Explores the intriguing prospect that, in some situations, a person's hand has a mind of its own.

A volume devoted explicitly to the subtle and multidimensional phenomenon of background knowing that has to be recognized as an important element of the triad mind-body-world. The essays are inspired by seminal works on the topic by Searle and Dreyfus, but also make significant contribution in bringing the discussion beyond the classical confines.

Collection with articles of different disciplines on Metaphor as a "Figure of Thought". Summary of contents: 1. A HIstory of Philosophy Perspective 2. A SEmantic Perspective 3. A COgnitive Science Perspective 4. A PHilosphy of Science Perspective 5. A THeological, Sociological and Political Perspective.

Modem theories of metaphor seem to be pretty unanimous in taking the "death" of a metaphor literally. By doing so they too easily wipe out sedimented, past meanings and so ignore semantic memory. A further consequence of this stand is that meanings are reduced to a one-dimensional (either metaphoric or literal), static structure. This article, in a procedure that resembles a sort of "archeology of meaning," is critical of such an attitude, for which conventionalization of metaphors means their burial in (...) the graveyard of language. It attempts to provide a ground for the assumption that labeling of metaphors as "dead" is not lethal, for their meanings can be revitalized and recreated, according to our linguistic competence, diachronic perspective, interests, and needs. It contains implicit support for the thesis that semantic mechanisms are flexible, dynamic, and subject to evolutionary growth. Not even the death of a metaphor can be exempt from this overall scheme. (shrink)

The paper deals with some misconceptions concerning ‘privileged’ access to our own experiences from the first-person perspective, points to the limitations of this immediacy, and questions the solipsist privacy of subjectivity. Based on the conviction that the identification of ‘point of view’ with ‘perspective’ proves to be problematic, the author argues that we may take different perspectives from the same point of view. As embodied and embedded cognitive persons we practice the interchange of perspectival attitudes towards our own subjectivity in (...) our daily lives far more easily and frequently than we are prone to admit in our theories. This kind of methodology, part of which is also the objectivist third-person approach, does not have the power to revise the irreducibility between the subjective and the empirical, although it does appeal to the mind open to the intersubjective space, in which the irreducible can still be communicated, compared and complemented. (shrink)

This collection of essays represents an interdisciplinary approach to some contemporary issues in the philosophy of science and the theory of knowledge. It is also an attempt to place art in the context of human cognition in general and also to relate it to science and philosophy. Its conception is such that it accords with the view that our creativity is not separable from a humanistic orientation. Within such a humanistic framework, aiming at a stable form of peace becomes the (...) moral responsibility of both the scientist and the philosopher. (shrink)

Široko je rasprostranjeno slaganje da se pozadinska infrastruktura nesvjesno primjenjuje i nije formalno predstavljiva, nego se pogledi razilaze treba li se ta vrsta vještine smatrati znanjem u pravome smislu. U ovome članku pokušavam pokazati da je pozadinska infrastruktura tip stručnog znanja koji služi kao preduvjet umu da bi bio o stvarima u svijetu. Suprotno uobičajenom razumijevanju, da je pozadina prvenstveno mehanička, ovdje predstavljen pogled potvrđuje je kao totalitet znanja preuzet od tijela i pretvoren u implicitno ‘znati-kako’ . On se pojavljuje (...) kao modus umskog ‘posvjetovljenja’, kao i organ potencijalnosti.There is wide agreement that background infrastructure is unconsciously applied and is not formallyrepresentable, but views diverge as to whether this sort of skill should be considered knowledgein the proper sense. In this paper I attempt to show that background infrastructure is a type ofskilled knowledge which serves as a precondition for the mind to be about things in the world. Contraryto the common understanding that background is primarily mechanical, the view presentedhere affirms that it as a totality of knowing taken up by the body and converted into an implicit‘know-how’. It appears as a mode of mind’s ‘enworldment’, as well as an organ of potentiality. (shrink)

This paper is motivated by the general idea that philosophical ambition to understand and define the human mind exclusively in terms of conscious, propositional, and deliberative behaviour cannot be adequate, for it leaves out great part of our mentality, which resides in the background. On a more specific plane it focuses on the background as a means of providing the cognitive organism with most plausible scenarios of reality, and prepares it for what appears most likely to be the case in (...) the world, in an instant way and without engaging in contemplation. The background proves to be a powerful instrument of initiating guesswork and does it in automatic and effortless manner. In such a way this backgrounded “reason” acts ahead of actuality and drives our behaviour and modes of our coping in the natural, social, and cultural world in an implicit way, not available in the conscious foreground.Este artículo viene motivado por la idea general de que la ambición filosófica de definir y entender la mente humana exclusivamente en términos de comportamiento consciente, proposicional y deliberativo no puede ser adecuada, pues deja inexplicada gran parte de nuestra mentalidad, la cual reside en el trasfondo. Más específicamente, el artículo se centra en el trasfondo como medio para proporcionar al organismo cognitivo los escenarios más plausibles de la realidad, y prepararlo para lo que más probablemente sea el caso en el mundo, de forma instantánea y sin entrar en la contemplación. El trasfondo demuestra ser un instrumento poderoso a la hora de hacer conjeturas de una manera automática y espontánea. De esta forma, esta “razón” de trasfondo se anticipa en la práctica y conduce nuestro comportamiento y modos de habérnoslas con el mundo natural, social y cultural de forma implícita, no disponible en el primer plano conscien-te. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt of outlining the mind responsible for moral judgments in a general manner, and according to the investigations done by the neuroscientists, and which challenge some standard philosophical notions. The “measuring” of morality on the part of neuroscience reveals that moral decisions are basically made on an intuitive level that can be emotionally motivated to a greater or lesser extent, what in turn depends on whether the attitude is “personal” or “impersonal”, and not so much on (...) the universal criteria of rightness and wrongness. The cost-benefit moral “calculus” appears to be derivation of some primary intuitive “decision-making”, and a sort of narrative the mind is constantly producing, and we come to believe in. The philosopher’s usual response to the sort of challenge is rightly that it is not the brain that is responsible for moral decisions and deeds, nor is it neuroscience that can provide us with the ultimate explanation of how the “ethical mind” works for moral sense and responsibility is still with persons and not with brains. Yet, the sort of knowledge can significantly enhance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying mental processes involved in solving moral dilemmas. (shrink)

Il y a presque unanimité à reconnaître que lesavoir des antécédents est appliquée inconsciemment et qu’elle n’est pas représentable formellement, mais les avis divergent quand il s’agit de décider si ce genre d’aptitude doit être considéré comme un savoir au sens propre du terme. Dans cet article, j’essaie de montrer que l’infrastructure des antécedents est un type de savoir technique constituant une condition préalable pour que la pensée soit sur le monde. Contrairement à la conception habituelle, selon laquelle les antécedents (...) sont principalement mécaniques, le point de vue présenté ici les définit comme totalité de savoirs empruntés au corps et transformés en savoir-faire implicite. Celui-ci se manifeste à la fois comme un mode d’«assimilation au monde» et un organe de potentialité. (shrink)