Many of the contemporary disagreements regarding privacy are conceptual in nature. They concern the meaning or definition of privacy and the analytic basis of distinguishing privacy rights from other kinds of rights recognized within moral, political, or legal theories. The two main alternatives within this debate include reductionist views, which seek a narrow account of the kinds of invasions or intrusions distinctly involving privacy losses, and anti-reductionist theories, which treat a much broader array of interferences with a person as separate (...) and irreducible kinds of privacy invasions. Other theorists have expressed doubts about the prospects for achieving greater analytical precision even within a fairly expansive anti-reductionist approach. However, a reductionist privacy definition is defended in this article, and its primary theoretical virtues are its ability to unify and explain the insights of several competing definitions and its role in developing an account of privacy rights that is both internally coherent and consistent with a plausible understanding of the theoretical basis for a number of related rights. (shrink)

Construal-level theory emphasizes that representing events at greater spatial, temporal, social, or hypothetical distance results in processing information at high construal levels (more conceptual, abstract). We posit that psychological distance and construal level are somewhat separable constructs, and can have different effects on emotion, and therefore, emotion regulation. We argue that psychological distance influences emotional appraisal, such that increasing distance results in lower emotion intensity, which can be leveraged to down-regulate emotions. However, we consider construal level a mindset, which can (...) occur with either high or low psychological distance. Furthermore, we argue that compared with psychological distance, construal level has a more nuanced relationship with emotion, and changing construal level for the purpose of changing emotion also requires considering the construal level of one's emotion-regulation goals. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 215 Seiten: 193-234.

This handbook gives an overview of cognition and emotion research. It provides readers with the historical background and the philosophical arguments on the debate, before moving on to outline the general aspects of various research traditions. Split into comprehensive sections, it discusses cognitive processes, including memory, decision-making, and reasoning, and also emotions such as anger, anxiety, sadness, and jealousy. With contributions from leading researchers in the subject, this volume examines the main theories, and also the application of these to (...) other areas of psychology. (shrink)

Are there common mechanisms that apply across different therapies that might explain their effectiveness? Many psychologists, psychotherapists and counsellors, whether clinicians or researchers, now recognize that one such key mechanism involves the transformation of meaning in the process of therapy. The purpose of this book is to show how the transformation of meaning is related to therapeutic change. Change in therapy can and should occur at a number of levels for improvement to be maintained, whether in behavior therapy, cognitive (...) therapy or psychoanalytic therapy. The leading scientists and practitioners who have contributed to this book approach therapy from very different perspectives, but they together help to fashion a common framework for understanding the role of meaning in therapeutic change. (shrink)

An introduction to a special interdisciplinary issue on time consciousness of The Journal of Consciousness Studies. I briefly describe the importance of time for thinking about consciousness, including some of the relevant issues in the philosophy of time. Then I introduce the papers in the volume.

As a growing area of research, the philosophy of time is increasingly relevant to different areas of philosophy and even other disciplines. This book describes and evaluates the most important debates in philosophy of time, under several subject areas: metaphysics, epistemology, physics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, rationality, and art. -/- Questions this book investigates include: Can we know what time really is? Is time possible, especially given modern physics? Must there be time because we cannot (...) think without it? What do we experience of time? How might philosophy of time be relevant to understanding the mind-body relationship or evidence in cognitive science? Can the philosophy of time help us understand biases toward the future and the fear of death? How is time relevant to art – and is art relevant to philosophical debates about time? Finally, what exactly could time travel be? And could time travel satisfy emotions such as nostalgia and regret? -/- Through asking such questions, and showing how they might be best answered, the book demonstrates the importance philosophy of time has in contemporary thought. Each of the book’s 10 chapters begins with a helpful introduction and ends with study questions and an annotated list of further readings. This and a comprehensive bibliography at the end of the book prepare the reader to go further in their study of the philosophy of time. (shrink)

Persons infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus often experience intermittent life-threatening infections, a progressive decrease in cognitive abilities, and a loss of capacity to communicate their wishes to their family and medical care providers. Accordingly, AIDS patients are among those most likely to benefit from the increased availability of legally recognized forms of advance care planning. Although the three countries examined in this article differ greatly in the prevalence of HIV infection, the legal status of advance directives, and in (...) the attitudes toward their use, a collection of case studies is used to demonstrate that an ability to address the specific needs, values and goals of individual patients is promoted by the availability of a variety of options for implementing advance directives or health care proxies. The conclusion of the analysis is that the best option in a specific context will depend upon differences in individual values and medical objectives of the sort discussed in the case studies. Das mit der HIV-Infektion verbundene Krankheitsbild ist durch wechselnde lebensbedrohliche Infektionen und den fortschreitenden Verfall kognitiver Fähigkeiten gekennzeichnet. Es führt zudem häufig zum Verlust der Möglichkeit, Behandlungswünsche gegenüber Ärzten und Angehörigen zu äußern. Deshalb gehören besonders AIDS-Patienten zu denjenigen, die von rechtlich anerkannten vorsorglichen Patientenverfügungen profitieren werden.In diesem Artikel werden drei Länder betrachtet, die sich hinsichtlich der Häufigkeit des Auftretens der HIV-Infektion sowie des rechtlichen Status von und der Einstellung zu Patientenverfügungen erheblich unterscheiden. Fallstudien belegen allerdings, daß nicht allein die kulturellen und sozialen Bedingungen für die jeweils beste Form der Patientenverfügung ausschlaggebend sind. Voraussetzung für die Möglichkeit, den Bedingungen, Wert- und Zielvorstellungen des individuellen Patienten zu entsprechen, ist auf jeden Fall die Verfügbarkeit unterschiedlicher Formen von Patienten- und Betreuungsverfügungen. Auch innerhalb eines Kulturkreises müssen daher verschiedene Formen vorsorglicher Willensäußerungen des Patienten rechtlich anerkannt werden. Welche Art von Verfügung jeweils die beste Option darstellt, ist dabei abhängig von medizinischen Bedingungen und persönlichen Wertvorstellungen, wie sie in den Fallstudien diskutiert werden. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of the soul’s cognitive powers of sense perception and discursive thought, with particular reference to the treatises 3. 6 [26], 4. 4 [28] and 5. 3 [49] of the Enneads . Part 1 of the paper discusses Plotinus’ direct realism in perception. Parts 2 and 3 focus on Plotinus’ account of knowledge in Enneads 5. 3 [49] 2–3. Plotinus there argues that we make judgements regarding how the external world is by means (...) of discursive reasoning. This latter claim, however, is in tension with what Plotinus argues elsewhere regarding our perceptual apprehension of the external world (3. 6 [26] 1; 4. 4 [28] 23). This puzzle is addressed in Part 3 of the paper, which investigates Plotinus’ view that there exist some sense perceptions of which we are unaware. Finally, Part 4 looks at Plotinus’ understanding of Plato’s famous wax block analogy, in 5. 3 (49). The overall conclusion of the paper is that Plotinus’ account of knowledge is radically different from that of the Cartesian tradition. (shrink)

The first part of this paper surveys types of olfactory art as well as some of the philosophical denials that odors and the sense of smell can be used for serious art making, raising the paradox that olfactory art seems actual, but the mainstream philosophical tradition has declared that one cannot make genuine artworks from odors. The second and third part of the paper address the primary argument against possibility of an olfactory aesthetics, namely, the claim that the human sense (...) of smell does not have sufficient cognitive capacity to support rational aesthetic discussion and judgment. The second part (The intuitive case for smell’s cognitive powers) examines and answers intuitive philosophical arguments against smell’s cognitive potential and the third part (The empirical case for the cognitive capacity of smell) first surveys evidence from the sciences that could be interpreted as supporting the negative position, before marshalling other empirical evidence in favor of smell’s cognitive powers. I conclude that on balance contemporary neuroscience and psychology support the view that the human sense of smell has the cognitive capacity to sustain rational aesthetic discussion and judgment. (shrink)

I argue that examining the explanatory power of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) offers a fruitful approach to the problem of cognitive system demarcation. Although in the discussions on HEC it has become common to refer to considerations of explanatory power as a means for assessing the plausibility of the extended cognition approach, to date no satisfying account of explanatory power has been presented in the literature. I suggest that the currently most prominent theory of explanation in the (...) special sciences, James Woodward’s contrastive-counterfactual theory, and an account of explanatory virtues building on that theory can be used to develop a systematic picture of cognitive system demarcation in the psychological sciences. A major difference between my differential influence (DI) account and most other theories of cognitive extension is the cognitive systems pluralism implied by my approach. By examining the explanatory power of competing traditions in psychological memory research, I conclude that internalist and externalist classificatory strategies are characterized by different profiles of explanatory virtues and should often be considered as complementary rather than competing approaches. This suggests a deflationary interpretation of HEC. (shrink)

To view language as a cultural tool challenges much of what claims to be linguistic science while opening up a new people-centred linguistics. On this view, how we speak, think and act depends on, not just brains, but also cultural traditions. Yet, Everett is conservative: like others trained in distributional analysis, he reifies ‘words’. Though rejecting inner languages and grammatical universals, he ascribes mental reality to a lexicon. Reliant as he is on transcriptions, he takes the cognitivist view that brains (...) represent word-forms. By contrast, in radical embodied cognitive theory, bodily dynamics themselves act as cues to meaning. Linguistic exostructures resemble tools that constrain how people concert acting-perceiving bodies. The result is unending renewal of verbal structures: like artefacts and institutions, they function to sustain a species-specific cultural ecology. As Ross argues, ecological extensions make human cognition hypersocial. When we link verbal patterns with lived experience, we communicate and cognise by fitting action/perception to cultural practices that anchor human meaning making. (shrink)

Analyzes Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect and sensation.

Two studies explored individual differences in appraisal of minor, potentially stressful events. Previous research on appraisal has focused on one or two appraisal dimensions within specific situations rather than on the full range of appraisals or on the stability of appraisal across situations. Goals of the present studies were: (1) to explore stability of individual differences in appraisal across situations; (2) to identify individual differences in general appraisal styles; and (3) to examine how appraisal styles are related to personality constructs. (...) Appraisal was moderately stable across situations and individual differences in appraisal style were related to relevant personality constructs. Primary threat appraisals and secondary appraisals of blame and manageability emerged as particularly important in distinguishing the appraisal styles. Implications of the results for the development of psychopathology are considered. (shrink)

Riemer’s recent paper on the perception of time discusses a neglected yet important topic in the psychological literature: the consequences for psychology (and psychophysics) from the ‘anisotropy’ of time. The paper presents an argument that there are unique kinds of challenges for psychophysics from such temporal anisotropy: (a) Challenges because the psychological experience of time has temporal anisotropy and the physical concept of time does not have temporal anisotropy. (b) Challenges for experimental research which are unique to temporal anisotropy. -/- (...) Although it is important to consider temporal anisotropy, I think there are reasons to deny the force of both kinds of challenges. (shrink)

This edited collection presents the latest cutting-edge research in the philosophy and cognitive science of temporal illusions. Illusion and error have long been important points of entry for both philosophical and psychological approaches to understanding the mind. Temporal illusions, specifically, concern a fundamental feature of lived experience, temporality, and its relation to a fundamental feature of the world, time, thus providing invaluable insight into investigations of the mind and its relationship with the world. The existence of temporal illusions crucially (...) challenges the naïve assumption that we can simply infer the temporal nature of the world from experience. This anthology gathers eighteen original papers from current leading researchers in this subject, covering four broad and interdisciplinary topics: illusions of temporal passage, illusions and duration, illusions of temporal order and simultaneity, and the relationship between temporal illusions and the cognitive representation of time. (shrink)

Cognitive architectures, like programming languages, make commitments only at the implementation level and have limited explanatory power. Their universality implies that it is hard, if not impossible, to justify them in detail from finite quantities of data. It is more fruitful to focus on particular tasks such as language understanding and propose testable theories at the computational and algorithmic levels.

Previous studies of the history of optics reveal that the confrontation between the emission theory of light and the undulatory theory of light in Britain occupied a considerable period during the early nineteenth century. After the majority of British physicists accepted the undulatory theory in the mid-1830s a few emissionists in Britain did not immediately surrender. They continued to fight a rear-guard action against the undulatory theory, hoping that someday they could reinstate their theory.’ The longevity of the confrontation between (...) the emission and the undulatory theory is consistent with recent philosophical and sociological accounts of science, which expect scientific controversy to last a considerable time. Lakatos’s philosophical account, for example, holds that a degenerating theory does not disappear immediately and may revive at any time through a burst of ‘heuristic power’. But this account only allows one universal standard-the verification of excess empirical content-as the basis for both the generation and the closure of scientific controversies.’ On the other hand, sociological accounts such as actor-network theory have also done much to dispel the impression that rapid closure is inevitable in scientific controversies. But perhaps they risk a new orthodoxy: that controversy itself is inevitable. (shrink)

Eating disorders (EDs) are characterized by marked cognitive distortions and maladaptive schemas. Cognitive models of EDs highlight the direct impact of cognitive dysfunctions on eating-related disturbances, insofar as specific cognitive contents such as thoughts about diet rules and food or loss of control may trigger disturbed eating behavior. Moreover, early maladaptive schemas that reflect perfectionist standards and relate to achievement and performance seem to be associated with disturbed eating, e.g. via their impact on situation-specific appraisals. However, (...) so far, no study has investigated these assumptions. Hence, the present study sought to demonstrate whether and how cognitive content exerts an impact on eating behavior in daily life, and whether maladaptive core schemas impact the occurrence of binge eating via dysfunctional ED cognitions in eating-related contexts. N = 29 females with Bulimia Nervosa (BN), n = 31 females with Binge Eating Disorder (BED) and n = 30 female controls without EDs (NC) participated in the study. All participants received a handheld computer for a 48-hour period to capture antecedents of disturbed eating behavior in daily life. Event-sampling (meals, binge eating, purging, stressful situations) and signal-sampling (five times a day) methods were applied. EMA included a short questionnaire to assess dysfunctional cognitions and level of craving and to capture information about situational contexts. Early maladaptive schemas were assessed using a short version of the Young Schema Questionnaire at baseline. The main results showed specific patterns of dysfunctional eating-related cognitions for BED and BN. Binge eating was predicted by thoughts about loss of control (positively) and dietary restraint (negatively). For meal situations, no significant differences between the two ED groups emerged. All three domains exerted indirect effects on craving via thoughts about ‘eating/loss of control’, whereas neither a direct nor an indirect effect emerged regarding thoughts about ‘dietary restraint’. These results fit well with previous studies and support cognitive models of EDs; schema therapeutic approaches may be a valuable contribution to enhance treatment of EDs. Further studies should explore whether the findings from emerging adulthood can be generalized to younger age groups. (shrink)

Implicit in the value sensitive design (VSD) approach is a concern for understanding, and where possible, disrupting problematic power relationships. Yet an awareness of the issues and ethics of power relations is a pre-requisite for such a concern to bear fruit. This article provides some insight into the issues, and through a case study of technology design to support care arrangements for age-related cognitive decline, illustrates how finding a satisfactory resolution can be particularly troublesome.

This response discusses the experiment reported in Krahmer et al.’s Letter to the Editor of Cognitive Science. We observe that their results do not tell us whether the Incremental Algorithm is better or worse than its competitors, and we speculate about implications for reference in complex domains, and for learning from ‘‘normal” (i.e., non-semantically-balanced) corpora.

Although the literature has focused on individual differences in authenticity, recent findings suggest that authenticity is sensitive to context; that is, it is also a state. We extended this perspective by examining whether incidental affect influences authenticity. In three experiments, participants felt more authentic when in a relatively positive than negative mood. The causal role of affect in authenticity was consistent across a diverse set of mood inductions, including explicit (Experiments 1 and 3) and implicit (Experiment 2) methods. The link (...) between incidental affect and state authenticity was not moderated by ability to down-regulate negative affect (Experiments 1 and 3) nor was it explained by negative mood increasing private self-consciousness or decreasing access to the self system (Experiment 3). The results indicate that mood is used as information to assess one's sense of authenticity. (shrink)

Previous accounts of hedges assume that they cause language to become vague or fuzzy ; however, hedges can actually sharpen numerical concepts by giving explicit information about approximation, especially where bare numbers appear misleadingly round or precise. They can also tell hearers about the direction of approximation. This article provides a first empirical account of interactions between hedging and rounding in numerical expressions. We demonstrate that hedges occur more commonly with round numbers than with non-round ones. However, we also provide (...) evidence from user studies that in the absence of hedges, readers interpret round numbers as approximations and non-round ones as precise; and that placing a hedge before a round number has no effect on its interpretation, whereas placing it before a non-round number shifts people’s interpretations from precise towards approximate. We attempt to explain this conundrum. (shrink)

Computational cognitive models hypothesize internal mental processes of human cognitive activities and express such activities by computer programs Such computational models often consist of many components and aspects Claims are often made that certain aspects of the models play a key role in modeling but such claims are sometimes not well justi ed or explored In this paper we rst review some fundamental distinctions and issues in computational modeling We then discuss in principle systematic ways of identifying the (...) source of power in the models.. (shrink)

Argues that Searle is confused, and underestimates computers. Weak.

Traditional approaches to modeling cognitive systems are computational, based on utilizing the standard tools and concepts of the theory of computation. More recently, a number of philosophers have argued that cognition is too subtle or complex for these tools to handle. These philosophers propose an alternative based on dynamical systems theory. Proponents of this view characterize dynamical systems as (i) utilizing continuous rather than discrete mathematics, and, as a result, (ii) being computationally more powerful than traditional computational automata. Indeed, (...) the logical possibility of such super-powerful systems has been demonstrated in the form of analog artificial neural networks. In this paper I consider three arguments against the nomological possibility of these automata. While the first two arguments fail, the third succeeds. In particular, the presence of noise reduces the computational power of analog networks to that of traditional computational automata, and noise is a pervasive feature of information processing in biological systems. Consequently, as an empirical thesis, the proposed dynamical alternative is under-motivated: What is required is an account of how continuously valued systems could be realized in physical systems despite the ubiquity of noise. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is (...) that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues. (shrink)

The article proposes a universal dual-axis intelligent systems assessment scale. The scale considers the properties of intelligent systems within the environmental context, which develops over time. In contrast to the frequent consideration of the “mind” of artificial intelligent systems on a scale from “weak” to “strong”, we highlight the modulating influences of anticipatory ability on their “brute force”. In addition, the complexity, the ”weight“ of the cognitive task and the ability to critically assess it beforehand determine the actual set (...) of cognitive tools, the use of which provides the best result in these conditions. In fact, the presence of ”common sense“ options is what connects the ability to solve a problem with the correct use of such an ability itself. The degree of ”correctness“ and ”adequacy“ is determined by the combination of a suitable solution with the temporal characteristics of the event, phenomenon, object or subject under study. The proposed approach can be applied in the evaluation of various intelligent agents in different contexts including AI and humans performing complex domain-specific tasks with high uncertainty. (shrink)

The contribution examines the aesthetic aspect of cognition in Kant by exploring the central function of the power of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) in Kant’s critical epistemology, first featured in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781; 1787) and revisited in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). First, the focus will be on the relationship between the power of the imagination and the two main sources of (theoretical) cognition in Kant, viz., sensibility and the understanding. Second, special attention will be (...) devoted to the distinction between schema and symbol, as alternative products of the power of the imagination in the service of rendering discursive concepts intuitive – with schemata serving to make sensible the concepts of the understanding (Verstand) and symbols suited to provide intuitional counterparts to the concepts of reason (Vernunft). (shrink)

It is generally assumed that the debate between theory‐theory and simulation theory is an empirical one, but this view of the structure of the debate is misleading. It is an a priori truth that theory‐theory is mistaken and equally a priori that simulation in one sense (here labelled ‘co‐cognition’) is central in thinking about the thoughts of others. Given this, it is a further question how our co‐cognitive powers are realized in sub‐personal machinery. Here simulation in quite another (...) sense (that involving such ideas as ‘pretend states’ and ‘off‐line’ mental processes) may provide one possible answer. (shrink)

The phenomenon of resonance is central in the contemporary literature on well-being. Many philosophers accept the Resonance Constraint: if something is good for a person, it must resonate with her. Failing to meet this constraint is often thought to be a forceful blow to a theory of well-being. It is widely assumed that resonance must be motivational. I call attention to and argue for an underexplored aspect of resonance, namely cognitive resonance. I provide arguments for Belief-Resonance, the claim that (...) if a person believes that something is good for her, it resonates with her. The Resonance Constraint allegedly favors subjectivism. I argue that there are facts about people’s well-being and that someone who is fully informed and reasons well would come to have true beliefs about her well-being. Based on these arguments, I formulate and defend a novel strategy for objectivists to respond to alienation objections. I conclude that objectivism is as well equipped to deal with alienation problems as prominent subjectivist views that appeal to idealization. (shrink)

ObjectiveSchizophrenia is a mental disorder that is characterized by progressive cognitive impairment. Objective measures of cognitive function may provide reliable neurobiomarkers for patients with schizophrenia. The goal of the current work is to explore the correlation between resting theta power and cognitive performance in patients with schizophrenia.MethodsTwenty-two patients with schizophrenia and 23 age-, sex-, and education-matched healthy controls were included in this study. The MATRICS Consensus Cognitive Battery was used for cognitive evaluation and the Positive (...) and Negative Syndrome Scale for evaluation of clinical symptoms. EEGs were acquired in the resting state with closed and opened eyes. Between the two groups, we compared the relative theta power and examined their relationship with cognitive performance.ResultsCompared to healthy controls, patients with schizophrenia showed significantly higher theta power, both with eyes closed and open. When the eyes were open, negative correlations were found in patients with schizophrenia between theta power in the central and parietal regions with processing speed scores, and between the theta power of the Pz electrode and verbal learning and reasoning and problem-solving scores. In the control group, theta power over the Fz electrode was negatively correlated with processing speed.ConclusionsOur findings showed that theta activity increased in certain brain regions during resting state in schizophrenia. Negative associations between resting theta power over the parietal-occipital regions with MCCB domains scores suggest that altered theta activity can be used as a neurobiological indicator to predict cognitive performance. (shrink)

A bold argument that constitutional states are not weaker because their powers are divided -- they are often stronger because they solve collective action problems rooted in speech and communication.