Purpose: This paper demonstrates the conceptual relevance of Maturana’s biology of cognition for the theoretical foundations of the language sciences. Approach: Stuck in rationalizing, rather than naturalizing, language, modern orthodox linguistics is incapable of offering a comprehensible account of language as a species-specific, biologically grounded human feature. This predicament can be overcome by using Maturana’s theory to stress that lived experience gives language an epistemological “lining.” Findings: The key concepts of Maturana’s biology of cognition provide a (...) more coherent theoretical framework for the study of language that can give new life to the language sciences by stressing languaging and the importance of connotation. Conclusion: Maturana’s concept of “languaging” allows the language sciences to depart from the view of language as a system of symbols. Instead, focus should be placed on how the relational dynamics of linguistic interactions trigger changes in the dynamics of the nervous system and the organism as a whole, and how their reciprocal causality is distinguished and described by the languaging observer in terms of mind, intelligence, reason, and self-consciousness. (shrink)

The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition.

The 'developmental systems' perspective in biology is intended to replace the idea of a genetic program. This new perspective is strongly convergent with recent work in psychology on situated/embodied cognition and on the role of external 'scaffolding' in cognitive development. Cognitive processes, including those which can be explained in evolutionary terms, are not 'inherited' or produced in accordance with an inherited program. Instead, they are constructed in each generation through the interaction of a range of developmental resources. The (...) attractors which emerge during development and explain robust and/or widespread outcomes are themselves constructed during the process. At no stage is there an explanatory stopping point where some resources control or program the rest of the developmental cascade. 'Human nature' is a description of how things generally turn out, not an explanation of why they turn out that way. Finally, we suggest that what is distinctive about human development is its degree of reliance on external scaffolding. (shrink)

According to the traditional nomological-deductive methodology of physics and chemistry [Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948], explaining a phenomenon means subsuming it under a law. Logic becomes then the glue of explanation and laws the primary explainers. Thus, the scientific study of a system would consist in the development of a logically sound model of it, once the relevant observables (state variables) are identified and the general laws governing their change (expressed as differential equations, state transition rules, maximization/minimization principles,. . . ) (...) are well determined, together with the initial or boundary conditions for each particular case. Often this also involves making a set of assumptions about the elementary components of the system (e.g., their structural and dynamic properties) and modes of local interaction. In this framework, predictability becomes the main goal and that is why research is carried out through the construction of accurate mathematical models. Thus, physics and chemistry have made most progress so far by focusing on systems that, either due to their intrinsic properties or to the conditions in which they are investigated, allow for very strong simplifying assumptions, under which, nevertheless, those highly idealized models of reality are deemed to be in good correspondence with reality itself. Despite the enormous success that this methodology has had, the study of living and cognitive phenomena had to follow a very different road, because these phenomena are produced by systems whose underlying material structure and organization do not permit such crude approximations. Seen from the perspective of physics or chemistry, biological and cognitive systems are made of an enormous number of parts or elements interacting in non-linear and selective ways, which makes very difficult their tractability through mathematical models. In addition, many of those interacting elements are hierarchically organized, in a way that the “macroscopic” (observable) parts behave according to rules that cannot be, in practice, derived from simple principles at the level of their “microscopic” dynamics.. (shrink)

In _The Biology of Clinical Encounters_, Gedo utilizes recent findings in neuroscience and cognitive psychology to elaborate his conception of psychobiology and to consider its implications in clinical analysis. He pursues this challenging undertaking in several directions. He illuminates the way in which psychobiology enters into his hierarchical model of mental functioning, and goes on to examine three clinical syndromes - phobias, obsessions, and affective disturbances - in which biological considerations are particularly important. Of special note are chapters examining (...) the implications of a biological approach for clinical psychoanalysis. Gedo explores the notion of transference that grows out of attentiveness to psychobiological factors, elaborates the concept of therapeutics that follows from looking beyond mental contents, and discusses the problem of assessing clinical evidence produced by analyses informed by a psychobiological orientation. Drawing on his own analytic work of over three decades, he compares analyses conducted with a psychobiological orientation with the outcome of analyses conducted earlier in his career with a more traditional psychological approach. A stimulating introduction to the interpenetration of the biological and the psychological in clinical work, _The Biology of Clinical Encounters_ is quintessential Gedo: scholarly in conception, elegant in tone, provocative in import, and illuminating, always, of fundamental issues about the status of psychoanalysis as a science of mind. (shrink)

What is the function of cognition? On one influential account, cognition evolved to co-ordinate behaviour with environmental change or complexity. Liberal interpretations of this view ascribe cognition to an extraordinarily broad set of biological systems—even bacteria, which modulate their activity in response to salient external cues, would seem to qualify as cognitive agents. However, equating cognition with adaptive flexibility per se glosses over important distinctions in the way biological organisms deal with environmental complexity. Drawing on contemporary (...) advances in theoretical biology and computational neuroscience, we cash these distinctions out in terms of different kinds of generative models, and the representational and uncertainty-resolving capacities they afford. This analysis leads us to propose a formal criterion for delineating cognition from other, more pervasive forms of adaptive plasticity. On this view, biological cognition is rooted in a particular kind of functional organisation; namely, that which enables the agent to detach from the present and engage in counterfactual inference. (shrink)

Philosophers tend to focus on the metaphysics of functions: establishing unifying theories employing general criteria for being a function, avoiding spooky backward causation, distinguishing functions from accidents, and correctly representing the functional structure of the world. We show that there is a need for localized, practice-sensitive accounts of the epistemology of functions—accounts that explain the identification, justification, and explanatory applications of function attributions in particular scientific contexts—and that this need is best met alongside a plurality of unifying metaphysical theories of (...) functions. Our argument begins with the observation that unifying theories assume that (i) functions are discovered or justified by criteria for being a function and (ii) criteria identified in a theory are generally applicable across target systems. We then draw on examples from cognitive science and ecology to show that function ascriptions are sometimes presupposed or assigned based on highly contextual epistemic factors not described in unifying metaphysical theories. (shrink)

_Abstract_: We argue that theoretical debates in biology and cognitive science often are based around differences in the posited _locus of control _for biological and cognitive phenomena. Internalists about locus of control posit that specific causal control over the phenomenon is exerted by factors internal (to the relevant subsystem) of an organism. Externalists posit that causally specific influence is due to external factors. In theoretical biology, we suggest, a minimal agreement has developed that the locus of control for (...) heritable variation is _distributed _– that is, both internal and external factors exert specific, non-redundant causal influence on evolved traits. We suggest that debates in cognitive science, particularly surrounding “enactivism”, should also embrace a distributed locus of control. We show how both internal and external factors contribute non-redundantly to psychological capacities and behavior. We further suggest that embracing a distributed locus of control provides a basis for a revisionary, but substantive account of “mental representation”. _Keywords_: Locus of control; Internalism/Externalism; Evolutionary Biology; Cognitive Science; Mental Representation _ Loci di controllo distribuiti: superare le vecchie dicotomie nella biologia e nella scienza cognitiva _ _Riassunto_: Numerose discussioni in biologia e nella scienza cognitiva vertono spesso su differenze nella individuazione del _locus di controllo_ dei fenomeni biologici e cognitivi. Posizioni internaliste rispetto al _locus di controllo_ ritengono che il controllo causale specifico su un fenomeno biologico o cognitivo venga esercitato da fattori interni a (un sottosistema rilevante) di un organismo. Al contrario, posizioni esternaliste assumono che specifiche influenze causali siano dovute a fattori esterni. In questo articolo mostriamo che nell’ambito della biologia teorica si è giunti a un minimo accordo rispetto al fatto che il _locus di controllo_ per l’emergere di variazioni ereditarie è _distribuito _– ossia dovuto sia a fattori interni che esterni all’organismo che esercitano influenze specifiche e non-ridondanti sui tratti che si sono evoluti. Riteniamo che tale accordo debba essere raggiunto anche nell’ambito della scienza cognitiva, in particolare per quel che concerne l’_enattivismo_. In questo articolo mostriamo che sia i fattori interni che quelli esterni contribuiscono in maniera non-ridondante alle capacità psicologiche e al comportamento di un individuo. Inoltre sosterremo che l’adozione di un _locus di controllo _distribuito possa costituire un buon punto di partenza per una revisione sostanziale della nozione di “rappresentazione mentale”. _Parole chiave_: Locus di controllo causale; Internalismo/Esternalismo; Biologia evolutiva; Scienze cognitive; Rappresentazione mentale _ _. (shrink)

Contemporary immunology has established its fundamental theory as a biological expression of personal identity, wherein the "immune self" is defended by the immune system. Protection of this agent putatively requires a cognitive capacity by which the self and the foreign are perceived and thereby discriminated; from such information, discernment of the environment is achieved and activation of pathways leading to an immune response may be initiated. This so-called cognitive paradigm embeds such functions as "perception," "recognition," "learning," and "memory" to characterize (...) immune processes, but the conceptual character of such functions has meanings that vary with the particular theory adopted. When different formulations of cognition are considered, immunology's conceptual infrastructure shifts: Extensions of conventional psychological understanding of representational cognition based on a subject-object dichotomy support notions of immune agency; alternatively, formulations of perception that dispense with representations and attendant notions of agency reconfigure the predicate epistemology dominating current immune theory. Reviewing immunological literature of the past five decades, these two understandings of perception – representational and non-representational – offer competing views of immune cognitive functions. These, in turn, provide competing philosophical understandings of immunology's conceptual foundations, which reflect parallel controversies dominating current debates in philosophy of mind and attendant discussions about personal identity. (shrink)

Lieder and Griffiths rightly urge that computational cognitive models be constrained by resource usage, but they should go further. The brain's primary function is to regulate resource usage. As a consequence, resource usage should not simply select among algorithmic models of “aspects of cognition.” Rather, “aspects of cognition” should be understood as existing in the service of resource management.

Arbib offers a comprehensive, elegant formulation of brain/language evolution; with significant implications for social as well as biological sciences. Important psychological antecedents and later correlates are presupposed; their conceptual enrichment through protosign and protospeech is abbreviated in favor of practical communication. What culture “is” and whether protosign and protospeech involve a protoculture are not considered. Arbib also avoids dealing with the question of evolution of mind, consciousness, and self.

Recent years have seen a gradual convergence of seemingly distant research fields over a single goal: understanding and replicating biological intelligence in artifacts. This work presents a general overview on the origin, the state-of-the-art, scientific challenges and the future of Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) research. Our perspective decomposes the field into the four principal semantic components associated with the BICA challenge that together call for an integration of efforts of researchers across disciplines. Areas and directions of study where new (...) integrated efforts will be primarily needed are summarized. (shrink)

The present essay aims at integrating different concepts of meaning developed in semiotics, biology, and cognitive science, in a way that permits the formulation of issues involving evolution and development. The concept of sign in semiotics, just like the notion of representation in cognitive science, have either been used too broadly, or outright rejected. My earlier work on the notions of iconicity and pictoriality has forced me to spell out the taken-forgranted meaning of the sign concept, both in the (...) Saussurean and the Peircean tradition. My work with the evolution and development of semiotic resources such as language, gesture, and pictures has proved the need of having recourse to a more specified concept of sign. To define the sign, I take as point of departure the notion of semiotic function (by Piaget), and the notion of appresentation (by Husserl). In the first part of this essay, I compare cognitive science and semiotics, in particular as far as the parallel concepts of representation and sign are concerned. The second part is concerned with what is probably the most important attempt to integrate cognitive science and semiotics that has been presented so far, The Symbolic Species, by Terrence Deacon. I criticize Deacon’s use of notions such as iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity. I choose to separate the sign concept from the notions of iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity, which only in combination with the sign give rise to icons, indices, and symbols, but which, beyond that, have other, more elemental, uses in the world of perception. In the third part, I discuss some ideas about meaning in biosemiotics, which I show not to involve signs in the sense characterised earlier in the essay. Instead, they use meaning in the general sense of selection and organisation, which is a more elementary sense of meaning. Although I admit that there is a possible interpretation of Peirce, which could be taken to correspond to Uexküll’s idea of functional circle, and to meaning as function described by Emmeche and Hoffmeyer, I claim thatthis is a different sense of meaning than the one embodied in the sign concept. Finally, I suggest that more thresholds of meaning than proposed, for instanceby Kull, are necessary to accommodate the differences between meaning (in the broad sense) and sign (as specified in the Piaget–Husserl tradition). (shrink)

Philosophy of science has seen a passionate debate over the influence of non-cognitive values on theory choice. In this paper, we argue against a dichotomous divide between cognitive and non-cognitive values and for the possibility of a dual role for feminist values. By analyzing the influence of feminist values on evolutionary psychology and evolutionary biology, we show how they have cognitive and non-cognitive functions at the same time.

The primary objective of this essay is to establish a basis for the development of a socio-biological approach to understanding the phenomenon of technological society and technical change, one that also serves to bridge the gap that has grown between natural science and social theory. The objective stems from the belief that an ecological crisis is looming that will require a new form of pragmatism from which new instruments for analysis, evaluation, and implementation can emerge and which, of necessity, will (...) be multidisciplinary in character. One possible intellectual framework is proposed, that of a biology of technology, a conceptualization of human organization woven from an unlikely mix of theoretical perspectives. The most consequential of these is structural determinism, a tenet of autopoietic theory (also known as the biology of cognition). Other elements, including actor network theory, a metatheory of technology, and cognitive anthropology are explored before proceeding to consider some implications should the thesis be adopted. (shrink)

Many philosophers and neuroscientists defend a view we express with the slogan that mental science is neuroscience. We argue that there are two ways of interpreting this view, depending on what is meant by ‘neuroscience’. On one interpretation, the view is that mental science is cognitive neuroscience, where this is the science that integrates psychology with the biology of the brain. On another interpretation, the view is that mental science is biological neuroscience, where this is the investigation concerned with (...) the chemistry, physiology and anatomy of neurons and neuronal assemblies. Since the claim about cognitive neuroscience is a scientific triviality, we concentrate on the claim about biological neuroscience, and criticise two initially promising lines of argument for it, one prompted by reflection on the history of biology, and one prompted by reflection on the neurophysiological process known as long‐term potentiation, which may be implicated in learning. We argue that neither of these arguments is successful in supporting the view that mental science is biological neuroscience. (shrink)

Contemporary literature distinguishes two ways to defend the claim that cognition is a matter of representations: one, cognition involves representation-hungry tasks; two, cognition involves a complex form of informational covariation between subcomponents of a system with an adaptive function. Each of these conceptions involves a different notion of representation, and promotes a particular view of the architecture of cognition. But despite the differences, each of them aims to support the claim that cognition is a matter (...) of representations on architectural constraints. The objective of this article is twofold: one, it is argued that architectural constraints do not entail either of those two ways to defend the claim that cognition is a matter of representations; two, it is claimed that both notions of representation share an objectionable common element – namely, the idea of a model that grounds the representational reading– that must be abandoned, in favor of a more economical explanation in terms of causal relations, in order to get a clear view of cognition. (shrink)

We discuss foundational issues of quantum information biology —one of the most successful applications of the quantum formalism outside of physics. QIB provides a multi-scale model of information processing in bio-systems: from proteins and cells to cognitive and social systems. This theory has to be sharply distinguished from “traditional quantum biophysics”. The latter is about quantum bio-physical processes, e.g., in cells or brains. QIB models the dynamics of information states of bio-systems. We argue that the information interpretation of quantum (...) mechanics is the most natural interpretation of QIB. Biologically QIB is based on two principles: adaptivity; openness. These principles are mathematically represented in the framework of a novel formalism— quantum adaptive dynamics which, in particular, contains the standard theory of open quantum systems. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of objectivism vs constructivism in two areas,biology and cognitive science, which areintermediate between the natural sciences suchas physics (where objectivism is dominant) andthe human and social sciences (whereconstructivism is widespread). The issues inbiology and in cognitive science are intimatelyrelated; in each of these twin areas, the objectivism vs constructivism issue isinterestingly and rather evenly balanced; as aresult, this issue engenders two contrastingparadigms, each of which has substantialspecific scientific content. The neo-Darwinianparadigm in biology is (...) closely resonant withthe classical cognitivist paradigm in cognitivescience, and both of them are intrinsicallyobjectivist. The organismic paradigm inbiology, based on the concept of autopoiesis,is consonant with the paradigm of enaction incognitive science; the latter paradigms are bothprofoundly constructivist.In cognitive science, the objectivism vsconstructivism issue is internal to thescientific field itself and reflexivity isinescapable. At this level, strong ontologicalobjectivism is self-contradictory and thereforeuntenable. Radical constructivism isself-coherent; but it also rehabilitatesa weak form of objectivism as a pragmaticallyviable alternative. In conclusion, there is aneven-handed reciprocity between objectivistand constructivist perspectives. Finally, thearticle examines the consequences of thisconclusion for fields other than cognitivescience: biology; physics and the naturalsciences; and the human and social sciences. (shrink)

Behavior and cognition, once conceived as psychological or interpersonal in origin, are increasingly thought to arise from biology. After investigating the validity of this trend of thinking, the article attempts to interpret what it means to the discipline of psychology. Two main categories of interpretation are discussed. First, this trend could mean that biological factors ultimately underlie traditionally psychological explanations i.e., biological factors are a sufficient condition for understanding behavior and cognition. Second, this trend could indicate that (...) biological factors are important, and perhaps even traditionally overlooked, but are not sufficient in themselves to explain human behavior and cognition i.e., biological factors are necessary conditions among other necessary conditions. The practical and methodological implications of each of these two interpretations are clarified, with a special focus on relevant research limitations. We conclude that the evidence does not bear out a sufficiency thesis and, instead, supports more convincingly a necessity understanding of these trends. (shrink)

Providing a new conceptual scaffold for further research in biology and cognition, this book introduces the new field of cognitive biology, a systems biology approach showing that further progress in this field will depend on a deep recognition of developmental processes, as well as on the consideration of the developed organism as an agent able to modify and control its surrounding environment. The role of cognition, the means through which the organism is able to cope (...) with its environment, cannot be underestimated. In particular, it is shown that this activity is grounded on a theory of information based on Bayesian probabilities. The organism is considered as a cybernetic system able to integrate a processor as a source of variety (the genetic system), a regulator of its own homeostasis (the metabolic system), and a selecting system separating the self from the non-self (the membrane in unicellular organisms). Any organism is a complex system that can survive only if it is able to maintain its internal order against the spontaneous tendency towards disruption. Therefore, it is forced to monitor and control its environment and so to establish feedback circuits resulting in co-adaptation. Cognitive and biological processes are shown to be inseparable. (shrink)

Cognitive gadgets are distinctively human cognitive mechanisms – such as imitation, mind reading, and language – that have been shaped by cultural rather than genetic evolution. New gadgets emerge, not by genetic mutation, but by innovations in cognitive development; they are specialised cognitive mechanisms built by general cognitive mechanisms using information from the sociocultural environment. Innovations are passed on to subsequent generations, not by DNA replication, but through social learning: People with new cognitive mechanisms pass them on to others through (...) social interaction. Some of the new mechanisms, like literacy, have spread through human populations, while others have died out, because the holders had more students, not just more babies. The cognitive gadgets hypothesis is developed through four case studies, drawing on evidence from comparative and developmental psychology, experimental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. The framework employed – cultural evolutionary psychology, a descendant of evolutionary psychology and cultural evolutionary theory – addresses parallel issues across the cognitive and behavioural sciences. In common with evolutionary developmental biology and the extended evolutionary synthesis, cultural evolutionary psychology underlines the importance of developmental processes and environmental factors in the emergence of human cognition. In common with computational approaches, it emphasises the power of general-purpose mechanisms of learning. Cultural evolutionary psychology, however, also challenges use of the behavioural gambit in economics and behavioural ecology, and rejects the view that human minds are composed of “innate modules” or “cognitive instincts.”. (shrink)

This paper analyses conceptual and experimental work in synthetic biology on different types of interactions considered as minimal examples or models of communication. It discusses their pertinence and relevance for the wider understanding of this biological and cognitive phenomenon. It critically analyses their limits and it argues that a conceptual framework is needed. As a possible solution, it provides a theoretical account of communication based on the notion of organisation, and characterised in terms of the functional influence exerted by (...) the sender upon the receiver. It shows that this account can be operationalised in synthetic biology, and that it can supply criteria and guidelines for the design and evaluation of synthetic models. (shrink)

From Descartes to Popper, philosophers have criticized and tried to improve the strategies of reasoning invoked in science and in everyday life. In recent years leading cognitive psychologists have painted a detailed, controversial, and highly critical portrait of common sense reasoning. Stephen Stich begins with a spirited defense of this work and a critique of those writers who argue that widespread irrationality is a biological or conceptual impossibility.Stich then explores the nature of rationality and irrationality: What is it that distinguishes (...) good reasoning from bad? He rejects the most widely accepted approaches to this question approaches which unpack rationality by appeal to truth, to reflective equilibrium or conceptual analysis. The alternative he defends grows out of the pragmatic tradition in which reasoning is viewed as a cognitive tool. Stich's version of pragmatism leads to a radical epistemic relativism and he argues that the widespread abhorrence of relativism is ill founded. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Alzheimer's Disease, Mild Cognitive Impairment, and the Biology of Intrinsic AgingThomas B. L. Kirkwood (bio)Keywordsaging, Alzheimer’s disease, genetic mutation, mild cognitive impairment, telomereThe article by Gaines and Whitehouse (2006) raises key questions about the uncertain relationship between (i) the intrinsic, "normal" aging process, and (ii) the clinicopathologic states represented by the labels of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and mild cognitive impairment (MCI). This short commentary offers a perspective on (...) this debate that is drawn from a consideration of underlying biological mechanisms.Because age is unquestionably the greatest single risk factor associated with AD and MCI, I begin by asking what we know about the intrinsic processes of aging. The central feature of current understanding of intrinsic aging is that it consists of the gradual, lifelong accumulation of a wide variety of molecular and cellular faults that begins very early in life and eventually leads to overt functional impairments resulting in age-related frailty, disability, and disease (Kirkwood 2005). This is an essentially bottom-up process. A strong consensus has emerged in recent years that there is no active program for aging and that there are no genetic factors that have evolved specifically to cause aging or age-related diseases. Unquestionably, there are genes that influence susceptibility to disease and even length of life, but these genes are genes for maintenance and repair functions, not for aging. It is the limitation in the past evolutionary pressure to invest in greater longevity than was required, within an environment where life was usually truncated by hazards such as starvation, injury, or infection, that means that our maintenance systems—good as they are—are insufficient to keep us going indefinitely. Added to this is the idea that there are probably also genes that program processes that are good for the young organism, but which may in later life have harmful effects. Processes like inflammation and apoptosis, which are seen to occur extensively in aged tissues, including brain, surely evolved to help cope with infection and cellular damage arising earlier in life. That they are called into play in aged tissues is a direct, but secondary, consequence of accumulated damage.With this general framework to understand the intrinsic biology of aging, let us now ask what we might expect a priori for the aging of an organ such [End Page 79] as the brain. Although we cannot pretend complete ignorance of how the brain actually does age, our enquiry can be based entirely on data from other organ systems, so we can develop our predictions about brain aging without prejudice.Aging begins very early during human development, faults accumulating from the first stages of embryonic development. Each time a cell divides, each of the daughter cells is likely to acquire a few new mutations. We know this from the estimates for the error rate in DNA replication and the size of the human genome. It is confirmed by direct evidence that at individual gene loci where mutations have been measured, mutation frequency increases with age (Morley 1998; Vijg 2000). In addition to replication errors, DNA is damaged on a daily basis to a very considerable degree by agents such as reactive oxygen species (free radicals), which are formed as byproducts of normal cellular metabolism. Although most of this damage is corrected by repair, the repair mechanisms themselves are not error free and additional mutations accumulate through this route. If a mutation is lethal to the cell, the cell dies and thus the mutation is eliminated. However, the majority of mutations are nonlethal, either because the mutation is recessive and the cell carries an intact gene copy on the other chromosome, because the gene is not currently required, or because the mutation produces only a delayed deleterious effect. Examples of genes that produce delayed deleterious effects include the genes responsible for familial AD. It is interesting to reflect that on statistical grounds alone, it is almost certain that each of us carries a randomly determined fraction of cells in our brains that bear amyloid precursor protein or presenilin mutations associated with AD. We also carry a heterogeneous array of random mutations that compromise essential cell maintenance functions. How many such... (shrink)

A noted philosopher and member of the Institute for Cognitive and Brain Science examines flaws in current understandings about consciousness while proposing a radical solution that argues that consciousness must not be limited to the confines of the brain.

Cognitive processes, cognitive psychology tells us, unfold in our heads. In contrast, several approaches in cognitive engineering argue for a shift of unit of analysis from what is going on in the heads of operators to the workings of whole socio-technical systems. This shift is sometimes presented as part of the development of a new understanding of what cognition is and where the boundaries of cognitive systems are. Cognition, it is claimed, is not just situated or embedded, but (...) extended and distributed in the world. My main question in this article is what the practical significance is of this framing of an expanded unit of analysis in a cognitive vocabulary. I focus on possible consequences for how cognitive engineering practitioners think about function allocation in system design, and on what the relative benefits and costs are of having a common framework and vocabulary for talking about both human and technical system components. I argue for what I call an *expansive but deflated conception of cognition*, primarily on pragmatic grounds. In addition, I claim that the important lesson of the “boundaries of cognition” debate in cognitive science is the negative claim that there is not anything special about the biological boundary of the skin and skull per se, rather than some positive claim about where the boundaries of extended or distributed cognitive systems really are. I also examine the role of the concept of cognition in the theoretical frameworks of distributed cognition, joint cognitive systems (also known as cognitive system engineering), and cognitive work analysis. (shrink)

abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including (...) genetic) interventions could thus accelerate the advance of science, or its application, and so increase the risk of the development or misuse of weapons of mass destruction. We argue that this is a reason which speaks against the desirability of cognitive enhancement, and the consequent speedier growth of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by an extensive moral enhancement of humankind. We review the possibilities for moral enhancement by biomedical and genetic means and conclude that, though it should be possible in principle, it is in practice probably distant. There is thus a reason not to support cognitive enhancement in the foreseeable future. However, we grant that there are also reasons in its favour, but we do not attempt to settle the balance between these reasons for and against. Rather, we conclude that if research into cognitive enhancement continues, as it is likely to, it must be accompanied by research into moral enhancement. (shrink)

The computational program for theoretical neuroscience initiated by Marr and Poggio (1977) calls for a study of biological information processing on several distinct levels of abstraction. At each of these levels — computational (defining the problems and considering possible solutions), algorithmic (specifying the sequence of operations leading to a solution) and implementational — significant progress has been made in the understanding of cognition. In the past three decades, computational principles have been discovered that are common to a wide range (...) of functions in perception (vision, hearing, olfaction) and action (motor control). More recently, these principles have been applied to the analysis of cognitive tasks that require dealing with structured information, such as visual scene understanding and analogical reasoning. Insofar as language relies on cognition-general principles and mechanisms, it should be possible to capitalize on the recent advances in the computational study of cognition by extending its methods to linguistics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Handbook of Cognitive Mathematics ed. by Marcel DanesiNathan HaydonMarcel Danesi (Ed) Handbook of Cognitive Mathematics Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2022, vii + 1383, including indexFor one acquainted with C.S. Peirce, it is hard to see Springer's recent Handbook of Cognitive Mathematics (editor: Marcel Danesi) through none other than a Peircean lens. Short for the cognitive science of mathematics, such a modern, scientific pursuit into the nature and study (...) of mathematical practice would no doubt be found agreeable to Peirce. The fact that references to Peirce appear often throughout the Handbook is a welcome find, with Peirce's ideas being a key subject of half a dozen chapters, and where a reader of any other chapter may well find further connections to Peirce's ideas. After spending time with the Handbook, it is clear that cognitive mathematics has not only embraced some of Pierce's ideas but may be at an important forefront of Peirce studies. In the end, the field may well be an area a Peircean should pay attention to.The book itself is pitched as a reference volume to the field (p. v) with the necessary background to familiarize oneself with the aims and results. The connection to cognitive science may call to mind detailed cognitive models [Ch. 10–14], theories on the origins of numeracy and other theories behind the biological and evolutionary requirements of mathematical thought [Ch.15–18], and the like. These are all present. But a key theme of the Handbook is to situate mathematics not just within more traditional 'cognitive' faculties and the more formal, i.e. algebraic, presentations of mathematics, but also to place mathematics within other human faculties and practices, from the arts to language [Ch. 19–22], within education and learning more broadly [Ch. 23–26], and in relation to the significant, though at first perhaps less quantitative parts of mathematics, like the use of metaphor, gesture, analogy, [End Page 243] abstraction, as well as further cultural and ethnographic considerations [Ch. 5–8]. The Handbook has explicitly taken a broader, more interdisciplinary approach (p. vi–vii) towards the scientific aspects of mathematical practice—choosing to regulate the study not by antecedently drawn opinions about what mathematics is (or has traditionally been taken to be) but by what future quantifiable and diverse study may come to bear on the practice and have to say about those engaging in it.This broad interdisciplinarity has a pragmatist ring, where theory cannot so easily be separated from the normative, social, and, more generally, the more thoroughly human aspects that we encounter and employ when we engage in it. Two further commitments of cognitive mathematics steer us even closer towards Peirce's views. The first—going back, for example, to Lakoff and Núñez's Where Mathematics Comes From (2000), which is taken to be a key early work in shaping the field—is that mathematics is taken to be a language like any other and as such must be learned and situated within our other cognitive faculties (p. vi, Ch. 4). The second—and largely, one imagines, following from a concern for seeing how mathematics is actually practiced—is that mathematics is essentially diagrammatic, involving as it does experimenting in diagrams and employing other signs (one may think here even of the mathematician sketching equations or geometric figures on a sheet of paper). What is perhaps initially most noteworthy about Peirce's philosophy of mathematics is his early concern for both these aspects of the practice.The book (more like a tome of over 1300 pages) is too large to be covered here in all its aspects, hence the review will focus on those aspects a Peircean or Pragmatist may find of interest. In particular, this review focuses on several of the themes above—situating mathematics more broadly within our everyday (cognitive) lives, the necessarily diagrammatic, fallible, and creative aspects of the practice, and, finally, what these aspects may have to say about Peirce's philosophy more generally, particularly with respect to (scientific) inquiry.A Peircean reader may well begin with Pietarinen's "Pragmaticism as Philosophy of Cognitive Mathematics" [Ch. 39] and "Peirce on Mathematical... (shrink)

I develop an account of the role that biology plays in the Timaeus’ view of nous and other aspects of cognitive life. I begin by outlining the biology of human cognition. I then argue that these biological views shine an important light on different aspects of the soul. I then argue that the human body is particularly friendly to nous, paying special attention to the heart and the liver. I next consider the ways that the body fails (...) to protect our nous. I conclude by comparing human nous with the cognition of non-humans. (shrink)

We argue that cognitive functions are not reducible to biological functionality. Since only neural animals can develop complex forms of agency, we assume that genuinely cognitive processes are deeply related with the activity of the nervous system. We first analyze the significance of the appearance of the nervous system in certain multicellular organisms, arguing that it has changed the logic of their biological organization. Then, we focus on the appearance of specifically cognitive capacities within the nervous system. Considering a case (...) of a minimal form of perceptual representation, we analyze the specific functional role of this minimal form of activity in relatively earlier nervous systems, arguing that though this role is only understandable within a biological organization, yet it is not reducible to the underlying biological functionality. Finally, we conclude that the appearance of cognition is in turn linked to the emergence of an autonomous neurodynamic domain and a qualitative change in body complexity. (shrink)

This paper assesses, from a philosophical point of view, the latest cultural neuroscience results that suggest the traditional interpretation of subject of cognition be essentially reconstructed. We must move from a universalistic interpretation of cognitive process to an interpretation taking into explicit account the socio-cultural context of the subject’s activity, as well as often its biological nature. The principle of cultural and cognitive neurobiological determination of knowledge acquisition is proposed. We claim that subject of cognition is fixed in (...) the historical and cultural context and it neurobiologically determined, and thus classical Kantian transcendentalism should be reconsidered in light of recent neuroscience research. (shrink)