The teacher self is a composite psychological construct which encompasses the cognitive, affective, emotional, and social dimensions of teaching. This qualitative study draws on Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogism, answerability, and addressivity to discuss how English language teachers negotiated the shifting and conflictive context to construct selves in relation to the promoted communicative language teaching approach. Based on narrative interviews and classroom observations with five tertiary English teachers in China, we found that these teachers were actively engaged in the dialog (...) with their prior learning experiences and active, responsive in answering their contexts while authoring selves in everyday teaching practice. The multiple-case study data support a Bakhtinian understanding that teachers are active users and producers of theory in their own right, highlighting teachers’ agency, creativity, and autonomy. Based on Bakhtin’s dialogism and the case study findings, we bring cognition, identity and practice together and conceptualize the teacher self as having multiple facets and layers: the autobiographical self, the discursive self, and the pedagogical self. The three selves are constitutive of the consummated whole of the teacher self instead of being separate entities functioning individually. The study is concluded with implications for language teacher education and teacher development. (shrink)

According to the Good True Self (GTS) theory, if an action is deemed good, its psychological source is typically viewed as more reflective of its agent’s true self, of who the agent really is ‘deep down inside’; if the action is deemed bad, its psychological source is typically viewed as more external to its agent’s true self. In previous work, we discovered a related asymmetry in judgments of blame- and praiseworthiness with respect to the mitigating effect of moral ignorance via (...) childhood deprivation. Inspired by work motivating the GTS theory, we ran a new study to discover whether our asymmetry likewise reflected judgments about the true self. It did. However, it is unclear whether our results fit with the ‘good’ part of the GTS theory: some of our and others’ results suggest that, in certain contexts, wrong actions are taken to be more expressive of agents’ true selves than right ones. In this paper, we propose that our and others’ data can be explained by the hypothesis that we are inclined to judge as the GTS theory predicts when there is a readily available external explanation for an agent’s action. In short, we give people the benefit of the doubt. (shrink)

Many of the differences between empirical/psychological and conceptual/philosophical approaches to the mind can be resolved using a more precise language that is sensitive to both. Distinguishing identification from identity and identification as from identification with, and then defining the experiential concept of the per sonat, provides a walking bridge. Applying the new terminology to increasing degrees of dissociation, from non-pathological cases to multiple personality, shows how our psychologies can profit from philosophical analysis while our philosophies can revise themselves according to (...) empirical data. Redefining the psychological structures of persona, personality, and self in terms of an experientially more precise conceptual vocabulary, including the per sonat, avoids the pitfalls of the old approaches and provides insights into the nature of human consciousness that lead both to therapeutic results in psychotherapy and a long-overdue conceptual revision in the philosophy of personal identity. Among the practical conclusions is that for legal purposes MPD should not be considered as a multiple person phenomenon but, rather, as a phenomenon of one person who, simultaneously, is identified as many selves. Among the theoretical conclusions is that a person qua person consists not just in a biology and a psychology but also a philosophy. (shrink)

This study examines the accountability of the self among sustainability and humanitarian advocates participating in the World Economic Forum. Drawing from Butler’s (Giving an account of oneself. Fordham University Press, New York, 2005) philosophy, we explore how these individuals narrate their accountability to themselves and others, the contradictions they experience, and how they explain becoming responsible in this context. Our data illustrate the difficulties faced by these individuals in resisting the temptation to condemn themselves for compromising their own values, (...) and/or to condemn others who think and behave differently. Through their humility in relation to their incoherent identities, and their generosity in engaging with others, the participants show their responsibility both to those they advocate for and to other delegates who may have different perspectives. The study illustrates how accountability to and of the self emerges through relations with others, how individuals struggle to resist ethical violence, and how they take up moral responsibility through human interaction. (shrink)

In the digital age, the concept of identity has evolved in ways that challenge long-held philosophical assumptions about the self. No longer has fixed or continuous, identity become fragmented, shaped by multiple digital personas that people craft in response to the ever-expanding digital universe. Now, there is no sense of a fixed self that remains constant throughout space and time. Self and identity can be seen as a Heraclitean flux always in a state of becoming and never for a moment (...) being in a state of being. The boundaries between the real and the virtual have blurred, and hyperreal experiences now often seem more significant than actual events. This review delves into the complex relationship between selfhood and digital representation, exploring how traditional theories like Baudrillard’s hyperreality and Buddhist notions of impermanence help explain this transformation. It examines the implications of digital simulations, especially in the context of digital immortality, which raises profound questions about consciousness, existence, and the essence of being. In a world where avatars, social media profiles, and virtual realities dominate, self navigates an uncertain terrain between reality and simulation. This study is an exploration of the evolving nature of identity, consciousness, and human experience in the age of digital fragmentation, with a focus on the philosophical and psychological dimensions of selfhood in the modern, digitized world. (shrink)

Self-reported data are regarded by medical researchers as invalid and less reliable than data produced by experts in clinical settings, yet individuals can increasingly contribute personal information to medical research through a variety of online platforms. In this article we examine this ‘participatory turn’ in healthcare research, which claims to challenge conventional delineations of what is valid and reliable for medical practice, by using aggregated self-reported experiences from patients and ‘pre-patients’ via the internet. We focus on 23andMe, a (...) genetic testing company that collects genetic material and self-reported information about disease from its customers. Integral to this research method are relations of trust embedded in the information exchange: trust in customers’ data; trust between researchers/company and research subjects; trust in genetics; trust in the machine. We examine the performative dimension of these trust relations, drawing on Shapin and Schaffer’s discussion of how material, literary and social technologies are used in research in order to establish trust. Our scepticism of the company’s motives for building trust with the self-reporting consumer forces us to consider our own motives. How does the use of customer data for research purposes by 23andMe differ from the research practices of social scientists, especially those who also study digital traces? By interrogating the use of self-reported data in the genetic testing context, we examine our ethical responsibilities in studying the digital selves of others using internet methods. How researchers trust data, how participants trust researchers, and how technologies are trusted are all important considerations in studying the social life of digital data. (shrink)

Humans have become increasingly datafied with the use of digital technologies that generate information with and about their bodies and everyday lives. The onto-epistemological dimensions of human–data assemblages and their relationship to bodies and selves have yet to be thoroughly theorised. In this essay, I draw on key perspectives espoused in feminist materialism, vital materialism and the anthropology of material culture to examine the ways in which these assemblages operate as part of knowing, perceiving and sensing human bodies. (...) I draw particularly on scholarship that employs organic metaphors and concepts of vitality, growth, making, articulation, composition and decomposition. I show how these metaphors and concepts relate to and build on each other, and how they can be applied to think through humans’ encounters with their digital data. I argue that these theoretical perspectives work to highlight the material and embodied dimensions of human–data assemblages as they grow and are enacted, articulated and incorporated into everyday lives. (shrink)

This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the (...) face of multiple personalities. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we (...) label an ‘embodied biography’. Building on a near consensus among consciousness researchers over the function of consciousness as integrating infor- mation, we argue that the phenomenology of mineness consists in the absence of any further thought on top of the experience itself. Finally we argue that this non-phenomenological account of mineness fits well with existing data on pathologies of mineness such as delusions of thought insertion. (shrink)

Drawing upon author's long-term psychoanalytical practice, research, and actual clinical data, this book examines the psychological ramifications of transnational immigration to Western countries and the continued influence of indigenous cultures on South Asian Diaspora. It explores new ways of understanding the psyche of migrants from the diverse cultures of South Asia and the universal norms applied in Western practice. To this end it embraces and critiques the categories that are more specific to this region, such as the magic-cosmic world (...) of private destiny, reincarnation, astrology, and palmistry. By using more informed ways of understanding this exodus of people, the book attempts to find a new paradigm fusing spirituality with psychoanalysis. (shrink)

In this article, we argue how instant messaging (IM) is actively made into a communicative space of their own among migrant girls. Triangulating data gathered through large-scale surveys, interviews and textual analysis of IM transcripts, we focus on Moroccan-Dutch girls who use instant messaging as a space where they can negotiate several issues at the crossroads of national, ethnic, racial, age and linguistic specificities. We take an intersectional perspective to disentangle how they perform differential selves using IM both (...) as an ‘onstage’ activity through which they express their communal, public and global youth cultural belongings and as a ‘backstage’ activity through which they articulate their individual, private and intimate identity expression. Instant messaging appears to be a space where they can strategically (re-)position themselves. The relationship between the online world of IM and the off-line world is shown to be intricate and complex; at certain points, both worlds overlap and at others they diverge. Despite all existing constraints that are both related to gender restrictions, often disenfranchised family backgrounds, religious dictums, and surveillance by parents, siblings and peers, which affect Moroccan-Dutch girls in specific ways, IM is also understood as a unique space for exerting their agency in autonomous, playful and intimate ways. (shrink)

Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives (...) from what she takes to be our “pretheoretic intuitions” about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf’s claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf’s attack intact. (shrink)

As the community corrections system has moved away from a focus on rehabilitation, it has been suggested that criminal offenders are no longer understood psychologically, but rather as rational actors for whom criminality is a choice. Rehabilitative efforts thus aim to guide these choices. Utilizing mixed methodology that draws on observational, interview, and case note data collected within the probation/parole system of a western U.S. state, I suggest that both officers’ conceptualizations of the criminal self and the rehabilitative strategies (...) they use are gendered. I find that officers view the male criminal self as flawed or underdeveloped and the female as permeable and amorphous, that is, lacking firm boundaries. In response to these constructions, officers aim to rehabilitate men largely by encouraging economic roles and responsibilities, while for women, rehabilitation aims to solidify boundaries: discouraging relationship formation and containing emotions. The differences identified point to ways in which gendered concepts of the criminal self contribute to gender disparities in contemporary supervision. (shrink)

Philosophers have been debating the nature of folk or commonsense psychology for three decades. We ask: What are the resources that enable us to navigate the social world, anticipating what others do, explaining what they’ve done, and perceiving them--and ourselves--as selves, subjects, persons, with beliefs, desire, perceptions, and feelings? Unlike traditional philosophy of mind, instead of directly confronting the mind-body problem and subproblems such as intentionality and qualia, we step back and look at the resources that give us the (...) concepts that get us into these knots. (shrink)

This article discusses the datafied embodiment of the Internet of Bodies (IoB) technology by applying the methodology of postphenomenology. Firstly, the author claims that the boundaries of dual distinction between real and virtual, online and offline, and embodiment and disembodiment have become increasingly blurred. Secondly, the author argues that postphenomenology can help us to study today’s emerging technologies’ mediating role in human–world relations. Thirdly, the author analyses the implication of embodiment from phenomenological and postphenomenological perspectives and then demonstrates in what (...) sense the data collected from the IoB devices can constitute our embodiment and selfhood. Fourthly, the author elucidates how the IoB devices are datafying our bodies and the whole lifeworld and how these devices mediate and transform our religious practices and experiences. Fifthly, the author points out that the Quantified Religion as the possible new religious model would smooth out the differences and diversities between religions and then create homogeneous religious data selves, which will mediate, reshape, constitute and even replace our physical selves. Ultimately, the author argues that responsible designing of the IoB devices and establishing the ownership of personal religious data can be seen as significant measures in the face of the risk of our quantified religious future. Contribution: This article contributes to understanding the potential religious transformations caused by the IoB technology. This article analyses the mediating role the IoB technology plays in the relationship between humans and the world through a postphenomenological perspective, thereby explaining how body data harvested from the IoB devices can datafy and constitute our embodiment and selfhood. The article argues that the Quantified Religion as a new religious model will emerge in the future IoB era, and it will mediate, constitute and shape our religious practices and experiences through personal data harvesting and analysis. (shrink)

Scholarship on the politics of new media widely assumes that communication functions as a sufficient conceptual paradigm for critically assessing new media politics. This article argues that communication-centric analyses fail to engage the politics of information itself, limiting information only to its consequences for communication, and neglecting information as it reaches into our selves, lives, and actions beyond the confines of communication. Furthering recent new media historiography on the “information theory” of Shannon and Wiener, the article reveals both the (...) primacy of communication in midcentury information theory, and also a striking resonance between these postwar communication theories and Habermas’s more recent communicative theory of democracy. To achieve a critical perspective beyond communication, the article proposes a media genealogy of the politics of subjects as a methodology for developing an analysis of how information formats us as subjects of data. (shrink)

Even given the final truths of what is right and wrong, good and bad, ethics is not complete. For one may yet ask “Why should I be moral?” Of course, we have no prior assurance that it will be possible to provide a non-moral and justifiable answer to the rational and self-interested person. Nevertheless, I claim that reasons for being moral can be provided even for the rational, self-interested, and remorseless individual who knows he will not be caught. In defending (...) my claim I will draw on empirical data from recent social psychology and game theory. Actual human selves are malleable in a number of ways. I will show that it is rational for the self-interested person to modify selves in such a way that moral actions are increasingly preferred. Specifically, I will argue that it is in one’s rational self-interest to enhance empathy in others and future selves in such a way that for increasing numbers other-injury becomes a component of self-injury, and other-benefit becomes a component of self-benefit. This will allow a linkage to be drawn from rational and self-interested action to moral action. The development of this theory will begin by distinguishing my approach from that of Gauthier, then three interpretations of the “Why be moral?” question will be delineated, next the decision theoretic components of my account will be presented, and finally the role of empathy will be considered in detail. (shrink)

This article draws on data from a study of the transition to motherhood to contribute to feminist theorizing of embodiment. Three bodily aspects of women's gendered sense of self are identified as undergoing possible change during this period—sensuality, shape, and space. The work of Arthur Frank is drawn on to theorize shifts in women's experience of these dimensions, and the author shows how the white, middle-class women studied could use such discourses around the body as resources in renegotiating their (...) social positioning. This empirical analysis demonstrates how physical changes may facilitate challenging the dominant body norms, although the work of Robert Connell indicates that social control may also be a consequence of such bodily conceptualizations. This article therefore uses its empirical analysis to contribute to theorizing the connections between bodily practices and gendered identity. (shrink)

This paper explores the motivations and experiences of British women working as lap dancers in the tourist resorts of southern Tenerife, with a particular focus on the subjective choices and processes undertaken by working-class women in the embodiment of positively evaluated identities. It uses Skeggs’ theoretical framework of ‘becoming respectable’ (1997) alongside other debates on ‘identity management’ in order to begin mapping the ways in which migrant British lap dancers produce themselves, negotiate gender and class, and seek forms of respectability, (...) reputability and honour through their work. Drawing on empirical data, it will discuss how strong disassociations with the Other are formed, and how and why important binaries, particularly distinctions between lap dancing and prostitution and lap dancing and other ‘degraded’ forms of work and lifestyle are drawn in the dancers’ own stories of themselves. It will look at notions and processes of gaining ‘respectability’ through part of a wider migrant discourse, exploring how being a migrant lap dancer can serve as a vehicle for reproducing a ‘respectable’ and otherwise positively evaluated self on several levels. (shrink)

Compartmentalizing our distinct personal identities is increasingly difficult in big data reality. Pictures of the person we were on past vacations resurface in employers’ Google searches; LinkedIn which exhibits our income level is increasingly used as a dating web site. Whether on vacation, at work, or seeking romance, our digital selves stream together. One result is that a perennial ethical question about personal identity has spilled out of philosophy departments and into the real world. Ought we possess one, (...) unified identity that coherently integrates the various aspects of our lives, or, incarnate deeply distinct selves suited to different occasions and contexts? At bottom, are we one, or many? The question is not only palpable today, but also urgent because if a decision is not made by us, the forces of big data and surveillance capitalism will make it for us by compelling unity. Speaking in favor of the big data tendency, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg promotes the ethics of an integrated identity, a single version of selfhood maintained across diverse contexts and human relationships. This essay goes in the other direction by sketching two ethical frameworks arranged to defend our compartmentalized identities, which amounts to promoting the dis-integration of our selves. One framework connects with natural law, the other with language, and both aim to create a sense of selfhood that breaks away from its own past, and from the unifying powers of big data technology. (shrink)

According to Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, big data reality means, “The days of having a different image for your co-workers and for others are coming to an end, which is good because having multiple identities represents a lack of integrity.” Two sets of questions follow. One centers on technology and asks how big data mechanisms collapse our various selves (work-self, family-self, romantic-self) into one personality. The second question set shifts from technology to ethics by asking whether we want (...) the kind of integrity that Zuckerberg lauds, and that big data technology enables. The negative response is explored by sketching three ethical conceptions of selfhood that recommend personal identity be understood as dis-integrating. The success of the strategies partially depends upon an undermining use of big data platforms. (shrink)

Understanding the selves, situations and actions of Africans can never be comprehended outside kinship. Local and foreign worldviews are first pigeonholed into culture and defined within kinship realities in Nigeria and Africa. There have been studies on kinship in Africa. However, the findings from such studies portrayed the immutability of African kinship. Thus, as an important contribution to the on-going engagement of kinship in the twenty-first century as an interface between the contemporary Diaspora, this article engaged kinship within international (...) migration. This is a major behavioural and socio-economic force in Nigeria. Methodological triangulation was adopted as part of the research design and primary data were collected through in-depth interviews (IDIs), and life histories of international migrants were documented and focus group discussions (FGDs) were held with kin of returnees. The article found and concluded that while returnees continued to appreciate local kinship infrastructures, the infrastructures were liable to reconstruction primarily determined by dominant support situations in the traditional African kinship networks. (shrink)

We investigated the interface between biomedia and humans by inviting participants to interact with biometric devices that measured and visualized their body data. At first, they struggled with the alienating and disembodying nature of the devices and the constrained, reductionist representation of data. Through their bodily interactions with these devices, however, participants reframed the data and inserted their bodies into the process of data collection. Drawing on the ideas of Bergson, Grosz, Merleau-Ponty and Bachelard, we argue (...) that by working with their subjectivity in a mediated process of becoming, participants ‘filled in the intervals’ of the visual representations of their bodies to interpret them in ways that marked the duration and meaning of their selves. We conclude that even when presented with artificial representations, individuals convert the representation of the data into narratives inspired by their embodied experience, and the ‘virtual’ pasts of their own lives. (shrink)

This paper explores the ways in which health care professionals, family carers, and older persons expressed attitudes and opinions on using Paro, a social robot designed to stimulate patients with dementia. Thereafter, we critically evaluate existing prejudicial views toward Paro users to provide recommendations for its future use. Using an exploratory qualitative interview method, we recruited a total of 67 participants in Switzerland. They included 23 care professionals, 17 family carers, and 27 older persons. Data obtained were analyzed thematically. (...) Study findings present general agreement that Paro is an appealing and beneficial social robot, but it is not a tool that everyone feels comfortable with. Because it is perceived as “child play,” it would be demeaning for competent adults to play with such things. Consequently, Paro is appropriate only for persons with dementia. These findings brought forth ethical concerns about deception, infantilization, and respecting older persons' dignity. The idea of who is an appropriate Paro user led to our discussions on predicting future Paro users. The meaning of using social robotics in nursing homes can be conditioned by a rigid interpretation of adulthood and playful behavior. To protect future selves when one is living with dementia from prejudices, it may be useful for older persons and their loved ones to plan their future care situations to ensure that they are treated in accordance with their delineated decisions. (shrink)

Techno-Anthropology recognizes the intertwining of technology with aims, needs, practices, and skills; ‘the techno’ and ‘the anthro’ are not only interconnected, but historically co-constituted. In this paper developments in ‘personal analytics’ are examined with the aim of proposing epistemological and methodological directions for Techno-Anthropological exploration. Personal analytics refers to the field of interactions that surrounds tracking various bodily and mental functions, including the analysis, visualization, and distribution of the data, thereby encompassing people’s involvements with measuring devices and data (...) movements. By discussing findings from a self-tracking study that focused on heart-rate variability measurement, the article opens for scrutiny ways in which personal data can translate people’s selves into a format that is engaging and actionable. This, in turn, enables researchers to witness and critically assess a terrain where bodily and mental capacities, and life itself, are not taken as given, but become part of the processes of everyday sense-making and contestation. (shrink)

Background In this article, the sources and features of moral distress as experienced by acute psychiatric care nurses are explored. Research design A qualitative design with 16 individual in-depth interviews was chosen. Braun and Clarke’s six analytic phases were used. Ethical considerations Approval was obtained from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. Participation was confidential and voluntary. Findings Based on findings, a somewhat wider definition of moral distress is introduced where nurses experiencing being morally constrained, facing moral dilemmas or (...) moral doubt are included. Coercive administration of medicines, coercion that might be avoided and resistance to the use of coercion are all morally stressful situations. Insufficient resources, mentally poorer patients and quicker discharges lead to superficial treatment. Few staff on evening shifts/weekends make nurses worry when follow-up of the most ill patients, often suicidal, in need of seclusion or with heightened risk of violence, must be done by untrained personnel. Provision of good care when exposed to violence is morally challenging. Feelings of inadequacy, being squeezed between ideals and clinical reality, and failing the patients create moral distress. Moral distress causes bad conscience and feelings of guilt, frustration, anger, sadness, inadequacy, mental tiredness, emotional numbness and being fragmented. Others feel emotionally ‘flat’, cold and empty, and develop high blood pressure and problems sleeping. Even so, some nurses find that moral stress hones their ethical awareness. Conclusion Moral distress in acute psychiatric care may be caused by multiple reasons and cause a variety of reactions. Multifaceted ethical dilemmas, incompatible demands and proximity to patients’ suffering make nurses exposed to moral distress. Moral distress may lead to reduced quality care, which again may lead to bad conscience and cause moral distress. It is particularly problematic if moral distress results in nurses distancing and disconnecting themselves from the patients and their inner selves. (shrink)

This article investigates the concept of sound, in relation to the new means and sciences from different perspectives, ultimately providing an analysis of the newborn artistic movement of bioart. It is divided into two parts. The first part of the study is based upon reference, investigating the interconnection between art and science. This mechanism is characterized by transformation processes in the interdisciplinary practices that are applied mainly by various artists and movements of the post-Second World War period. The expressive element (...) seeks an unworldly explanation through audio and visual conjunctions. This nature is obvious in Paul Klee’s reflections of musical elements in his paintings, and Rimmington’s attempts to marry audio-visual influences in his ‘colour organs’. The experimentations of composers such as Xenakis and Stockhausen at various locations with light and colour illustrate the continuous quest to render sound by the use of new means. Technology is a vital component of transformation as it enhances syncretic creativity for various art domains such as those that Fluxus deployed. Nam Jun Paik and Dick Higgins introduce radical techniques in their performances as they detach their selves from the parameters that define composition, and use the mind and power of sentiment in order to identify reality aurally and optically. Towards the end of the twentieth century, we witnessed the appearance of new art forms such as bioart. The human body, host of material and immaterial functions, comes to the forefront of art prac¬tice. Its relation to elements such as oscillations and vibrations that express the energy flow is analysed through the model of spiritualism that came from eastern thought. The notion of digital embodiment is presented as a reminder, highlight¬ing the importance of technology in biotechnology and genetics. The second part of the article involves an experiment. This describes how the concept of biomusic is applied with the use of electrocardiography (ECG) data from the MIT PhysioNet database. As sound penetrates the entire human body, it can be analysed in all of its phasma. Using this information, we attempt to translate/transform these biological sound phenomena into music. The sound produced by the elaboration of data that result from biological functions can be described as biomusic. It can be transformed into frequencies related to time and can be expressed in musical themes. Sonification plays an important role in this research as it constitutes a rapid and precise rendering of polymorphic information (in this case the ECG) in musical notes. This modelling and musical attribution leads to two distinguishable results, each concerning different clinical cases (all data belong to a normal heart function and a pathological one). The invention of this novel system is suggested for scientific as well as musical disciplines. It has the ability to be implemented in an experimental form and obtain an educational character. The transformation process avoids compensation throughout the matching process between ECG functions and music, while focusing on the aesthetic factor at the same time. Sound meets art in the world of biomusic as it takes shape through technology, constituting a new medium to further evolve the model of ‘biology into art’ transformation. (shrink)

My dissertation, “Love, Self-Constitution, and Practical Necessity,” offers an interpretation of love between people. Love is puzzling because it appears to involve essentially both rational and non-rational phenomena. We are accountable to those we love, so love seems to participate in forms of necessity, commitment, and expectation, which are associated with morality. But non-rational attitudes—forms of desire, attraction, and feeling—are also central to love. Consequently, love is not obviously based in rationality or inclination. In contrast to views that attempt to (...) fit love into existing models of practical reasoning, I argue that love participates in a unique form of practical necessity, different from both moral and psychological necessity, yet bearing resemblances to each. Distinctive to this type of practical necessity is a direct appeal to another particular person that cannot be delivered in third-personal terms—that is, a non-moral yet normative type of expectation on another person. This type of expectation is predominant in loving relationships, but can also make better sense of the experiences of humor and beauty, as well as attitudes like forgiveness, gratitude, and agent-regret. I treat Immanuel Kant’s discussion of the experience of beauty in the Critique of Judgment and Christine Korsgaard’s work on self-constitution as fruitful starting points for this account of love. I conclude that our loving relationships enable us to have distinctive personal selves, and provide support for this account of love by offering a complementary theory of grief. In Part One of the dissertation, I focus on two prominent approaches to love characteristic of the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions. I begin with the work of David Hume, which treats desire (understood as something like a simple impulse or craving) as the paradigmatic mental state, and emphasizes our personal and affective dimensions. Hume has the valuable insight that loving someone affects our sense of ourselves. But Hume’s view becomes unsatisfying when he claims that love is essentially enfeebling, implying that to love is to be passive toward and readily overcome by another person. While this indicates Hume’s awareness that love involves being open and receptive to another person, the problem is that love is also a demanding attitude. Hume lacks the conceptual resources to offer a nuanced view of the self, in which we can—with one attitude—be both demanding of and vulnerable to another person. Hume’s model of a desire-based deliberative process has recently been revived in Harry Frankfurt’s discussions on love and rationality. Frankfurt, however, goes beyond Hume’s picture of the self by introducing a notion of “identification,” which he offers to make sense of our apparent ability to commit ourselves decisively to certain projects or people. I argue that active powers like identification and commitment cannot be accommodated within any basically Humean moral psychology. Such abilities, and with them the possibility of love, depend on something closer to a Kantian conception of rational agency. I next focus on the work of Kant, who provides the substantial counterpart to Humean-inspired moral theories, but is not known for his insight into our emotional lives. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides love into “practical love”—what we experience when we are morally motivated to help someone—and “pathological love”—what we experience when we feel fond of something. But in reality, we experience love neither as a mere preference for another person, nor as something that generates the kind of demands that would be binding on any rational creature. David Velleman attempts to remedy the deficiency of Kant’s dichotomy. Velleman offers a Kantian theory in which he describes love and respect as two ends of a continuum of attitudes that it is morally appropriate to have toward people. Velleman’s view has the peculiar implication that everyone deserves the love of everyone else, and I argue that this is a fatal flaw. Like Kant and Velleman, Korsgaard characterizes personal love as involving the treatment of other people as Kantian ends-in-themselves to a heightened degree. Korsgaard, though, also contends that our individual identities depend upon our personal relationships, and I take this position seriously for the remainder of the dissertation. Ultimately, however, characterizations of loving relations as subsets of moral relations can account for the authority of the demands of love, but not its particularity. The major conclusion of Part One is that any attempt to understand love primarily on a model of practical reasoning with which we are already familiar is doomed to fail. Our experience of love calls for a theory of a unique type of practical necessity. In Part Two I take seriously the possibility that love is simultaneously inescapable (in something like the way morality is supposed to be), and yet ineluctably personal. In love, we experience an engagement with a person as essentially particular, rather than as an instance of a rational agent in general. To make sense of this direct attachment to an individual, I argue that love involves distinctive forms of expectation and disappointment. When those we love let us down, they hurt our feelings, which is not a response to a failed prediction, but nor is it a reaction to a moral insult or offense. According to Peter Strawson and Stephen Darwall, second-personal moral reactive attitudes (such as resentment) always have third-personal analogues (such as indignation). In contrast, I argue that the type of hurt feelings associated with love is a second-personal reactive attitude that does not have a third-personal corollary. I take this as evidence that the expectations involved in love are not objective in the way that the moral is objective. Nor, however, is love a matter of mere preference. On my interpretation, Kant introduces this different type of expectation in the Critique of Judgment. Whereas he characterizes moral judgments as universally communicable, judgments of beauty implicitly involve only second-personal address: I appeal to your direct experience with a particular object. This provides the conceptual space for an account of love according to which it involves a uniquely second-personal form of practical necessity. I contend that the second-personal addresses we make in love are appeals to strengthen the intimacy implicit in the loving relationship, and I identify three interrelated dimensions of that intimacy. First, those we love have the standing to interpret us in a constitutive manner. We fine-tune and make determinate the character of our concerns and interests in part by accepting the interpretations provided by those we love. In that way, the people we love have the normative power to constitute who we are. Second, we share a perspective with those we love in a way that is not reducible to or derivative of our independent perspectives. Loving someone centrally involves the activity of forming concerns together, and we do this in a mode best understood on the model of playing a spontaneous game or improvising music. Finally, being loved enables us to see ourselves as distinctive and special, because the concern those who love us have for us does not track the objective merit of our characteristics. These dimensions of the intimacy that characterizes a loving relationship reveal what it is that we appeal for in love, and how we are hurt when our appeals are rebuffed. In broad terms, this dissertation advocates the recognition of a non-moral yet normative type of expectation, which is predominant in loving relationships. Humor and beauty, too, make more sense when understood in terms of this non-moral yet normative type of expectation, as they involve appeals to others that are more than mere predictions of, but less than rational demands for, a certain kind of response. Introducing this alternative notion of expectation into the discourse of moral philosophy can shed light on other common attitudes that are clearly normative, but defy translation into objective, third-personal terms. Such attitudes include certain experiences of pride and shame, apology and forgiveness, the bestowing of mercy, gratitude, agent-regret, and perhaps a basic sense of trust we have in others. Ultimately, I situate love in respect to grief, which demonstrates my theory’s ability to make sense of related dimensions of our emotional lives. The people we love and grieve over give us a sense of who we are as distinctive, particular individuals, as the three interrelated dimensions of intimacy in loving relationships reveal. Consequently, grief is best understood as a type of practical disorientation—namely, a disorientation that involves the loss of the personal self. I present my account of grief against the type of account that would draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of love and grief from empirical psychological data alone. In particular, these data indicate that we recover quickly from the deaths of loved ones, and Dan Moller draws the philosophical conclusion that those we love fulfill certain roles in our lives and are replaceable. In contrast, I contend that while we should acknowledge the truth of the objective judgment, made in the third-person, that we will likely recover after the deaths of those we love, it does not follow that we must affirm such a claim from the internal perspective of one person who loves another. As a result, the case of love and grief supports a general claim concerning the proper work of moral philosophy, which is that the understanding of ourselves gained through empirical data is not a substitute for the normative conclusions that are revealed through first-personal reflections on our relationships. (shrink)

The article begins at the intellectual fissure between many statements coming from neuroscience and the language of faith and theology. First I show that some conclusions drawn from neuroscientific research are not as firm as they seem: neuroscientific data leave room for the interpretation that mind matters. I then take a philosophical-theological look at the notions of soul, self, and freedom, also in the light of modern scientific research (self-organization, neuronal networks), and present a view in which these theologically (...) important notions are seen in relation both to matter (brain) and to God. I show that religious insights expressed with soul and free will bear a remarkable resemblance to certain insights from neuroscience and the science of complex, self-organizing systems, including emphasis on corporeality and emphasis on organization as a form of that corporeality, and that they also show an interesting parallel --- albeit described in different terms --- concerning the crucial role of a valuation principle that generates attraction. With that, the common-sense idea that freedom simply is the same as indeterminism is refuted: freedom primarily means self-determination. I bring to the fore that the self is not a static thing but a “longing.‘ Such longing springs from something, and it is the relationship to this source that constitutes the self. The main concern is to point out the crucial role of attraction with respect to being and to life, and to draw attention not only to the astonishing parallel on this point between Thomas Aquinas and Alfred North Whitehead but also to a surprising --- albeit more implicit --- analogy between these philosophical-theological views and scientific theories of self-organization (such as those concerning neuronal networks). In short, being attracted toward what appears as “good‘ is what constitutes us as selves and what thereby signifies the primary meaning of our freedom. (shrink)

This paper explores the effects of incidental guilt on Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) decisions of retail investors. Do investors who feel guilty invest more in SRIs to clear their conscience? Are guilty investors willing to sacrifice returns to restore their moral selves? Using survey data from an online quasi-experiment among a sample of US retail investors, we find that individuals who experience incidental guilt are willing to invest more in SRI funds than those in a neutral state. We (...) show that this effect, albeit moderate in magnitude, cannot be explained solely by differences in retail investors’ moral reasoning, attitudes towards social responsibility, risk tolerance and demographic factors. When presented with a trade-off between sustainability, risk and return characteristics of the funds, guilty investors are more willing to sacrifice returns for greater sustainability than non-guilty participants. Our research provides new evidence of the effect that incidental guilt has on the sustainable investing decisions of retail investors. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to obtain an increased understanding of the experiences of elderly people in geriatric care, with special reference to integrity. Data were collected through qualitative interviews with elderly people and, in order to obtain a description of caregivers’ integrity-promoting or non-promoting behaviours, participant observations and qualitative interviews with nursing students were undertaken. Earlier studies on the integrity of elderly people mainly concentrated on their personal and territorial space, so Kihlgren and Thorsén opened up the (...) possibility of considering the concept of integrity from a broader view by recognizing its relationship to the larger framework of the self-concept. Based on this, findings in the present study indicate that elderly people’s integrity relating to their corporal self were the least violated. On the other hand, their psycological, information and cultural selves were the most exposed. The study also identified a further dimension (i.e. one relating to social self), which should be included in the concept of integrity because respecting elderly people’s social self reduces their feelings of loneliness, isolation and seclusion. In summary, the results indicate that the concept of integrity is complex and has several dimensions. (shrink)

Social scientists agree that women are generally more religious than men, but disagree about whether the differences are universal or contingent on social context. This study uses General Social Survey data to explore differences in religiosity between, as well as among, women and men by level of individual earned income. Extending previous research, I focus on high earners with other groups included for comparison. Predicted probabilities based upon fully interacted models provide four key findings: There are no significant gender (...) differences among high earners; high-earning women are less religious than low-earning women; high-earning men are more religious than low-earning men; and differences among women and among men at different earnings levels are just as large as average differences between women and men. Further analyses demonstrate that the relationship between gender, earnings, and religiosity varies by race. The findings demonstrate the utility of intersectional approaches for understanding gender differences in religiosity. Beyond the implications specific to the gender differences in religiosity literature, this study also indicates that religion is an important, yet often underemphasized, aspect of our intersectional selves. (shrink)

This article inverts Donna Haraway’s proposition that ‘the ideologically charged question of what counts as daily activity, as experience, can be approached by exploiting the cyborg image’ by instead exploiting everyday experience to approach the contemporary cyborg. It utilises digital tools to compile a corpus of Instagram posts that foreground corporeal hybridity, and examines this social media data through the lenses of feminist STS, affect theory and digital studies. This strategy offers a new vantage on the cyborg by connecting (...) it to concrete and ongoing user practices. To make these interventions, this project focuses specifically on a genre of post popularised by Instagram fitness (or fitstagram) influencers – diptych photographic montages that oppose imperfectly ‘real’ material bodies to unrealistically ‘perfect’ media bodies. Although they formally rely on binary logics (real v. perfect, offline v. online), the posts simultaneously deconstruct them in a number of ways. These repeated boundary transgressions reflect users’ lived experiences of hybrid online/offline corporeality and help forward a theory of cyborg embodiment that relies on quotidian practices as opposed to fixed products or identities. Moreover, close engagement with a final dataset of eighty-nine posts illuminates three particular modes of enacting the cyborg corpus on Instagram: occupation of multiple bodies, awareness of the analogue body and anxious boundary-work. This research extends the cyborg as a critical figure by situating it within a social media context, attending to its imbrication in everyday practices, and affirming female Instagram users as theorists of their cyborg selves. (shrink)

Essentialists understand authenticity as an inherent quality of a person, object, artifact, or place, whereas constructionists consider authenticity as a social creation without any pre-given essence, factuality, or reality. In this paper, we move beyond the essentialist-constructionist dichotomy. Rather than focusing on the question whether authenticity can be found or needs to be constructed, we hook into the idea that authenticity is an interactive, culturally informed process of negotiation. In addition to essentialist and constructionist approaches, we discuss a third, less (...) well-known approach that cannot be reduced to any of the two forms. This approach celebrates the authenticity of inauthenticity by amplifying the made. We argue that the value of authenticity lies not in choosing for one of these approaches, but in the degree to which the process of negotiating authenticity enables a critical formation of selves and societies. Authenticity is often invoked as a method of social control or a mark of power relations: once something is defined as authentic, it is no longer questioned. Emerging technologies—especially data-driven technologies—have the capacity to conceal these power relations, propel a shift in power, and dominate authentication processes. This raises the question how processes of authentication can contribute to a critical formation of selves and societies, against the backdrop of emerging technologies. We argue in favor of an interactionist approach of authenticity and discuss the importance of creating space in authentication processes that are increasingly influenced by technology as an invisible actor. (shrink)

Evidentials in Pastaza Quichua, an Amazonian dialect of Ecuadorian Quechua, are examined and their uses in narratives compared. The novel contribution of this paper is to show, by comparing data from personal experience narratives, that evidentials are used to convey speaker subjectivity, rather than source of information, and that switches between different speaker subjectivities, which may be encoded as ‘selves’ or ‘others’, are particularly evident in passages where momentous, life-changing statuses or interpersonal upheavals are being articulated.

This study describes the cultural, cognitive, social, and emotional work that once-devout members of the LDS Church must engage in to leave the church and divest themselves of Mormon culture. A Grounded Theory approach with a multi-modal memoing process showed that, for the devout, leaving the LDS Church and Mormon culture is not a singular event, but rather a process of gradual transformation that requires time and effort, passing through a series of punctuating events. Formerly devout ex-Mormons had to confront (...) various problems, including the LDS Church’s truth claims and ethical contradictions from within the particular Mormon framework that leavers believed in and followed, which in turn had shaped and constrained both their leaving process and their post-Mormon selves. Interview data revealed a necessary reconstruction of post-Mormon emotionalities. And devout women who left Mormonism bore an added burden of overcoming internalized misogyny. (shrink)

Alexis Karpouzos' thought is a poetic metaphysics. His philosophical and spiritual thoughts transcend all limits of language, culture, and nationality. In his writings, the poet and mystic takes us on a spiritual quest and gives us a glimpse of the infinite in the midst of the finite, unity at the heart of all diversity, and the Divine in all beings and things of the universe. Alexis karpouzos is one of the most influential mystic poets and teachers of our time. Deeply (...) spiritual and profoundly sensitive, his verse speaks to people from all backgrounds who seek a deeper understanding of self, life creation, Universe, and love. Overwhelmingly mystical and lovely in its simplicity, this unique collection offers insight into Alexis karpouzos' heavenly desires, his ongoing quest for the joy eternal, and illuminates the remarkable diversity that made him the bridge between the spirituality of the East and West in our time. Mysticism is a word derived from Mystes. Mystes comes from Greek language word Muein. It means to keep quiet. Mysticism is the faith that knowledge of Cosmos and of real truth is independent of the mind and sanity. Study mysticism if you want to. It will give your heart joy, your mind inspiration and your life a true, fulfilling and soulful assurance. But do not try to define it. Do not try to interpret it. If you try to define and interpret the mysticism, you you will most deplorably fail. are bound to fail. -/- He says: We get experiences: from science, scientific discoveries; from history, historical revelations; from philosophy, philosophical data; from religion, religious doctrines. In these experiences, we see the presence of subject and object, essence and existence, vision and reality. But a mystic experience, which is immediate oneness, transcends all such distinctions. This experience is the constant oneness with the Beyond, the ever transcending Beyond that always remains ineffable. When it is oversimplified and underestimated, it comes down from its original sphere and stands beside religion. But even here if a person is sincere, he will realize that his highest religious experience is nothing more than an uncertain, obscure and faint perception of Truth; whereas, no matter what kind of mystical experience he has, he will feel the intensity, immensity and certainty of Truth. Yet are our souls the Immortal’s selves within, Comrades and powers and children of the Unseen. (shrink)

Massage and sexuality in nursingThis paper draws upon data from a students' massage workshop, focuses on the students' discourse as they positioned diem‐selves as masseurs and considers relationships between nursing discourses and genderized self‐hood. For some students, there was a conflation of sex and massage. Massage was more heavily laden with implicit sexual meaning for male students than for female students. The latter were able to negotiate the ambiguities of working with people's bodies in a more comfortable way. (...) This research has implications for teaching students of nursing, particularly in relation to massage, and also nursing practice that involves care for the patient's body. (shrink)

Healthcare apps er blevet en omfattende industri. Vi kan ganske gratis downloade tusindvis af apps, som sætter os i stand til at monitorere alt fra vores fysiske form til vores mentale velbefindende, og vi kan gennem denne monitorering, producere endeløse datamængder og viden om os selv og vores liv – altså skabe et «monitoreret mig». Men hvordan forholder vi os til denne mulighed? I nærværende artikel tages udgangspunkt i foreløbige resultater fra et igangværende ph.d. projekt, hvor brugen af apps og (...) biofeedback anvendes i praksis, til at belyse en stigende stressproblematik blandt lærere i den danske folkeskole. Artiklens ærinde er, at tematisere de normer og fortolkningsrammer, som kommer til syne, når aktørerne selv italesætter sit «monitorerede mig» og hernæst diskutere, i hvilken position, disse normer og tolkninger af teknologien i anvendelse, bringer aktøren. Er «det monitorerede mig» en mulighed for frisættende autonomi – en empowerment? Eller bidrager monitoreringen i stedet til individualisering eller patologisering, hvor vi gennem ejerskabet af vores egen fortælling, producerer et overansvar for eksempelvis hvilken behandling vi skal modtage, eller hvordan vores arbejdsmiljø bør være?Nøgleord: Etik, humanistisk sundhedsforskning, selvmonitorering, Ecological Momentary StorytellingEnglish summary: The Monitored Me - empowerment or pathologization?Healthcare apps have become a major industry. We can freely download thousands of apps, that enable us to monitor everything, from our physical condition to our mental well-being, and we can through the monitoring produce endless amounts of data and knowledge about our inner selves and our lives - creating a “monitored me”. But how is this technological possibility dealt with, in practice? The present article presents and discusses results from a case study in which apps and biofeedback were used to illuminate an increasing stress problem among teachers in the Danish preliminary school system. The focus of the article is to analyze the self-interpretation framework that appears when the users of the technology articulate the "monitored me” and hereafter discuss how these self-interpretations position the user. Is “the monitored me” an opportunity for liberating autonomy – for empowerment? Or does it contribute to individualization or pathologization? (shrink)

The aim of our paper is to show that there is a sense of body that is enactive in nature and that enables to capture the most primitive sense of self. We will argue that the body is primarily given to us as source or power for action, i.e., as the variety of motor potentialities that define the horizon of the world in which we live, by populating it with things at hand to which we can be directed and with (...) other bodies we can interact with. We will show that this sense of body as bodily self is, on the one hand, antecedent the distinction between sense of agency and sense of ownership, and, on the other, it enables and refines such distinction, providing a conceptual framework for the coherent interpretation of a variety of behavioral and neuropsychological data. We will conclude by positing that the basic experiences we entertain of our selves as bodily selves are from the very beginning driven by our interactions with other bodies as they are underpinned by the mirror mechanism. (shrink)

Are you bored of the endless scroll of your social media feed? Do you swipe left before considering the human being whose face you just summarily rejected? Do you skim articles on your screen in search of intellectual stimulation that never arrives? If so, this book is the philosophical lifeline you have been waiting for. Offering a timely meditation on the profound effects of constant immersion in technology, also known as the Interface, Wish I Were Here draws on philosophical analysis (...) of boredom and happiness to examine the pressing issues of screen addiction and the lure of online outrage. Without moralizing, Mark Kingwell takes seriously the possibility that current conditions of life and connection are creating hollowed-out human selves, divorced from their own external world. While scrolling, swiping, and clicking suggest purposeful action, such as choosing and connecting with others, Kingwell argues that repeated flicks of the finger provide merely the shadow of meaning, by reducing us to scattered data fragments, Twitter feeds, Instagram posts, shopping preferences, and text trends captured by algorithms. Written in accessible language that references both classical philosophers and contemporary critics, Wish I Were Here turns to philosophy for a cure to the widespread unease that something is amiss in modern waking life. (shrink)

Introduction. According to the well-established opinion of specialists in social sciences and humanities, a person diffracts his selves in the modern world: real spaces (professions, statuses) and virtual (accounts, profiles). In the diffraction of a person through spaces of different order, each “new” self acquires relative autonomy (a trace of the self in the network, which is present regardless of the attitude to it), and at the same time there remains the connection that, as it were, keeps the self (...) with his digital images and “prints”. The main questions of the article are: in what relation and in relation to what is it possible to talk about the identity of a modern person; what fundamentally significant do the researches on human identity give us today; what do those who ask questions about personal identity in the digital age focus their attention on? In order to answer these questions, let us turn to scientific articles from domestic and foreign journals. This article presents the analytics of publications from Scopus and RSCI databases, in which the problem of personal identity is posed. The purpose of the article is to analyze scientific publications on human identity and summarize the main ideas presented in those publications. Methods. The research is based on general scientific methods, analysis and synthesis, induction, deduction, and abstraction. The author analyzes scientific publications on the basis of the interpretation method and a systematic approach method. Content analysis was used as a method, but it was used within the scope of the purpose. The publications were selected on the basis of the authors’ research of various aspects of identity and the difference in interpreting the phenomenon. Results. Analysis of Scopus publications made it possible to assert that the problem of identity is moving out of the anthropological context and acquiring new technical and technological frameworks (for example, scholars are raising the problem of the digital data identity, digital identification in the context of online transactions). At the same time, the anthropological view of identity remains. It is found for instance in the context of narratives, texts of a person about self that are posted on the Internet. In this context, the concept of “Person Life View” (M. Schechtman) is presented as a variant of a person’s holistic view of the self. The analysis of domestic publications makes it possible to conclude that representatives of social sciences and humanities in their research strive to overcome the dynamic view of a person (dissolving of identity or an absent self), are in search of models of “stability” of identity. Conclusion. Posing the question about the personal identity of a modern person, it seems that the border between the directly human (consciousness and body, for example) and the technical and technological (the Internet and the objective world) is becoming more and more destabilized every day. This predetermines the direction of the research. Contemporary scholars, who publish the results of their work in journals included in scientific databases, are faced not only with the problem of substantiating human identity as a theoretical concept that reflects the modern situation, but also with the problem of finding models in which a person is able to embody the idea of “stability” of identity in the everyday life. (shrink)

Why another book on Berkeley? For one thing, because he is so curiously modern. He was one of the pioneers of the empiricism and nominalism so popular today. He discussed with great clearness many of the issues with which present-day philosophers are concerned--the status of sense-data, the nature of causation, the relation of primary to secondary qualities, the problems of universals, the importance of language, the existence of other selves, and how we communicate with them.

The increasing incidence of ‘trafficking’ has added an incontestably disturbing dimension to the contestable nature of a ‘non-trafficked’ UK sex industry. Men who buy sex remain under-researched, though some studies have indicated ambivalence within men's attitudes. This study combines a critical discursive psychology in support of dialogical self theory. Secondary data, from prominent UK media resources, were analysed using Edley's method of combining ‘interpretative repertoires’, ‘ideological dilemmas’ and ‘subject positions’. Contrasting discursive practices indicative of wider ideological conflict were found. (...) Discursive concepts were ‘mapped’ onto Hermans and Hermans-Konopka's ‘I-positions’ to explore how these potentially dilemmatic positions might be understood in terms of identity production. The function of ‘uncertainty’, particularly salient with the increasing complexity of globalisation, was considered a factor in how men's identities might be limited by the current discursive space. A ‘dialogical’ model of self is introduced as a framework for understanding how men who buy sex might take up new, inclusive, positions. A corollary is reflected upon; that researchers, activists and buyers alike, who remain ideologically inflexible, may be sustaining the conditions for coercion through their contribution to the discursive conflict. The synthesis of discursive and dialogical analytical tools is recommended for investigating the production of selves in contested spaces. (shrink)

Empirical science, such as psychology and neuroscience, employ diverse methods to develop data driven models and explanations for complex phenomena. In research on the self, differences in these methods produce different depictions of persons. Research in developmental psychology highlights the role of intuitive beliefs, such as psychological essentialism and intuitive dualism, in individuals’ singular, cohesive, and stable sense of self. On the other hand, research in neuroscience highlights the de-centralized, distributed, multitudes of neural networks in competition making selves, (...) with arguments around whether the interpretation of these data imply that the self is somehow fundamental and special to human functioning. In this paper, I explore these discrepant pictures of the self to advance understanding about personhood. Specifically, I suggest that these divergent pictures of self from psychology and neuroscience have the potential to inform philosophical and theological discussions around personhood by anchoring models of persons in empirical views of persons. Likewise, I explore the opportunity for philosophy and theology to inform and enhance scientific research on the self by critiquing scientific bias and construct development as well as highlighting potential limits in understanding selves with empirical models. (shrink)

We sought to expand on the concept of the moral self to include not just the duty to develop the moral self but the moral duty to develop the self in both moral and non-moral ways. To do this, we focused on how leaders can promote a climate in which individuals feel a sense of duty to develop themselves for the betterment of the team and organization. In our theoretical model, duty orientation plays a key role in determining whether followers (...) will seek performance feedback to develop their work selves. We hypothesized that followers with ethical leaders would experience a greater sense of duty to improve themselves and would therefore be more likely to seek and less likely to avoid leader feedback. Drawing on social learning theory, we hypothesized that duty orientation would mediate the relationship between ethical leadership and feedback-seeking/feedback-avoiding behavior, expert power would moderate the relationship between ethical leadership and duty orientation such that duty orientation would be higher when followers perceived their leader to be both highly ethical and competent, and expert power would moderate the indirect effect of ethical leadership on feedback-seeking/feedback-avoiding behavior through duty orientation. We tested our hypotheses using a sample of 249 followers across two waves of data collection. Results suggest that ethical leadership and leader competence interact to drive followers’ duty orientation, thereby reducing followers’ feedback-avoiding behaviors. Further, ethical leadership had a direct positive relationship with followers’ feedback-seeking behaviors. (shrink)

This article evaluates the experience of an extraordinary mental change of novice female runners that is connected to long-distance running. Two female participants were interviewed regarding their life-changing experience associated with endurance exercise. Descriptions of the lived experience from women who train for marathons were gathered and a phenomenological analysis of the data was conducted which suggests that the women underwent a mental change that improved their self-confidence and enhanced relationships with their selves and others. The six constituents (...) that emerged were: Participants Perception of an Enhancing Outdoor Environment, Life-Style Changes Resulting in More Openness to Others and Self, Discoveries Concerning Self-Improvements, Sustaining a Desired Mental Disposition, Empowerment in Considering New Possibilities, and Support for Encountering Future Challenges. This article demonstrates how a mental change associated with long-distance running positively impacts participants’ personal and professional lives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Minds, Memes, and Multiples”Michael Bavidge (bio)Multiple Personality Disorder challenges the idea we have of ourselves—selves whose essential characteristics are simplicity, identity, transparency. Stephen Clark argues that we should look behind the myth of a unitary self to an older tradition which represents personal integration not as a given but as something to be striven for, “a distant, luminous goal,” a “light” over the multiple parts of (...) the human personality, a therapeutic and personal ideal of ourselves as persons separate from the ideas that invade us and the experiences that flow through us.He argues that this notion has a number of advantages. It is compatible with the data of Multiple Personality Disorder. It avoids Cartesian myths while providing a self substantial enough to meet both philosophers’ demands for an explanation of the coherence of experience and clinicians’ requirements for a therapeutic objective.Clark sees Multiple Personality Disorder as an exotic manifestation of the unstable and fractured nature of familiar experience. He points up the complexities of our personalities and the passivity of our normal experience. So our everyday experience comes together with the psychiatric disorder to encourage a looser, more dispersed notion of the self than has been felt necessary since Descartes.The notion of self which we think of as Cartesian (though, Clark suggests, Descartes may never have accepted it), caught on as part of the settlement between the emerging sciences and older wisdom. The basis of the settlement was that the world was to be made amenable to scientific investigation and our innermost selves were to be protected from it. This requires that the self has to be all the things that the rest of the world is not—non-spatial, privately accessible, outside determinist, causal chains, simple and indivisible. The settlement was never stable, and, as contemporary arguments over the cognitive sciences demonstrate, it is as controversial today as ever. Multiple Personality Disorder adds psychiatric considerations to the evidence piling up against the Cartesian self.However, the diagnosis is extremely controversial. A highly critical editorial in the British Journal of Psychiatry in March 1995 suggests that the condition is largely generated within therapy. 1 The diagnosis, as the New Scientist (June 17, 1995) reported, seems excessively subject to trends and fashions. 2 Clark shares these reservations, but he concludes that there is now strong evidence of a “real condition.” Yet he does not discuss what he means by a “real condition.” Certainly he intends to exclude malingering or mere therapist suggestion. Nevertheless, he prefers to interpret the disorder as a matter of one [End Page 29] person having different strategies for dealing with a stressful world, rather than as the emergence of a plurality of persons. Some psychiatrists will think that his acceptance, however qualified, is too much of a concession, while others may feel that he is not allowing the alters, and therefore the condition itself, to be “real” enough.Clark’s philosophical remarks are also circumspect, but ambitious claims are there. He wants a re-appraised, strong theory of the self, though he doubts that the truth of such a theory could ever be established. Nevertheless, for Clark, we need a notion of self as “substance, a real being”; we discover and rediscover it; “it becomes aware of itself in me.”Apart from its philosophical advantages, the notion of self he wishes to revive has therapeutic value. Autonomy is the therapeutic target. Understood in Cartesian terms, Multiple Personality Disorder presents paradoxes of autonomy. Cognitive autonomy is the defining characteristic of the Cartesian self; when we have multiple persons, the question arises: autonomy for whom? The difficulties are softened if our idea of self allows for plurality, opacity and divergence within the one person, so the prospect held out to the patient is the possibility of repossessing the fragmented parts of his or her life.Clark engages in a two-fold maneuver for making sense of Multiple Personality Disorder. He revives a looser philosophical concept of self, and he interprets the disorder as an extension of ordinary experience in which there is a divergence of coping strategies rather than a plurality of egos. One could argue that Clark is too optimistic... (shrink)