__ Inclusive education is complex, multi-faceted and ever-changing and to date there has been no fixed definition of what is meant by the term ‘inclusion’, leading to confusion about what inclusive education actually means in practice. This key text introduces readers to the underlying knowledge and wider complexities of inclusion and explores how this can relate to practice. Considering inclusion as referring to _all_ learners, it surveys the concept of inclusive practice in its broadest sense and examines its implementation in (...) a variety of educational institutions. Throughout the book, international contributors consider this broader concept to critically evaluate the realities of practically implementing inclusive objectives. Each chapter assesses key theories and concepts alongside a range of examples to encourage students to think critically and reappraise their own experience as learners. Key topics covered include: • studying the definition of inclusion • the relevance of pedagogy in inclusive practice • how to lead and manage for inclusion • the issue of inclusion in early years, primary, secondary and post-16 settings • inclusive practice for families • international perspectives on inclusive practice. Fully illustrated with tasks, case studies, discussion questions and recommended reading, _Inclusive Education_ is essential reading for second and third year students looking to extend their research and writing, and to develop their critical and reflective thinking. (shrink)

Vol. 1. Aristotle's Ontology and the Middle Ages: the Tradition of Met., Book Zeta.

David Bostock has produced a translation that admirably fulfills the Clarendon Aristotle Series’ goal of making Aristotle’s texts accessible to the Greekless philosophical reader. It is accurate without being overly literal and is probably the best available in English. Despite Bostock’s inelegant rendering of to ti en einai as "a what-being-is", and to ti esti as "a what-it-is", the translation is, on the whole, highly readable and brings out perspicuously the structure of Aristotle’s arguments.

Review of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota, translation and commentary by Montgomery Furth (Hackett: 1985).

Frank A. Lewis presents a close study of book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics, one of his most dense and controversial texts, commonly understood to contain his deepest thoughts on the definition of substance and related metaphysical issues. Lewis argues that Aristotle returns to the causal view of primary substance from his Posterior Analytics.

This book argues that according to Metaphysics Zeta, substantial forms constitute substantial being in the sensible world, and individual composites make up the basic constituents that possess this kind of being. The study explains why Aristotle provides a reexamination of substance after the Categories, Physics, and De Anima, and highlights the contribution Z is meant to make to the science of being. Norman O. Dahl argues that Z.1-11 leaves both substantial forms and individual composites as candidates for basic constituents, (...) with Z.12 being something that can be set aside. He explains that although the main focus of Z.13-16 is to argue against a Platonic view that takes universals to be basic constituents, some of its arguments commit Aristotle to individual composites as basic constituents, with Z.17’s taking substantial form to constitute substantial being is compatible with that commitment.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 267-268 [Access article in PDF] Myles Burnyeat. A Map of "Metaphysics" Zeta. Pittsburgh, PA: Mathesis Publications, 2001. Pp. x + 176. Paper, $25.00. Burnyeat's map is an ambitious attempt to establish two claims about Zeta: that Aristotle employs an unusual, non-linear form of argument in Zeta, and that the discussion in Zeta is on two levels, one (...) abstract and "logical" and another specific and "metaphysical." In addition to looking at Zeta, chapter by chapter, Burnyeat examines the other works that provide the context for Zeta—the Organon for the logical level of explanation and the rest of the Metaphysics for the metaphysical level. Burnyeat argues that Aristotle's metaphysical project culminates in the theology of'Lambda, for which the metaphysics of Zeta has prepared us. The goal is to "map" or sketch the evidence for these claims rather than provide definitive arguments for them.A brief introductory chapter presents the main themes of the book. This is followed by an even briefer chapter that sets out the four routes (or independent sections of Zeta), viz. Z 3; Z 4-6, 10-11 with Z 7-9, 12; Z 13-6; and Z 17 with H 1. On all four routes, a logical discussion moves to a metaphysical discussion of form and matter.The third chapter on "signposts" is the lengthiest of all and takes the reader through the chapters of Zeta in order. It is also the most map-like of the chapters, as it requires that the reader have a copy of the Metaphysics ready to hand. Burnyeat follows other commentators in treating Zeta 7-9 and Zeta 12 as later insertions; he does, however, argue that the former and probably the latter were added by Aristotle. Chapters 7-9 are integral to the argument of Zeta, as they provide a diachronic view of artifacts and substantial beings (37). [End Page 267] Rejecting the prominence assigned Z 13 by several recent commentators, Burnyeat reads Z 13 in context with chapters 14-6. "The task of Z 13-6 is to show how the idea that substantial being is a universal such as human leads eventually, after suitable refinements and restrictions, to the conclusion that substantial being is form" (54). Wrapping up the discussion of Zeta, Burnyeat concludes that the goal of Zeta's two-level approach has been to show how logical concepts should be used to search for form.This leads directly to a chapter on the Organon. Burnyeat argues that none of the treatises making up the Organon are metaphysical; all employ an abstract (logical) mode of analysis. Even if written at different times, these treatises belong together because they are all methodological. Since form and matter belong to the metaphysical level, in the Analytics Aristotle "follows a deliberate policy of excluding form and matter" (97).In the final chapter, Burnyeat returns to the Metaphysics and considers Zeta in the context of the other books. Three "chunks," viz. books ABGE, ZHQ, and MN are briefly surveyed. The topics of Zeta are then considered in relation to Lambda. Several chapters, viz. D1 and Z1; D3 and Z 7-9, are found to have the same concerns. Burnyeat concludes with a fanciful muqo~ (story) about a dying Aristotle hastily writing a culminating metaphysical treatise.Burnyeat gives us a map—a map to prompt questions; he does not attempt to delve into many of the interpretative puzzles that have exercised other interpreters of Zeta. Thus, this book stands as a helpful counterbalance to a certain kind of scholarship on Zeta. The two interpretative claims, however, that are at the heart of Burnyeat's enterprise stand in need of further justification. One of these, the non-linearity of Zeta, seems to be too weak to support substantive claims. Burnyeat defines non-linearity as holding when "it is not the case that the successive chapters build continuously upon the results of their predecessors" (4). He then cites a few examples of linearity, e.g., Physics II. Yet the vast majority of Aristotelian... (shrink)

Aristotle's views on the fundamental nature of reality are usually taken to be inconsistent. The two main sources for these views are the Categories and the central books of the Metaphysics, particularly book Zeta. In the early theory of the Categories the basic entities of the world are concrete objects such as Socrates: Aristotle calls them 'primary substances'. But the later theory awards this title to the forms of concrete objects. Michael Wedin proposes a compatibilist solution to this (...) long-standing puzzle, arguing that Aristotle is engaged in quite different projects in the two works. The theory of Metaphysics Zeta is meant to explain central features of the standing doctrine of the Categories, and so presupposes the essential truth of the early theory. The Categories offers a theory of underlying ontological configurations, while book Zeta gives form the status of primary substance because it is primarily the form of a concrete object that explains its nature, and this form is the substance of the object. So when the late theory identifies primary substance with form, it appeals to an explanatory primacy that is quite distinct from the ontological primacy that dominates the Categories. Wedin's new interpretation thus allows us to see the two treatises as complementing each other: they are parts of a unified history of substance. (shrink)

In der neueren Forschung gehören die Substanzbücher der Metaphysik zu den meistdiskutierten Aristotelischen Texten. In den letzten zweieinhalb Jahrzehnten entwickelte sich eine umfangreiche Diskussion, die zu einem ganz neuen Bild von der Aristotelischen Substanzlehre führte. Eine für die Seminararbeit zugängliche Übersicht über diese Diskussion und den neuesten Stand der Forschung lag aber bisher im deutschen Sprachraum nicht vor. Der Band hilft diesem Mangel ab. Seine Beiträge geben unterschiedliche Standpunkte wieder und reflektieren den jeweiligen Forschungsstand, so dass sowohl für die Seminardiskussion (...) als auch für die eigene Beschäftigung mit diesem Thema eine direkt aus der Forschung gewonnene Grundlage vorliegt. MIT BEITRÄGEN VON: Andreas Anagnostopoulos, Thomas Buchheim, Mary Louise Gill, Donald Morrison, Christof Rapp, Holmer Steinfath, Walter Mesch und Michael V. Wodin. (shrink)

Burnyeat calls this book a “map” because, he explains, he intends to set up signposts for readers of one of the most difficult texts in philosophy to use in their own explorations. The “map” consists of an Introduction that explains the assumptions behind his “map,” most importantly that this text consistently operates on “two levels,” the “logical” and the “metaphysical”; an analytic guide to the map ; and the heart of the map, “signposts” from which the reader can survey and (...) then move through the text. Three chapters that are not formally part of the map conclude this study. Chapter 4 asks “Why do it this way?” and suggests that “Metaphysics Zeta is not only the most difficult work in the corpus. It is also methodologically unique. And that does need explaining”. Two final chapters return to the “logical level” and to the “metaphysical level,” asserted at the outset, explaining what they mean and why they provide a fruitful way of reading Metaphysics Zeta. Chapter 5 considers “The Organon as ‘logical’” and how Aristotle’s logic is reflected in this text ; chapter 6 places Metaphysics Zeta within the larger context of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and in so doing provides a vision of the work as a whole. The book is completed by several indices: Index to issues of text and translation ; Index locorum ; Index of names ; Index of Greek terms discussed ; and a General index. (shrink)

The central question in Aristotle' Metaphysics Zeta- Eta is "What is substance?" and Aristotle answers that substance is essence or substantial form. But it is not clear what in Zeta-Eta Aristotle is inquiring and what the conclusion implies. ;In this study I argue that in Zeta-Eta Aristotle advances a new theory of substance: he establishes a new criterion for substance and identifies substantial form as primary substance. ;The criteria for substance which I take Aristotle to offer are (...) these two. A thing is a substance if and only if its formula of essence is a definition. A thing is a substance if and only if it has no cause other than itself. The former criterion is derived from a consideration of essence and substance from the formulaic point of view, while the latter is derived from a consideration of essence and substance from the metaphysical point of view. ;However, Aristotle recognizes a problem in the logical or formulaic criterion. The difficulty is that the definition of substantial form doesn't seem to be different from the definition of a concrete particular in the composite structure of the formula. The definitions of substantial form and a concrete particular are all composed of parts. I claim that such dissatisfaction with the logical criterion is the main reason why Aristotle declares a new beginning in Zeta 17. ;In Zeta 17 Aristotle claims that it is impossible to identify the cause of the being of substantial form in the same way as the cause of the being of a concrete particular, since the thing asked about is ontologically simple. The cause of the being of a simple thing is itself. Aristotle claims that substantial form, which is the cause of the being of a concrete particular, does not have any cause other than itself. Substantial form is, therefore, primary substance on the metaphysical criterion. ;This interpretation implies that a concrete particular is not to be ranked as primary substance and that this revision can be taken as "a return to, or a renewal of sympathy with, Plato" as G. E. L. Owen described. (shrink)

Michael Wedin argues against the prevailing notion that Aristotle's views on the nature of reality are fundamentally inconsistent. According to Wedin's new interpretation, the difference between the early theory of the Categories and the later theory of the Metaphysics reflects the fact that Aristotle is engaged in quite different projects in the two works--the earlier focusing on ontology, and the later on explanation.

The book reviews of the early Philosophical Transactions have not been considered a dominant feature of the journal, and thus more research is needed to enrich our understanding of them. This paper begins this process by describing some of the basic features of the reviews, before moving on to address the issue of how they were composed. The specific focus here is on how Henry Oldenburg’s correspondence influenced the process in various ways. As it turns out, there are episodes when (...) Oldenburg’s exchanges impacted the timing, length, content, form, and sometimes even the very existence of the book reviews. It thus seems that these reviews were rooted just as much in epistolary correspondence as other texts published in the Transactions. (shrink)

The central chapter of Burnyeat’s Map is organized like a commentary, moving through Metaphysics Ζ (and parts of Η) section by section. But unlike a commentary, it does not strive for comprehensiveness. Its aim is to describe the general lay of the land—what is being argued for where, in what way, and why— and so its exegesis is limited to Aristotle’s “signposts.” For example, every time Aristotle says “we must investigate” or “as we have seen,” Burnyeat asks “where?” As far (...) as possible, he tries to construct his map on philological evidence, remaining neutral on many of the substantive issues that have defined readings of Ζ. The hope is that, map in hand, we can interpret Ζ’s notoriously obscure arguments with a better sense of their place in Aristotle’s overall project. (shrink)

This thesis argues that Metaphysics ZH$\Theta$--the crux of Aristotle's metaphysics--are not, as the tradition takes it for granted, a unity which hosts a consistent doctrine of substance; rather they contain two distinct approaches to substance. I call them respectively the formal approach and the synthetical approach. They present two kinds of hylomorphism, with Z17 as a demarcation. ;The formal approach takes form or essence as a separate substance from matter and the composite and demonstrates that form is the primary substance (...) over them. In this approach Aristotle views form or essence to be an essential property of an individual material substance. The locus of this approach is mainly in Z3-16 which host two conflict schemes for avoiding Plato's Third Man Argument. One is in Z7-9 which claims that form as primary should be toionde and not separate, and the other is in the program outlined in Z3 which rejects the notion of the Categories that primary substance is primary subject and proposes that it should be tode ti and separate. Each of these two schemes has internal difficulty. The former's claim that substance is universal is criticised in Z13, and the latter's claim that substance is particular is in conflict with the universality of knowledge. Thus the formal approach is an aporematic investigation into the ontological status of form on the basis of the dichotomy of tode ti-toionde. ;The synthetical approach associates the matter/form relation with the potentiality/actuality relation. Form and matter become relative conceptions, and are not separated from each other in definition. In this approach, Aristotle views form or essence to be the formal cause or the unifying principle which makes the material substance a unity rather than a heap. The locus of this approach is Z17 and H$\Theta$. ;The formal approach leads to the science of being qua being , and the synthetical approach leads to theology . Since two approaches are distinct, Aristotle's two notions of first philosophy cannot be reconciled. (shrink)

Płotka and Eldridge’s book is an important addition to the literature on phenomenology and phenomenological history, showing that phenomenology had a lively efflorescence in Eastern Europe during its first four decades. Historians have recently shown phenomenology’s intellectual, cultural, and social importance in postwar Eastern Europe, but this volume demonstrates that phenomenology’s independent East European trajectory began long before World War II—indeed from the earliest years of the movement. The review essay also raises the question of phenomenology’s social and political influence (...) beyond academic circles. (shrink)

At the end of the Second World War, the figure of Gandhi haunts political philosophy as it wrestles with the task of justifying violence in the name of history. The story begins with Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at noon in 1938. Gandhi’s name appears during a discussion between Roubachof and Ivanof. A few years later (1946), Koestler publishes in French a book entitled Le Yogi et le commissaire, analysed by Merleau-Ponty in Humanisme et terreur (1946–1947). Camus replies in L’Homme révolté (1951). (...) Ricœur’s thinking, examined in the present article, has its own place in this debate. At stake is our own knowledge of the conditions under which the rejection and condemnation of violence might, in fact, accommodate violence. (shrink)

In order to identify the role that temporality plays for Ricœur’s view on the spiritual life, I will start my analysis from his interpretation of the Augustinian Confessions (book XI, ch. XXX). In his reading, Ricoeur makes use of the notion of extension to which he accords multiples meanings (spatial, categorical and existential) and he also points out the conceptual couple of distensio / extensio. I will bring forth Ricoeur’s misinterpretation that consists in strongly relating the discovery of this conceptual (...) couple to the distinction between the three inner dimensions of time. I will end with a discussion of Heidegger’s analysis of the Confessions and his tentative to temporalize Dasein starting from the future. (shrink)

We publish here the letters between Gadamer and Ricoeur, as they are found in the Archives of the two philosophers (Gadamer-Archiv in Marbach and Fonds Ricoeur in Paris). Starting from February 1964 and ending on October 2000, the thirty-five letters reproduced here cannot give a complete picture of their much richer correspondence and relations, because it seems that neither Ricoeur, nor Gadamer kept all the letters they received from one another. But altogether, they document their common concerns, their mutual respect, (...) even their intellectual solidarity and finally the particular context that brought them to write to one another, i.e. Ricoeur’s intention to publish a translation of Gadamer’s book, Truth and Method, in a new series he edited for the Seuil Publisher. This publishing and translation project will mark their entire correspondence. (shrink)

English summary: Each of the great philosophical movements of the twentieth century had to reflect on their place in the history of philosophy. This is true even of phenomenology, despite its early desire to shed the weight of encumbering tradition. This study examines the complex relationship that brings together with the history of philosophy the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger. French description: Tous les grands mouvements philosophiques du XXe siecle ont ete tenus de mediter les (...) consequences de leur inscription dans l'histoire de la philosophie. La phenomenologie n'a pas escamote cette tyche, elle qui, nee d'une volonte de se defaire d'une tradition trop encombrante, a fini par chercher... s'expliquer avec elle. Chez Heidegger tout d'abord, chez Husserl ensuite, l'histoire de la philosophie est devenu l'une des problematiques essentielles de la recherche sur les fondements de la methode phenomenologique. Cette etude interroge la relation complexe qui unit... l'histoire de la philosophie la phenomenologie transcendantale de Husserl et la phenomenologie hermeneutique de Heidegger. Plutot que d'opposer ces deux phenomenologies et chercher... en souligner les differences, l'ouvrage fait plutot le pari de montrer qu'elles finirent toutes deux par reconnaOEtre la necessite pour la philosophie de comprendre sa propre histoire et par accepter de se convertir en une phenomenologie historiste, voire meme en une phenomenologie de l'histoire. Chez le jeune Heidegger et le dernier Husserl, la phenomenologie se sera comprise comme une maniere de philosopher qui, tout en reconnaissant sa propre historicite, n'abandonne pas son ambition de parler des choses elles-memes. Docteur en philosophie de l'Universite de Montreal et boursier de la Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Francois Jaran est presentement professeur... l'Universite de Valence (Espagne). Il est l'auteur de La metaphysique du Dasein (Zeta Books, 2010), Heidegger inedit 1929-1930. L'inachevable Etre et temps (Vrin, 2012) et The Heidegger Concordance (Continuum, 2013). (shrink)

In several texts, Paul Ricœur has elaborated different concepts of horizon: the horizon of tradition that shapes our perspectives, the horizon as a careful set of determinations of the future, the horizon as a divine call that comes from the future towards us. However, the connection of these three views on the horizon, together with the explicitly Christian interpretation of the third horizon are problematic elements in Ricœur’s thoughts on this topic. In this article his views are confronted with the (...) criticism of Jacques Derrida, who uses a quite different notion of horizon: an enclosing limit that dominates the understanding of what seems to fit in its circle. Finally, the notions of horizon and history as formulated by Jan Patočka provide valuable alternatives to Ricœur’s problematic versions of the horizons of expectation, while leaving the underlying thread of his understanding of horizon intact. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Husserl offers an important, although almost completely neglected so far, contribution to the reductionist/antireductionist debate about testimony. Through a phenomenological analysis, Husserl shows that testimony works through the constitution of an intentional intersubjective bond between the speaker and the hearer. In this paper I focus on the Logical Investigations, a 1914 manuscript now published as text 2 in Husserliana 20.2, and a 1931 manuscript now published as Appendix 12 in Husserliana 15. I argue that, (...) in those texts, Husserl highlights three essential phenomenological features of testimony: a) testimony is personal, meaning that it only takes place among persons, b) testimony is social, meaning that it requires the joint effort of multiple cognitive agents, c) testimony is community-building, meaning that it generates a long-lasting social bond among the parts involved. (shrink)

We explore the idea that a testimony is always constituted by at least three parts—the word of the witness, the listening of the one to whom it is addressed, and language as a symbolic register where speaking and listening are inscribed. Thus, the structure of testimony would not be captured only by the subjective formula “I was there”—a subject designates himself in reference to a past experience—, nor by the intersubjective formula “I am speaking to you”—a subject designates himself and (...) his listener in the synchrony of the word addressing the other. What is also necessary to consider, in order to capture the structure of testimony, is that “there is language”—the testimony transcends diachronically the speaker and the hearer by inscribing them inseparably in the symbolic register that they share, namely language. (shrink)

To compare Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze’s phenomenal bodies, I first examine how for Merleau-Ponty phenomena appear on the basis of three levels of integration: 1) between the parts of the world, 2) between the parts of the body, and 3) between the body and its world. I contest that Deleuze’s attacks on phenomenology can be seen as constructive critiques rather than as being expressions of an anti-phenomenological position. By building from Deleuze’s definition of the phenomenon and from his more phenomenologically relevant (...) writings, we find that phenomena for him are given to the body under exactly the opposite conditions as for Merleau-Ponty, namely that 1) the world’s differences 2) appear to a disordered body that 3) comes into shocking affective contact with its surroundings. I argue that a Deleuzian theory of bodily-given phenomena is better suited than Merleau-Ponty’s model in the task of accounting for the intensity of phenomenal appearings. (shrink)

Many genetic approaches in philosophy, psychology or sociology lead to a partially or fully deterministic understanding of the self and its position-taking. In this article, I argue that Husserl’s view of genesis differs broadly from such deterministic conceptions, as he investigates the genesis as the awakening of consciousness as consciousness or spirit as spirit. Husserl claims that the passive foundation of conscious life is the topsoil of activity and rational position-taking. But still the genetic process of the awakening of the (...) ego, far from being an automatism, demands a primary responsibility to proceed with the awakening itself. I discuss the issue of the responsibility of wakefulness in three interconnected ways. Drawing on Edith Stein, I first develop some theological implications to demonstrate how the paradox of responsibility points toward its divine ratio, because the unfounded givenness of responsibility links the awakening person to a phenomenological understanding of theosis: the more a person cultivates her responsibility the more she resembles the divine actus purus. In a second step, I show how the ethical implications of the responsibility of awakening connect it with the truth of will. The manifold obstacles that tend to undermine ethical love reveal a new level of both responsible position-taking and practical faith in the divine entelechy. Finally, the theological and ethical results motivate a social renewal, in which responsibility embraces the Other and longs for the communitization of the truth of wills. Clearly, the Husserlian view of genetic philosophy enables deep theological and ethical insights, that remain hidden from the method of static phenomenology and that are denied by most empirical genetic approaches. (shrink)

Jean Améry’s memoir of his imprisonment and torture by the Nazis links the loss of “trust in the world” to the violence he experienced. The loss of trust makes him feel homeless. He can no longer find a place in the intersubjective world, the world for everyone. What is this “trust in the world”? How does violence destroy it? In this article, I use Améry’s remarks as guide for understanding the relation of violence, trust, and homelessness. Trust, I argue, is (...) crucial to the constitution of the intersubjective world. Violence, by undermining trust in Others, destroys the sense that this world is “for everyone.” In excluding the victim from its “for everyone,” it enforces a homelessness that transforms the victim’s very being-in-the-world. (shrink)

Considering that Husserl identifies passivity as the general principle of genetic dynamics and as given prior to any intentional activity, the original condition of possibility of such passivity must be clarified. Phenomenological analysis can successfully attest the presence of a drive-habituality operating prior to the level of the I, an instinct-character, thus, that raises the question about life as auto-affective capability. In the framework of a universal monadology the latter’s teleological orientation must be questioned in order to avoid that both (...) the limes constituted by the unconscious as well as affective being remain indeterminate and anonymous, which would not do justice to the transcendental rootedness of drive and instinct through the form of ipseity. (shrink)