphysical necessity is part of the task Jago set himself. But another part is to give an account of the knowledge of the possibilities accorded to particular objects. And prior to both what is needed, and something Jago attempts to supply, is an account of how ordinary knowers can come to have knowledge of an individual’s essential properties. We argue that Jago’s accounts of both these additional matters are also unsatisfactory. This is important because the thought that our knowledge of metaphysical modality has its source in our knowledge of essence is currently an attractive one and Jago has set out very clearly what must be done to justify the thought. The flaws in his proposal thus indicate the work needed if the attractive thought is to be accepted. (shrink)

Could one give expression to a doctrine of essentialism without running afoul of semantical problems that are alleged to beggar systems of quantified modal logic? An affirmative answer is, I believe, called for at least in the case of individual essentialism. Individual essentialism is an ontological thesis concerning a kind of necessary connection between objects and their (essential) properties. It is not or anyhow not primarily a semantic thesis, a thesis about meanings, for example. And thus we are implicitly counselled (...) not to seek for the logical reconstruction of such necessities in theories in which necessity is a de ditto matter. A more natural-seeming target is an understanding of the structure of idioms of de re necessity. Of course, de re necessities may turn out to be special cases of necessities de ditto, with what consequences it is interesting to speculate upon, but it would be preferable if the theory of individual essences were to be prosecuted initially at least without prejudice to this other matter. A theory of individual essences therefore may find it a convenience to recognize a special category of open sentence by means of which to represent de re attributions of necessity. (shrink)

In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT (...) or, alternatively, the neo-Aristotelian position of taking essences as natures in the Aristotelian sense, can help to evade these main charges against the qualitative view. The functional parallels with the alternative haecceitistic view of individuation and individual essence will also be considered. (shrink)

A groundswell of recent work in philosophy has sought to revitalize the analysis of causation by appealing to "active principles" such as powers, dispositions, capacities, tendencies, and propensities. These principles are described in a realist and rather Aristotelian fashion, in stark contrast to the deflationary and linguistic accounts of such principles characteristic of Humean thought and empiricist thinking more generally. Natures, essences, powers, and de re necessity are back in the analysis of causation. I do not argue in this (...) paper for the plausibility of the revitalization project in general; instead, I explain how I think one aspect of it must be understood if the project is to be plausible. I suggest that those who are moved to resist Humean austerity and embrace a realism about things such as causal powers should take care in how they formulate this realism. Some Aristotelian notions, such as the concept of a causal power, may well be useful to modern studies of causation. Others, such as the notion that causal powers are determined by essences which comprise the natures of things, are outmoded in many sciences today. This paper focuses specifically on the notions of power and essence in the context of causation. Contra some of the most important recent proponents of the revitalization project, I contend that causal generalizations are not generally best understood as determined by the essential properties of natural kinds. How a member of a kind (natural or otherwise) behaves causally may be a function of its causal powers, but such powers need not constitute anything like the "essence" of a kind. -/- 1. Revitalizing causation with dispositional essences 2. Causal behaviour in kinds without essences 3. Causal powers and inessential distributions. (shrink)

The chapter discusses the issue of how we may achieve knowledge of essence. It offers a critical survey of the main theories of knowledge of essence that have been proposed within contemporary debates, particularly by Lowe, Hale, Oderberg, Elder, and Kment.

Here I offer a critical evaluation of modalism about essential properties. To that effect, I begin by rehearsing Fine’s now infamous counterexamples to pure modalism. I then consider two recent defenses of it, offered by Livingstone-Banks and Cowling, respectively. I argue that both defenses fail. Next I consider the most plausible variety of impure modalism – sparse modalism – which has recently been defended by Wildman and de Melo. Skiles has argued that sparse modalism fails too. I argue that Skiles’s (...) counterexamples misfire; nonetheless, his conclusion that, like pure modalism, sparse modalism is too broad, is on the right track. And so, I offer an original objection – the sparse modal propria counterexample – to show that this is so. I conclude by considering ways the modalist might once again modify her account to circumvent this new objection and improve the account’s extensional adequacy. (shrink)

A number of recent books and articles have defended the concept of de re modality. Although Slote makes some contributions toward its defense, he is mainly concerned with using de re modality to provide analyses of key concepts in metaphysics, including "process", "event", "change", "physical body", "self", "future", "past", "fact", and "state of affairs". Each concept is defined by essence and accident, that is, by specifying what is either accidental or essential to the entities covered by the concept. Such definitions (...) focus on the ontological relationships of exact similarity, necessary coexistence, and logical dependence. They provide the necessary existence conditions for processes, events, selves, etc. These existence conditions are a major concern in metaphysical questions about the relationship between psychic and physical existence, selves and their experiences, and things and their alterations. Thus Slote provides an important analytical procedure for this type of metaphysical problem. (shrink)

This paper explores the Aristotelian context of the real distinction between existence and essence thought to be posited in Thomas Aquinas’ early workDe Ente Et Essentia. In doing so, the paper situates its own position in the context of contemporary scholarship and in relation to the contemporary trend to downplay Aristotle’s influence in Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy. The paper argues that re-readingDe Ente Et Essentiain this way sheds new light on some of the crucial debates in contemporary Thomist scholarship, particularly with (...) respect to the analogous relation between potency and act: essence and existence, the distinction between conceptual and causal explanation, and the relationship between philosophy and theology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

A groundswell of recent work in philosophy has sought to revitalize the analysis of causation by appealing to "active principles" such as powers, dispositions, capacities, tendencies, and propensities. These principles are described in a realist and rather Aristotelian fashion, in stark contrast to the deflationary and linguistic accounts of such principles characteristic of Humean thought and empiricist thinking more generally. Natures, essences, powers, and de re necessity are back in the analysis of causation. I do not argue in this (...) paper for the plausibility of the revitalization project in general; instead, I explain how I think one aspect of it must be understood if the project is to be plausible. I suggest that those who are moved to resist Humean austerity and embrace a realism about things such as causal powers should take care in how they formulate this realism. Some Aristotelian notions, such as the concept of a causal power, may well be useful to modern studies of causation. Others, such as the notion that causal powers are determined by essences which comprise the natures of things, are outmoded in many sciences today. This paper focuses specifically on the notions of power and essence in the context of causation. Contra some of the most important recent proponents of the revitalization project, I contend that causal generalizations are not generally best understood as determined by the essential properties of natural kinds. How a member of a kind (natural or otherwise) behaves causally may be a function of its causal powers, but such powers need not constitute anything like the "essence" of a kind. -/- 1. Revitalizing causation with dispositional essences 2. Causal behaviour in kinds without essences 3. Causal powers and inessential distributions. (shrink)

Ce livre propose de penser ce qui ne l'a encore jamais été. Il étudie d'abord avec rigueur et précision la genèse philosophique de la théorie du genre. Il montre que, par-delà Beauvoir, Sartre, Foucault et Derrida, la théorie dont Judith Butler est la plus célèbre représentante plonge ses toutes premières racines chez Platon lui-même. Tout se passe comme si la confusion des natures était une menace à l'oeuvre dès la naissance de la philosophie. Contre cette menace originaire et contre l'opinion (...) dominante de la modernité, il s'agit de comprendre de manière philosophique la profondeur morale et la vérité de la revendication grecque d'une pluralité des natures humaines intégrant la différence entre la féminité, l'esclavage et l'excellence. Dépassant cette conception ancienne, il s'agit notamment de comprendre ce que signifie la belle conception chrétienne de la féminité ainsi que ce que pourrait signifier la féminité comme nature suprême à savoir comme ce que Nietzsche appelait la sur-humanité. Il s'agit enfin ultimement de restaurer, en la comprenant de manière originale et nouvelle, la richesse de l'humanité. Il s'agit de restaurer, par-delà la nature du génie, la pluralité des essences humaines. (shrink)

An attempt is made to distinguish three problems which are often confused: the problem of making sense of de re modal discourse; the problem of individuating objects across possible worlds; and the problem of whether any term can refer to its bearer independently of how it is described.

Ecouter est une tâche d'humanité. C'est ce que tout homme doit pouvoir offrir à l'autre en proie à une détresse dont il a envie de parler. Mais écouter peut devenir, dans certains cas, affaire de spécialistes. Les Eglises chrétiennes ont une longue, très longue expérience de ce qui s'appelait jadis la direction spirituelle et que l'on nomme plus volontiers de nos jours l'accompagnement spirituel. Les modalités et le but de ces accompagnements visent à faire grandir la relation avec Celui que (...) les Eglises confessent comme le Dieu de Jésus-Christ et, conséquemment, avec autrui. Or, depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, la psychanalyse, une toute nouvelle discipline, profane en son essence et en son déploiement concret, s'est donné comme tâche similaire d'écouter la souffrance et la détresse qui cherchent à se dire. Les modalités peuvent apparaître, dans un premier temps, assez proches de la relation pastorale ou de la cure d'âmes des prêtres ou des pasteurs chrétiens : il s'agit, dans l'un et l'autre cas, de parloirs en vue du dialogue, afin qu'une parole se fasse chair là où elle a fait défaut et là où, donc, le symptôme a surgi. Le but est, cependant, très différent : permettre au sujet souffrant de pouvoir à nouveau aimer et travailler est l'unique objectif d'une analyse qui ne saurait être confondue avec la poursuite d'une éthique, étrangère à Freud... mais peut-être un peu moins à Lacan. Cet ouvrage expose les thèses et les méthodes de la psychanalyse susceptibles de jeter des lumières nouvelles au profit de la relation pastorale. Des générations pionnières en la matière, celles de plusieurs théologiens et/ou spirituels chrétiens - comme Albert Plé, Louis Beirnaert, Marc Oraison - ont osé engager le dialogue avec la psychanalyse, aussi explosif qu'il puisse se révéler de prime abord. Il a fallu, d'abord, mettre au point une méthodologie du dialogue pour éviter, autant que possible, des jonctions injustifiées. Et puis, pour nombre de ces pionniers, c'est le vif de l'expérience psychanalytique qui est apparu comme le lieu-source d'où le matériau le plus riche sur les plans théorique et clinique peut être extrait au bénéfice d'une pratique chrétienne de l'écoute qui n'ignore pas les ruses de nos conflits intrapsychiques, ces ruses toutes passionnelles que la Tradition chrétienne avait déjà pressenties. (shrink)

Two arguments are offered here for postulating individual essences of concrete individuals on top of their sortal essences. One is the explanatory gap argument, the other draws on the analogy with the individual essences of events presupposed in single causal explanations. These arguments support qualitative individual essences with explanatory goals as opposed to hybrid impure relational essences accounting for origin and numerical identity. It is highlighted why origin properties as parts of impure relational essences (...) do not yield genuine de re constructions. The distinction between the two types of individual essences is traced back to the ambiguity of the very notion of individuation. (shrink)

Le XXe siècle a été celui d'un éclatement sans précédent des formes traditionnelles de l'art, et donc aussi de son essence ou de son "idée". Est-ce à dire qu'un héritage entier de sens et de culture a été dilapidé en cet âge qu'on a dit être celui de la "fin de l'art"? Doit-on au contraire penser qu'héritage il y a bel et bien eu, sur un mode critique et selon des logiques qui ne firent peut-être pas sans raison? Loin d'être (...) dépourvus de sens, les signes contemporains de l'art - restes, bribes, traces, "symptômes" divers - sollicitent en fait plus que jamais les interprétations. C'est pourquoi nous avons estimé pouvoir, et même devoir, poser les questions suivantes : - Que fait donc l'art, de lui-même et de son histoire, à l'époque de son an-archie eidétique? - Que peuvent en dire aujourd'hui les théories esthétiques et philosophiques? - Sous quelle forme de fidélité critique à leur tradition respective le peuvent-elles? (shrink)

A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information about the world outside of us. So the justification for a theory of the categories must derive from the empirical support of the scientific theories whose descriptions it unifies and clarifies. We don’t have reliable information about the de re modal profiles of external things either because the overwhelming proportion of our knowledge of the external world is theoretical—knowledge by description rather than knowledge by acquaintance. This undermines (...) the traditional idea that to be an object of category C is to be an object with such- and-such characteristic possibilities of combination. But this is no loss because de re modal thought lacks utility for creatures like us. (shrink)

I address two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have de re modal properties? Second, what is the best defence of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? I critically discuss several theories of how objects have their de re modal properties and address the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, I show how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal (...) intuitions while holding that objects have their modal properties independently of contexts. (shrink)

There is relatively little comprehensive treatment of Heidegger’s theory of essences despite his ubiquitous use of essences. It is commonplace in contemporary analytic philosophy to view essences as the ground for true de re modal claims. I argue that Heidegger offers an account of essences that can best be understood as a type of relative essentialism. Relative essentialism is the view that more than one being can occupy the same space at the same time and those (...) beings have distinct sets of de re modal truths about them. Heidegger’s account of essences allows for true de re modal claims about a wide variety of things including scientific and cultural entities. At the same time, Heidegger rejects absolute essentialism: the view that there is one privilege collection of beings whose natures determine the truth values of de re modal claims about them. Relative essentialism is distinguished from contextual essentialism. (shrink)

To reconcile true claims of de re necessity with the supposedly contingent existence of the concrete objects those claims are typically about, Kripkean essentialists invoke weak necessity. The claim that a is necessarily F is held to be equivalent to the claim that necessarily, if a exists then a is F. This strategy faces a barrage of serious objections a proper subset of which shows that the strategy fails to achieve its intended purpose. Relief can be provided via recourse to (...) a markedly non-Kripkean version of essentialism.1. (shrink)

L'interdiction du meurtre a un sens même en l'absence de toute référence à un Dieu transcendant et à l'idée selon laquelle la vie humaine serait sacrée. Bien plus, la justification de cette norme par des valeurs morales et l'effort pour la fonder rationnellement l'affaiblissent. Malgré l'apport majeur de Kant à la morale, son analyse consistant à rapprocher les devoirs envers soi-même des devoirs envers autrui passe à côté de la violence propre au meurtre et criminalise le suicide. Au contraire, en (...) faisant de l'expérience de mon rapport à l'autre la source de l'éthique, la description du meurtre, qui renvoie à la volonté d'anéantir l'autre comme tel, permet de dégager l'essence de la violence qui est un faire taire. Il y a donc dans le "tu ne tueras point" plus qu'une prohibition de l'homicide volontaire. Affirmer l'actualité de cet interdit, c'est rappeler le sens des crimes imprescriptibles tout en invitant à prendre la mesure de ce qu'impliquent les guerres qui ne sont pas des génocides. C'est aussi préconiser des solutions adaptées aux problèmes qui se posent au début et à la fin de la vie, comme on le voit avec l'avortement, le suicide assisté et l'euthanasie. Enfin, c'est reconnaître que le droit absolu que nous nous octroyons sur les animaux relève d'une transgression. (shrink)

It is commonplace to formalize propositions involving essential properties of objects in a language containing modal operators and quantifiers. Assuming David Lewis’s counterpart theory as a semantic framework for quantified modal logic, I will show that certain statements discussed in the metaphysics of modality de re, such as the sufficiency condition for essential properties, cannot be faithfully formalized. A natural modification of Lewis’s translation scheme seems to be an obvious solution but is not acceptable for various reasons. Consequently, the only (...) safe way to express some intuitions regarding essential properties is to use directly the language of counterpart theory without modal operators. (shrink)

De l'essence du judaïsme aux figures de l'exil, de l'idée d'origine au destin de l'art, du concept romantique de critique aux interprétations de Nietzsche et de Kafka, c'est l'esprit d'une époque, celui de la modernité d'avant la catastrophe, qui se trouve ici restitué. Composé de textes représentatifs de la pensée de Stéphane Mosès, cet ouvrage, qui est bien plus qu'un recueil d'articles épars, reflète à la manière d'un kaléidoscope toute une série d'interrogations, étroitement reliées entre elles, s'inscrivant dans la perspective (...) théorique ouverte par le génie benjaminien. Un livre érudit, vif, brillant, indispensable à qui souhaite s'initier à l'une des pensées les plus fécondes du XXe siècle."--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la motivation en phénoménologie? Concept aux multiples visages, la motivation traverse la totalité des analyses d'Edmund Husserl, sans que jamais il ne soit parvenu à poser la question de son essence, de son unité et de sa fonction. La question sera restée, de son aveu même, une énigme. C'est à explorer cette béance que s'emploie le présent ouvrage. Dans chaque région de l'expérience : signe, corps, autrui, histoire..., l'enquête révèle que, loin d'être un concept subsidiaire, la motivation est (...) la condition de possibilité de l'exercice même de l'intentionnalité, redessinant ainsi toute la problématique phénoménologique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The problem of natural kinds forms the busy crossroads where a number of larger problems meet: the problem of universals, the problem of induction and projectibility, the problem of natural laws and de re modalities, the problem of meaning and reference, the problem of intertheoretic reduction, the question of the aim of science, and the problem of scientific realism in general. Nor do these exhaust the list. Not surprisingly then, different writers confront a different ‘problem of natural kinds,’ depending on (...) which background issue is for them the principal issue at stake. The issues of essentialism, meaning, and reference, for example, have tended to dominate recent discussions of natural kinds. But evidently these are only part of the puzzle. (shrink)

Aucune notion déterminée de bien ne peut constituer le point de départ de l'éthique, le bien ne peut être que ce qui résulte de l'éthique. Car l'éthique diffère dans son essence du légal, elle est une production du bien et non pas son application. " Agis de telle sorte que la maxime de ta volonté puisse en même temps toujours valoir comme principe d'une législation universelle. " Quel est le réel que nomme cette foi, quel est le désir qu'elle peut (...) susciter, quel est l'objet qu'elle fixe au désir? Aucun. Tout le problème et tout l'intérêt de l'éthique kantienne est là : si l'on prend pour point de départ une loi qui n'est justement pas une qui nomme le Bien ou le Mal ni une loi qui pourrait immédiatement activer notre "faculté de désirer ", comment parvenir au réel de la liberté, où le situer, comment le repérer? Voilà la question. (shrink)

Two major interpretations have been advanced for the sum res cogitans passage in Descartes’s Second Meditation. According to the first interpretation, he argues in this passage that only thinking belongs to his essence. According to the second interpretation, due to Anthony Kenny, Harry Frankfurt and others, no such claim is defended by Descartes. Rather, it is his aim to argue that only thinking can be ascribed to him with certainty. In this essay, it will be shown that the “naive”, essentialist (...) reading of the sum res cogitans reasoning is closer to the text than the perhaps more sophisticated, purely epistemic reading. Although the interpretation defended here is not new, it will be arrived at by way of new arguments. (shrink)

This paper outlines a heterodox and largely unexplored conception of objecthood according to which the notion of an individual object is a determinable. §1 outlines the view. §2 argues that the view is incompatible with a natural analysis of kind membership and, as a consequence, undermines the Quinean distinction between ontology and ideology. The view is then used to alleviate one source of Quinean hostility towards non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility in §3, and to elucidate Fine’s neo-Aristoteltian, non-modal conception (...) of essence in §4. §5 concludes. (shrink)