Results for 'akrasia'

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  1. Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs.Timothy Kearl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2501-2515.
    According to the Fragmentation Analysis, epistemic akrasia is a state of conflict between beliefs formed by the linguistic and non-linguistic belief-formation systems, and epistemic akrasia is irrational because it is a state of conflict between beliefs so formed. I argue that there are cases of higher-order epistemic akrasia, where both beliefs are formed by the linguistic belief-formation system. Because the Fragmentation Analysis cannot accommodate this possibility, the Fragmentation Analysis is incorrect. I consider three objections to the possibility (...)
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  2. Logical Akrasia.Frederik J. Andersen - forthcoming - Episteme.
    The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia. If successful, the initial sections will draw attention to an interesting akratic phenomenon which has not received much attention in the literature on akrasia (although it has been discussed by logicians in different terms). Secondly, §3 and §4 present a dilemma related to logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano Arithmetic and (...)
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  3. Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.
    This essay provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on (...)
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  4. Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):717–727.
    We call attention to certain cases of epistemic akrasia, arguing that they support belief-credence dualism. Belief-credence dualism is the view that belief and credence are irreducible, equally fundamental attitudes. Consider the case of an agent who believes p, has low credence in p, and thus believes that they shouldn’t believe p. We argue that dualists, as opposed to belief-firsters (who say credence reduces to belief) and credence-firsters (who say belief reduces to credence) can best explain features of akratic cases, (...)
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  5. Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
    Many views rely on the idea that it can never be rational to have high confidence in something like, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P.” Call this idea the “Non-Akrasia Constraint”. Just as an akratic agent acts in a way she believes she ought not act, an epistemically akratic agent believes something that she believes is unsupported by her evidence. The Non-Akrasia Constraint says that ideally rational agents will never be epistemically akratic. In a number of recent (...)
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  6. Epistemic Akrasia and Treacherous Propositions.Bar Luzon - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    I argue that one ought not be epistemically akratic. Although this position may look self-evident, it is hard to pin down exactly what’s wrong with the akratic subject. Indeed, some philosophers argue that epistemic akrasia is permissible. The standard anti-akratic response focuses on the weird downstream implications of this state for action and assertion. This approach, however, is unsatisfactory, since it fails to explain the epistemic impermissibility of epistemic akrasia. Here, I argue that epistemic akrasia is impermissible (...)
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  7.  91
    Agency, Akrasia, and the Normative Environment.Gregory Antill - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):321-338.
    Just as the existence of practical akrasia has been treated as important evidence for the existence of our practical agency, the alleged absence of epistemic akrasia—cases in which a believer believes some proposition contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to believe—has recently been marshaled as grounds for skepticism about the existence of similar forms of epistemic agency. In this paper, I defend the existence of epistemic agency against such objections. Rather than argue against (...)
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  8. (1 other version)Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.
    It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This paper argues otherwise. In certain cases, akrasia is intuitively rational. Understanding why akratic beliefs in those case are indeed rational provides a deeper explanation how typical akratic beliefs are irrational—an explanation (...)
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  9. Akrasia and Uncertainty.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):483–505.
    According to John Broome, akrasia consists in a failure to intend to do something that one believes one ought to do, and such akrasia is necessarily irrational. In fact, however, failing to intend something that one believes one ought to do is only guaranteed to be irrational if one is certain of a maximally detailed proposition about what one ought to do; if one is uncertain about any part of the full story about what one ought to do, (...)
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  10. Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters.Javier González De Prado Salas - forthcoming - Philosophia.
    This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) remarks on moral matters.
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  11. Complex Akrasia and Blameworthiness.Anna Hartford - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:15-33.
    The idea that conscious control, or more specifically akratic wrongdoing, is a necessary condition for blameworthiness has durable appeal. This position has been explicitly championed by volitionist philosophers, and its tacit influence is broadly felt. Many responses have been offered to the akrasia requirement espoused by volitionists. These responses often take the form of counterexamples involving blameworthy ignorance: i.e., cases where an agent didn’t act akratically, but where they nevertheless seem blameworthy. These counterexamples have generally led to an impasse (...)
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  12.  27
    Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1705-1711.
    This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s remarks on moral matters.
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  13. Epistemic Akrasia.David Owens - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):381-397.
    One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon of akrasia, in an agent's ability to do, freely and deliberately, something that they judge they ought not to do. Akrasia constitutes a failure of control but not an absence of control. The akratic agent is not a compulsive; an akratic (...)
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  14.  78
    Akrasia, dispositions and degrees.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (3):285-308.
    It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe (...)
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  15. Epistemic Akrasia.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
    Though it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-five years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Also surprisingly, despite the prima facie analogue with practical akrasia (the possibility of which is not much disputed), much of the recent work on this question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is impossible. While the arguments purporting to show the impossibility (...)
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  16. Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence: A Reconsideration.Neil Levy - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156.
    According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption (...)
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  17. Akrasia and moral motivation.Sam Shpall - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):411-426.
    Offers a distinctive take on the motivation problem by way of an analysis of akrasia and the nature of rationality.
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  18. Akrasia, instincts and revealed preferences.Alvaro Sandroni - 2011 - Synthese 181 (S1):1 - 17.
    The standard economic theory of choice is extended to accommodate a particular form of akratic choice. The empirical content of the new theory is fully characterized. A characterization of revealed akratic choice, in terms of observable choice only, is also provided. These results are consistent with the viewpoint that akrasia is a concept that can be empirically substantiated.
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  19. Rational Akrasia.John Brunero - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):546-566.
    It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an (...)
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  20. Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.
    Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically (...)
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  21. Akrasia in Greek philosophy: from Socrates to Plotinus.Christopher Bobonich & Pierre Destrée (eds.) - 2007 - Boston: Brill.
    The 13 contributions of this collective offer new and challenging ways of reading well-known and more neglected texts on akrasia (lack of control, or weakness ...
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  22. Akrasia in Epictetus: A Comparison with Aristotle.Michael Tremblay - 2020 - Apeiron 53 (4):397-417.
    This paper argues that Epictetus’ ethics involves three features which are also present in Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1) A major problem for agents is when they fail to render a universal premise effective at motivating a particular action in accordance with that premise. 2) There are two reasons this occurs: Precipitancy and Weakness. 3) Precipitancy and Weakness can be prevented by gaining a fuller understanding of our beliefs and commitments. This comparison should make clear (...)
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  23. Obsessive–compulsive akrasia.Samuel Kampa - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (4):475-492.
    Epistemic akrasia is the phenomenon of voluntarily believing what you think you should not. Whether epistemic akrasia is possible is a matter of controversy. I argue that at least some people who suffer from obsessive–compulsive disorder are genuinely epistemically akratic. I advance an account of epistemic akrasia that explains the clinical data and provides broader insight into the nature of doxastic attitude‐formation.
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  24. Akrasia and conflict in the Nicomachean Ethics.Mehmet Metin Erginel - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4):573-593.
    In Nicomachean Ethics VII, Aristotle offers an account of akrasia that purports to salvage the kernel of truth in the Socratic paradox that people act against what is best only through ignorance. Despite Aristotle’s apparent confidence in having identified the sense in which Socrates was right about akrasia, we are left puzzling over Aristotle’s own account, and the extent to which he agrees with Socrates. The most fundamental interpretive question concerns the sense in which Aristotle takes the akratic (...)
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  25. Rational epistemic akrasia for the ambivalent pragmatist.Neil Sinhababu - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia, The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York: Routledge.
    Epistemic akrasia can be rational. I consider a lonely pragmatist who believes that her imaginary friend doesn’t exist, and also believes on pragmatic grounds that she should believe in him. She rationally believes that her imaginary friend doesn’t exist, rationally follows various sources of evidence to the view that she should believe in him to end her loneliness, and rationally holds these attitudes simultaneously. Evidentialism suggests that her ambivalent epistemic state is rational, as considerations grounded in the value of (...)
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  26. Epistemic Akrasia: Irrational or Worse.Eyal Tal - manuscript
    Epistemically akratic agents believe both p and that believing p is irrational for them. Some of the costs of thinking that epistemic akrasia can be rational are clear. It is hypocritical, and outright weird, to have beliefs that we consider irrational, let alone to reason with or act on those beliefs. However, as Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2020) and Brian Weatherson (2019) have argued, the weirdness of akrasia does not obviously tell against its rationality. Here I argue that views permitting (...)
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  27. Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
    _ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order (...)
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  28. (1 other version)Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - Tópicos 43:25-50.
    In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
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  29. Epistemic Akrasia.Declan Smithies - 2019 - In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 284–311.
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  30. A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
    In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem (...)
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  31.  8
    Tomando la akrasia en serio.Verónica Rodríguez Blanco & Andrés Botero-Bernal - 2024 - Revista Filosofía Uis 23 (2):53-76.
    Este artículo representa el primer paso para demostrar que la akrasia[1] proporciona la característica estructural subyacente en los juicios de culpabilidad o responsabilidad ética y jurídica por actos negligentes; el trabajo explica el fenómeno de la akrasia y compara las concepciones clásicas y contemporáneas de este fenómeno. Argumentamos que actuamos inadvertidamente porque actuamos acráticamente, lo que se explica en términos de un compromiso defectuoso específico del razonamiento práctico por parte del agente ejecutor, es decir, una falta de integración (...)
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  32. Akrasia and Self-Rule in Plato's Laws.Joshua Wilburn - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43:25-53.
    In this paper I challenge the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. I offer a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and I show that it is not intended as an illustration of akrasia at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion of (...)
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  33. Inverse akrasia and weakness of will.Richard Holton - manuscript
    The standard account of weakness of will identifies it with akrasia, that is, with action against one's best judgment. Elsewhere I have argued that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. Many cases of weak willed action will not be akratic: in over-readily abandoning a resolution an agent may well do something that they judge at the time to be best. Indeed, in so far as temptation typically gives rise to judgment shift -- (...)
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  34.  79
    Akrasia, collective and individual.Philip Pettit - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet, Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 68--97.
    Examines what is necessary for a group to constitute an agent that can display akrasia, and what steps such a group might take to establish self‐control. The topic has some interest in itself, and the discussion suggests some lessons about how we should think of akrasia in the individual as well as in the collective case. Under the image that the lessons support, akrasia is a sort of constitutional disorder: a failure to achieve a unity projected in (...)
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  35.  80
    Does Locke Have an Akrasia Problem?Leonardo Moauro & Samuel C. Rickless - 2019 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (1):9.
    Starting in the second edition of the Essay, Locke becomes interested in the phenomenon of akrasia, or weakness of will. As he conceives it, akrasia occurs when we will something contrary to what we acknowledge to be our greater good. This commitment represents an important shift from the first edition of the Essay, where Locke argues that the will is always determined by a judgement of our greater good. But traces of the first-edition view are present even in (...)
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  36.  6
    Against better judgment: akrasia in anthropological perspectives.N. H. Evans & P. Mckearney (eds.) - 2023 - New York: Berghahn Books.
    Anthropologists have long explained social behaviour as if people always do what they think is best. But what if most of these explanations only work because they are premised upon ignoring what philosophers call 'akrasia' - that is, the possibility that people might act against their better judgment? The contributors to this volume turn an ethnographic lens upon situations in which people seem to act out of line with what they judge, desire and intend. The result is a robust (...)
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  37.  30
    Akrasia.T. E. Wilkerson - 1994 - Ratio 7 (2):164-182.
    Aristotle's account of akrasia is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his account of the problem is coloured by a number of unattractive assumptions and preoccupations; second, his central claim, that akrasia involves a temporary displacement of knowledge, deals at best with only a small number of cases; third, he is wrong to suppose that the akrates is typically someone overwhelmed by passion. We need to follow Davidson in recognising that the central problem consists in a failure (...)
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  38. Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible.Rachel Fraser - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):79-106.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  39.  14
    Tipología de la Akrasía En Aristóteles.Manuel Oriol Salgado - 2020 - SCIO Revista de Filosofía 9:35-54.
    El estudio de la akrasía o incontinencia que Aristóteles abre en el libro VII de Ética a Nicómaco es una de las primeras aproximaciones filosóficas al problema de la maldad específicamente humana. Este artículo comienza identificando el tipo humano que revela la akrasía, señalando su importancia filosófica y exponiendo brevemente la explicación aristotélica del fenómeno. Después categoriza las diferentes formas que puede asumir la transgresión de los propios principios morales, según dos criterios independientes. Por un lado, el tipo de deseo (...)
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  40. Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mind?Gabriela Roxana Carone - 2001 - In David Sedley, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume Xx Summer 2001. Clarendon Press. pp. 107-148.
     
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  41. Akrasia, self-control, and second-order desires.Alfred Mele - 1992 - Noûs 26 (3):281-302.
    Pristine belief/desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill various gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, for example, second-order desires have been imported into a more stream- lined view to explicate such important notions as freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. I believe that we need to branch out as well as up, augmenting a familiar 'philosophical psychology' with psychological items that are irreducible to beliefs and desires (for support, (...)
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  42. Locke’s Diagnosis of Akrasia.Matthew A. Leisinger - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):6.
    I argue for a new interpretation of Locke’s account of akrasia. On this interpretation, akrasia occurs on Locke’s account because certain cognitive biases endemic to the human mind dispose us to privilege present over future happiness. As a result, we end up irrationally pursuing present pleasure and the removal of present pain even as we simultaneously judge that doing so runs contrary to our own greater good. In this sense, I argue that Locke seeks to diagnose akrasia (...)
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  43. Aristotle’s Akrasia: The Role of Potential Knowledge and Practical Syllogism.Imge Oranli - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 2 (2):233-238.
    In Nicomachean Ethics VII Aristotle describes akrasia as a disposition. Taking into account that it is a disposition, I argue that akrasia cannot be understood on an epistemological basis alone, i.e., it is not merely a problem of knowledge that the akratic person acts the ways he does, but rather one is akratic due to a certain kind of habituation, where the person is not able to activate the potential knowledge s/he possesses. To stress this point, I focus (...)
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  44. Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.
    It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one’s higher-order attitudes do not align with one’s first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. (...)
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  45.  17
    Appetites, Akrasia, and the Appetitive Part of the Soul in Plato’s Republic.C. D. C. Reeve - 2024 - In David Keyt & Christopher Shields, Principles and Praxis in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy in Honor of Fred D. Miller, Jr. Springer Verlag. pp. 115-133.
    In his much-explored argument for the tripartition of the soul in book IV of the Republic, Socrates makes use of two principles, which I shall call the principle of opposition and the principle of qualification. The aim of the present paper is to explain, in particular, the second of these principles, so as to reveal its role in that argument and in the conception of an appetite and of the appetitive part that is central to the larger argument of the (...)
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  46. Embodied Akrasia: James on Motivation and Weakness of Will.Kyle Bromhall - 2018 - William James Studies 14 (1):26-53.
    This paper presents an account of akrasia, drawn from the work of William James, that sees akrasia as neither a rational failing (as with most philosophical accounts) nor a moral failing (as with early Christian accounts), but rather a necessary by-product of our status as biological beings. By examining James’s related accounts of motivation and action, I argue that akratic actions occur when an agent attempts to act against her settled habits, but fails to do so. This makes (...)
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  47. Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason.Derek Baker - 2015 - Ratio 28 (1):65-80.
    Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
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  48. Locke's Diagnosis of Akrasia Revisited.Samuel C. Rickless & Leonardo Moauro - 2024 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 6:1-24.
    Matthew Leisinger (2020) argues that previous interpretations of John Locke’s account of akrasia (or weakness of will) are mistaken and offers a new interpretation in their place. In this essay, we aim to recapitulate part of this debate, defend a previously articulated interpretation by responding to Leisinger’s criticisms of it, and explain why Leisinger’s own interpretation faces textual and philosophical problems that are serious enough to disqualify it as an accurate reconstruction of Locke’s views. In so doing, we aim (...)
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  49. Virtue, akrasia and moral weakness.D. Carr - 1999 - In David Carr & Jan Willem Steutel, Virtue ethics and moral education. New York: Routledge.
     
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  50.  19
    (1 other version)Akrasía inversa genuina de la primera persona.Ignasi Llobera Trias - 2017 - Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación E Información Filosófica 73 (275):61.
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