Accountability has recently become synonymous with punishment, or sanctions, thus marginalizing the traditional definition of accountability as giving an account and justifying one’s actions to those to whom one is responsible. Sanction-based accountability is appropriate in contexts of justified distrust. Trust-based accountability, which relies heavily on giving an account, is most appropriate in contexts of justified trust. Sanction-based accountability can undermine trust-based accountability. Dynamic accountability, appropriate for conditions of complexity and change, involves both sanctions and trust, allowing principals and agents (...) to work together, along with the agents’ peers and external stakeholders, toward recursively revisable responses. A contingency theory of accountability stresses crafting the mix of forms of accountability to fit the requirements and capacities of the context. (shrink)

Ethics research in Accounting has not proceeded beyond the descriptive level while, at the same time, ethics is a vital part of accounting decisions to the point where professional codes of etherics are necessary. A theoretical model is offered using cognitive and contingency (field) theories to gain insight into how ethical considerations enter into accounting decisions. Propositions are generated so that the use of ethics in accounting decisions can be predicted.

Using a contingency theory framework, this study examines the relationship between a firm’s business-government relations (BGR) strategy, BGR structure, and BGR performance. Based on previous work, the study hypothesizes that BGR strategy determines, in part, the structure of the public affairs function, as well as the function’s effectiveness. Furthermore, the study contends that an appropriate fit between BGR strategy and BGR structure leads to improved BGR performance. Results indicate that there is a positive association between BGR strategies (buffering and (...) bridging) and BGR performance. There is also a positive association between BGR strategy and BGR formalization (structure). However, the study finds no direct association between BGR structure and performance. Further analysis reveals that it is a fit between a firm’s BGR strategy and BGR structure that leads to improved BGR performance. The associations between strategy, structure, fit, and performance offer empirical support for the relevance of the contingency theory framework to BGR research. (shrink)

This paper addresses representations of Burns and Stalker’s theory that arose soon after its publication in The Management of Innovation in 1961. Different conceptions of Burns and Stalker’s contingency theory as portrayed in organisation and management texts are discussed. It will be argued that what has been represented as their theory stems in the main from ideas based on different positions within the spectrum of the positivistic, functionalist ‘paradigm’.

I present and consider critically O'Regan and Noë's sensorimotor contingency theory, proposed as an alternative to solve the explanatory gap problem. I start with the criticism that these authors address the current conception of representation, according to which conscious experiences are representations of the external world produced by the brain. Afterward, I summarize the way the sensorimotor contingency theory addresses the problem of the explanatory gap, explaining the existence, form, and content of visual consciousness in terms of an (...) "exploratory activity" mediated by sensorimotor contingency laws. Finally, in agreement with criticisms addressed to O'Regan and Noë's solution, I propose a way to face the problem of the explanatory gap, which, recognizing the relevance of the body and the external environment to the existence, form and content of visual consciousness, but privileging the role of the brain as an organ of visual consciousness, and as an agent who uses visual consciousness as a guide to initiate and maintain embodied and situated adaptive actions in the world. (shrink)

We review studies that indicate a dissociation between the perceptual estimate and the resulting cognitive representation of given properties of a seen object, on the one hand, and the motor action exerted on the same object. We propose that there exist multiple levels of organization of sensorimotor loops and that internal models may be made accessible to one level of organization while remaining inaccessible to another level.

In _Action in Perception _Alva No develops and presents a sensorimotor account of vision and of visual consciousness. According to such an account seeing (and indeed perceiving more generally) is analysed as a kind of skilful bodily activity. Such a view is consistent with the emerging emphasis, in both philosophy and cognitive science, on the critical role of embodiment in the construction of intelligent agency. I shall argue, however, that the full sensorimotor model faces three important challenges. The first is (...) to negotiate a path between two prima facie unsatisfactory readings of the central claim that conscious perceptual experience is constituted by knowledge of patterns of sensorimotor dependence. The second is to convince us that the sensorimotor contribution, in such cases, is actually constitutive of perceptual experience rather than merely causally implicated in the origination of such experience.² And the third is to respond to the important challenge raised by what I will dub 'sensorimotor summarizing' models of the relation between conscious experience and richly detailed sensorimotor routines. According to such models³ conscious perceptual experience only rather indirectly reflects the rich detail of our actual sensorimotor engagements, which are instead lightly sampled as a coarse guide, optimized for planning and reasoning, and geared and filtered according to current needs and purposes. (shrink)

In this article I investigate the Confucian sense of responsibility from the framework of “moral economy,” understood as a causal relationship between one’s virtue and non-moral goods including political position/success, and “contingency,” the failure of moral economy, and argue that early Confucians’ astute understanding of the contingent nature of the political world enabled them to subscribe to the non-causal sense of responsibility. Contrary to the common argument that Heaven was invoked by the Confucians in order to shield themselves from (...) responsibility for their political failures, I argue that they imposed a more expanded sense of responsibility both on them and on the rulers, largely preoccupied with realpolitik. In their effort to restore moral economy between the ruler’s virtue and his political position in particular, I show Confucians engaged in what I call reverse moral economy, at the heart of which was to constrain the ruler’s arbitrary use of political power. (shrink)

I argue that historical contingency, in the sense of the order in which events take place, can be an essential factor in determining which of two equally adequate and fruitful, but observationally indistinguishable, scientific theories is accepted by the scientific community. This type of actual underdetermination poses questions for scientific realism and for rational reconstruction in theory evaluation. To illustrate this, I discuss the complete observational equivalence of two radically different, conceptually incompatible interpretations of quantum mechanics and argue (...) that an entirely plausible reordering of historical factors could reasonably have resulted in the causal program having been chosen over the "Copenhagen" one. (shrink)

In this, the first major philosophical study of contingent pacifism, Larry May offers a new account of pacifism from within the Just War tradition. Written in a non-technical style, the book features real-life examples from contemporary wars and applies a variety of approaches ranging from traditional pacifism and human rights to international law and conscientious objection. May considers a variety of thinkers and theories, including Hugo Grotius, Kant, Socrates, Seneca on restraint, Tertullian on moral purity, Erasmus's arguments against just (...) war, and Hobbes's conception of public conscience. The guiding idea is that the possibility of a just war is conceded, but not at the current time or in the foreseeable future due to the nature of contemporary armed conflict and geopolitics - wars in the past are also unlikely to have been just wars. This volume will interest scholars and upper-level students of political philosophy, philosophy of law, and war studies. (shrink)

This book explores the significance of rhetoric from the perspective of its complex relationship with philosophy. It demonstrates how this relationship gives expression to a basic tension at the core of politics: that between the contingency of its happening and the transcendence toward which it strives. The first part of the study proposes a reassessment of the ancient quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric, as it was discussed by Plato, Aristotle, and above all Cicero and Quintilian, who ambitiously attempted to (...) bring them together creating an ideal that is at the roots of the humanist tradition. It then moves to twentieth-century political theory and shows how the questions that emerge from that quarrel still strongly resonate in the works of key thinkers such as H. Arendt, L. Strauss, and R. Rorty. The volume thus offers an original contribution that locates itself at the intersection of politics, rhetoric, and philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIki is the key word of Shūzō Kuki’s The Structure of Iki, and it became one of the most widely recognized Japanese aesthetic categories mainly due to this work. However, in The Problems of Contingency, which is Kuki’s most important philosophical work, there is no discussion of iki again, and consequently, most commentators of Kuki fail to see the correlation between his theories of iki and contingency. This article, by contrast, intends to provide a new interpretation of (...) iki in the light of Kuki’s theory of contingency. The specific thesis of this paper is that aesthetic phenomena categorized as subject to the principles of iki are positively evaluated in Japanese culture just because the consciousness of iki is just one form of the consciousness of contingency, in which the awareness of alternatives to the actual situation could produce considerable spiritual entertainment for aesthetic subjects. (shrink)

A slight modification to the translation scheme for David Lewis's counterpart theory I put forward in 'An Alternative Translation Scheme for Counterpart Theory' (Analysis 49.3 (1989)) is proposed. The motivation for this change is that it makes for a more plausible account of contingent identity. In particular, contingent identity is accommodated without admitting the contingency of self-identity.

In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain of his claims about causation. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy.

What motivates behavior? What are the qualities of experience which make life worth living? Taking a new interdisciplinary approach, Morillo advances the theory that pleasure—interpreted as a distinct, separable, noncognitive quality of experience—is essential for all positive motivation and is the only intrinsic, nonmoral good in the lives of human beings and many other sentient creatures. Morillo supports her arguments with recent neuropsychological evidence concerning the role of reward centers in the brain and philosophical arguments for a naturalistic theory of (...) value and the good life. "Contingent Creatures" will interest philosophers, psychologists, and neurobiologists. (shrink)

This paper investigates the degree to which information theory, and the derived uses that make it work as a metaphor of our age, can be helpful in thinking about God’s immanence and transcendance. We ask when it is possible to say that a consciousness has to be behind the information we encounter. If God is to be thought about as a communicator of information, we need to ask whether a communication system has to pre-exist to the divine and impose itself (...) to God. If we want God to be Creator, and not someone who would work like a human being, ‘creating’ will mean sustaining in being as much the channel, the material system, as the message. Is information control? It seems that God’s actions are not going to be informational control of everything. To clarify the issue, we attempt to distinguish two kinds of ‘genialities’ in nature, as a way to evaluate the likelihood of God from nature. We investigate concepts and images of God, in terms of the history of ideas but also in terms of philosophical theology, metaphysics, and religious ontology. (shrink)

Contingentism is the view that it is possible for there to be contingent existents. Timothy Williamson has argued that contingentists cannot provide a satisfactory interpretation of the possible-world semantics for modal logic. This paper aims to provide such an interpretation on behalf of contingentists.

Debating the interpretation of the Burgess Shale fossil records, Stephen Jay Gould and Simon Conway Morris have formulated two conflicting theses regarding the nature of evolutionary processes. While Gould argued that evolution is essentially a contingent process whose outcomes are unpredictable, Conway Morris claimed that the omnipresence of convergence testifies that it is in fact deterministic, leading to predictable and inevitable outcomes. Their theses have been extensively researched from various perspectives. However, a systematic parallel analysis of the core arguments each (...) of them offered in support of their thesis has been lacking. I argue Conway Morris has successfully exposed the core weaknesses of Gould's thesis and offered a comprehensive account in favor of the major role of convergence in evolutionary history. On the other hand, I will point out some of the weak points in the latter's arguments supporting the deterministic view of life's evolution. Although Conway Morris has been more successful in arguing for the deterministic nature of the evolutionary processes, both theses could be improved if their shortcomings are taken into consideration. (shrink)

My discussion has four parts. In section 1, I reconstruct Leibniz’s early position on freedom and show how various problems motivated significant changes in Leibniz’s views over a short period of time. In section two, I outline a series of notes by Leibniz entitled “De Libertate a Necessitate in Eligendo,” where Leibniz develops a rudimentary theory of contingency that resembles the infinite analysis theory developed around 1686. In section three, I consider some reasons for why Leibniz dropped the “Eligendo” (...) view. In section four, I look at the link that Leibniz develops between an infinite series of reasons and indemonstrability and suggest how the rudimentary theory of “Eligendo” eventually became the infinite analysis theory of contingency. (shrink)

Many interpreters have supposed that the root of contingency in Leibniz's thought is that it is contingent rather than necessary that God chooses to create the best possible world. It is far from clear, however, that Leibniz believed this. This chapter argues that Leibniz did believe two theories of contingency: one based on the notion of a thing's being possible in itself whether or not a perfectly wise and good God could choose it, and one based on (...) an identification of necessity with provability, where an infinite analysis does not count as a proof. It emerges that Leibniz's conception of possible worlds is not exactly the same as that now used in possible worlds semantics. (shrink)

It is argued that accepting that there are human rights, or that there are categorically binding requirements of any kind on action, logically requires accepting the PGC (Principle of Generic Consistency) as the supreme criterion of practical reasonableness.Consequently, all legal systems that recognise human rights (hence, the English legal system), all who view law as a matter of obligation, and all who consider that there are categorically binding requirements on action, must take the PGC to be a necessary criterion of (...) legal validity. Conventions on human rights must, as conventions on human rights, be interpreted to conform with the PGC. (shrink)

Some things happen or exist only contingently: although they do happen or exist, they do not have to. Some other things do not happen or come to exist, although they could. They are contingent possibilities. Philosophers have tried to understand contingent possibilities in two different ways. According to one, possibilities should be understood with reference to worlds. A nonactual event is possible because there is a world in which it does happen. According to another, possibilities should be understood with reference (...) to modal properties. An event or an object is possible because it would occur or come to exist if a modal property of some substance, another object or set of objects were exercised. -/- This book argues that the latter approach provides a better account of possibilities than the former. It develops a theory of contingent possibilities according to which possibilities within a world must be distinguished from the possibility of worlds. It is the distribution of modal properties within a world which metaphysically determines what could happen in that world. The most important of these modal properties are abilities and dispositions. Dispositions explain nomic and behavioural regularities, while abilities ground more or less abstract possibilities. By way of connecting the ascription of more or less specific modal properties to different counterfactual conditionals, we can identify various possibilities that we are concerned with when we try to understand what can happen in our world. (shrink)

This article argues that Oakeshott's theory of freedom possesses a greater degree of coherence than is often perceived. Freedom in Oakeshott's philosophy may be defined as `recognized contingency', combining the notions of a genuine choice of action and of an agent's awareness of having such a choice. Oakeshott employs his notion of freedom in two different contexts. One is the context in which freedom is understood as a concept distinguishing what is conceived as `human' from what is conceived as (...) `non-human'. The other context is that of membership in societies, which under certain circumstances can be characterized either by the presence or the lack of freedom. The article argues that, while at first glance Oakeshott's ideas look counter-intuitive, at a deeper level this understanding of freedom is akin to that prevalent in the consciousness of modern liberal societies. (shrink)

To be fair to Robinson, it is worth mentioning that he does offer a number of qualifications to his thesis. He tries to avoid excessive determinism and at one point suggests:A satisfactory account should not imply an evolutionary notion and should leave open the possibility of historic discontinuities and of contingencies that generate alternative pathways of development, including alternative futures.In other words, maybe this embryonic TNS will never progress beyond its current stage or perhaps it will continue to grow but (...) it will never become a real state. But the main thrust of Robinson’s account is strongly deterministic. In fact, he does not consider a single factor that might impede the unity of the global bourgoisie or derail transnational state formation.In a sense, Robinson’s mistake is that he has tried to derive a theoretical solution to a concrete problem that global capitalism has not yet solved in practice. While it might well be a logical step for capitalist elites to create a Transnational State, it is always risky to attribute too much rationality to an order that is notorious for its contradictions. (shrink)

This essay argues that, with his much-maligned “infinite analysis” theory of contingency, Leibniz is onto something deep and important – a tangle of issues that wouldn’t be sorted out properly for centuries to come, and then only by some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century. The first two sections place Leibniz’s theory in its proper historical context and draw a distinction between Leibniz’s logical and meta-logical discoveries. The third section argues that Leibniz’s logical insights initially make his (...) “infinite analysis” theory of contingency more rather than less perplexing. The last two sections argue that Leibniz’s meta-logical insights, however, point the way towards a better appreciation of (what we should regard as) his formal theory of contingency, and its correlative, his formal theory of necessity. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory promises a fresh explanation of phenomenal consciousness, for instance of the feeling of experiencing redness. But can it also be extended to explaining aspects of phenomenal consciousness which are only possible thanks to culture, thanks to our embeddedness in social practices? In this paper, I argue that the sensorimotor theory is in need of such an extension, and I make a proposal for how this might be accomplished. I concentrate on one example of culturally shaped experiences, namely (...) on feeling socially shaped emotions, and in particular moral emotions, such as resentment, guilt, forgiving someone, etc.. My main suggestion is this: in our case of enculturated humans, our implicit knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies is informed by, and transformed by, sociocultural practices. There are, I suggest, 'sociocultural contingencies', the mastery of which can contribute to one's phenomenal consciousness. For example, in order to have the experience of feeling resentment or guilt, one has to engage in an actual fight and make use of one's sociocultural skills of blaming someone or of justifying oneself. (shrink)

This article discusses the problem of understanding in Adorno’s critical theory. It is argued that another rationale for the contingency of understanding is provided by Adorno, one that justifies understanding critical theory as disclosing critique. For Adorno, what is responsible for the contingency of understanding is not the local limitation of our knowledge and vocabulary, but the presupposition of understanding itself. In this article, two readings of this contingency of understanding are distinguished: an epistemo-critical one and an (...) ideology-critical one. Finally, the case is made for adopting the epistemo-critical view of the contingency of understanding in preference to the ideology-critical view - not least because it contains a normative impulse which goes beyond contextualism. (shrink)

As far as scientific theories are concerned, contingent events are those that fall outside their explanatory framework, either because the theory doesn’t have the resources to explain them or because the events are unpredictable in principle. In what follows, the focus is on contingency as a problem about how we describe those features of the world that fall outside our best theories, including our best high-level theories. On this understanding of contingency, contingent things are things (...) that just happen. I want to explore how contingency, in this sense, has remained a problem from ancient to early modern scientific theories and to sketch how what might be termed “the problem of contingency” has been transformed. (shrink)

Some time ago, Quine asserted that to be is to be value of a variable. This entails that if one wishes to accept any theory as true, we must be committed to the existence of those objects over which we existentially quantify. I suggest instead that we are committed only to the existence of things for which certain intrinsic properties are contingent (those that an object can have independent of the properties that make it a member of a certain kind). (...) Any discourse that involves existential quantification over entities for which those properties can change should be given an objectual interpretation, and these objects are therefore real. In contrast, all discourse that involves existential quantification over objects who have at least some intrinsic properties essentially, which are properties that are not what make them members of a kind, will be given a substitutional interpretation, which does not entail a realist interpretation. This conception of ontological commitment has potential direct consequences in several areas -- the status of fictional characters, the debate about the existence of god, realism about mathematical entities, and so on. (shrink)

This paper focuses on how revolts against caste-based oppression in India have been made invisible due to conceptual legacies in European social and political theory. Weber’s and Arendt’s conceptualization of Pariah agency is a case in point. Arendt’s main understanding of Pariah agency is individualized and inadequate to study freedom struggles among untouchable castes. This article argues that one not only needs to move away from analyzing individual to collective action, but it is also crucial to foreground how collective mobilization (...) among excluded groups has focused on contingencies that embed a system of domination. Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar’s critique of caste-based domination in India is noteworthy in this regard; he foregrounds how the distinction between “Touchables” and “Untouchables” in the caste system is both embedded and contingent. Focusing on untouchability in India, Ambedkar offers insights into hegemonic analyses of social exclusion, human rights articulations before the Universal Declaratio... (shrink)

Structure/agency theories presuppose that there is a unity to structure that distinguishes it from the (potential) diversity of agents' responses. In doing so they formally divide the robust social processes shaping the social world (structure) from contingent agential variation (agency). In this article we question this division by critically evaluating its application to the concept of role in critical realism and structural functionalism. We argue that Archer, Elder-Vass and Parsons all mistakenly understand a role to have a singular structural (...) definition which agents may then diverge from. Drawing on the work of Gross, Mason and McEachern we argue instead that if agents diverge in their conceptions of what role incumbents should do, there is no single role definition, but rather a range of diverse role-expectations. Acknowledging this can help us to understand variation in role behaviour, with different incumbents potentially being more exposed to some expectations than others. We argue that considering roles in this way can extend the ability of social scientists to identify robust social processes shaping role behaviour and decrease the extent to which they need to call on contingent factors in such explanations. (shrink)

Pragmatists embrace the concept of textuality but do not concede that textuality changes anything about how we interpret literature in specific social contexts.

Since its inception, roughly sixteen years ago, the theory of the contingent identity of mental-states and brain-states has been argued on many fronts. I want here to examine and to try to meet one in particular of the objections raised in connection with this theory. The objection has been stated with especial force by Peter Herbst.Let us then investigate a proposition that there is a particular mental entity which is contingently identical with a particular brain state. In order to be (...) able to test it, we must know which mental entity is supposed to be identical with what brain state. Therefore we need at least two clear and independent identifying references to serve as the basis of our proposition of identity. They must each be sufficient to individuate an entity, or else we cannot say what is identical with what, and they must be independent of each other, or else the identity proposition expressed in terms of them becomes tautologous. (shrink)

In this 1989 book Rorty argues that thinkers such as Nietzsche, Freud, and Wittgenstein have enabled societies to see themselves as historical contingencies, rather than as expressions of underlying, ahistorical human nature or as realizations of suprahistorical goals. This ironic perspective on the human condition is valuable on a private level, although it cannot advance the social or political goals of liberalism. In fact Rorty believes that it is literature not philosophy that can do this, by promoting a genuine sense (...) of human solidarity. A truly liberal culture, acutely aware of its own historical contingency, would fuse the private, individual freedom of the ironic, philosophical perspective with the public project of human solidarity as it is engendered through the insights and sensibilities of great writers. The book has a characteristically wide range of reference from philosophy through social theory to literary criticism. It confirms Rorty's status as a uniquely subtle theorist, whose writing will prove absorbing to academic and nonacademic readers alike. (shrink)

This essay develops our meta-logical interpretation of Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency by taking up two additional issues not fully addressed in our earlier efforts. The first issue concerns the relationship between Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency and his views on species and essentialism. The second issue concerns the relationship between Leibniz’s formal theory of contingency and the modal status of the actual world.