The article focuses on reconstructing the structures of implicit criticism on postmodern understanding of music, found within the discourse of a dispute between Alain Badiou and Philip Lacou-Labar the concerning philosophical interpretation of Richard Wagner's musical works. It was revealed that A. Badiou proposes a program to overcome the characteristic deconstructivist reduction of art to politics that brings the former to another by-product of ideology. Negative conceptual apparatus of deconstruction is opposed by A. Badiou with a hermeneutics, characterized by affirmative (...) morphology and syntax constituted onto the pragmatics of a lesson, teaching action, open gesture of involvement. Badiou si an approach marks a good possibility of overcoming the methodological and ideological deadlock of postmodernity. This new wave of philosophical debates around Richard Wagner responds to the revival of grand epical genres in mass culture. Consequently a new dialectical thinking must be taught in order to continue the tradition of critical approach to culture. This is the key implication of A. Badiou's lessons on how it is possible to rethink the works of art and historically determined approaches to understanding them besides the clich?s of the recent postmodernist legacy. Although Badiou's critique itself can be seen as a kind of postmodernist interpreting technique, the French philosopher manages to escape the overt radicalism of postmodernist claims against Wagner by means of true radicalityof affirmative interpretation inspired not by suspicion of a concealed truth but rather a commitment to a truth to come. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin called Felix Noeggerath (1885-1960) the “universal genius” or simply “genius.” In his 1916 treatise “Synthesis and the Concept of System in Philosophy,” Noeggerath offered a reading of Kant’s concept of synthesis in an original and radical manner. He dares to confront thought with the incommensurability of atheoretical Being. The linkage between logic and incommensurability is what he calls rationalism. In contradiction to this claim, any attempt to exclude atheoretical Being from the realm of logic is anti-rationalism. Noeggerath elaborates (...) on this in a penetrating discussion and modification of epistemological positions, especially those of the Marburg School and Hermann Cohen. Noeggerath constructs a notion of the philosophical system with the help of Kant’s three tables of transcendental judgements, categories, and principles in the Critique of Pure Reason. Each of these tables is known to contain 12 individual elements in four groups of three each. For the systematic division, the third group under the title “Relation” is decisive. Noeggerath assigns one systemic part to each kind of relation: “For it is to be connected: the categorical relation with ethics, the hypothetical with logic, and the disjunctive with aesthetics.” As a result the classical sequence, beginning with logic, is changed. “The order of the limbs is: a) ethics, b) logic, c) aesthetics.” In Noeggerath’s logical outline, specific mathematical concepts of meta-geometry play a decisive role. According to him, philosophy can resemble their preciseness in building a viable concept of the infinite. The prerequisite is that philosophy does not itself behave mathematically but proceeds along its own path in critical distance to the “specialized, act-kindred thinking” of the mathematician. (shrink)

The evolution of a single trapped ion exhibiting intermittent fluorescence and dark periods may be described either as a continuous process, using differential rate equations, or discretely, as a Markov process. The latter models the atom as making instantaneous transitions from one energy eigenstate to another, and is open to the objection that superpositions of energy states will form which are not covered by the Markov process. The superposition objection is replied to, and two new mathematical elements, Markov vectors and (...) Markov matrices, are proposed as additions to quantum theory. The paper concludes by attributing the cause of dark periods in the ion's history to instantaneous transitions in the ion itself, rather than to photon detection or other components of measurement. (shrink)

개인동일성은 우리가 사람으로서 시간을 가로질러 지속하는 조건에 관한 형이상학의 오랜 논제이다. 개인동일성에 대한 지속 조건들의 문제는 ‘시간이 지남에 따른 개인동일성 문제’, 혹은 ‘지속성 질문(the Persistence question)’이라 불린다. 지속성 질문에 답하기 위한 몇 가지 시도들이 있다. 개인동일성과 관련한 지속성 질문에 대한 가장 인기 있는 답변은 심리적 연속성 견해(psychological-continuity views)이다. 이 견해는 심리주의로 알려져 있다. 이 견해에 따르면 개인의 지속은 어떤 심리적 속성들로 구성된다. 또 다른 영향력 있는 답변은 동물적-신체적 견해(brute-physical views)이다. 인간 존재를 생물학적 유기체로 보고 동물적-신체적 조건들이 인간의 지속 조건이라고 (...) 보는 이러한 입장은 우리에게 ‘애니멀리즘(animalism)’으로 알려져 있다. 본 논문은 심리적 연속성과 연결성이 우리의 지속 조건이라고 보는 심리주의와 동물적-신체적 연속성을 지속의 우선순위에 두는 애니멀리즘 혹은 생체주의의 논증들의 핵심 쟁점들을 검토하고, ‘무-사실 논제’를 통해 사실 지속성의 조건에 문제가 되는 사실이 없음을 보일 것이다. (shrink)

Perceptual disjunctivism is a controversial thesis about perception. One familiar characterization of the thesis maintains that there is no common epistemic kind that is present in both veridical and non-veridical cases of perception. For example, the good case, in which one sees a yellow lemon, and the bad case, in which one hallucinates a yellow lemon, share a specific first-person phenomenology, being indistinguishable from the first-person point of view; however, seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon do not, (...) according to the disjunctivist, share a common epistemic kind. There are two types of disjunctivism: epistemological vs. metaphysical. John McDowell, 243–255, 2011, Philosophical Explorations, 16, 259–279, 2013) has articulated, refined, and defended one kind of disjunctivism. Tyler Burge, 1–78, 2005, Philosophical Explorations, 13, 43–80, 2011) has objected to many forms of disjunctivism, arguing that they are all inconsistent with the proximality principle in the vision sciences. PP requires an ability-general kind in common between relevantly similar perceptual states, such as seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon, which disjunctivism denies. Against the background of this debate some analytic epistemologists, such as Michael Martin, Alan Millar, 176–198, 2007), Berit Brogaard, 46–73, 2011), Duncan Pritchard, and Heather Logue, 105–133, 2013) remain attracted to some version of disjunctivism. Brogaard and Pritchard each have gone on to articulate and defend a version. Pritchard’s, for example, defends epistemological disjunctivism. Martin, Millar, and Logue, by contrast, have defended the idea that the disjunctivist is right about something, but perhaps not wholly correct about the nature of perception. In what follows, I articulate and defend the view that an interesting kind of disjunctivism is to be found through a reading of the Nyāya School of classical Indian philosophy. I articulate a version of perceptual disjunctivism informed by Nyāya perceptual theory that is not derivable from any single Nyāya philosopher. The view I offer is inspired by work on disjunctivism both in Anglo-analytic philosophy and in Nyāya scholarship, such as by Dasti and Phillips, 535–540, 2010), Ganeri, 541–550, 2010), Dasti, 1–15, 2012), Phillips, Vaidya, 562–585, 2013), and Schiller, 1–18, 2019). Importantly, the causal account I offer is distinct from Grice’s single-factor causal theory of perception by crucially involving a multi-factor causal theory of perception. My work on Nyāya perceptual theory derives primarily from Jaysankar Shaw’s account of Nyāya on the sources of knowledge, which is distinct from Stephen Phillips’ well-known account of Nyāya epistemology. Shaw’s theory has been developed and refined through textual analysis and dialectical engagement with the twentieth century Nyāya Pundit Philosopher, Viśvabandhu Tarkatīrtha. Like other modern Nyāya scholars, such as B. K. Matilal, A. Chakrabarti, 1–8, 2010), M. Chadha, J. Ganeri, and S. Phillips, 104–113, 2001, 2012), J. Shaw’s account shows how Nyāya epistemology is a living and continuing form of Indian philosophy. My goal here is twofold. On the one hand, I articulate multi-factor causal disjunctivism and show how it can be applied to the McDowell-Burge debate over the viability of disjunctivism and naïve realism. On the other hand, I aim to start a cross-cultural epistemological conversation with those that have contributed to the Anglo-analytic debate in anthologies, such as Haddock and Macpherson, Byrne and Logue, and introductions, such as Soteriou. The hope is that a cross-cultural epistemological investigation into disjunctivism will lead to better epistemic theorizing about the nature of perception. (shrink)

Seven studies explored the empirical basis for claims that infants represent cardinal values of small sets of objects. Many studies investigating numerical ability did not properly control for continuous stimulus properties such as surface area, volume, contour length, or dimensions that correlate with these properties. Experiment 1 extended the standard habituation/dishabituation paradigm to a 1 vs 2 comparison with three-dimensional objects and confirmed that when number and total front surface area are confounded, infants discriminate the arrays. Experiment 2 revealed that (...) infants dishabituated to a change in front surface area but not to a change in number when the two variables were pitted against each other. Experiments 3 through 5 revealed no sensitivity to number when front surface area was controlled, and Experiments 6 and 7 extended this pattern of findings to the Wynn (1992) transformation task. Infants’ lack of a response to number, combined with their demonstrated sensitivity to one or more dimensions of continuous extent, supports the hypothesis that the representations subserving object-based attention, rather than those subserving enumeration, underlie performance in the above tasks. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The 2006 Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian StudiesWashington, DC, November 17–18, 2006Frances S. Adeney, SecretaryThe theme of this year's meeting was "Religious Self-Fashioning and the Role of Community in Contemporary Buddhist and Christian Practice." The first session presented participants with three papers. The first compared Christian and Buddhist groups that fostered community and long-term commitment. A second paper developed the theme of community affiliation with a description of (...) the Buddhist practice of Hoza. And a third paper demonstrated how a dual practitioner could minister pastorally to both Buddhists and Christians. In the second session practical and philosophical foci met in the discussion of papers on individualized vs. Sangha Buddhism in the United States and co-origination and universal intersubjectivity in Buddhist and Christian philosophies. It was a rich feast indeed.Dr. Sandra Costen Kunz presented her paper "Christian and Buddhist Confession, Affiliation, and Countercultural Action" to start off the first session. In a study of Christian and Buddhist groups, she found interesting methodological parallels in the process that groups undertook to build commitment and community among followers of each tradition. Focused on specific congregations, her paper served to illustrate a trend toward community building that has broad implications for both Buddhist and Christian institutions in their work of fostering commitment and nurturing faith in participants.Dr. Gene Reeves continued along the same theme with a description of the Buddhist practice of Hoza in his particular Buddhist community in Japan. A weekly practice of meeting together to help one another demonstrates a deeper philosophical belief that all can become bodhisattvas for others. Within the hierarchical Buddhist institutional structure, the meetings around Hoza display an egalitarianism that empowers ordinary people to see the Buddha nature in others and to realize it in themselves. In addition to empowering individuals, that process of mutual aid also solidifies the group.According to both papers, individual practice of religion, be it Buddhist or [End Page 133] Christian, and a group process of social solidification work together to deepen faith and community.The third paper in this first session showed the results of that individual/ social dialectic in the life of Dr. Duane Bidwell, who presented his paper "Practicing the Religious Self: Buddhist-Christian Identity as Social Artifact." The main emphasis of this paper was that religion, as a socially constructed reality, depends on community even in its most individualistic forms. As Buddhism and Christianity develop their traditions, those socially constructed worlds can be penetrated by one who traverses between the two worlds. Two stories of pastoral care demonstrated his point. First, in a Buddhist setting, Bidwell, although perceived as a Christian, drew on his Buddhist practices to comfort the dying. In the second example, the situation was reversed. In a setting in which Christianity was the expected form, Bidwell drew on those resources to worship around the deathbed of a young man.In her response to those three papers, Dr. Sallie King brought a critical dimension into the discourse as she asked questions concerning authority and decision making in each context. "How is consensus decision making balanced with hierarchical power in the groups studied?" she asked Dr. Kunz. "Given the equalizing power of Hoza, why is Reeves's organization so hierarchical?" was her question to Dr. Reeves. "And how," she asked, "did choice enter into Bidwell's religious identity?" Responses to those queries led to an interesting discussion that provided food for thought for participants in this meeting.The second session opened with Dr. Kenneth Tanaka's study "The Individual in Relation to the Sangha in American Buddhism: An Examination of 'Individualized Religion.' " Dr. Tanaka spoke to both communal and individualized dimensions of American Buddhism by analyzing a sangha in Alameda County, California, and contrasted it with the Buddhist practices of converts who did not participate in a sangha. He showed that identity for sangha members in Alameda was primarily related to selective joining of group activities by members. In the case of converts, his research showed that their Buddhist identity was most strongly related to meditative practices. A high level of commitment to those practices, with a goal of spiritual development, marked the converts who were... (shrink)

One of the strongest critiques against Fanon’s work centers on the idea that Fanon leaves black subjects caught in slavish regard of whites. Such a depiction of the black subject does not explain Fanon’s own life and his ability to escape slavish regard of whites and become a formative intellectual. Such slavish regard of whites, in other words, the idea of an inferiority complex has been challenged by notable current black philosophers, including Lucius Outlaw. In autobiographical references within Fanon and (...) Outlaw’s work, the two scholars share similar childhood experiences but draw very different conclusions on the development of an inferiority complex. I argue that this estrangement in slavish regard of whites occurs when reading Fanon’s work only through a dialectic framework. A phenomenological reading of Fanon’s work illuminates the ambiguous possibilities of experience. In a phenomenological reading of experience, admitting inferiority complexes does not necessarily debilitate and trap subjects in perpetuity. (shrink)

Low reason is about coping in the world in the world's terms; but our freedom, morality, and enlightenment require the higher, more speculative faculty. Dr. Hanhijarvi (Humboldt Univ.) invites us to explore the great thinkers and re-activate the profound abilities of the human mind that so importantly out-shine today's mechanistic thinking.

The purpose of my Masters thesis was to develop a conceptual framework for analysing the relation between human beings (moral persons) and other entities that share a subset of our properties. The background for this project was MIT historian Bruce Mazlish’s claim that humans are continuous with machines, in the same way that we are continuous with animals and the world at large. Rather than focusing explicitly on whether humans are indeed unique or not, my aim was to reach a (...) better understanding of what such a claim amounts to. This is important since the uniqueness of man has important implications for our conception of ourselves, our relation to other entities, and our corresponding moral obligations. The sometimes paradoxical claims about human uniqueness is perhaps best illustrated by animal experimentation, which on the one hand rests on the assumption that there is a continuity between man and animals (i.e. the experimental results are relevant for humans) but, on the other hand, that there is a discontinuity between man and animals when it comes to moral obligations. (shrink)

In a crucial paragraph (KrV, A 663-664 / B 691-692) of the first part of the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant discusses the specific status of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. In doing so, he refers to an already proven argument and thus to other passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In search of this argument the “Transcendental Analytic” but in particular the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic” turn out to be possible reference points. (...) Although this contextualisation demands further systematic and editorial reflections, it also allows the clarification of the status of the principles and their justification in relation to a subjective deduction. Kant offers with the subjective deduction, as introduced in the “Preface” (of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason) and again in the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic”, a first argumentative strategy, which differs from the objective one but provides “some objective validity” (KrV, A 664 / B 692; Kant, 1998, p. 602) and therefore has systematic importance for the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. My aim is to offer immanent strategies for a justification of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity in the framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

This article discusses the philosophy of Alain Badiou from the perspective of a formulation that we believe represents it succinctly: the dialectic of formalization. The main thesis of the article is that Badiou’s doctrine of the four truth procedures can be understood as a doctrine of a dialectical realization of new and universal forms in the world. The dialectic of formalization announces a double procedure – an autonomous and creative procedure for the production of a new true form in the (...) world and a process of the formation of continuity in discontinuity. Moreover, the dialectic of formalization represents a connection between Badiou’s mature work and his early writings from the late 1960s. Even though in the 1960s and 1970s Badiou had not yet introduced the concepts of subject and truth in the sense that he understands them today, it is possible to support the thesis that there is an indisputable connection between Badiou’s early concept of formalization and his later concept of generic truth procedure. We will try to show that the dialectic of formalization designates the continuity between Badiou’s early and mature work. (shrink)

It is fairly well-known that certain hard computational problems (that is, 'difficult' problems for a digital processor to solve) can in fact be solved much more easily with an analog machine. This raises questions about the true nature of the distinction between analog and digital computation (if such a distinction exists). I try to analyze the source of the observed difference in terms of (1) expanding parallelism and (2) more generally, infinite-state Turing machines. The issue of discreteness vs continuity (...) will also be touched upon, although it is not so important for analyzing these particular problems. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, Franz Neumann, Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal—the impact of the Frankfurt School on the sociological, political, and cultural thought of the twentieth century has been profound. _The Dialectical Imagination_ is a major history of this monumental cultural and intellectual enterprise during its early years in Germany and in the United States. Martin Jay has provided a substantial new preface for this edition, in which he reflects on the continuing relevance of the work of the Frankfurt (...) School. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's _Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ has sold over a million copies in more than twenty languages and has remained one of the ten most cited academic works for the past half century. In contrast, Karl Popper's seminal book _The Logic of Scientific Discovery_ has lapsed into relative obscurity. Although the two men debated the nature of science only once, the legacy of this encounter has dominated intellectual and public discussions on the topic ever since. Almost universally recognized as the (...) modern watershed in the philosophy of science, Kuhn's relativistic vision of shifting paradigms -- which asserted that science was just another human activity, like art or philosophy, only more specialized -- triumphed over Popper's more positivistic belief in science's revolutionary potential to falsify society's dogmas. But has this victory been beneficial for science? Steve Fuller argues that not only has Kuhn's dominance had an adverse impact on the field but both thinkers have been radically misinterpreted in the process. This debate raises a vital question: Can science remain an independent, progressive force in society, or is it destined to continue as the technical wing of the military-industrial complex? Drawing on original research -- including the Kuhn archives at MIT -- Fuller offers a clear account of "Kuhn vs. Popper" and what it will mean for the future of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Hegel came to maturity as a philosopher during the first years of the nineteenth century, developing through prodigious intellectual struggles a highly original conception of dialectic as a method for rationally comprehending traumatic historical change. At the same time, he continued a process begun earlier, of critical engagement with the Christian gospel and its historical ethos. Hegel spent much of his youth reacting against this drama and its cultural expression. By the time he published his early masterpiece, the _Phenomenology of (...) Spirit_, he had found an ingenious way of reconstructing it in counterpoint with his new dialectical understanding of historical experience. _Dialectic and Gospel in the Development of Hegel's Thinking_ tells the story of this interplay as it develops in Hegel's thinking. It culminates in a fresh interpretation of the _Phenomenology of Spirit_ and a detailed commentary on larger portions of the text relevant to that story. Crites's reading of the masterpiece is contextualized by three substantial chapters detailing the course of Hegel's reflections on Christian themes through the first thirty-five years of his life. These chapters are both biographical and textual, treating not only the philosopher’s personal and intellectual development but also the major cultural influences that informed it. Hegel is seen to have begun as a child of the Enlightenment powerfully, affected by the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, who finds his way to his own position as a founding genius of German Idealism and its historical dialectic. His development is thus interpreted as an epitome of a major transformation in European intellectual history. (shrink)

A course of dialogical reasoning involving the atheist and the theist reveals a connection between the Curry phenomenon and the step-wise construction of a sound version of the modal ontological argument. The exercise is both adversarial and cooperative as the participants are committed to the norms of shared truth-seeking, respect for one's opponents and a desire to continue the dialectic for as long as possible. The theist relies on the interaction between the properties of a Curry-style sentence and the structure (...) of implication in order to show that the atheist's own commitments imply Anselm's principle (God necessarily exists if He actually exists at all). As Anselm's principle and the possibility premise are the only assumptions required for the modal ontological argument it follows that the theist has, given the norms of the dialogue, a winning strategy against the atheist. This follows since the possibility premise is granted by the atheist as part of their commitment to the norms governing the dialectic though the theist in virtue of those same norms must accept that God is at best maximally perfect in the light of the argument from evil and the Stone paradox. (shrink)

This present Doctoral Thesis deals with David Bohm's reflection on the Act of Thinking vs. Thinking, and its impacts that would affect freedom for creativity, or, on the contrary, would run into arbitrariness and fragmentation, especially in scientific knowledge. For that, we combined some of his works, written in the period of his maturity. In the weaving of our text, following the line of Bohm, we resort to the use of metaphors and analogies, in order to explore not only the (...) “awakening of his creativity”, through the contexts to which he was involved, but also his repertoire, their lenses to understand the world involved and explained. In addition, we analyze how their affective bonds would have contributed to their particular way of making themselves: as a physicist and free thinker. Although he was a scholar born in the last century, we will see how other researchers, even today, seem to share the "same" act of thinking, which in a way, even if implied, continues to extend its influence to many. (shrink)

In a recent article, Iris Marion Young raises several challenges to deliberative democracy on behalf of political activists. In this paper, the author defends a version of deliberative democracy against the activist challenges raised by Young and devises challenges to activism on behalf of the deliberative democrat. Key Words: activism • deliberative democracy • Discourse • Ideology • public sphere • I. M. Young.

Gadamer's Dialectical Hermeneutics affirms the continuity between Gadamer's interest in Plato and his hermeneutics by focusing on the role of dialectic for Gadamer's own conception of understanding. Highlighting the productive and on-going nature of the dialectical tension at the heart of hermeneutics clarifies the roles that truth, good, practice, theory, and dialogue play in Gadamer's thought and emphasizes his desire to recover the practical nature of philosophy.

We study the position of the computable setting in the “common theory of locality” developed in [4, 5] for local problems on $\Delta $ -regular trees, $\Delta \in \omega $. We show that such a problem admits a computable solution on every highly computable $\Delta $ -regular forest if and only if it admits a Baire measurable solution on every Borel $\Delta $ -regular forest. We also show that if such a problem admits a computable solution on every computable maximum (...) degree $\Delta $ forest then it admits a continuous solution on every maximum degree $\Delta $ Borel graph with appropriate topological hypotheses, though the converse does not hold. (shrink)

Jonathan Bennett's analysis of the second half of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, in which Kant concerns himself with topics such as substance, the nature of the self, the cosmos, freedom and the existence of God, continues to be an engaging and accessible exploration of Kant's major work. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Karl Ameriks, illuminating its enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work has been revived for (...) a new generation of readers. (shrink)

So-called ‘reified temporal logics’ were introduced by researchers in Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the early 1980s, and gave rise to a long-running series of debates concerning the proper way to represent states, events, causation, action, and other notions identified as crucial to the knowledge representation needs of AI. These debates never resulted in a definitive resolution of the issues under discussion, and indeed continue to produce aftershocks to the present day; none the less, we are now sufficiently far removed in (...) time from their heyday for it to be a worthwhile exercise to stand back and review them as a connected piece of history. (shrink)

Few ideas have played a more continuously prominent role throughout the history of philosophy than that of dialectic, which has figured on the philosophical agenda from the time of the Presocratics. The present book explores the philosophical promise of dialectic, especially in its dialogical version associated with disputation, debate, and rational controversy. The book s deliberations examine what lessons can be drawn to exhibit the utility of dialectical proceedings for the theory of knowledge in reminding us that the building-up of (...) knowledge is an interpersonally interactive enterprise subject to communal standards.". (shrink)

The world’s third largest producer of scientific research, Germany, is the origin of the research university and the independent, extra-university research institute. Its dual-pillar research policy differentiates these organizational forms functionally: universities specialize in advanced research-based teaching; institutes specialize intensely on research. Over the past decades this policy affected each sector differently: while universities suffered a lingering “legitimation crisis,” institutes enjoyed deepening “favored sponsorship”—financial and reputational advantages. Universities led the nation’s reestablishment of scientific prominence among the highly competitive European and (...) global science systems after WWII. But sectoral analysis of contributions to science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medical and health journal publications finds that Germany’s small to medium-sized independent research institutes have made significant, growing contributions, particularly in publishing in higher impact journals proportionally more than their size. Simultaneously—despite dual-pillar policy implications—the university sector continues to be absolutely and relatively successful; not eclipsed by the institutes. Universities have consistently produced two-thirds of the nation’s publications in the highest quality journals since at least 1980 and have increased publications at a logarithmic rate; higher than the international mean. Indeed, they led Germany into the global mega-science style of production. Contrary to assumed benefits of functional differentiation, our results indicate that relative to their size, each sector has produced approximately similar publication records. While institutes have succeeded, the larger university sector, despite much less funding growth, has remained fundamental to German science production. Considering these findings, we discuss the future utility of the dual-pillar policy. (shrink)

If we accept both that human enhancement could produce beings with higher moral status than our own (i.e. supra-persons), and that this scenario may be detrimental to unenhanced persons, then there are still several ways that the creation of supra-persons could be defended. I will argue that some of these defences fail. Their justification for the permissibility or unlikelihood of harms to the unenhanced is weakened once we consider that those who enhance may be undermining their own individual interests. Enhancements (...) that are substantial enough to increase moral status may also be substantial enough to affect psychological continuity. Certain individual interests are sensitive to loses of psychological continuity. I will consider three scenarios: the creation of supra-persons within one generation, the enhancement of persons into supra-persons, and the generational replacement of persons by supra-persons. The arguments for the first scenario fail on intuitive grounds. A thorough consideration of individual interests undermines the arguments for the other two scenarios. I conclude that although the creation of drastically morally better persons may be desirable and likely to help realise most of what we currently value, this realisation is undermined by the fact that the beings enjoying this future scenario might not be our psychological continuants. (shrink)

In this paper I combine the embodiment thesis with extended mind theory by introducing a unique theory on consciousness based on one of the most neglected philosophers: Von Hartmann. There will be a discussion based on two contemporary debates within the field of cognition: the computational theory versus the embodied theory of mind and consciousness versus unconsciousness. With the help of the theory of Von Hartmann, I will ask the question why we are unconscious -- as both Von Hartmann and (...) contemporary neuroscientists suggest -- and whether consciousness should be a state of the brain or mind alone. Subsequently, I will present the argument that consciousness is every physiological state and that the body continuously creates ideas. Following extended cognition theorists, the suggestion will be made that the environment can shape these ideas. This will result in a critique against the contemporary emphasis on the unconscious will. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics controversially claims that the A deduction is superior to the B deduction because the imagination, as the“common root” of understanding and sensibility, opens the first Critique to metaphysical ground. Drawing on Dieter Henrich, this paper reinterprets Heidegger’sreading by moving beyond the Analytic and taking the Dialectic into account. This suggests a continuity between the A and B deductions, namely that the imagination, as more than an ontic faculty, remains a basic power that (...) keeps open a metaphysics of being in Kant—a metaphysics whose site is a radicalized unity of transcendental apperception. Revisiting Heidegger in this way shows how Kant is both linked to and differentiated from German Idealism’s debate about the imagination, a position suggested in both Heidegger and recent scholarly discussion. (shrink)

Variability is pervasive in spoken language, in particular if one is exposed to two varieties of the same language. Unlike in bilingual settings, standard and dialectal forms are often phonologically related, increasing the variability in word forms. We investigate whether dialectal variability in children’s input affects their ability to recognize words in Standard German, testing non-dialectal vs. dialectal children. Non-dialectal children, who typically grow up in urban areas, mostly hear Standard German forms, and hence encounter little segmental variability in their (...) input. Dialectal children in turn, who typically grow up in rural areas, hear both Standard German and dialectal forms, and are hence exposed to a large amount of variability in their input. We employ the familiar word paradigm for German children aged 12–18 months. Since dialectal children from rural areas are hard to recruit for laboratory studies, we programmed an App that allows all parents to test their children at home. Looking times to familiar vs. non-familiar words were analyzed using a semi-automatic procedure based on neural networks. Our results replicate the familiarity preference for non-dialectal German 12–18-month-old children. Non-dialectal children in the same age range, on the other hand, showed a novelty preference. One explanation for the novelty preference in dialectal children may be more mature linguistic processing, caused by more variability of word forms in the input. This linguistic maturation hypothesis is addressed in Experiment 2, in which we tested older children. These children, who are not exposed to dialectal forms, also showed a novelty preference. Taken together, our findings show that both dialectal and non-dialectal German children recognized the familiar Standard German word forms, but their looking pattern differed as a function of the variability in the input. Frequent exposure to both dialectal and Standard German word forms may hence have affected the nature of lexical representations, leading to more mature processing capacities. (shrink)

John Adams vs Thomas Paine: Rival Plans for the Early Republic by historian Jett B. Conner explores how the two rivals helped shape America's first constitutions--the Articles of Confederation and those of several states-- and how they continued contributing to American political thought as it developed during the so-called "critical period" between the adoption of the Articles of Confederation and the start of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. It also focuses on the creation of our democratic republic and compares Paine's (...) and Adams's approaches to structuring constitutions to ensure free government while guarding against abuses of power and the excesses of democratic majorities. (shrink)

There are fundamental differences between the explanation of scientific change and the explanation of technological change. The differences arise from fundamental differences between scientific and technological knowledge and basic disanalogies between technological advance and scientific progress. Given the influence of economic markets and industrial and institutional structures on the development of technology, it is more plausible to regard technological change as a continuous and incremental process, rather than as a process of Kuhnian crises and revolutions.

Effective Altruism encourages affluent people to make significant donations to improve the wellbeing of the world’s poor, using quantified and observational methods to identify the most efficient charities. Critics argue that EA is inattentive to the systemic causes of poverty and underestimates the effectiveness of individual contributions to systemic change. EA claims to be open to systemic change but suggests that systemic critiques, such as the socialist critique of capitalism, are unhelpfully vague and serve primarily as hypocritical rationalizations of continued (...) affluence. I reformulate the systemic change objection, rebut the charges of vagueness and bad faith and argue that charity may not be worth doing at all from a purely altruistic perspective. In order to take systemic change seriously, EA must repudiate its narrowly empiricist approach, embrace holistic, interpretive social analysis and make inevitably controversial judgments about the complex dynamics of collective action. These kinds of evidence and judgment cannot be empirically verified but are essential to taking systemic change seriously. EA is thereby forced to sacrifice its a-political approach to altruism. I also highlight the importance of quotidian, extra-political contributions to perpetuating or changing harmful social practices. Radical efforts to resist, subvert and reconstruct harmful social practices, such as those involved in economic decision-making, could be just as effective and demanding as charity. But such efforts may be incompatible with extensive philanthropy, because they can require people to retain some level of affluence for strategic reasons but to repudiate both the acquisition of significant wealth and charity as is currently organized. The wealth and status of some critics of charity may indeed be incompatible with effectively contributing to social change, but the altruistic merits of charity are neither as obvious nor as easily demonstrated as EA believes. (shrink)

The classical liberal approach to deregulation is based on the consecutive elimination of state regulatory activities and their substitution by competitive market structure. Increasing competition accompanied with decreasing arbitrary state agencies’ interventions will undoubtedly cultivate the behaviour of market agents and bring benefits to consumers.The classical liberal approach to deregulation is incompatible with the EU deregulation model, which in case of network industries is still based on the permanent existence of regulatory agencies, Third-Party-Access, public service liability, centralized control of investments (...) and the negative reciprocity. The adoption of these principals will at least delay deregulation process in transition economies but will likely preserve the cartel structure on the utility markets.Economics of regulation and implicitly economics of deregulation is a product of the Chicago School of Economics. Since current “deregulation process” leads to tighter regulation, the adequate term for it should be the reregulation.L’approche libérale classique de la réglementation repose sur l’élimination de la réglementation étatique et leur substitution par des structures marchandes concurrentielles. Une concurrence accrue et une diminution des interventions arbitraires de l’état ne pourront que modifier le comportement des agents sur le marché et engendrer des bénéfices pour les consommateurs.L’approche de la déréglementation du libéralisme classique est incompatible avec le modèle de déréglementation de l’Union Européenne : dans le cas des industries en réseau, ce dernier demeure fondé sur l’existence continue d’agences de réglementation, la responsabilité du service public, le contrôle centralisé des investissements et la réciprocité négative. L’adoption de ces principes aura pour effet au moins de retarder le processus de déréglementation dans les économies en transition et probablement aussi de préserver la structure cartellisée des marchés de services publics.L’économie de la réglementation, et par implication, l’économie de la déréglementation est une contribution émanant de l’Ecole d’Economie de Chicago. Parce que les “processus de déréglemen- tation” en vigueur induisent des réglementations plus drastiques, l’expression appropriée devrait plutôt être la re-réglementation. (shrink)

This paper interprets the two pages devoted in the Critique of Pure Reason to a critique of Leibniz’s view of organisms as infinitely organized machines. It argues that this issue of organisms represents a crucial test-case for Kant in regard to the conflicting notions of space, continuity and divisibility held by classical metaphysics and by criticism. I first present Leibniz’s doctrine and its justification. In a second step, I explain the general reasoning by which Kant defines the problem of (...) the Antinomies, and then I specify the case of the Second Antinomy. Then, I ask why the organism raises specific issues for Kant’s solution of the Second Antinomy, and why it sheds light on the nature of Leibniz’s metaphysical assumptions about organisms. The last section considers this critique of Leibniz from the perspective of Kant’s future theory of organisms in the third Critique, specifying its role in the development of a Kantian view of organisms with regard to the changes occurring at the same time in the life sciences. (shrink)

The philosophical–ethical literature and the public debate on autonomous vehicles have been obsessed with ethical issues related to crashing. In this article, these discussions, including more empirical investigations, will be critically assessed. It is argued that a related and more pressing issue is questions concerning safety. For example, what should we require from autonomous vehicles when it comes to safety? What do we mean by ‘safety’? How do we measure it? In response to these questions, the article will present a (...) foundation for a continued discussion on these issues and an argument for why discussions about safety should be prioritized over ethical concerns related to crashing. (shrink)

This paper concerns a surprisingly sharp disagreement about the nature of ancient Pyrrhonism which first emerges clearly in Kant and Hegel, but which continues in contemporary interpretations. The paper begins by explaining the character of this disagreement, then attempts to adjudicate it in the light of the ancient texts.

Paper explores the controversial relationship between Schelling and Hegel with respect to the role of negativity. By rejecting the common framework, according to which, one of the authors is usually presented as either advancing or preceding the other, it argues for an alternative synchronic reading which approaches this relationship not in terms of surpassing, subordination or perversion but rather presents it as an inversion. By discussing (a) the negativity of reflection, (b) the ontological interpretation of the transcendental object and (c) (...) the application of dialectics, it proposes an amphibolic elaboration of commonly shared presuppositions—a movement following a similar path yet in converse directions, which in its own turn challenges our common understanding of German idealism. Keywords: Schelling, Hegel, inversion, concept, negativity, reflection, dialectics. (shrink)