What rational foundation underlies argument-critical judgements? What are the canons of argument criticism and how are they to be "justified"? This paper explores an analogy between art- and argument-criticism and argues that the analogy promises not only to illuminate the nature of argument criticism and capture the central goals of instruction in informal logic, but also to resolve fundamental problems at the foundations of normative theory of argument concerning the "justification" of standards (...) of reasoning. (shrink)

I criticize the particular argument for evolutionary progressivism which is based on the concept of a series of "dominant life forms." My procedure is to show that there is no rigorous definition for the concept of "dominant life form." I examine several attempts to define this concept by Julian Huxley and a new formulation of the concept by G. G. Simpson and show that none of the criteria either of these men develop for determining which groups of organisms can (...) be classified as dominant are adequate to exclude any groups of organisms from the classification. The concept proves so broad as to be meaningless. Since it is a key concept in the particular argument for progressivism that I discuss, the criticism of the concept demonstrates the argument to be invalid. (shrink)

The study of argument has never before been so wide-ranging. The evidence for this claim is to be found in a growing number of different conceptions of argument, each of which purports to describe some component of argument that is effectively over-looked by other conceptions of this notion. Just this same sense that a vital component of argument is being overlooked by current conceptions of this notion is what motivates Dale Hample to pursue a specifically cognitive (...) conception of argument. However, Hamples contribution to the study of argument extends beyond his development of a view of argument as cognition. For Hample is reflective on the interrelationship of his cognitive conception of argument to two other views of argument within which most conceptions of this notion may be taken to fall, the traditional view of argument as a textual product and the view of argument as a social phenomenon. I will argue, however, that what starts out as a well-intentioned aim on the part of Hample to pursue a comprehensive analysis of the notion of argument ends in the circumscription of this concept through Hample s denial of the primacy of argument. I will also argue that a circumscribed concept of argument is an unintelligible concept of argument. The context of my claims will be a similar charge of unintelligibility by Hilary Putnam against a logical positivistic conception of rationality. (shrink)

This commentary identifies a range of flaws and contradictions in Parker’s critical realist position and his critique of relativism. In particular we highlight: (1) a range of basic errors in formulating the nature of relativism; (2) contradictions in the understanding and use of rhetoric; (3) problematic recruitment of the oppressed to support his argument; (4) tensions arising from the distinction between working in and against psychology. We conclude that critical realism is used to avoid doing empirical work, on the (...) one hand, and to avoid scholarly interdisciplinary engagement, on the other. (shrink)

우리의 믿음, 욕구, 의도 등은 주관적인 성격을 갖는다. 예컨대, 우리는 존재하지 않는 대상에 대하여도 주관적으로 믿고, 생각하고, 욕구하고, 의도할 수 있다. 그리고 이와 같은 현상은 이러한 심적 태도의 내용이 외적 세계와 독립적으로, 즉 순수히 개인 내적으로 결정된다는 내재론적 직관을 이해할 수 있게 하여준다. 심성 내용이 내재적으로 결정된다는 전통적 견해는 그러나 버지(T. Burge)에 의해 촉발된 소위 심성 내용 외재론 논의에 의해 오늘날 심각하게 도전을 받고 있다. 버지는 퍼트남(H. Putnam)이 제시한 의미 외재론 논증을 응용하여, 의미뿐 아니라 심성 내용 역시 필연적으로 외적 세계의 (...) 인과적, 사회적 관계에 의존한다고 주장한다. 본 논문은 이 주장을 비판적으로 검토한다. 구체적으로, 이러한 주장을 위해 버지가 제시한 형태의 외재론 논증을 비판적으로 분석하고 그것이 충분한 설득력을 가지지 않음을 보이고자 한다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 우선, 심성 내용 외재론 논증이 전형적으로 어떤 형태를 취하는지 구체적으로 살펴보고, 이를 통해 심성 내용 외재론이 궁극적으로 의미론적 근거에 토대하고 있다는 것을 보일 것이다. 다음으로, 심성 내용에 대한 언어적 기술이 심성 내용을 결정하고 이해하는 데 있어 반드시 필요한지 또는 충분한 조건을 이루는지 구체적으로 검토한다. 이 검토를 통해 결국 언어적 기술은 심성 내용을 결정하고 이해하기 위해 필요하지도 충분하지도 않음이 드러날 것이다. 그리고 이러한 점은 결론적으로 심성 내용 외재론이 제시하고 있는 의미론적 근거는 이 이론이 주장하는 외재론적 견해를 뒷받침할 적절한 근거가 되지 않는다는 점을 드러내 보여줄 것이다. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the question: ‘Did Philo in Hume’s Dialogues succeed in undermining Cleanthes’ argument from design?’ Hume’s commentators have differed on their answers. Norman Kemp Smith speaks of Philo’s destructive criticism as “final and complete.” And Professor Bernard Williams, in a recent symposium devoted to Hume, says that “although the argument from Design lingered on through the nineteenth century, and even to the present time, Hume undermined it in a thoroughgoing and definitive manner.” Professor (...) Alvin Plantinga, on the other hand, while conceding that Hume had succeeded in pointing out differences between the universe and things we know to be designed, nevertheless concludes that “there seems to be no reason to think that these differences ruin the argument.”. (shrink)

This paper sheds light on the main issue of this book by affording a side look at a discipline other than economics, namely political theory. It is argued that the contemporary debate in political theory hinges on the question of 'realism'. Through a discussion of Raymond Geuss's work, the paper seeks to show that political theory remains caught between the conflicting requirements of deep contextual analysis and radically critical engagement with the world 'as it is'. Finally, the idea of a (...) 'division of labour' between contextualist and critical approaches to political theory is introduced. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne (Swinburne and Shoemaker 1984; Swinburne 1986) argues that human beings currently alive have non{bodily immaterial parts called souls. In his main argument in support of this conclusion (modal argument), roughly speaking, from the assumption that it is logically possible that a human being survives the destruction of their body and a few additional premises, he infers the actual existence of souls. After a brief presentation of the argument we describe the main known objection to it, (...) called the substitution objection (SO for short), which is raised by Alston and Smythe (1994), Zimmerman (1991) and Stump and Kretzmann (1996). We then explain Swinburne's response to it (1996). This constitutes a background for the discussion that follows. First, we formalize Swinburne's argument in a quantified propositional modal language so that it is logically valid and contains no tacit assumptions, clearing up some notational issues as we go. Having done that, we explain why we find Swinburne's response unsatisfactory. Next, we indicate that even though SO is quite compelling (albeit for a slightly different reason than the one given previously in the literature), a weakening of one of the premises yields a valid argument for the same conclusion and yet immune to SO. Even this version of the argument, we argue, is epistemically circular. (shrink)

다산(茶山)의 『춘추고징(春秋考徵)』에서는 고대의 예제(禮制)의 확립을 목표로 설정하고, 길례(吉禮)와 흉례(凶禮) 분야를 집중적으로 다루고 있다. 특히 이 두 분야는 다양한 이론과 주장, 그리고 논쟁이 끊이지 않는 영역이기 때문에 예제의 정확한 규정을 위해서는 반드시 다루어야 할 부분이다. 『춘추』 삼전(三傳) 중에서도 『좌씨전』은 고대의 다양한 문물제도와 문화, 예제(禮制)를 가장 풍부하게 담고 있으며. 여기에 상세한 주석을 단 인물이 바로 두예(杜預)이다. 고대의 예제 고증에 두예의 주석(註釋)이 매우 중요한 역할을 하지만, 그 속에 포함된 오류까지도 무비판적으로 답습할 경우에는 부정적인 영향력도 그만큼 클 수밖에 없다. 따라서 다산의 입장에서 두예의 오류를 (...) 찾아서 변론하는 일은 매우 중요한 학문적 과제라고 할 수 있다. 본 논문에서는 두예의 이론 중에서 ‘장례를 치르면 바로 상복을 벗는다[旣葬除服]’는 주장에 대한 다산의 비판과 변론에 대해 살펴본다. 두예를 ‘명교(名敎)의 죄인(罪人)’이라고까지 극언할 정도로, 다산에게 이 문제는 매우 중요한 문제로 인식되었다. 다산이 체계적인 논증을 통해 두예의 주장이 근거 없는 억단임을 추론해나가는 과정을 통해서 그의 경전 연구의 방법과 특징을 발견할 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

Alik Pelman proposes a sceptical challenge to the widely accepted thesis that theoretical identities are necessary. His argument relies on the possibility of the manifest criterion of identity. In this article, we argue that given the necessity of the obtaining of the identity criterion, Pelman’s sceptical argument against the necessity of theoretical identities cannot be effective. By comparing Pelman’s sceptical argument with classical sceptical arguments, it is demonstrated that there is a sense in which classical arguments are (...) effective but not Pelman’s. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Heck's new argument for content dualism. This argument is based on the claim that conceptual states, but not perceptual states, meet Evans's Generality Constraint. Heck argues that this claim, together with the idea that the kind of content we should attribute to a mental state depends on which generalizations the state satisfies, implies that conceptual states and perceptual states have different kinds of contents. I argue, however, that it is unlikely that there is (...) a plausible reading of the Generality Constraint under which it is non-trivially true both that conceptual states meet it and that perceptual states do not. Therefore, the soundness of Heck's argument is dubious. En este artículo discuto el nuevo argumento de Heck en favor del dualismo de contenido. Este argumento se basa en la afirmación de que los estados conceptuales, pero no los perceptuales, cumplen con el Requisito de Generalidad de Evans. Heck argumenta que esta afirmación, junto con la idea de que el tipo de contenido que debemos atribuir a un estado mental depende de las generalizaciones que el estado satisface, implica que los estados conceptuales tienen un tipo de contenido diferente del de los estados perceptuales. Yo argumento, sin embargo, que es poco probable que haya una interpretación convincente del Requisito de Generalidad según la cual sea verdadero pero no trivial tanto que los estados conceptuales lo satisfacen como que los perceptuales no. Por lo tanto, la solidez del argumento de Heck es dudosa. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Heck�s (2007) new argument for content dualism. This argument is based on the claim that conceptual states, but not perceptual states, meet Evans�s Generality Constraint. Heck argues that this claim, together with the idea that the kind of content we should attribute to a mental state depends on which generalizations the state satisfies, implies that conceptual states and perceptual states have different kinds of contents. I argue, however, that it is unlikely that there (...) is a plausible reading of the Generality Constraint under which it is non-trivially true both that conceptual states meet it and that perceptual states do not. Therefore, the soundness of Heck�s argument is dubious. (shrink)

What is the relationship between literary criticism and ethics? Does criticism have an ethical task? How can criticism be ethical after literary theory? Ethical Criticism seeks to answer these questions by examining the historical development of the ethics of criticism and the vigorous contemporary backlash against what is known as 'theory'. The book appraises current arguments about the ethics of criticism and, finding them wanting, turns to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Described as 'the (...) greatest moral philosopher of the twentieth century', Levinas' thought has had a profound influence on a number of significant contemporary thinkers. By paying close attention to his major writings, Robert Eaglestone argues cogently and persuasively for a new understanding of the ethical task of criticism and theory. (shrink)

David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most ?central? psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view (...) by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations. (shrink)

In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical view of normativity.

Krabbe (2003, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 641–644) defined a metadialogue as a dialogue about one or more dialogues, and a ground-level dialogue as a dialogue that is not a metadialogue. Similarly, I define a meta-argument as an argument about one or more arguments, and a ground-level argument as one which is (...) not a meta-argument. Krabbe (1995, in F.H van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 333–344) showed that formal-fallacy criticism (and more generally, fallacy criticism) consists of metadialogues, and that such metadialogues can be profiled in ways that lead to their proper termination or resolution. I reconstruct Krabbe’s metadialogical account into monolectical, meta-argumentative terminology by describing three-types of meta-arguments corresponding to the three ways of proving formal invalidity he studied: the trivial logic-indifferent method; the method of counterexample situation; and the method of formal paraphrase. A fourth type of meta-argument corresponds to what Oliver (1967, Mind 76, 463–478), Govier (1985, Informal Logic 7, 27–33), and Copi (1986) call refutation by logical analogy. A fifth type of meta-argument represents my reconstruction of arguments by parity of reasoning studied by Woods and Hudak (1989, Informal Logic 11, 125–139). Other particular meta-arguments deserving future study are Hume’s critique of the argument from design in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Mill’s initial argument in The Subjection of Women about the importance of established custom and general feeling vis-à-vis argumentation. (shrink)

A defense of Frank Jackson's knowledge argument from an objection raised by Michael Tye , according to which Mary acquires no new factual knowledge when she first sees red but, instead, merely comes to know old facts in a new way.

What if in discussion the critic refuses to recognize an emotionally expressed argument of her interlocutor as an argument, accusing him of having presented no argument at all. In this paper, we shall deal with this reproach, which taken literally amounts to a charge of having committed a fallacy of non-argumentation. As such it is a very strong, if not the ultimate, criticism, which even carries the risk of abandonment of the discussion and can, therefore, not (...) be made without burdening oneself with correspondingly strong obligations. We want to specify the fallacies of non-argumentation and their dialectic, i.e., the proper way to criticize them, the appropriate ways for the arguer to react to such criticism, and the appropriate ways for the critic to follow up on these reactions. Among the types of fallacy of non-argumentation, the emphasis will be on the appeal to popular sentiments . Our aim is to reach, for cases of non-argumentation, a survey of dialectical possibilities. By making the disputants themselves responsible for the place of emotion in their dialogues, we hope to contribute to a further development of the theory of dialectical obligations. (shrink)

Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convincingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of “directiveness” that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether (...) there are normative requirements that enhance the directiveness of criticism. Does the opponent have in circumstances a dialectical obligation to provide clarifications, explanations, or even arguments? In this paper, it is hypothesized that the competitiveness inherent in critical discussion must be mitigated by making the opponent responsible for providing her counterconsiderations, if available, thus assisting the proponent in developing an argumentative strategy that defuses them. (shrink)

Meta-arguments are arguments about one or more arguments, or argumentation in general. They contrast to ground-level arguments, which are about natural phenomena, historical events, human actions, abstract entities, etc. Although meta-arguments are common in all areas of human cognitive practice, and although implicit studies of them are found in many works, and although a few explicit scholarly contributions exist, meta-argumentation has never been examined explicitly, directly, and systematically in book-length treatment. This lacuna is especially unfortunate because such treatment can offer (...) not only an understanding of a special class of arguments, but also a promising way of doing logic and argumentation theory. This is the first book that attempts a systematic treatment of meta-arguments, providing both an illustration of the meta-argumentational approach to logical theory, and an analysis of an especially rich collection of meta-arguments. First, it elaborates an empirical methodology derived partly from a critical appreciation of Stephen Toulmin's applied-logic approach, and partly from a novel application of the author's historical-textual approach. Then it examines theoretical meta-arguments, by such scholars as Tony Blair, Robert Fogelin, Alvin Goldman, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Ralph Johnson, Henry Johnstone, Erik Krabbe, Frans van Eemeren, Carl Wellman, and John Woods, on such topics as defining argument, methods of criticism, deep disagreements, and conductive or pro-and-con arguments. Thirdly, it studies famous meta-arguments by such classics as John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and Galileo Galilei, on such topics as freedom of discussion, women's liberation, the existence of God and intelligent design, and the motion of the earth. (shrink)

The articles examines the teleofunctional solution to the problem of mental causation, presented by Dmitry Volkov in his recently published book Free Will. An Illusion or an Opportunity. D.B. Volkov proposes solutions to three big metaphysical problems – mental causation, personal identity, and free will. Solving the first problem, Volkov creatively combines the advantages of Dennett’s teleofunctional model and Vasilyev’s local interactionism. Volkov’s teleofunctional model of mental causation seeks to prove the causal relevance of mental properties as non-local higher order (...) properties. In my view, its substantiation is based on three points: (a) critics of the exclusion problem and Kim’s model of mental causation, (b) “Library of first editions” argument, (c) reduction of the causal trajectories argument (CTA 1) by Vasilyev to the counterpart argument (CTA 2) by Volkov. Each of these points faces objections. Kim’s criticism is based on an implicit confusion of two types of reduction – reduction from supervenience and from multiple realizability. The latter type does not threaten Kim’s ideas, but Volkov uses this very type in his criticism. The “Library of first editions” argument does not achieve its goal due to compositional features and because non-local relational properties are a type of external properties that cannot be causally relevant. The reduction of CTA 1 to CTA 2 is unsuccessful since, in the case of this reduction, important features of CTA 1 are lost – these are local mental properties, due to which the influence of non-local physical factors occurs. My main objection is that the concept of causally relevant non-local properties is incompatible with the very concept of cause. The set of causally relevant properties of cause can only be local. (shrink)

This research is founded on the fundamental hypothesis that a holistic perspective and general understanding play a decisive role in shaping the terminology of any discipline and organizing its components and subfields within a coherent methodological framework. Possessing such a holistic perspective and understanding is a key factor in determining the creativity, innovative approaches, and depth of expertise of scholars, as well as their ability to guide the discipline in accurate and constructive directions. The study explores this hypothesis in the (...) context of Hadith sciences, specifically focusing on Hadith criticism and the evidentiary value of narrations. It de-monstrates that Hadith scholars adopted a holistic view by considering the impact of thematic chapters (bab) in their criticism of Hadiths and their judgments regarding authenticity or rejection. This approach is evident in the classification of Hadith compilations, where Hadiths are arranged ac-cording to thematic chapters. Subsequently, each narration, Hadith, or chain of transmission (isnād) is evaluated in light of the established princip-les and evidence specific to these chapters, including other supporting pro-ofs. Over time, these principles and evidences became well-defined within each chapter, serving as essential criteria for assessing subsequent narrati-ons and scholarly interpretations.The research is structured around five main axes:1.The concept of thematic babs and their relationship with Hadith, inc-luding an analysis of their historical application by muhaddithūn in classifi-cation and methodological development.2.The impact of singularity (tafarrud) within Hadith chapters and the criteria for its acceptance or rejection.3.The relationship between solitary (āhād) Hadiths and singularity, and the significance of thematic categorization in this context.4.The role of thematic babs in evaluating discrepancies among narra-tors (rāwīs) and determining preferences.5.The influence of thematic babs on judging Hadiths as munkar or unacceptable.The study concludes by affirming the strong and intrinsic connection between the thematic categorization of Hadiths and Hadith criticism, emp-hasizing that this relationship constitutes a fundamental element in the judgments of critics regarding Hadiths. Additionally, it confirms the impact of thematic classification on the evaluation of narrators and the grading of Hadiths.The research highlights that neglecting the thematic context of Hadiths when examining narrators and their narrations has led later scholars (mu-ta’akhkhirūn) to methodological errors, diverging from the approaches of master Hadith critics and well-established jurists. Therefore, particular at-tention must be given to the meticulous classification employed by Hadith scholars, especially the authors of the Kutub al-Sittah, whose precision in categorization reflects a profound understanding of Hadiths and their cor-rect interpretation. Finally, the study underscores that the pinnacle of matu-rity and excellence in Hadith classification is particularly evident in the ar-rangement of authentic compilations, with Imam al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) standing as a leading figure. His methodological rigor in the organization of the Sahīh and the profound insights derived from his use of chapter hea-dings (bab titles) exemplify an unparalleled model in this domain. (shrink)

심적 내용에 대한 외재주의가 등장한 이래로 이런 종류의 입장이 사고에 대한 일인칭적 특권적 접근과 양립가능한지 여부가 문제시되어왔다. 맥킨지는 오랫동안 양립불가능성을 옹호해왔으며, 우리가 특권적 접근을 포기해야 한다고 논증한다. 이에 대항하여 브뤼크너는 맥킨지의 논증이 실패한다고 반론하며 양립가능성을 옹호한다. 그러나 브뤼크너의 비판에는 몇 가지 중요한 문제점이 있다. 특히 브뤼크너가 받아들이는 특권적 접근은 맥킨지의 결론과 사실상 충돌하지 않는다.

Can subjective taste regulate social norms or political practices? This book argues that from the late seventeenth century to the present national cultures have sought to regulate the democratic subject through the academic form of arguments about the proper relations of aesthetics to ethics and politics. In so doing it offers a radical reconsideration of the history of modernity, tracing the emergence of criticism as a socio-cultural practice across all the major European nations, and drawing on an extensive range (...) of European literature and philosophy. (shrink)

It furthers the dialectic when the opponent is clear about what motivates and underlies her critical stance, even if she does not adopt an opposite standpoint, but merely doubts the proponent’s opinion. Thus, there is some kind of burden of criticism. In some situations, there should an obligation for the opponent to offer explanatory counterconsiderations, if requested, whereas in others, there is no real dialectical obligation, but a mere responsibility for the opponent to cooperate by providing her motivations for (...) being critical. In this paper, it will be shown how a set of dialogue rules may encourage an opponent, in this latter type of situation, to provide her counterconsiderations, and to do so at an appropriate level of specificity. Special attention will be paid to the desired level of specificity. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced by an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or from popular opinion. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with less than fully specific criticism? (shrink)

If any emergent historical criticism will tend by its own choice toward inclusiveness and eclecticism, it is also likely to be constrained by more subtle forms of complicity with the theoretical subculture within which it seeks its audience. It is not in principle impossible that we might choose to set going an initiative that is very different indeed from the methods and approaches already in place. But is nonetheless clear that we must be aware, in some propaedeutic way, of (...) the predispositions for or against such change that are latent in the horizons of the field as they are presently conceived and transmitted. An account of these predispositions will take up most of the following essay. Whether or not the particular texts I shall discuss constitute anything as firm as an establishment in the absolute sense does not matter much: they neither sum up the ongoing careers of their particular authors, in the diachronic sense, nor do they represent any simple totality in the critical culture of the late 1960s. All we need here is the weaker assumption: that these writings by Derrida, Paul de Man, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Macherey do offer, by virtue of their very notoriety, evidence of the priorities within the discipline that have afforded them their reputations in the first place. Thus, while they do not in themselves prohibit the emergence of alternatives, they do give us clues about the residual pressures that might constrain those alternatives, and they signal the questions that the historical party must respond to if it is to be recognized as making an important contribution to a debate. My argument will be that the influential critics of the late 1960s have made it very hard indeed to find a place for history, so much so that the avowedly Marxist alternative set forth by Jameson finds itself making disabling concessions to those very influences. I do not claim to describe the entire range of options and alternatives, and indeed offer no discussion of the most excitingly contested field of all, that represented by contemporary feminisms. I mean instead to demonstrate, through a reading of those methodologies that have become authoritative, that the status of historical inquiry has been so eroded that its reactive renaissance, in whatever form, threatens to remain merely gestural and generic. “History” promises thus to function as legitimating any reference to a context beyond literature exclusively conceived, whether it be one of discourse, biography, political or material circumstance. In particular, given the current popularity of discourse analysis, it seems likely that for many practitioners the historical method will remain founded in covertly idealist reconstructions. David Simpson is professor of English and comparative literature at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He is the author of various books and essays, most recently The Politics of American English, 1776-1850 and Wordsworth’s Historical Imagination: The Poetry of Displacement. (shrink)

Arguments for the inherent value, equality of interests,or rights of non-human animals have presented a strong challenge for the anthropocentric worldview. However, they have been met with criticism.One form of criticism maintains that,regardless of their theoretical consistency,these 'pro-animal arguments' cannot be accepted due to their absurdity. Often, particularly inter-species interest conflicts are brought to the fore: if pro-animal arguments were followed,we could not solve interest conflicts between species,which is absurd. Because of this absurdity, the arguments need to be (...) abandoned. The paper analyses the strength, background and relevance of this 'argument from absurdity'. It is claimed that in all of the three areas mentioned above, the argument faces severe difficulties. (shrink)

In ‘Pro-life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’ Joona Räsänen argues that Christopher Kaczor's objections to Giubilini and Minerva's position on infanticide are not persuasive. We argue that Räsänen's criticism is largely misplaced, and that he has not engaged with Kaczor's strongest arguments against infanticide. We reply to each of Räsänen's criticisms, drawing on the full range of Kaczor's arguments, as well as adding some of our own.

In "Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction", William Spanos examines the controversy, both in Europe and the United States, surrounding Heidegger and recent disclosures about his Nazi past. Not intended as a defense or apology for Heidegger's thought, Spanos instead affirms the importance of Heidegger's "antihumanist" interrogation of the modern age, its globalization of technology, and its neo-imperialist politics. The attack on Heidegger's "antihumanistic" discourse (by "liberal humanists" who have imported the European debate into the United (...) States) aligns ideologically with the ongoing policing operations of William Bennett, Allan Bloom, E.D. Hirsch, Roger Kimball, Dinesh D'Souza, and others in the spheres of higher education and cultural production. Throughout his arguments, Spanos focuses not so much on Heidegger the historical subject, as on the transformative cultural and political discourses and practices, implicit in and enabled by Heidegger's interrogations of Being and Time, that have led to the contemporary emergence of the multiplicity of resistant "Others" colonized by hegemonic discursive formations. All the while he reminds us that Heidegger's philosophic interrogations eventually generate a diverse body of transgressive writing and an oppositional intellectual climate in the West. Spanos is author of "Repetitions: the Postmodern Occasion in Literature and Culture" (1987) and "The End of Education: Toward Posthumanism" (Minnesota, 1992), and the editor of "Martin Heidegger and the Question in Literature" (1980) and the co-editor of "The Question of Textuality: Strategies of Reading in Contemporary American Criticism" (1982). This book is intended for those in the fields of philosophy, literary theory, political theory. (shrink)

What if in discussion the critic refuses to recognize an emotionally expressed argument of her interlocutor as an argument, accusing him of having presented no argument at all. In this paper, we shall deal with this reproach, which taken literally amounts to a charge of having committed a fallacy of non-argumentation. As such it is a very strong, if not the ultimate, criticism, which even carries the risk of abandonment of the discussion and can, therefore, not (...) be made without burdening oneself with correspondingly strong obligations. We want to specify the fallacies of non-argumentation and their dialectic, i.e., the proper way to criticize them, the appropriate ways for the arguer to react to such criticism, and the appropriate ways for the critic to follow up on these reactions. Among the types of fallacy of non-argumentation, the emphasis will be on the appeal to popular sentiments. Our aim is to reach, for cases of non-argumentation, a survey of dialectical possibilities. By making the disputants themselves responsible for the place of emotion in their dialogues, we hope to contribute to a further development of the theory of dialectical obligations. (shrink)

This essay considers the tradition of criticism against Athenian democracy, in both ancient and modern times. Often this critical tradition has been seen to adduce greater interest than the very democratic experience from which it arose; in this it has been aided, in part, by the asserted absence of an ancient theory of democracy. Yet there are significant traces of a democratic theory in the ancient sources, which ought to serve both as a theoretical and ideological riposte to the (...) critics. Some of the modern objections to classical Athenian democracy take up the argument of the ancient critics and display an anti-democratic orientation. Others, however, are motivated by a certain sensibility, grown out of liberalism and the legal state, as well as the emancipation of women and the abolition of slavery. Nevertheless, these objections are sometimes lacking in historical perspective. If we reassess Athenian democracy, it may yet be seen to constitute a useful point of reference, at a time when the current model of democracy finds its legitimacy questioned.2. (shrink)