The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.

We argue that folk psychology and folk morality both develop from the same core conception of persons, namely a concept of a responsive intentional agent. Key features of this conception are evident in infancy and develop universally in the preschool years across cultures and languages. Even these early understandings develop, shaped and specified via processes of cognitive construction intertwined with cultural constructs of persons provided within interactive culturally constituted, communicative experiences of childhood. The result is culturally variable endpoints of social (...) cognitive development, that is, culturally variable folk psychologies and folk moralities. We underwrite this argument with data from studies of theory of mind understandings, moral judgments, person description and explanation, and autobiographical memory, research that spans from infancy to adulthood and includes a variety of cultural communities. (shrink)

The author of the article explores the views of Lithuanian–American thinker Thomas Kasulis on the interaction between emotions and ethical principles. This interaction is revealed in the contexts of the concepts of intimacy and integrity analysed by the philosopher. Intimacy is perceived as a framework of sociocultural structures of society, which determine the behavioural patterns and choices of individuals. In the ethical sphere, Kasulis attributes responsibility to integrity, which he links in his comparative analysis to Western and Eastern philosophies. (...) Another philosophical concept, namely intimacy, is associated by the philosopher with relationships between people and values revealed in them. In communication, values are expressed not only through language but also through emotions. Kasulis particularly emphasizes sympathy, which is inherent in the cultural orientation of intimacy. For this reason, the article also analyses the nature of sympathy and its relationship to love, compassion, favour and trust. The article is based on the assumption that in the hermeneutics of the texts of comparative philosophy, it is possible to find both differences and similarities in the ideas of heterogeneous civilisations, and that the emotional-value vision emerging in these contexts makes it possible to look differently at cultural phenomena that appear in everyday life. (shrink)

Beginning with a critique of Max Weber’s famous, but misleading distinction between an ‘ethics of intention’ and an ‘ethics of responsibility’, the article brings attention to the elucidating analysis of the concept of responsibility by the German philosopher Georg Picht. Originally a juristic term, responsibility was applied to eschatology and so became a fundamental ethical concept. By separating the concept from its theological background it remains a necessary idea for modern societies but increasingly loses its definition. The (...) concept suffers from overemphasising the autonomous subject, which is overburdened by the universality of responsibility. Therefore a ‘polis ethic’ is needed: not the isolated subject, but subjects in community are its authors. For Christians all human responsibility is preceded by God’s actions and held by God’s grace. (shrink)

edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.

The main argument of the paper is, that there are two menanigs of the concept of responsibility. On one hand there is the meaning bringing the responsibility together with the idea of imputable actions and on the other hand the concept of responsibility defined through the quality of warranty. The responsibility is thus seen as related to the human behaviour as well as to the kindred and mutual dependence, which are constitutive of human relationships. The author's (...) view is, that to shed lihgt on these different menanings makes the proper understanding of what it means to be responsible posssible. (shrink)

The concept of responsible leadership has garnered increased attention in recent years. Indeed, irresponsibility on the part of organizational leaders appears to represent an area of growing concern to the greater public. Accordingly, it is appropriate that increased scholarly attention be devoted to an understanding of this concept. But with that said, the purpose of this article is to identify three caveats about which researchers and practitioners should be concerned as work in this area proceeds. These caveats pertain to: (1) (...) definitional issues, (2) the importance of theory and research that is not ideologically driven or biased, and (3) the positioning of responsible leadership within the greater body of leadership theory and research. Additional concerns are considered including the measurement of responsible leadership and research strategies. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is an influential family of views in the ethics of self-defense and war: views that ground the agent’s liability to be attacked in self-defense in the agent’s moral responsibility for the threat posed (“Responsibility Views”). I critically examine the concept of responsibility employed by such views, by looking at potential connections with the contemporary literature on moral responsibility. I start by uncovering some of the key assumptions that Responsibility Views make (...) about the relevant concept of responsibility, and by scrutinizing those assumptions under the lens of more general theorizing about responsibility. I identify an important conflict that arises at that point. The problem is that the concept presupposed by Responsibility Views is in tension with the standard way of understanding the connection between the neutral and non-neutral forms of moral responsibility. I draw attention to a particular strategy that could be used to address this challenge, but I also identify some important obstacles that stand in the way. (shrink)

Abstract In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry (...) of the concept is required. As a second step, we analyze the concept of innovation which is self-evidently presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation. It becomes clear that innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. By challenging this narrow and uncritical concept of innovation, we contribute to a second round of theorizing about the concept and provide a research agenda for future research in order to enhance a less naïve concept of responsible innovation. (shrink)

In this article I examine the ethical concept of responsibility as presented by Emmanuel Levinas and Karol Wojtyła. I focus throughout on questions pertaining to the relations between identity and alterity and between heteronomy and autonomy. To do so involves looking at the contrary roles that these two authors give to selfhood and freedom when accounting for our sense of obligation and responsibility toward others and toward ourselves. I then put Levinas’s phenomenological account of responsibility into dialogue (...) with Wojtyła’s personalist account in an examination of the question of animal ethics. Specifically, I discuss the extent to which their ideas on our responsibilities toward others can be extended to the domain of non-human animals. (shrink)

Opening with Ford Motor Company as a case in point, this essay develops a broad and systematic approach to the field of business ethics. After an analysis of the form and content of the concept of responsibility, the author introduces the principle of moral projection as a device for relating ethics to corporate policy. Pitfalls and objections to this strategy are examined and some practical implications are then explored.The essay not only defends a proposition but exhibits a research style (...) and a research program. Philosophical ethics and organizational management are joined in the process. (shrink)

The acquisition of genetic information (GI) confronts both the affected individuals and healthcare providers with difficult, ambivalent decisions. Genetic responsibility (GR) has become a key concept in both ethical and socioempirical literature addressing how and by whom decision-making with respect to the morality of GI is approached. However, despite its prominence, the precise meaning of the concept of GR remains vague. Therefore, we conducted a systematic literature review on the usage of the concept of GR in qualitative, socioempirical studies, (...) to identify the main interpretations and to provide conceptual clarification. The review identified 75 studies with primarily an Anglo-American setting. The studies focused on several agents: the individual, the family, the parent, the healthcare professional, and the institution and refer to the concept of GR on the basis of either a rational/principle-oriented approach or an affective/relational approach. A subtype of the rational/principle-oriented approach is the reactive approach. The review shows how the concept of GR is useful for analyzing and theorizing about socioempirical findings within qualitative socioempirical studies and also reveals conceptual deficits in terms of insufficient theoretical accuracy and heterogeneity, and in the rarity of reflection on cultural variance. The vagueness and multiplicity of meanings for GR in socioempirical studies can be avoided by more normative-theoretical explication of the underlying premises. This would provide a higher degree of differentiation of empirical findings. Thereby, the complex findings associated with the individual and social implications of genetic testing in empirical studies can be better addressed from a theoretical point of view and can subsequently have a stronger impact on normative and policy debates. (shrink)

The Concept of Milieu in Environmental Ethics discusses how we can come together to address current environmental problems at the planetary level, such as climate change, biodiversity loss, transborder pollution and desertification. -/- The book recognises the embedded individual sociocultural and environmental contexts that impact our everyday choices. It asks, in this pluralism of worldviews, how can we build common ground to tackle environmental issues? What is our individual moral responsibility within the larger collaborative challenge? Through philosophical reasoning, this (...) book pragmatically addresses these questions and builds a framework to support sustainable ways of living. At the core of the book, it draws on the concept of milieu (fūdo) inspired by the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō, which captures how we act within and perceive our surroundings as a web of culturally, historically and geographically situated meanings and values. It argues that the milieu connects us as individuals with community, past and future history, and the natural world, providing us with common ground for global environmental ethics. -/- This book will be an engaging and interesting read for scholars, researchers and students in environmental ethics, philosophy and sustainability. (shrink)

The term of responsibility is ambiguous. In a general sense it means nothing more than answering questions about human behaviour (in Greek: logon didonai; in Latin: rationem reddere). In order to get a more precise sense of responsibility this article discusses concepts of responsibility, worked out by Albert Schweitzer, Hans Jonas, Richard Niebuhr and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The discussion is concentrated on two problems: (1) extensification of responsibility in accordance with the expansion of technological power; (2) limitation (...) and intensification of responsibility in accordance with human capability and readiness. The central question is that of the subject of responsibility: How becomes man, who abdicates responsibility, ‘the responsible self’ (Niebuhr)? Referring to this question the biblical language is of great importance as the word, which re-establishes communication between God and man. Responsibility in the biblical sense means the response to this word of God. Therein lies not only a radicalising and intensifying of responsibility, but also its enabling and limiting. (shrink)

Assessment of risk is one of the key issues in the field of responsible conduct of research which covers discourses of research ethics and research integrity. The principle of minimizing risks and balancing of risks and benefits is one of the main requirements of research ethics. In addition, the content of informed consent that is another fundamental principle of research ethics derives from the assessment of risks and benefits related to a particular research project. Risk assessment also plays a crucial (...) role in methodological design of the research project. This is an important point where research ethics and research integrity discourses overlap. Firstly, because the choice of a control group (e.g., placebo control) is a key ethical issue related to the protection of the research subjects’ interests. Secondly, because the quality of the research data, that is one of the key elements of research integrity, is closely connected to the choice of research methodology as well. The problem of biased interpretation or manipulation of risk related features of biomedical research should also be taken into account. Despite the importance of the concept of risk to the field of biomedical research, its relevance has not yet attracted a sufficient attention in the responsible conduct of research debate. (shrink)

This paper proposes a political concept of Responsible Innovation (RI). As a first step, we diagnose the RI discourse with a conceptual ambiguity, struggling to accommodate both private and public interests. To address this ambiguity, we distinguish between weak RI, which seeks to govern a techno-economic concept of innovation; and strong RI, which seeks to conceive a political concept of innovation beyond techno-economic ideology and practice. Secondly, we consult The Human Condition, in which Hannah Arendt articulates a threefold distinction between (...) the activities of labor, work, and action. Although Arendt does not explicitly address the topic of innovation, her equation of politics with the human capacity to “begin the unexpected” inspires a political concept of RI which fundamentally empowers the public sphere and drives radical novelty. Finally, we account for how this political concept of RI can be operationalized, advocating for its integration at both substantive and procedural level. (shrink)

Although seldom examined and not explained by Robert Brandom himself, the concept of responsibility is as important as the concept of inference for Brandom’s account of discursivity. Whereas ‘inference’ makes explicit the propositional content of concepts as the inferentially structured totality of their relations of material incompatibility, ‘responsibility’ makes explicit the normative force of these relations. ‘Responsibility’ thus becomes the paradigm of understanding normativity’s binding force – and my critical reading demonstrates that it fosters a moralizing, juridifying (...) and economizing understanding of normativity’s binding force. Furthermore, a diagnostic interpretation of Nietzsche’s genealogy of ‘responsibility’ reveals that Brandom’s concept of ‘responsibility’ is not an exception but exemplary for how ‘responsibility’ is used in philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to catch up with a conjecture designated by the term ‘responsive self-preservation’. This term appears neither strikingly beautiful nor intuitively understandable. Obviously it is a convoluted terminus technicus in need of conceptual clarification. The reasons for introducing it should therefore be good. That this is the case cannot be guaranteed from the outset. What can be offered here is a substitution of good reasons with high ambitions: the concept of ‘responsive self-preservation’ is designed to (...) illuminate the conditio humana. In all brevity the claim is that human beings are responsive beings. This means that they do not just exist. In order to do so, they must respond to their existence. On the one hand the inner drive and utmost aspiration in human responsiveness therefore lies in self-preservation. On the other hand self-preservation is thoroughly transformed when embedded into human responsiveness. The article will thus use the concept of responsiveness and the concept of self-preservation to mutually clarify each other – in order to open the possibilities and avoid the pitfalls in each of them. In doing so, it aspires to intervene in contemporary philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

In part one I review the literature, exposing some of the ambiguities, contradictions, and antinomies involved in the notion of communication. The literature presents us with two rather contradictory notions of communication: one rhetorical, the other responsible. Disparity between the two may be seen to jeopardize a new moral mandate to corporate business. In part two I develop more explicitly the models of rhetorical and responsible communication, locating the issue at the center of a solution to the problem of collective (...) responsibility. A proper exercise of corporate moral responsibility, I argue, is compatible only with a model of responsible communication. I conclude by challenging top management to strive toward a goal of responsible communication at all levels in their respective corporate institutions. (shrink)

Fabian Wendt argues that political realism is not capable of explaining how the state’s moral right to rule over its subjects is generated. I believe that Wendt’s criticism is not sound because his position relies on the false implicit assumption that realism and moralism ask the same philosophical questions on state authority. I contend that it is fallacious to evaluate the realist account of legitimacy by the standards of moralism, and vice versa, as these two accounts arrive at different (...) class='Hi'>conceptions of legitimacy by raising different sets of philosophical questions. The two sets of philosophical questions are not reducible to each other. The realist account of legitimacy does not aim to explain what the moralist account of legitimacy aims to explain. (shrink)

While the concept of sin plays a pivotal role in the ethico-religious philosophies of Kierkegaard and Kant, both struggle to provide an adequate account of the nature of sin. Kant’s ethical interpretation improves signifi cantly on the traditional theological account by introducing the notion of individual responsibility, but it ultimately fails to provide an explanation of the psychological mechanisms of the fall. Kierkegaard tries to unite the Kantian conception of responsibility with an essentially Hegelian interpretation of the fall, (...) using the concept of anxiety as the glue. Contrary to usual opinion, it is argued here that far from resolving the difficulties of the Kantian account, Kierkegaard’s interpretation only serves to multiply them. But it is also shown that Kierkegaard’s analysis of the phenomenon that he calls “anxiety about sin” does provide the materials for an alternative interpretation of the origin of moral evil in man. (shrink)

Educational Theory, Volume 72, Issue 1, Page 65-83, February 2022.

ABSTRACTAs the window of opportunity to limit global average warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels is narrowing, the impacts of climate change are already being experienced around the world. No longer of merely theoretical interest, the issue of ‘loss and damage’ has become central to climate politics. Against this backdrop, old concepts of responsibility and wrongful harm are being revisited. Boran proposed moving away from an interactional conception of harm to an architectural one. The former supports the widely (...) shared view that wrongful harm results from actions. The latter turns the spotlight on complexity and social practices. In response to critical appraisals, this short essay revisits key components of an architectural conception of harm. An architectural approach is not an analytic tool to answer the epistemic challenges in singling out those who are causally responsible as a discrete problem. It is an encompassing theoretical framework drawing a picture of a world where vulnerability is inseparably tied to a complex web of social, political, and institutional interrelations. Wrongful harm resulting from climate impacts is inextricable from the constructed environment and everyday practices forming a complex web of social and political interconnections. (shrink)

I related the following story to my large undergraduate class: “Johnny Jones was born with an impulsive temperament. On the way home one day he found a gun that had apparently been thrown away. He then went to rob a bank. The bank had just hired a security guard for protection. When Johnny attempted the robbery he was confronted by the guard and fatally shot him.” I then asked the students in the class to select one of the following.

Extinction is a concept of rapidly growing importance, with the world currently in the sixth mass extinction event and a biodiversity crisis. However, the concept of extinction has itself received surprisingly little attention from philosophers. I will first argue that in practice there is no single unified concept of extinction, but instead that its usage divides between descriptive, epistemic, and declarative concepts. I will then consider the epistemic challenges that arise in ascertaining whether a species has gone extinct, and how (...) these lead to serious limitations on responsibility and accountability for preventing extinctions. I will propose two conceptual engineering changes to our understanding of extinction. Firstly, to use twin epistemic concepts of extinction, corresponding to high and low epistemic demands. Secondly, to explicitly recognize that in many contexts extinction is a thick concept that contains an evaluative component, which therefore motivates explicit ethical considerations such as the use of precautionary principles. (shrink)

Nichols and Bruno claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide new empirical evidence suggesting (...) that the folk do not consider psychological continuity to be necessary for an individual to be categorized as a person or for ascribing identity over time and through transformations. In this, we assume, along with Nichols and Bruno, that folk judgments about identity can be read off the use of proper names. Furthermore, we raise some doubts about the ability of current experimental designs to adequately distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity jud.. (shrink)

Eli Feiring has developed a concept of forward-looking responsibility in healthcare. On this account, what matters morally in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources is not people's past behaviours but rather their commitment to take on lifestyles that will increase the benefit acquired from received treatment. According to Feiring, this is to be preferred over the backward-looking concept of responsibility often associated with luck egalitarianism. The article critically scrutinises Feiring's position. It begins by spelling out the wider implications (...) of Feiring's view. Against this background, it shows that (i) Feiring's distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility is incompatible with the Scanlonian notion of responsibility she apparently endorses; (ii) her favoured forward-looking notion of responsibility is subject to the objections levelled against the luck egalitarian view (whatever the strength of such objections). (shrink)

Looking at responsibility within a Lévinasian sense, human beings are firstly seen not in the philosophically traditional sense, of being egocentric, but rather seen as ethical subjects based on “the other” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). The purpose of this paper is to examine the notion of responsibility as Lévinas conceptualized in the idea that human beings are responsible for not only themselves but for others. Lévinas within “Ethics as First Philosophy” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989) states that before all (...) other forms of being in the world there must be responsibility to the Other (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). Lévinas defines this to mean that before freedom of the subject, and their subjectivity, before self-consciousness, before the consciousness of consciousness, before being, and before relativity there is “responsibility for the Other pre-exists any self-consciousness” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75). Perhaps, Lévinas is saying that a human beings obligation comes before all of what follows from our being in this world, our obligation to the Other beginning with the “face to face” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75), interaction, which is our first and foremost responsibility, the responsibility to the Other. And to be ethical beings who begin with responsibility we rely on the fundamental relationship of others. This notion of responsibility appears when we encounter, in the face-to-face interaction, the unknowable other. However, does this responsibility extend to more than two individuals and to those outside our immediate proximity? For example, Lévinas states that it is the “face to face” notion of seeing one in distress, yet what if it is a group of people, and what if they are not in close proximity but on the other side of the world? What if they are on the other side of a screen that can also be artificial intelligence in our modern era. Are we still responsible? And if we are responsible, how does Lévinas’s concept of responsibility fit into that situation or is it limited? I want to examine responsibility in terms of proximity through a Lévinasian ethical lens and plurality, defined as more than two individuals, by questioning responsibility in terms of relationality, and vulnerability. I will be looking mainly at five authors Emmanuel Lévinas, Ernst Van Alphen, Judith Butler, Kevin Quashi, and Lisa Guenther, to answer the question of whether Lévinas’s definition of responsibility includes proximity, and plurality. (shrink)

The dissertation develops a conception of action based on the concept of practical task-responsibility rather than on the concept of intention. It answers two problems. First, it grounds the distinction between an action and a mere happening, thus meeting Wittgenstein's challenge to explain what is the difference between an agent's raising her arm and her arm rising? Second, it grounds the distinction between acting for a reason and acting while merely having a reason, thus meeting Davidson's challenge to give (...) an account of the explanatory force of reasons. ;One source of resistance to an account of action in terms of normative expectations rather than in terms of intentions comes from explanatory individualism. The explanatory individualist argues that it is ultimately the intentional attitudes of the agent rather than normative expectations of other people that are relevant to the way in which we explain one another's actions, and that they ought to figure in the account of the nature of action. I defend explanatory nonindividualism, according to which we sometimes act on our own intentions and desires but sometimes on the normative expectations and desires of others . Explanatory nonindividualism is fortified by a selectional account of the explanatory force of reasons. I demonstrate that Davidson's challenge can be met by identifying reasons with selectional criteria rather than with causes. ;In response to Wittgenstein's challenge, I propose that we understand what it is to be an action not in terms of a performance being intentional under a description, but in terms of it being reasonable to expect a performance of the agent under some description. Only one concept of reasonableness is necessary to make the distinction between actions and mere happenings, and I explicate that concept. In addition to accounting for actions that are intentional under some description, the account also captures cases that are not so straightforwardly captured by that criterion . Moreover, cases of so-called basic wayward causal chains are excluded from qualifying as actions. (shrink)

The conception of responsibility for beliefs typically assumed in the literature mirrors the practices ofaccountabilityfor actions. In this paper, I argue that this trend leaves a part of what it is to be responsible unduly neglected, namely the practices ofattributability.After offering a diagnosis for this neglect, I bring these practices into focus and develop a virtue-theoretic framework to vindicate them. I then investigate the specificity of the belief case and conclude by resisting two challenges, namely that attributability cannot amount (...) to genuine responsibility and that it can be reduced to a sort of accountability. (shrink)

During their educational life, medical students encounter several challenges, the origins and causes of which vary. This paper explores and attempts to scrutinize two of these challenges, before eventually introducing the concept of responsibility. First, this paper describes the general characteristics of medical schools, medical students, and medical education. Second, two different ethical challenges that medical students confront are then delineated: the anxiety of continuously questioning ‘while being trained, do I cause patients to receive suboptimal health care?’ and occasionally (...) feeling obligated, consequently, to breach the ethical boundaries to practice procedures on patients. Finally, the faculty of responsibility and its components are introduced and discussed as a model that can overcome these ethical challenges. (shrink)

Numa sociedade democrática, as regras sociais são impostas a cada um por todos. Como “recebedores” de tais regras, tendemos a pensar que elas deviam ser designadas para engendrar a melhor distribuição possível de bens e males ou qualidade de vida. Enquanto autores das regras, tendemos a pensar que os malefícios por nós impostos através de tais regras têm maior peso moral que os danos que nós meramente deixamos de evitar ou mitigar. Embora as atuais teorias sejam dominadas pela primeira perspectiva, (...) uma concepção adequada da justiça exige um balanceamento de ambas tendências. O tema da equidade na saúde é bem apropriado para mostrar como concepções da justiça puramente dirigidas aos recebedores estão fadadas ao fracasso e como esboçar uma alternativa mais promissora. (shrink)

Background Concepts of health have been widely discussed in the philosophy and ethics of medicine. Parallel to these theoretical debates, numerous empirical research projects have focused on subjective concepts of health and shown their significance for individuals and society at various levels. Only a few studies have so far investigated the concepts of health of non-professionals and professionals involved in long-term home care and discussed these empirical perspectives regarding moral responsibilities. Objectives To identify the subjective concepts of the health of (...) non-professionals (care recipients, informal caregivers) and professionals (registered nurses) involved in long-term home care and to discuss them against the background of existing normative guidelines addressing non-professionals and professionals’ responsibilities and rights concerning health. Research design A qualitative design was chosen to explore subjective concepts of health. Data were collected by semi-structured interviews; content analysis was applied according to Mayring. Participants and research context Twenty-eight interviews were conducted with non-professionals and professionals in long-term home care arrangements in Northern Germany. Ethical considerations Ethics approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board at the University Medicine Greifswald (BB123/16). Findings Non-professionals and professionals consider health as a capability that enables them to participate in social activities and live their own lives according to their preferences. The former regard health particularly as a feeling and an attitude, the latter as the absence of disease with a focus on mental and emotional well-being. Both groups highlight the unsurpassable value of health and the personal responsibility for it. Discussion Normative guidelines applicable to practice in long-term home care discuss responsibilities and rights unevenly and raise several problems regarding non-professionals and professionals’ subjective concepts of health. Conclusion Individuals’ concepts of health are relevant for the subsequent interpretation of rights and responsibilities and should, thus, be reflected upon to address health-related needs effectively. (shrink)

Does a political conception of human rights dictate a particular view of corporate human rights obligations? The U.N. “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights hold that corporations have only a responsibility to respect human rights. Some critics have argued that corporations should be responsible for a wider range of human rights obligations, beyond merely an obligation to respect such rights. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Framework relied on a political conception (...) of human rights, and this is what led to limiting corporate obligations to mere respect for human rights. In this paper, I explore and critically assess this general claim about political conceptions of human rights. This involves distinguishing different types of political conceptions of human rights, as well as specifying what makes a theory of human rights a “political conception.” In light of this clarificatory discussion, I argue that the general thesis is false; the mere fact that a theory offers a political conception of human rights does not necessarily entail any certain range of corporate human rights obligations. Finally, I identify some of the other aspects of a theory of human rights that do affect the range of corporate obligations it will prescribe. (shrink)

본 논문은 1인칭 외부의 ‘복수 주체(multiple subjects)’가 윤리적 주체로서 성립될 수 있는가하는 문제를 ‘책임’ 개념을 중심으로 살펴본다. 통상 윤리적 책임의 귀속여부는 분명한 행위자를 요구하기에, 윤리학은 1인칭을 전제로 전개된다. 그러나 독립적이고 자율적인 개인만을 전제하는 강한 1인칭의 윤리학에서 역사적 부당행위에 대한 집단 사죄와 같은 문제는 미답 상태로 남겨진다. 이러한 문제에서 보다 적극적으로 책임질 수 있는 윤리적 주체를 사유한 것이 공동체주의자로 꼽히는 알레스데어 매킨타이어(A. MacIntyre)와 마이클 샌델(M. Sandel)이었다. 이들이 제시하는 ‘서사적 자아관’에서 개인은 언제나 타자의 이야기의 부분으로 들어가고, 타자 역시 나의 이야기의 한 부분으로 (...) 개입해 들어온다. 때문에 서사적 자아관은 상호 긴밀하게 결부되어 있는 관계성과 그로부터 발생하는 책임의 문제를 강조한다. 동일한 관심사에서 도나 해러웨이(D. Haraway)는 복수의 행위자들이 함께 사는 문제는 전적인 책임의 문제임을 환기시킨다. 그러나 이러한 복수 주체라는 토대에서, ‘설명책임(accountability)’을 동일하게 중시하면서도, 매킨타이어에게 중시되는 것이 상호간에 ‘이해가능성(intelligibility)’을 가능하게 하는 종착지로서의 ‘설명책임’이라면, 해러웨이에게 ‘설명책임’은 그로부터 다시 ‘응답책임(responsibility)’로 나아가야 하는 출발점으로 다뤄진다. 해러웨이에게 공동의 운명에 처해있는 복수의 주체란 ‘독립적이고 자율적인 개인’들로 구성된 것이 결코 아니다. 공동의 행위자들은 언제나 불균등하고 비동등한 입장에서 상호결부되어 있다. 때문에 불균등한 관계 속에서 행위자들간에 지속적인 응답의 노력이 수행되지 않는다면, ‘이해가능성’ 만으로 공동의 운명을 꾸려나갈 책임은 온전히 성취될 수 없다. 강한 1인칭의 관점에서 벗어나 복수의 주체를 윤리적 주체로 상정함에도 불구하고, 매킨타이어의 서사적 자아관이 궁극적으로 ‘함께 사는 문제’에 대한 실제적인 답변을 제출하지 못했던 것은, 이러한 불균등한 행위자들의 입장에 대한 고찰이 결여되어있었기 때문이라는 것이 이하 논의의 주장이다. 그로써 우리는 해러웨이의 주장을 따라 공동의 행위자들이 함께 사는 문제에서 어떻게 책임이 사유되고, 수행될 수 있는지 살펴본다. (shrink)