This paper explores the origins of the term "causa sine qua non" used by Durand de Saint-Pourçain to describe the role of material things in knowledge. I show that its technical meaning comes from the Stoics and was transmitted to the Middle Ages by Boethius' commentary on Cicero's Topics. The expression "sine qua non" here does not have the ordinary and restricted meaning of "indispensable", "necessary condition", which can also apply to direct, per se causes of an (...) effect. In the present context, sine qua non causes do not act on the effect in question, either as concomitant, secondary, or instrumental causes, or as remote causes. They act only on that which hinders the actualization of a potentiality, in order to remove that obstacle. For example, the removal of a support that prevented something from falling does not act on that thing, nor does it add anything to its tendency to fall; it simply enables that thing to exercise its own actualization. Similarly, in cognitive processes, external things do not impose anything on the soul, but simply give it the opportunity to actualize its faculties of its own accord. I situate Durand's use of this form of causality in the context of late 13th/early 14th century theories of cognition, among several other attempts to find an alternative theory to the standard Aristotelian model and to maintain the pure activity of the soul with respect to the body. (shrink)

For theological reasons, medieval thinkers maintained that sacraments “effect what they figure”—that is, they are more than mere signs of grace; and yet, they also maintained that they are not proper causes of grace in the way fire is the proper cause of heat. One way to reconcile these requirements is to explicate sacramental causation in terms of sine qua non causes, which were distinguished from accidental causes on the one hand, and from proper efficient causes on the other (...) hand. This article traces the development of this concept, as discussed in the context of the sacraments, from Scotus and Auriol, via Ockham and Peter of Ailly, to Gabriel Biel. It shows how the discussion, in its later stages, opened up concerns about occasionalism, offering thereby a case study of how particular theological issues led to metaphysical ones in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. (shrink)

In early major works, Cassirer and Schlick differently recast traditional doctrines of the concept and of the relation of concept to intuitive content along the lines of recent epistemological discussions within the exact sciences. In this, they attempted to refashion epistemology by incorporating as its basic principle the notion of functional coordination, the theoretical sciences' own methodological tool for dispensing with the imprecise and unreliable guide of intuitive evidence. Examining their respective reconstructions of the theory of knowledge provides an axis (...) of comparison along which to locate Cassirer's Neo-Kantianism and Schlick's pre-positivist empiricism, and an immediate background of contrast to the subsequent rise of logical empiricism. For in the absence of intuition all our knowledge is without objects and therefore remains entirely empty. (Kant A62/B87) And how awkward is the human mind in diving the nature of things when forsaken by the analogy of what we see and touch directly? (Boltzmann 1895). (shrink)

This article demonstrates the pre-eminent place the issue of interstate relations occupies in Carl Schmitt’s political thinking between the early 1920s and early 1940s. First, I discuss how Schmitt’s understanding of interstate relations develops from 1923 until the Nazi’s taking power. By focusing on his critique of imperialism and universalism in international law during this period, I reveal that his engagement with the Monroe Doctrine, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg–Briand Pact results in a change in (...) his views in Roman Catholicism and Political Form in which he talks about the possibility of a world state in the form of a League of Nations with supra-state and supra-sovereignty powers. Second, I show to what extent the novel international circumstances created by the emergence of the Nazi rule leads him to elaborate the concepts of the Reich and the Groβraum in addition to his continuing engagement with the concepts of imperialism and universalism. By accentuating the development of his interest in the concepts of imperialism, universalism, the Reich and the Groβraum, I argue that the question of interstate relations is the sine qua non of Schmitt’s political thinking. I conclude by asserting that studying Schmitt’s political thinking in its connection with his interest in interstate relations provides a promising path for leftist political theorists to understand, explain and reimagine the contemporary global order. (shrink)

The trope that modern Europe, emerging from its Dark Ages, is indebted to the Islamic Middle Ages is widespread. The article traces this ‘Islamic medievalism’ back to Muslim discourses of the late 19th and early 20th century. Focusing on the Egyptian intellectual Muhammad Lutfi Jum’a’s (1886-1953) portrayal of medieval Islam and its philosophers as well as his mobilization of these within a reformist ideology, it argues the following: Firstly, that Jum’a’s medievalism, perceiving medieval Islamic philosophy as the sine qua (...) non of European modernity, is indebted to readings of European orientalist histories of philosophy, demonstrating how medievalism emerged from a global discursive formation. Secondly, that Jum’a mobilized the medievalist argument and the philosophers to argue for the possibility of an alternative counter-modern Muslim and Eastern modernity where the materialist and disenchanting tendencies of European modernity are negated – a vision he shared with other so-called Easternist thinkers, who conceived of Muslim countries as belonging to a broader East ranging from North Africa to Japan. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article critically considers a state-centred approach to public law that has been epitomised in Martin Loughlin’s claim that the concept of the state is the sine qua non of public law....

스코투스는 옥스퍼드 강독집에서 의지와 지성이 의지운동의 공동 작용인이라고 주장했으나, 후기의 파리 보고록에서는 의지가의지운동 전체를 일으키는 유일한 작용인이라고 가르쳤다. 이 논문의 목적은 이러한 이론 변화의 의미와 원인을 밝히는 것이다. 이를 위해 이 논문은, 헨리쿠스에 대한 스코투스의 비판 논변이 어떻게 변화하는지를 주로 검토한다. 대상을 필요원인으로 간주하는헨리쿠스의 견해가 강독집에서 명시적으로 기각됨에 비해, 보고록에서는 헨리쿠스의 견해에서 귀결된다고 가정되었던 난점들에 대한 적극적 해결이 모색된다. 그러나 이러한 변화는 스코투스가 헨리쿠스와 동일한 극단적 주의주의의 노선으로 사고의 방향 전환을했다는 의미는 아니다. 이러한 변화는 지성과의 연결에 의존하지않고 의지를 그 자체로서 (...) 이성적 능력으로 파악하는 관점이 확립된 결과로 이해되어야 한다. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to analyze the response of John Duns Scotus to Godfrey of Fontaines’s argument against Henry of Ghent’s theory of the will’s self-motion. Godfrey’s argument is that, if the object is assumed to be causa sine qua non and the efficient causality is totally attributed to the will in the act of volition, it would also follow that not only the will’s motion but every motion in nature, such as, for example, the igniting (...) of wood, is a self-motion. In this paper, I will explain that Scotus’s refutation of this argument in Reportatio II, d. 25 is based on his reflection upon the general possibility of self-motion as well as upon the indeterminacy of the will’s act. In doing so, I will show that the development of Scotus’s theory of the will’s motion is closely related to his universalized theory of self-motion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy: 1637–1739J. A. CoverKenneth Clatterbaugh. The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy: 1637–1739. New York and London: Routledge, 1999. Pp. xi + 239. Cloth, $75.00. Paper, $21.00.Over the scholastics and earliest moderns, Hume had an advantage of hindsight in declaring that "There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caus'd more disputes both among ancients and modern (...) philosophers, than this concerning the efficacy of causes, or that quality which made them be followed by their effects" (Treatise I.iii.14). Between the scholastics and Hume fell (i) Descartes, (ii) classical mechanists such as Hobbes and Gassendi, (iii) the Cartesians Le Grand and Malebranche, (iv) the explanatory rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz, (v) later experimental mechanists such as Boyle, Rohault and Newton, and (vi) the so-called empiricists Locke and Berkeley. This book presents an accessible and admirably broad overview of the modern debate about causation, without sacrificing serious attention to textual details. With two chapters on (i) and one apiece on (ii) - (vi), Clatterbaugh earns for himself and his reader a helpfully synoptic picture of philosophical shifts in the causation debate in the hundred years separating Descartes' Discourse and Hume's Treatise. By the end of the (modern) day, (1) the four-fold causes of Aristotelian-Scholasticism have given way to efficient causation alone; (2) no pre-existing forms in efficient causes are to be found, nor indeed any substantial active powers whatever; (3) there is no deep sense in which causes communicate reality to effects; (4) necessary connection has gone by the board; (5) divine causation has no place in a natural philosophy of causation. No surprises there, but Clatterbaugh's effort reminds us afresh of the varied and torturous routes to such shifts, helping advanced students better (or newly) appreciate them in the comfortable space of 200 pages.Of those pages, a third are devoted to Descartes and the Cartesians. That's not inappropriate, given the importance and difficulty of Descartes's response to Aristotelian-Scholastic accounts of causation, and its influence on occasionalist sentiments on the Continent. The tenor and value of this book may be illustrated by reflecting on the first of these—a rich and frustrating business, both in Descartes's texts and in Clatterbaugh's book. Suppose we grant Descartes the back of his hand to substantial forms and active formal causes as at best "unexplanatory" (counseling Regius): his "at-least-as-much-reality-in-the-cause-as-in-the-effect" principle might be treated as the basis of "an alternative" metaphysical account of causation (19-32). Well, it might be so-treated: but three versions of the principle later, the reader will be excused for judging it little more than a necessary condition for some event-pair x,y counting as a cause-effect pair. If the scholastic appeal to active forms is unexplanatory, then Descartes's [End Page 600] principle—which isn't Descartes's principle at all but a scholastic commonplace—can scarcely fill the explanatory gap. Glossed as a predictable consequence of some strong form of influxus physicus, it is embarrassed by Foucher's objection (that mind bears no likeness to body) and by the weight of texts urging that accidents are individual to their bearers. Having offered us no deep metaphysical story about what in the world answers to 'vis,' Descartes is at best a bungling "interactionist" (here appropriating Clatterbaugh's word for someone whose apparent talk of secondary causes we are asked to respect as expressing a strict and considered philosophical commitment). One can only side with Voetius in reckoning Descartes's replacement of forms by purely quantitative, mechanical principles of motion as expressing a mere "disposition of the movable to move... not an activity of an efficient cause, but merely a necessary condition and a causa sine qua non" (my emphasis: Selectarum Disputationum I [1648-59], 873). Descartes has no deep theory about the nature of causation.Is that too harsh? Had this book a different target, one could fairly complain that the author too infrequently steps away from the texts and commentators to offer and defend a... (shrink)

What role does the imagination play in scientific progress? After examining several studies in cognitive science, I argue that one thing the imagination does is help to increase scientific understanding, which is itself indispensable for scientific progress. Then, I sketch a transcendental justification of the role of imagination in this process.

The paper assesses current rising reparations claims for the Maafa/ Maangamizi from two angles. First, it explores the connectivity of reparations and global justice, peace and security. Second, it discusses how the claim is justified in international law. The concept of reparations in international law is also explored, revealing that reparations cannot be limited to financial compensation due to the nature of the damage and international law prescriptions. Comprehensive reparations based in international law require the removal of structures built on (...) centuries of illegal acts and aggression, in the forms of transatlantic slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Reparations must also lead to the restitution of sovereignty to African and indigenous peoples globally. They are indispensable to halt the destruction of the earth as human habitat, caused by the violent European cultural, political, socio-economic system known as capitalism that is rooted in transatlantic slavery. (shrink)

Living together peacefully in a world of differences asks for a practice of respecting the irreducible difference of the other. Acknowledging this `not-me' of the other subject generates an in-between: a space/time between subjects that cannot be transgressed other than by violence. Following Irigaray, I argue that this `in-between' comes about through the passion of wonder, a being touched in the flesh in the encounter with the other, which opens the subject to him/herself and to the other. To perceive this (...) touch asks for a life-style directed at keeping open and sensitizing the sensibilities of the senses, so that the subject's aesthesis or awareness for the perceptions of the sensible flesh and of its reactions to the other is heightened. Key-element in this aesthetics is the practice of breathing. It enables the subject to remain rooted in him/or herself and open to the other: generating and respecting the in-between between them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas on Efficient Causation and Causal Powers by Gloria FrostBrian DaviesGloria Frost. Aquinas on Efficient Causation and Causal Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. 288. Hardback, $99.99; paperback, $32.99.Philosophers have often assumed that good philosophy discusses what X, Y, or Z is essentially. And Thomas Aquinas is someone who favors this way of proceeding. At one point in his writings, he modestly recognizes that he is at (...) a loss to explain what a house fly actually is. But he continually aims to tell us what such and such really is. And he does so when it comes to “cause” (causa). One might ask, “What is a cause?” or “What is causation?” Aquinas tries to answer these questions in theoretical ways that effectively add up to definitions of ‘cause’ and ‘causation.’Unfortunately, however, Aquinas never wrote a self-contained treatise on ‘cause’ and ‘causation.’ So, in order to fully understand what he says about these terms, one must pay attention to many texts scattered throughout his many writings, which may sound like bad news. The good news, however, is that Gloria Frost has now provided (for the first time, as far as I know) what amounts to an excellent and much-needed one-volume exposition of what Aquinas says about causation. More specifically, she has given us a fine scholarly work on the history of philosophy that focuses exegetically on what Aquinas calls “efficient” causation.Following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes between efficient, final, formal, and material causes (all of which are explanations of some kind). Frost has accurate things to say about Aquinas on material, formal, and final causes. But it is Aquinas on efficient causation that she homes in on in great detail—understandably, since Aquinas references this notion many times over and since what he means by ‘efficient causation’ seems in various ways to correspond to what “causation” is taken to be these days by both philosophers and nonphilosophers (few of whom are familiar with the phrases ‘material causation,’ ‘formal causation,’ and ‘final causation’). Frost rightly notes that Aquinas takes final causation to be bound up with efficient causation, and she explains the relation between them (chapter 4). Still, her focus is on Aquinas on efficient causation. As she writes, “I have combed through Aquinas’s corpus to find the most important passages about efficient causation and causal powers and using them as a basis, I reconstruct his views in a systematic way” (5).Chapter 1 begins this reconstruction by providing a general overview of Aquinas on efficient causation together with some historical background and context for understanding what he says on the topic. The chapter includes reference to views on causation differing from that of Aquinas and introductions to some of Aquinas’s sources concerning efficient causation. Chapters 2 through 6 expand on this overview in great detail with many quotations from Aquinas and a lot of cross-referencing within his writings. In these chapters, Frost expounds Aquinas on topics such as the distinction between per se and per accidens causation, temporality and causation, agent and patient, causation at a distance, actuality and potentiality, active power and passive power, and causation and necessitation. Chapter 7 deals with what Frost calls “non-paradigm” cases of efficient causation (191), which include absences (which Aquinas thinks can be efficient causes) and sine qua non efficient causation (which Aquinas does not think to be genuine efficient causation). Chapter 8 is devoted to instrumental causes, primary and secondary causation, and the causality of heavenly bodies. Each chapter begins with an introduction explaining what the core of the chapter is about. And each chapter ends with a summary of the findings of the chapter. This structure, which leads Frost to repeat herself a lot, might irritate some readers. I take [End Page 661] it to be didactically helpful. Nobody can complain that Frost has failed to make it clear what she takes Aquinas to be saying.Frost’s account of Aquinas on causation is exemplary. It is written with great clarity and avoids jargon. It draws heavily on texts of Aquinas and gives us an accurate account of what he thought about efficient causation (as well as... (shrink)

As a Franciscan friar, student, teacher, philosopher, theologian, and political theorist, William of Ockham was and remains one of the most stimulating thinkers of the Middle Ages. The one consistent characteristic of his professional output—both as a student and later as an opponent of papal authoritarianism—was the provocative nature of his ideas. In required commentaries on standard theological texts as well as in his later, more independently inspired treatises, Ockham demonstrated a genuine talent for suggesting and sustaining a number of (...) original, unorthodox and, occasionally, even outrageous ideas. Accordingly, Ockham holds the distinction of being the most rejected but influential philosopher-theologian of the fourteenth century, an observation that applies to his views on causality in which, for example, Ockham held the principle of action at a distance in order to save the causal account of some phenomena. One of the more interesting distinctions that he made, however, occurs in his treatment of sacramental theology as part of his account of God's causal activity with respect to the sacraments. (shrink)

RESUMO A tradução árabe de alguns trechos do tratado de metafísica "Elementatio Theologiae" de Proclo, conhecida com o nome de "Liber de Causis" e atribuída erroneamente a Aristóteles, influenciou três grandes pensadores dominicanos da Idade Média: Alberto Magno, Tomás de Aquino e Meister Eckhart. Composto de 31 proposições, defende a tese da existência de uma causa primeira que dá o ser a tudo o que existe, sem nenhuma exceção. Os estudiosos são unânimes em reconhecer que este livro pseudoepigráfico possui (...) um peso relevante nos momentos centrais da obra eckhartiana, tanto latina quanto alemã. Em particular, o turíngio lança mão da auctoritas do "Liber de Causis" para sustentar a imanência-transcendência simultânea da causa primeira com relação às criaturas, a doutrina da hierarquia dos entes, a concepção do ser como ratio prima da criaturalidade, a inefabilidade de Deus. Além desses aspectos ontológicos, este trabalho apresenta também o aspecto especificamente antropológico do esvaziamento de toda criatura como conditio sine qua non para a união com o único Uno, um traço inconfundível da presença do "Liber de Causis" na obra de Meister Eckhart. ABSTRACT The Arabic translation of some stretches of the treatise on metaphysics "Elementatio Theologiae" of Proclus, known under the name "Liber de Causis" and wrongfully attributed to Aristotle, influenced three great Middle Age Dominican thinkers: Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart. Composed by thirty-one propositions, it advocates on the thesis of existence of a root cause that gives the being all things existing, with no exception. Scholars are unanimous in acknowledging that this pseudoepigraphic book has a relevant weight in the central topics of the Eckhartean works, on both the Latin and the German ones. Particularly, the Thuringian scholar makes use of the "Liber de Causis’s" auctoritas to hold that the simultaneous immanence-transcendence of the root cause regarding the creatures, the doctrine of the hierarchy of beings, the conception of the being as a ratio prima of creatureness, God’s ineffability. Besides those ontological aspects, the present work also presents the specifically anthropologic aspect of the emptying of all beings as conditio sine qua non for the union with the One Being, an unmistakable trait of the presence of Liber de Causis in Meister Eckhart’s work. (shrink)

Globalization consists of global interculture strengthening local cultures as it depends on them. Globality and locality are interdependent, and “universal” must be replaced by “inter-versal” as existence inter-exists. Chinese thinking thus must be Chinese, not Western, as Western thinking must be Western, not “universal”; China must help the West be Western, as the West must help China be Chinese. As Mrs. Tu speaks English in Chinese syntax, so “sinologists” logicize in Chinese phrases. English speakers parse her to realize the distinctness (...) of English; Chinese thinkers parse Western “sinologists” to realize the distinctness of China. Inter-versal parsing toward cultural inter-enrichment occurs in three stages. This is intercultural globalization. (shrink)

Palermos’s (2023) concept of “mental data” is appreciated as advancing fresh considerations in urgent discourse on mental privacy. However, it is suggested that the proposal for an ontologically di...

Autor u ovom doprinosu podastire rezultate istraživanja ideje i korijena mediteranske bioetike. Postoji li uopće jedna regionalna, upravo mediteranska bioetika? Ako postoji, nameće se pitanje o njezinim teorijskim korijenima. Ako njezini teorijski korijeni uistinu počivaju na sveobuhvatnome kulturnom tlu mediteranskoga kompleksa, onda nije beznačajno pitanje o njezinu odnosu prema drugim regionalnim bioetikama. Međutim, odgovor na pitanje o teorijskim korijenima mediteranske bioetike podrazumijeva također odgovor na pitanje o njezinim praktičkim – upravo etičkim – korijenima. Drugim riječima, koja etika može stajati i (...) stvarno stoji u temeljima mediteranske bioetike, kao njezin odlučujući raison d’être regionalne bioetike? Pritom regionalno određenje bioetike kao mediteranske ne označava puko zemljopisno razgraničenje nego podrazumijeva i uključuje bitne elemente historijske realizacije jednoga kulturnoga kruga koji je pokazao i pokazuje svoje enormne teorijske i praktičke učinkovitosti na razini stvaranja jedne zasebne, upravo Zapadne civilizacije. I upravo kao što kompleks Zapadne civilizacije, svojom misaonom prodornošću i praktičkom učinkovitošću, probija i nadilazi okvire zemljopisnoga ograničenja, to se isto razložno može očekivati od regionalne mediteranske boetike u kojoj ono regionalno ima značenje začeća, kolijevke i izvora ideje koja određuje, karakterizira i uvjetuje ljudsko istraživanje smisla i sreće iz jedne metapovijesne perspektive. Izvanjsko, tj. civilizacijsko istraživanje smisla i značenja korijena mediteranske bioetike u slijedećem koraku treba ustupiti mjesto unutrašnjem, tj. filozofijskom istraživanju smisla i značenja njezinih korijena. Autor upravo u ovom doprinosu podastire neke rezultate istraživanja korijena mediteranske bioetike te nekih njezinih idejnih određenja i usmjerenja.The paper presents the results of the author’s research of the idea and roots of Mediterranean bioethics. Is there such a thing as regional, Mediterranean bioethics at all? If it does exist, we must ask about its theoretical fountainhead. If, furthermore, its theoretical source truly rests on the all-embracing cultural soil of the Mediterranean complex, then the question of its relation to other regional bioethics is not inconsequential. However, the answer to the question of the theoretical roots of Mediterranean bioethics assumes an answer to the question of its practical – i.e. ethical – fountainhead. In other words, which ethics can be and indeed is the very bedrock of Mediterranean bioethics as its decisive raison d’être of regional bioethics? It must, however, be noted that defining bioethics as Mediterranean is not some mere geographical demarcation, but rather implies and involves the vital elements of the historical realisation of a cultural circle that has demonstrated its superlative theoretical and practical efficiencies at the level of creating a distinctive, namely the Western, civilisation. Just as the complex of Western civilisation transcends and exceeds the limits of geographical boundaries with its reflective penetration and practical efficiency, the same can reasonably be expected from regional Mediterranean bioethics, in which the regional determines the conception, the cradle and source of the idea that determines, characterises and conditions the human research of meaning and happiness from a meta-historical perspective. The external, i.e. civilisational, research of the meaning and significance of the roots of Mediterranean bioethics is to be followed by the internal, i.e. philosophical, research of the meaning and significance of its roots. This paper presents some of the results of the author’s research of the source of Mediterranean bioethics and a number of its ideaistic determinations and orientations. (shrink)

This essay deals critically with Nietzsche’s anthropological typology of the “free spirit par excellence”, “we spirits”, persons endowed with positive as against negative power patterns, and the ideal of the Übermensch. The conclusions are twofold. The first is that actually it was not Nietzsche’s ideal of the Overman that was the pinnacle of his anthropological philosophy, but the even more ideal type of the “free spirit par excellence”. The second conclusion is that it is impossible to envisage a society consisting (...) of such “free spirits”. This thesis is highlighted by contrasting the society of Übermenchen, who, according to Nietzsche, might live in society and even need it as a sine qua non for their cultivation, with free spirits par excellence, who are by definition free from any social ethos, and hence impossible within its framework. However, I argue that, on Nietzsche’s terms, the ideal of the Übermench is also not viable in society. Hence this essay points to an inherent flaw ofNietzsche’s existential philosophy -- thenon-viability of its most sublime ideals. (shrink)

We are affected by the world: when I place my hand next to the fire, it becomes hot, and when I plunge it into the bucket of ice water, it becomes cold. What goes for physical changes also goes for at least some mental changes: when Felix the Cat leaps upon my lap, my lap not only becomes warm, but I also feel this warmth, and when he purrs, I hear his purr. It seems obvious, in other words, that perception (...) (at least, and at least under ordinary conditions) is a matter of being affected by the agency of perceptible objects. Call this doctrine affectionism. Durand of St.-Pourçain rejects affectionism. The paper has three parts. In the first part, I sketch, briefly, what motivates Durand to reject affectionism. In the second part, I will take up the affectionist doctrine as defended by Durand's older contemporary at Paris, Godfrey of Fontaines, who holds that the object of all our mental acts (not just perceptions, but also thoughts and desires) is the efficient cause of those acts, or, in other words, all mental acts (not just perception) come about owing to the affection of the relevant mental faculty by the agency of the object. As it turns out, Godfrey develops a celebrated argument against the thesis that the object is not the efficient cause but a mere sine qua non cause. Hence his position offers a challenge to Durand's position, a challenge, I argue in the third part, Durand meets. (shrink)

Générations futures, animaux, rivières, espèces, écosystèmes, œuvres d’art, androïdes. La liste des entités non-humaines (ou non-individuelles) aspirant à la personnalité juridique s’allonge. Un nombre croissant d’État leur attribuent des droits dans le but de les protéger, avec plus ou moins de succès, en tant qu’entité à part entière. L’article 71 de la Constitution de l’Équateur figure parmi les exemples les plus marquants puisqu’il fait de la Nature ( Pacha Mama ) un sujet de droits au nom desquels on compte le (...) droit au respect de son existence et le droit à la régénération de ses cycles vitaux. La vulnérabilité de ces entités non-humaines appelle une protection dépassant les intérêts individuels. Souvent dépourvues de la personnalité juridique, ces entités ne peuvent pas agir en justice par elles-mêmes. Leurs intérêts, bien que de plus en plus protégés par les normes juridiques, demeurent partiellement défendus par l’appareil juridictionnel. Au-delà de la résistance de nos imaginaires politiques, cela s’explique par la difficulté théorique et pratique d’ouvrir l’accès au prétoire à des requérants agissant au nom d’autrui, en l’occurrence de ces entités. Ce sont les obstacles juridiques que nous tentons ici de lever. Le principe Nul ne plaide par procureur interdit à toute personne d’agir en défense d’un droit subjectif qui ne lui appartiendrait pas en propre, sans requérir un mandat de représentation du bénéficiaire du droit. L’intérêt pour agir que l’on présente comme la condition sine qua non de recevabilité de l’action se caractérise, en substance, par l’intérêt lésé du requérant. Les actions en justice dans l’intérêt d’autrui ne sont admises que par exception et sans que les concepts doctrinaux ne les embrassent pleinement. L’action en justice tout autant que la protection juridique des intérêts ont été pensées presque exclusivement par le prisme des intérêts et des besoins humains et individuels. La reconnaissance de droits aux non-humains rebat les cartes du droit processuel. Il faut repenser l’intérêt à agir comme condition de recevabilité susceptible d’être caractérisée par une motivation du requérant qui puisse être autre que la lésion de son propre droit. Il faut élargir la catégorie des bénéficiaires de droit aux entités, quelles qu’elles soient, dont les intérêts sont objectivement protégés par des normes juridiques. Il faut concevoir l’action en justice comme subordonnées non pas à un intérêt personnel du requérant mais à une norme d’habilitation dont le contenu est laissé à la décision des autorités normatives. Les voies processuelles peuvent accueillir une grande diversité de configurations. Il appartient à la sphère politique de pondérer la nécessité de garantir les droits sans encourager l’engorgement du prétoire. Toutefois, intégré au sein de ce que l’on appelle les « grandes causes », le contentieux des droits des non-humains participe à la transformation du rôle la justice dans nos systèmes. En dépassant le règlement des conflits individuels, elle doit aujourd’hui se prononcer sur des questions qui sont habituellement discutées au sein des arènes démocratiques ( cause lawyering ). JEL Codes : K380, K410. (shrink)

This article defends the principle of non-establishment against 21st-century projects of political religion, constitutional theocracy and political theology. It is divided into two parts. The first part, published in special issue 39.4–5 of Philosophy and Social Criticism, proceeds by constructing an ideal type of political secularism, and then discussing the innovative American model of constitutional dualism regarding religion that combined constitutional protection for the freedom of religious conscience and exercise with the principle of non-establishment. It then critically assesses the integrationist (...) approach –disguised as a concern for pluralism and fairness – as an alternative to this framework. The integrationist approach challenges ‘separation’ and political secularism in a subtle attack on the non-establishment principle, aimed at drastically narrowing its scope. Successes of this approach in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and politics, have triggered a response by liberal egalitarians. I address this response – the equal liberty model – in this second part, arguing that although on the right track, it fails to find a middle ground between political secularism and integration. Instead, by abandoning the discourse of separation, it plays into populist integrationist hands without delivering on the promise of providing a coherent standard for deciding cases. The article proposes a third approach, one that does not throw out the non-establishment baby with the strict separationist bathwater and that wholeheartedly endorses political secularism, a sine qua non for 21st-century constitutional democracy. Equal liberty properly construed can help provide criteria for determining when an accommodation, a regulation or no regulation of religion by the state is appropriate. But it must be supplemented by other values – democratic and civil republican. The article concludes with a typology of the forms of regulation that are warranted under the conditions of the contemporary regulatory state, now the target and prize of politicized religion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.1 (2003) 137-141 [Access article in PDF] Qvomodo Stemma Gladiatoris Pellicvlae More Philologico Sit Constitvendvm Martin M. Winklersive Martinvs Satiricvs Philocinematographicvs [Figures]Poetae rervmqve scriptores et antiqui et recentiores lectoribus fabulas suas sententiis vel versibus bene textis soliti sunt adferre. Sed hodie novum exstat narrandi genus, quod fabulas hominibus adfert praecipue picturis eo modo compositis et inter se coniunctis ut oculi humani imagines singulares celerrime et (...) sine ulla motus intermissione ipsas moveri percipiant, personarum dialogis et arte musica sonisque diversis comitantibus et iuvantibus. Adeo enim progressa est ars magna lucis et umbrae, quam primum photographiam deinde cinematographiam nominare consuevimus, ut fabulae cuiusvis modi—breves longae, novae antiquae, laetificae tragicae—imitatione veri paene perfecta spectatoribus persuadeant tempora iam praeterita in vitam novam esse recreata.In ipsa arte narrandi non multum interest inter eos qui verbis utuntur, ut poetae ac scriptores, et eos qui imaginibus, ut cinematographi. Praeclare Horatium in arte poetica exponenda dixisse recordemur ut picturam poesin esse. Qua in re Simonidem illum Ceum aliosque poetas Graecos secutus est Flaccus noster. Utroque enim modo, et verbis et picturis, auctores antiqui atque hodierni homines docent delectant movent. 1 Facillime ergo intellegimus fabulam cinematographicam genus quoddam esse textus, sed textus non tantum legendi aut audiendi sed imprimis videndi vel spectandi. Peritissimus quisque talium fabularum [End Page 137] auctor omne tulit punctum, nam miscuit utile dulci. Is quoque non aliter ac poeta antiquus aut prodesse vult aut delectare.Sed editiones nonnullarum fabularum cinematographicarum inter se differunt et lacunas corruptelas vitia alia exhibent. Non enim raro pelliculas adfectas esse constat eius generis damno quod textuum antiquorum docti in editionibus suis obelis indicare solent. Itemque quomodo fabulae cinematographicae originem suam trahant ab antiquioribus quaerere et explicare haud absurdum est. 2Ergo editorum usum secutus his paginis originem pelliculae Gladiatoris anno MM editae exempli gratia stemmate quasi philologico explicabo. Deinde stemmatis sigla brevibus adnotationibus percurram. 3 Hoc modo me demonstraturum spero principia artis philologicae, quae litterarum Graecarum Romanarumque docti adhuc solum soliti sunt textibus adhibere, fabulis quoque cinematographicis magno cum fructu admoveri posse. In stemmate infra dato titulos fabularum cinematographicarum et auctorum eorum nomina Latine reddidi.Ridlius Scotus, pelliculae Gladiatoris auctor, magna cum acclamatione publica, minore criticorum, narrare studet quae imp. Caes. M. Aurelii Commodi Antonini Aug. aetate in imperio Romano gesta sunt. Sed stemmate monstrabo Gladiatorem imprimis ortum esse a nonnullis fabulis cinematographicis prioribus, quibus sons aut insons copiosissime usus sit ille Scotus. Qua de causa pellicula eius nobis indicat quemadmodum res Romanae temporibus nostris undique floreant. Cum ipsa et ceterae huius modi fabulae falsa inventione abundare soleant, tamen rerum et linguarum Romanarum Graecarumque magistri hodie hoc artis popularis genere in scholis saepius niti consueverunt, ut discipulos a falsa ad veram adducant rerum gestarum scientiam et rebus antiquis accuratius instruant. Quibus igitur magistris hoc offero stemma, nam amicus Scotus, sed magis amica veritas. 4 [End Page 138] [Begin Page 140] Conspectvs Siglorvm WPellicularum res antiquas tractantium archetypus, qui est summa rerum Romanarum a scriptoribus antiquis et recentioribus expositarum.AConsensus fabularum quae vel litteris vel ludis scaenicis vel picturis cinematographicis praecipue Italicis Americanisque res Romanas narrant depinguntque.TTriumphus Animi Helena Riefenstahle auctore anno MDCCCCXXXV editus. 5SSpartacus Antonio Viro—nomine suppresso—et Stanlio Cubrico auctoribus anno MDCCCCLX editus.CCasus Imperii Romani Antonio Viro auctore anno MDCCCCLXIIII editus. 6B1-3Triga Georgii Lucae Bella Galactica inscripta et annis MDCCCCLXXVII MDCCCCLXXX MDCCCCLXXXIII primum edita, quae his picturis cinematographicis constat: Pars Quarta: "Spes Nova" (B1), Pars Quinta: "Imperium Referit" (B2), Pars Sexta: "Iedi Reversi" (B3). 7 Editio trigae altera anno MDCCCCLXXXXVII edita itemque Bellorum Galacticorum trigae novae Pars Prima: "Simulacri Minae" anni MDCCCCLXXXXVIIII nihil ad rem.M1-3Triga Georgii Molitoris Maximus Furens inscripta, annis MDCCCCLXXVIIII MDCCCCLXXXI MDCCCCLXXXV edita et his picturis cinematographicis constans: Maximus Furens (M1), Maximi Furentis Pars Altera vel Bellator Peregrinans (M2), Maximus Furens Vltra Tonitrus Tholum (M3). 8GGladiator Ridlio Scoto auctore anno MM editus. 9 [End Page 140]His alias poteram et plures subnectere causas vel philologicas vel cinematographicas. Qui de Scoti Gladiatore plurima cognoscere velint... (shrink)

Choice is a sine qua non of contemporary life. From childhood until death, we are faced with an unending series of choices through which we cultivate a sense of self, govern conduct, and shape the future. Nowadays, individuals increasingly experience and enact consumer choice online through web-based platforms such as Yelp.com, TripAdvisor.com and Amazon.com. These platforms not only provide a sprawling array of goods and services to choose from, but also reviews, ratings and ranking devices and systems of classification (...) to navigate this landscape of choice. This paper suggests a radical reconsideration of platform architectures and design features to consider how they reconfigure and respecify choice, ‘choosers’, and choice-making practices. Platforms are not simply cameras that present choice and enable comparisons between different options, but are more akin to engines that govern, drive and expand choice, configuring users within particular discourses, practices and subjectivities. In making sense of the entangled trajectories of consumer choice, platform architectures and Big Data, I suggest that ‘hyper-choice’ emerges as a condition of the contemporary platform-driven web. I examine hyper-choice not only in terms of the relationship between platforms and a growing abundance of choice, but more importantly how platforms reconfigure choice in ways that go beyond and fundamentally challenge existing understandings of what choice is, who and what is involved in producing knowledge about choice, and what it means to be a ‘chooser’. (shrink)

Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität analyses the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity, and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental subjectivity was a conditio sine qua non for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts the book examines his reasons for this conviction and delivers a detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of intersubjectivity, showing that (...) precisely his reflections on transcendental intersubjectivity are capable of clarifying his phenomenological core-concepts, thus making possible a new understanding of his philosophy. Against this background the book then attempts to establish to what extent the phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity can contribute to the current discussions of intersubjectivity. This is achieved through a systematic confrontation with the language-pragmatical positions of Apel and Habermas. Die Abhandlung untersucht die transzendentale Relevanz der Intersubjektivität und zeigt, daß eine intersubjektive Transformation der Transzendentalphilosophie schon innerhalb der Phänomenologie - besonders der Husserlschen - zu finden ist. Husserl gelangte zu der Auffassung, daß eine Analyse und Einbeziehung der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität als conditio sine qua non für eine phänomenologische Philosophie zu betrachten sei. Die Gründe, die Husserl zu dieser Überzeugung führten, werden herausgearbeitet. Dabei weist die Analyse des radikalen und komplexen Begriffs der Intersubjektivität auf, daß erst seine Überlegungen zur transzendentalen Intersubjektivität viele phänomenologische Grundbegriffe ins rechte Licht stellen können und darüber hinaus ein neues Grundverständnis seiner Phänomenologie ermöglichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Frage, inwieweit die Phänomenologie zur gegenwärtigen Intersubjektivitätsdiskussion beitragen kann, durch eine systematische Auseinandersetzung mit der sprachpragmatischen Intersubjektivitätstheorie von Apel und Habermas beantwortet. (shrink)

Food is a sine qua non for life on Earth. It has more significance than nutrition and sustenance, more variety than many aspects of human culture. Food has religious as well as historical dimensions. The complexity of the food chain and of the related ecological balance is one of the wonders of the biological world. In the human context, food has found countless expressions and regional richness. Food has provoked feasts, as its lack and maldistribution have caused famines. While (...) being a source of physical satisfaction food has also had environmental impacts. Some of these matters are explored in these reflections. (shrink)

We say that things happen accidentally when they do indeed happen, but only by chance. In the opposite situation, an essential happening is inescapable, its inevitability being the sine qua non for its very occurrence. This paper will investigate modal logics on a language tailored to talk about essential and accidental statements. Completeness of some among the weakest and the strongest such systems is attained. The weak expressibility of the classical propositional language enriched with the non-normal modal operators of (...) essence and accident is highlighted and illustrated, both with respect to the definability of the more usual modal operators as well as with respect to the characterizability of classes of frames. Several interesting problems and directions are left open for exploration. (shrink)

Modularity is a fundamental doctrine in the cognitive sciences. It holds a preeminent position in cognitive psychology and generative linguistics, as well as a long history in neurophysiology, with roots going all the way back to the early nineteenth century. But a mature field of neuroscience is a comparatively recent phenomenon and has challenged orthodox conceptions of the modular mind. One way of accommodating modularity within the new framework suggested by these developments is to go for increasingly soft versions of (...) modularity. One such version, which I call the “system” view, is so soft that it promises to meet practically any challenge neuroscience can throw at it. In this paper, I reconsider afresh what we ought to regard as the sine qua non of modularity and offer a few arguments against the view that an insipid “system” module could be the legitimate successor of the traditional notion. (shrink)

Background: Ethics, being a fundamental component of nursing practice, must be integrated in the nursing education curriculum. Even though different bodies are promoting ethics and nursing researchers have already carried out work as regards this concept, it still remains difficult to clearly identify the components of this competence. Objective: This integrative review intends to clarify this point in addition to better defining ethical competence in the context of nursing practice. Method: An integrative review was carried out, for the 2009–2014 period, (...) in the CINAHL, MEDLINE, and EMBASE databases and in the journal Nursing Ethics. The keywords nursing ethics or ethical competence were used in order to make sure to widely encompass the concept of “ethical competence” in the case of a university curriculum in nursing. In the end, 89 articles were selected. Ethical consideration: We have respected the ethical requirements required regarding the sources and authorship. There is no conflict of interest in this literature review. Results: Ethical sensitivity, Ethical knowledge, Ethical reflection, Ethical decision-making, Ethical action, and Ethical behavior are the most frequently used terms with regard to ethical competence in nursing. They were then defined so as to better ascertain the possible components of ethical competence in nursing. Conclusion: Even though ethical competence represents a sine qua non competence in nursing practice, no consensus can be found in literature with respect to its definition. The identification of its components and their relationships resulting from this integrative review adds to the clarification of its definition. It paves the way for other studies that will contribute to a better understanding of its development, especially among nursing students and practicing nurses, as well as the factors that may exert an influence. More adapted education strategies can thus be put forward to support its development. (shrink)

This paper argues that it has been widely assumed by philosophers of science that the cumulative retention of explanatory success is a "sine qua non" for making judgements about the progress or rational preferability of one theory over another. It has also been assumed that it is impossible to make objective, Comparative judgements of the acceptability of rival theories unless all the statements of both theories could be translated into a common language. This paper seeks to show that both (...) these dogmas are mistaken; that progress without cumulativity and comparability without commensurability are both viable. (shrink)

When the original Dutch version of this book was presented in 1971 to the University of Leiden as a thesis for the Doctorate in philosophy, I was prevented by the academic mores of that university from expressing my sincere thanks to three members of the Philosophical Faculty for their support of and interest in my pursuits. I take the liberty of doing so now, two and a half years later. First and foremost I want to thank Professor G. Nuchelmans warmly (...) for his expert guidance of my research. A number of my most im portant sources were brought to my attention by him. During the whole process of composing this book his criticism and encouragement were carried out in a truly academic spirit. He thereby provided working conditions that are a sine qua non for every author who is attempting to approach controversial matters in a scientific manner, conditions which, however, were not easily available at that time. In a later phase I also came into contact with Professors L. M. de Rijk and J. B. Ubbink, with both of whom I had highly stimulating discussions and exchanges of ideas. The present edition contains some entirely new sections, viz. 1-9, IV-29, V-9, V-20, VII-14 (iii), (iv), VII-17 (i), VIII-22, IX-17, IX-19, X-9 and XI-8. Section X-9 was inspired by a remark made by Professor A. (shrink)

Practical wisdom is the sine qua non of good conduct for Aristotelian virtue ethicists. Aristotelians conceive it as the virtue responsible for the intellectual side of good conduct, which involves having the right goal and deliberating well about what fulfils that goal, among other tasks. But is there any such trait as practical wisdom? Given the diversity of jobs practical wisdom is asked to do (seven goals are often enumerated), there may be a cluster of traits corresponding to what (...) Aristotelians are talking about, so there really isn’t one trait. In this paper, I defend a traditional Aristotelian position on practical wisdom, arguing that it is one thing despite having different functions. Following Thomas Aquinas, we can see practical wisdom as having parts. Those parts may be psychological components (integral parts) of the trait, or they may be derivative functions (virtual parts), things that someone with practical wisdom is also able to do because they have practical wisdom. Still, practical wisdom is one because it is a trait that functions to enable us to pursue the good as good; it possesses what I will call here ‘practical unity’ as the master virtue of praxis or acting well full stop. (shrink)

This paper argues that spacetime visualisability is not a necessary condition for the intelligibility of theories in physics. Visualisation can be an important tool for rendering a theory intelligible, but it is by no means a sine qua non. The paper examines the historical transition from classical to quantum physics, and analyses the role of visualisability and its relation to intelligibility. On the basis of this historical analysis, an alternative conception of the intelligibility of scientific theories is proposed, based (...) on Heisenberg 's reinterpretation of the notion of Anschaulichkeit. (shrink)

Joshua Greene’s dual process account contends that deontological moral judgments are the result of intuitions that are automatic, emotional and arational. Deontological intuitions cannot be trusted, Greene argues, because they are arationally acquired and deployed. However, the empirical evidence taken to support this view is methodologically flawed and does not support the utilitarianism-rational and deontology-emotional links that dual process theorists postulate. Instead, the available evidence supports a social domain account of moral development, in which the acquisition of moral intuitions is (...) a rational process. That is, one acquires moral intuitions through repeated exposure to and reasoned engagement with moral information. The deployment of moral intuitions is not arational merely because it is not easily open to introspection. Indeed, if introspection were the sine qua non of rationality, then it would follow that the deployment of consequentialist intuitions is also arational. Although deontological intuitions are not infallible, the infirmities of deontological intuitions are equally shared by utilitarian intuitions. Thus, contrary to Greene’s recommendation, one need not abandon her deontological moral intuitions. Instead, intuitions – be they deontological or consequentialist – can be useful tools to guide moral reasoning. (shrink)

The ArgumentWhat are the aims of genetic services? Do any of these aims deserve to be labeled “eugenics”? Answers to these strenuously debated questions depend not just on the facts about genetic testing and screening but also on what is understood by “eugenics,” a term with multiple and contested meanings. This paper explores the impact of efforts to label genetic services “eugenics” and argues that attempts to protect against the charge have seriously distorted discussion about their purpose. Following Ruth Chadwick, (...) I argue that the existence of genetic services presupposes that genetic disease is undesirable and that means should be offered to reduce it. I further argue that the economic cost of such disease is one reason why governments and health care providers deem such services worthwhile. The important question is not whether such cost considerations constitute “eugenics,” but whether they foster practices that are undesirable and, if so, what to do about them. The wielding of the term “eugenics” as a weapon in a war over the expansion of genetic services, conjoined with efforts to dissociate such services from the abortion controversy, has produced a rhetoric about the aims of these services that is increasingly divorced from reality. Candor about these aims is a sine qua non of any useful debate over the legitimacy of the methods used to advance them. (shrink)

I was in Bucharest for a few days, not long before the fall of Ceaucescu’s regime. The fear, both of the authorities and of the people, which reigned in the city was vividly felt everywhere. To be sure, the communist regime was based on a doctrine that called itself ‘dialectic’. Unfortunately, it was a ‘dialectic’ that had nothing to do with dialogue, with listening to the other, respecting the other, and learning from the other. It assumed that ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ (...) were the absolute monopoly of one side – the side which enforced its monopoly by the sheer force of power. The atmosphere couldn’t but be of repression, since there was no room for alternative ideas, which for the dominant ‘dialectic’ were necessarily wrong. There was no room for argument, debate and persuasion other than brainwashing and the passive acceptance of the ideas in power. The reigning doctrine was the nemesis of dialectic, for it denied its sine qua non: tolerance. Sorin grew up in this atmosphere, where in spite of its oppressive character, he developed a concern for truth, a tolerant and gentle character, and a sense for the fundamental value of rational persuasion. No wonder that he was attracted by dialogue and argumentation, and devoted his research to them – not merely as an object of study, but also as a method of research and a form of life. It is an honor for me, as a member of IADA, the association devoted to the study of dialogue founded by Sorin, of ISSA, the society whose object of study is argumentation, of IASC, the association that recognizes and investigates the essential role of controversy in the growth of knowledge and in the improvement of society, and as a friend, to pay a well deserved tribute to Sorin Stati’s memory and to his achievements. He was one of the pioneers in the contemporary study of argumentation. Although his research in this field focused on the linguistic analysis of argumentative discourse, he did not neglect other approaches. His role in leading to the organization, in July 2002 in Lugano, of a memorable conference where the above mentioned three international associations joined forces with the Università della Svizzera Italiana in an interdisciplinary, cooperative as well as contrastive drive for increasing our understanding of the multi-faceted phenomenon of argumentation, was decisive.. (shrink)

Americans have an unwavering faith in democracy and are ever eager to import it to nations around the world. But how democratic is our own "democracy"? If you can vote, if the majority rules, if you have elected representatives--does this automatically mean that you have a democracy? In this eye-opening look at an ideal that we all take for granted, classical scholar Paul Woodruff offers some surprising answers to these questions. Drawing on classical literature, philosophy, and history--with many intriguing passages (...) from Sophocles, Aesop, and Plato, among others--Woodruff immerses us in the world of ancient Athens to uncover how the democratic impulse first came to life. The heart of the book isolates seven conditions that are the sine qua non of democracy: freedom from tyranny (including the tyranny of majority rule), harmony (the blending of different views), the rule of law, natural equality, citizen wisdom, reasoning without knowledge, and general education. He concludes that a true democracy must be willing to invite everyone to join in government. It must respect the rule of law so strongly that even the government is not above the law. True democracy must be mature enough to accept changes that come from the people. And it must be willing to pay the price of education for thoughtful citizenship. Ancient Athens didn't always live up to these ideals. Nor does modern America. If we learn anything from the story of Athens, Woodruff concludes, it should be this--never lose sight of the ideals of democracy. This compact, eloquent book illuminates these ideals and lights the way as we struggle to keep democracy alive at home and around the world. (shrink)

Este volumen colectivo se suma al 150 aniversario del fallecimiento de Arthur Schopenhauer, cuyo pensamiento tiene una enorme vigencia siglo y medio después, acaso entre otras muchas cosas por haber querido tender puentes entre categorías occidentales y orientales −una suerte de Buda de Occidente−, al no desdeñar ninguna tradición y oficiar como buen escanciador de autores clásicos e inmisericorde crítico del academicismo carpetovetónico. Este autor figura de manera inequívoca entre los grandes pensadores del ayer con proyección para el mañana. Fue (...) a la par un tábano punzante contra la vulgaridad pública y un promotor de la paideia de la excelencia. El Encuentro internacional celebrado en el Instituto de Filosofía del CSIC propició que se publiquen aquí las contribuciones aportadas por especialistas alemanes, italianos y españoles. La Colección de Clásicos europeos (que dirige Roberto R. Aramayo) pretende rescatar del olvido algunos textos fundamentales para comprender mejor nuestro presente, al poner en valor la impronta que han legado a Europa y al mundo determinados pensadores europeos. Como complemento a esa colección de textos, este volumen sobre Schopenhauer inaugura la serie de Diálogos con Clásicos europeos, que quisiera cumplir en castellano un papel similar al jugado por los Companions filosóficos de Cambridge. Conviene seguir dialogando con ciertos autores que forman parte del entramado de nuestro acervo cultural, pues no en vano el diálogo es condición sine qua non del filosofar. (shrink)

The existence of differences in time, meant to be structure ‹T,<›, where the earlier-later relation < is a linear ordering, dense and without the first and the last element, is a sine qua non condition of changes taking place at any temporal instant. Therefore it is impossible to give a definition of the operator of change ↑ (the intended meaning of the phrase „↑α” is „it is changing now what a states”) in the language Lͭ of Tense Logic calculi (...) containing, besides classical sentential connectives, temporal categories: G, H, F, P. The paper contains the proof of this statement. (shrink)

Consistency is often pictured as an indispensable requisite for rationality. The paper argues that this is overly rigoristic. Inconsistency can be treated as a matter of isolable singularities rather than an all-destructive disaster. The paper, supports and illustrates a perspective on which consistency can be seen as a desideratum rather than a totaly non-negotiable demand. The argumentation of the paper casts consistency in the role of a cognitive ideal rather than a sine qua non condition of rational process.

Irving Singer has defended the thesis that the "fine gold thread" of love, its sine qua non, is the bestowal of value by the lover on the beloved, even in those cases where the love itself is grounded in a positive appraisal of the beloved's attributes. He suggests that bestowal is a matter of elevating the importance of the beloved and his or her needs and interests above their appraised merit. I argue that love's bestowal is principally effected through (...) speech acts of the kind that John Searle refers to as _Status Function Declarations_, the very same linguistic mechanism by which, according to him, all of social or institutional reality is created. On this picture, the roles of lover and beloved are shown to be status functions constituted by a deontology that delineates the partiality of the former towards the latter. (shrink)